Algerians
WITHOUT BORDERS

The Making of a Global Frontier Society

ALLAN CHRISTELOW

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UNIVERSITY PRESS OF FLORIDA

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The publication of this book is made possible in part by a grant from Idaho State University.

17 16 15 14 13 12 6 5 4 3 2 1

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Christelow, Allan, 1947-
Algerians without borders : the making of a global frontier society / Allan Christelow.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-8130-3755-4 (alk. paper)
1. Algeria—History. 2. Algeria—Emigration and immigration. 3. Algerians—Foreign countries.
I. Title.
DT285.C47 2012
304.80965—dc23 2011037507

The University Press of Florida is the scholarly publishing agency for the State University System of Florida, comprising Florida A&M University, Florida Atlantic University, Florida Gulf Coast University, Florida International University, Florida State University, New College of Florida, University of Central Florida, University of Florida, University of North Florida, University of South Florida, and University of West Florida.

University Press of Florida
15 Northwest 15th Street
Gainesville, FL 32611-2079
http://www.upf.com

For Stephanie, my inspiration

Contents

Preface ix
Note on Transcription xiii

Introduction: A People on a Frontier of Civilizations 1
1. A Failed Transformation, 1775–1830 25
2. Colonial-Era Border Crossing, 1830–1911 50
3. The Last Jihad and the End of *Hijra*, 1911–1920 82
4. Exchange and Innovation in the Revolutionary Era 108
5. Algerians in an Age of Globalization 141
Conclusion: The Dynamics of Fear and Hope on a Frontier between Civilizations 174
Epilogue: *'Asabiya* in the Digital Age 187

Glossary 189
Notes 191
Bibliography 215
Index 241

Preface

The experiences that have contributed to the making of this book go back to the fall of 1971, when I first entered a classroom as an English teacher at Lycée Moubarek El Mili in Annaba, Algeria. The students were classified as *arabisant*, taking most of their classes in Arabic at a time when the government of Algeria was proudly proclaiming its commitment to a return to Algeria's Arabic cultural identity. Many of these students came from rural areas outside of the city. They seemed to have a great sense of hope for the future, and a great enthusiasm for learning a European language not associated with their colonial past. They also had a great sense of humor, coming up with a nickname for me drawn from the region's folklore, "Si al-Hafsi." I would also teach English at the factory complex of the National Steel Company just outside of the city, a great symbol of Algeria's hopes for rapid economic development.

Since that time, Algerians have endured many disappointments and have experienced some terrible ordeals. Indeed, the ordeals of conflict have become an integral part of the image of Algerian history since the late 1980s, so much so that the sense of hope in that earlier time has become almost completely obscured.

The objective of this book is not to place blame or judgment for Algeria's recent woes but rather to put the Algerian experience in a long-term perspective, one that may help to gain insights about a key challenge of the twenty-first century, how to foster a global environment in which dialogue between cultures and civilizations is possible. Certainly a key element in this is realizing that collective labels are often of limited utility when it comes to understanding the experience of a particular individual, family, or community.

It is the Arabic-language sources that often provide the greatest insights into the particular characteristics of individuals and settings in the past. They show us that details about the lives of individuals can often be of far greater

use to the historian than reams of statistics. This book owes a good deal to the inspiration of two Algerian historians whose work has appeared mainly in Arabic. One of these is Ahmad Tawfiq al-Madani, a key figure in the Association of Muslim Scholars in the 1930s, whom I met at a conference in Algiers late in his life. His autobiography, *Hayat kifah* (A Life of Struggle), and his work in editing a nineteenth-century narrative, Ahmad Sharif al-Zahhar's *Mudhakkirat* (Memoirs), have been inspirational for me. The other is Bilqasim Sa'adallah, a truly outstanding figure among Algeria's Arabic-language historians, an indefatigable researcher and writer. His nine-volume *Ta'rikh al-Jaza'ir al-thaqafi* (A Cultural History of Algeria), among many other works, has proven invaluable to me, and so have the insights and advice he has provided me in communications over the years.

I was never able to meet in person with Malik Bennabi, one of the foremost figures in Algerian intellectual life in the 1940s and 1950s. He was still publishing lively pieces in the Algerian press in the early 1970s, and I found myself entranced as I read them sipping coffee at outdoor cafés on Annaba's Cour de la Révolution. He died in 1973, just as I was beginning my graduate study. But I have had the good fortune of later entering into contact with two individuals who were very close to him, his nephew Zidane Khoulif, and Nour Eddine Boukrouh, the foremost authority on his life and work. Another key figure is Mohamed Ben Medani, editor of the London-based *Maghreb Review*. It was the publication of my article on Bennabi in this journal that helped to open up many channels of communication.

My interest in Bennabi also brought me into contact with scholars focusing on efforts at interfaith dialogue, such as Jacques Keryell, who led a conference in which I took part at Notre Dame University in 1998 on Louis Massignon, a prominent French scholar of Islam who had a legendary clash with Bennabi. This conference helped me to become more aware of the efforts at interfaith dialogue, especially in the late 1940s and early 1950s in Algeria, and it added to my interest in the Catholic Community of Sant' Egidio, which led efforts to mediate the conflict in Algeria in 1994–95. My perspective on interfaith dialogue has also been shaped by my experience in Nigeria, a country that faces great challenges in this realm but has also produced some remarkable achievements.

As the conflict in Algeria continued, there was a steady stream of Algerians seeking refugee status around the world. Since I had published work on Islamic law in Algeria, I was called on as a consultant in asylum cases, giving me the opportunity to learn in detail about the experiences of Algerians in the midst of the civil war, and bringing my attention to a range of material relating to

Algerian refugees and the phenomenon known in colloquial Arabic as *harraga*, or illegal border crossing.

Through the years I have also explored archival material in diverse settings, from Algeria to France to England to Tunisia to the United States. Some of the most interesting material turns up in the less conventional sources outside of Algeria and France. This is a reminder that Algeria needs to be understood in a global perspective, not simply as part of the French colonial empire or as an Arab territory.

A great many heart-wrenching stories emerge from Algerian history, and they are often accompanied by intense polemics. A good strategy for seeking refuge from this conflict is to move toward the past before the French colonial conquest, and to look at American perspectives on events. The 1780s are a particularly interesting period since this is when Algerians and Americans first came into contact. Not long before the first encounter, the Laki volcano in Iceland erupted, setting off widespread climate change. Benjamin Franklin, then serving as American consul in Paris, noted the connection in an essay he penned in 1784. When one consults the online version of this essay created by a scanner, one finds that the eighteenth-century form of the letter *s* has been turned into an *f*: the volcanic cloud prevented "rays of fun" from reaching the earth. Today's global society finds itself experiencing clouds of hostility and suspicion that spewed from the Twin Towers volcano. The Algerian experience over the years since 1784 contains many somber notes, but it also offers some "rays of fun," stories of effective efforts at dialogue and cross-cultural understanding that can penetrate through these clouds.

Note on Transcription

The transcription of Arabic names presents a challenge for those working on Algerian history who draw on both Arabic- and European-language sources. The Arabic transcription system of the Library of Congress produces spellings sometimes quite different from the spelling of the name found in French- or other European-language sources. The solution chosen for this book is to use the standard transcription for "first" or given names, and the most common Roman letter spelling for last names that frequently appear in European language sources: for example, Huwari Boumediene. Thus if a reader seeks further information on such an individual through the services of Google, he or she will be asked: "Did you mean Houari Boumediene?" For last names encountered mainly in Arabic-language sources, the standard transcription of the family name is used: for example, Bu Talib rather than Boutaleb. This may seem arbitrary, but it will frequently remind the reader that in a frontier setting such as Algeria one needs to be adept at code shifting.

For Arabic words, the standard transcription is used: for instance *barrani* rather than *berrani*, the term used to refer to immigrant workers in the cities of nineteenth-century Algeria. The glossary provides standard French transcriptions of terms. The plural of a term is usually indicated by adding an *s* rather than using the Arabic plural form: hence *muhajirs* (refugees) rather than *muhajirin*.

Introduction

A People on a Frontier of Civilizations

Sir and Brother:
From your Genereux and Brotherly reception and from the Universal Character you possess of assisting strangers encourages me to address to you. Your petitioner is Achmet Ben Ali a native of Algiers, at present exiled from my native land, to which I am in hopes of Returning to Enjoy the rights I am at present deprived of. . . .

I am of a family and connections that I am persuaded—could I once reach home I promise you sir by the sacred ties of a Brother mason to render what services I can to the unfortunate Americans that may be in Algiers.

Achmet Ben Ali to Secretary of State Edmond Randolph,
Philadelphia, December 1794

Unfortunately the bonds between us are all but forgotten, as politics interferes in the dialogue between religions. This is especially true since the Cold War ended, a finale that gave birth to many ethnic unrests and fundamentalisms—which, to be fair, are an understandable enough response, an attempt to preserve national identities that are being threatened by the bulldozer of globalization.

The value of dialogue is easy to underrate. It seems slow, and its achievements so much less dramatic than the deadly outbursts of conflict. As a religious practice, it consists of the patient building of bridges to peaceful co-existence between peoples and religions, linking experience and meaning, dissolving otherness and constructing an understanding based on common interests and a shared history.

"Clash of Civilizations: Myth or Reality?"
Ahmed Zaoui, Auckland, New Zealand, October 19, 2004

Algeria, from the late eighteenth century to the early twenty-first century, has had a turbulent history. As a point where civilizations intersect, Algeria has seen the devastation that can result from the "clash of civilizations."[1] From its beginning as a political unit under Ottoman rule in the early 1500s, Algeria was

a focal point of conflict with Christian Europe, in what an Algerian historian has termed "the three-hundred-year war."[2] While Algeria shares many cultural and social traits with its neighbors, Tunisia, Libya, and Morocco, its interaction with Europe, and the conflicts it has experienced have been longer and more intense. From the start of the French colonial intrusion in 1830 until the 1880s, it was the scene of prolonged resistance and brutal repression.[3] Popular protests against colonial rule on VE Day, May 8, 1945, marked the start of a new cycle of conflict that would last until Algeria's independence in 1962.[4] The cancellation of elections in 1992 led to a tragic new wave of violence pitting the government against Islamist opposition groups.[5]

Yet Algerians have also played roles in the challenging task of serving as diplomatic intermediaries and promoting the dialogue of civilizations. They have been prepared for such roles by their long experience in navigating the cultural and political waters that lie between the West and the Islamic world. An Algerian statesman, Hasan Pasha, pushed through successful negotiations for truces, first with Spain in 1785, then with the United States in 1796. The Algerian resistance hero 'Abd al-Qadir, in exile in Damascus, intervened to protect members of the Syrian Christian minority from the Druze in 1860, and he has become an icon for interfaith dialogue.[6] It was three Algerian intermediaries who brokered the release of American hostages in Iran in 1980.[7] While Algeria was a theater of intense conflict in the 1990s, it was also the focus of an innovative effort at conflict resolution, the Rome Conference of November 1994, facilitated by a Catholic nongovernmental organization, the Community of Sant' Egidio.[8]

The above quotations by Algerian refugees on very distant shores, separated by two centuries and a decade, help to frame major themes in the experiences of Algerians far beyond the borders of their country. The first quotation comes from a letter written for an Algerian who claimed to have been taken captive at sea by the Neapolitans, then to have escaped from prison in Naples with a fellow Algerian, after which they made their way to the United States. The letter, pleading for help in returning to Algeria, or some nearby location, was written in late 1794 as American leaders were beginning to recognize the necessity of negotiating with the Algerians for the release of American captives.[9] It appeals to a secular framework of relations created during the Enlightenment that helped move beyond the religious clashes of the previous era. Records indicate that at least a few Algerian merchants and sailors had become registered as Freemasons as early as 1785.[10]

The second quotation comes from a speech delivered for Ahmad Zaoui, a leading figure in the Islamic Salvation Front, commonly referred to as the FIS, initials of Front Islamique du Salut, the political party banned by the

Algerian government in 1992 after the cancellation of elections that the FIS seemed likely to win.[11] Like many other leaders of the "Algerianist" wing of the FIS, which put the emphasis on transformation within Algeria rather than the pursuit of a global jihad, Zaoui sought refuge in the West. Yet he had considerably more difficulty than his peers in gaining acceptance as a refugee because of allegations, pursued by both the Algerian and French governments, that he had connections to terrorists. From 1997, his path of flight led him from Belgium to Switzerland, to Burkina Faso, to Malaysia, and finally to New Zealand, where he sought refuge in late 2002.[12]

Upon arrival, however, he was plunged into a long ordeal of imprisonment and legal proceedings from which he finally won a partial reprieve in December 2004, with the support of human rights activists, New Zealand's Green Party, and members of the local Christian community. Zaoui's case became part of a debate between those who favored openness and inclusion of cultural others, be they Algerian refugees or Samoan immigrants, and those who argued for exclusion of the others.

Both Ben 'Ali and Zaoui arrived at their destinations at a time when dramatic events made it easy to develop wild suspicions about any Algerian who appeared suddenly on such distant shores. In America in 1794, Algeria immediately brought to mind the image of bloodthirsty pirates and tyrannical rulers as portrayed that year in Susanna Rowson's play *Slaves in Algiers*, or in newspaper articles describing the ordeals of American sailors held captive in Algiers, some since 1785.[13] In New Zealand in 2002, an Algerian, especially one belonging to an Islamist political movement, was easily associated with terrorists such as fellow Algerian Ahmad Ressam, the "Millennium Plot" bomber caught on his way from Canada at Port Angeles, Washington, on December 14, 1999.[14] In such settings as Philadelphia in 1794 or New Zealand in 2002, efforts to engage in dialogue could all too easily give rise to charges of devious dissimulation.

Frameworks for Understanding the Algerian Experience: Ibn Khaldun meets Jürgen Habermas

Algeria can be conceived of as a frontier territory, an area of sharp environmental transition that lies at the intersection of different major political-cultural zones.

In granting independence to Algeria in 1962, the French attempted to establish a border, clearly separating Algeria from France. "Frontier" carries the implication for the potential of military conflict and conquest, followed by large-scale movement of people. Algeria, and more broadly North Africa, bears

certain similarities to other frontier settings such as Inner Asia, the Russian Caucasus, or the North American West,[15] but with one notable difference. It is separated from its threatening neighbor by a heavily traveled sea. The Mediterranean both connects Algeria to Europe and insulates it from Europe, and introduces an international dimension to this frontier not found in the other settings.[16]

When one is dealing with borders, one can speak of people crossing them to another country, with the prospect of return to their own country. But in a frontier setting, geographical borders disappear, creating instead legal, social, and psychological barriers between people sharing the same territory and interacting with one another. For Algerians under French rule, the only way to escape these barriers was to move to a Muslim land as a *muhajir*, one fleeing infidel conquest.

Because of their long history in dealing with different cultures and coping with a repressive political environment, Algerians are particularly adept at what linguists term "code switching," moving between different languages and styles of speech. They do this to establish special bonds within their own community but also to create channels of communication with those in other communities.[17]

In the process, they produce what Homi Bhabha has termed "cultural hybridity."[18] While these concepts are widely used in studies of immigrant communities in Europe, they are less familiar in the domain of Middle East studies.

In "area studies," where the Middle East, Africa, and Europe are seen as distinct cultural units, Algeria has tended to be treated as marginal, not fully part of any distinct area. What attention Algeria gets is mainly given to conflicts, or to the exotic appeal of its culture. But in an age of globalization as different areas are increasingly intertwined, Algerian society can be seen not simply as a distinct territorial unit, but also as a global network, potentially playing a creative role in forms of interchange ranging from cultural borrowing in music, art, architecture, and literature, to interfaith dialogue, to diplomatic negotiation.

To see Algeria in this perspective, one needs to pay particular attention to Algerians who engage in interchange with those from other backgrounds, either in what might be termed "frontier encounters" that took place between Algerians and French citizens, or in border crossing, becoming an immigrant or refugee outside of the French domain, in the Muslim world or elsewhere in the West. Some frontier encounters can become incidents in the "clash of civilizations." But others can be understood as contributing toward efforts to establish what the philosopher Jürgen Habermas has termed a "public sphere"—a domain of open discussion, separate from the "official sphere" of government,

and free from the threat of force. One can see a public sphere emerging within Algeria in the critical period of the late 1940s and early 1950s. The mediation efforts at the Rome Conference of 1994 can be understood as part of a global effort to build a public sphere. Both these efforts did fail, but they can provide important insights on the problems of fitting religion into the public sphere.[19]

To pursue an understanding of Algeria's experience as a frontier society, it is important to have a breadth of geographic perspective, searching for relevant comparisons such as the experience of the Russian Empire's Muslim peoples. One also needs a depth of perspective, developing a framework for understanding long-term continuity and change that moves beyond the colonial-history narrative that begins with the French invasion of Algeria in 1830, to a perspective that extends back to the early days of the Muslim West, particularly in the multicultural setting of al-Andalus.[20] This perspective can see the modern phase of Algerian history beginning not in 1830 but in 1775, with the defeat of the last Spanish attack on Algiers, the end of the "three-hundred-year war," and the emergence of Algeria as an important setting for international diplomacy, and as the subject of discussions on the development of international law.

In pursuing a long-term perspective, it can be useful to consider not only frameworks that stress continuity of cultural identity, or evolution from one historical stage to another, but also those that propose cyclical patterns. Ibn Khaldun, one of the most eminent theorists of historical cycles, came from a family that left al-Andalus for Tunis. He grew up in North Africa at a time of turbulent transition in the mid-fourteenth century. Another important contributor to cyclical theory is Arnold Toynbee, a great admirer of Ibn Khaldun. Both raise the question of why a civilization might go into decline. In Ibn Khaldun's era, the remedy for decline seemed clear: revitalization of the civilization under strong new leadership that inspires a sense of *'asabiya*, or group solidarity. He looked back for inspiration to such movements as the Fatimids and the Almohads, which had their beginnings when dynamic religious leaders mobilized rural people in North Africa, then went on to found highly successful empires. But Ibn Khaldun was living at the dawn of the gunpowder age, an age that would place a foreign military elite in control of much of North Africa and usher in three centuries of confrontation in the western Mediterranean.

In the first half of the twentieth century, "gunpowder"—powerful new military technology—was fused with a new, electronically amplified sense of group solidarity. And the results were disastrous. Hopes placed in strong leaders and group solidarity could now be seen as perilous delusions. In response to the devastating crises of two world wars, and the crumbling of European empires, Toynbee argued that the only effective way to avoid the decline of a civilization was to attempt to understand and negotiate with other cultural groups and

civilizations, not to dominate them: in other words, to build a global public sphere. Working toward such a goal in a world where the mass media dominated communication and shaped people's image of the "other," and conflicts between global powers dominated the political scene was a great challenge.

Institutions such as the United Nations could serve as a global official sphere that helped to contain conflicts between territorial states. But the building of a multicultural public sphere that might contribute to preventing new kinds of conflict rooted in cultural or religious identity rather than territory was a project that required a different sort of forum. In the late 1940s, Canadian scholar Harold Innis, the mentor of Marshall McLuhan, suggested that the most fruitful communications might take place at the margins of the great empires, not at their center.[21] This is an idea that can be adapted to the study of Algerian border crossers by asking in which environments they were best able to engage in dialogue and innovation and in which ones they fell victim to the clash of civilizations.

To understand why some interactions lead to fruitful conclusions while others come to tragic ends, one needs conceptual frameworks that take into account a wide range of variables, and one needs to interweave the conceptual frameworks with a historical perspective to help see continuity and change in those variables over time, and if not cyclical repetition, meaningful comparisons between different periods. This study will focus on two dimensions: legal and institutional frameworks that define communities in a frontier setting and shape the power relationships involved in their interaction; and the experiences of socialization and acculturation that have shaped individuals involved in interaction.

Legal and Institutional Frameworks

The history of relations between religious groups in the western Mediterranean poses an enduring set of questions. How can different communities maintain separate legal identities in the same territory? If they are separate, can there be at least a degree of equality? If a group in this situation is not given adequate respect, will it lead to the group's flight from the territory? Or to what Frantz Fanon would describe as a "colonial mentality," strategies of deference and dissimulation that conceal anger and resentment that can lead to violence?[22] Violence in such a setting can be particularly disturbing for it may involve not just clashes between armed groups but attacks aimed at an entire community. Moreover, external powers can become involved in such conflicts, pursuing their own agendas.

Religious Pluralism in al-Andalus

The western Mediterranean, and in particular Muslim Spain, had from the eighth through the thirteenth centuries been renowned for *convivencia*, the coexistence of different religious communities within the same territory, and for cultural and intellectual interchange among them.[23] A great icon of this era is Ibn Rushd, known in the West as Averroes, who helped reconnect Christian and Jewish scholars of his day with the heritage of Greek scientific thought.[24] His scholarly career in the second half of the twelfth century coincided with the rule of the Almohad Empire in Spain and North Africa, an empire that had its roots in a puritanical Islamic revival movement, yet also encouraged the work of scholars like Ibn Rushd.

Within the Islamic legal framework, Christians and Jews were offered the status of *dhimmi*, or protected subject, paying a special tax and being allowed to maintain institutions for the administration of their own laws in such matters as marriage and inheritance. It would be wrong to argue either that there was perfect harmony among these communities, or that non-Muslims were condemned to a servile, humiliating status of *dhimmitude*, a concept similar to "colonial mentality."[25] Indeed, both these approaches miss the key element: that there existed a framework for negotiation and communication, made possible by a separation between community and state; and that while one might see this framework as admirable, one must also recognize that it was vulnerable. As Christian kings gained control over more and more territory in the thirteenth century, they maintained a framework for negotiation within their realm, allowing local Muslims, known as *mudéjars*, to remain in place, albeit in a disadvantaged position.

Slaves, Captives, and Converts in an Era of Conflict

Starting in the late thirteenth century, the framework for negotiation began to fall apart. French King Louis IX's unsuccessful attack on Tunis in 1270 might be seen as an early sign of the impending collapse. Gradually the western Mediterranean setting was transformed into an arena of religious conflict. The Christian monarchs of Spain adapted policies to force the conversion of Muslims and Jews or require their expulsion. Those who did convert, the *moriscos* and *conversos*, were often suspected of dissimulation, accepting Christianity outwardly but privately maintaining their own identity. When the Spanish Crown issued a decree in 1568 forbidding all external expressions of Islamic identity, such as wearing the veil, there was a violent uprising at Alpujarras, near Granada. This set in motion events that would lead to the expulsion of all *moriscos* from Spain in 1609.[26] The only legal status in which one could

still maintain aspects of cultural "otherness" was as a slave, and even as a slave one might well be nominally Christianized through baptism and taking on a Christian name.[27] Patterns on Russia's Muslim frontier at this time bore some similarity to those in Spain. At times the Russian Empire pursued a policy of pressure for conversion or expulsion from Russian territory. But at other times the emphasis was on a pragmatic policy of accommodating those Muslim subjects willing to cooperate with Russian authorities.[28]

Within North Africa, there were two responses to the imposition of conversion on Muslims in Spain, and the extension of Spanish power to coastal enclaves on the southern shore of the Mediterranean. One was to counsel, as did the mufti of Oran, Ahmad ibn Abu Juma'a, that *taqiya*, outward submission but inward resistance, was acceptable.[29] The other was to condemn any collaboration with the infidel and retreat to a safe place to renew or spread Islam, as did Muhammad al-Maghili, who crossed the Sahara and became an adviser to the Muslim ruler of Songhai.[30]

Starting in the 1400s, two very different forms of slavery came to play a crucial role in the western Mediterranean. Increasing demand for slave labor was stimulated by a plague epidemic that broke out in 1348 and was particularly devastating in urban areas, creating a severe labor shortage.[31] New gunpowder-based weaponry drove a demand for mercenaries or slave soldiers in the Middle East and North Africa. Working slaves were powerless, though those who were enslaved at a young age and converted might advance their status. Slave soldiers could become powerful and privileged, but as slaves they could not, in principle, transmit that power to their offspring, often the product of marriage alliances with the local elite. To allow this to happen would have weakened Ottoman imperial control, as indeed it eventually did in eighteenth-century Tunisia.[32]

The political unit of Algeria had its beginning in the early 1500s, when the Ottoman Empire established a base in Algiers, making what had been a small town into a heavily fortified city.[33] Its rulers were Janissaries, slave soldiers from the East, or in some cases Christian renegades. To make the city into an all-weather port, they built a barrier to connect the shore with nearby islands (in Arabic, *al-jaza'ir*, the name of the city and the new territorial unit for which it became the center). To build and maintain the city, they needed large numbers of workers. Since this was not a long-established urban site, and it lay on the edge of lightly populated unhealthy swampy terrain on the Mitidja plain, slave captives and rural immigrants became major elements in the workforce.

When it came to Christian states removed from the theater of combat, Ottoman Algeria was open to diplomatic and commercial relations. Its most important trading partners were Livorno (Leghorn) in northern Italy, and the

southern French port of Marseille. From the early seventeenth century, Algiers also developed ties with England.[34] Jewish trading networks played a key role in these relations since they had an accepted legal status in both settings.[35] Algeria and the Maghrib also had important commercial ties to the east, with a large community of merchants in Cairo.

In the late eighteenth century, this pattern of corsair raids against some European countries and truce agreements with others began to be dismantled. The combination of the failure of a Spanish attack in 1775 and the prospect of opening up agricultural exports to Europe raised the possibility of an end to the "three-hundred-year war" and the creation of a new order that would respect Algerian sovereignty and create new economic opportunities. But a combination of international conflicts and internal rivalries, combined with environmental and epidemiological challenges, thwarted this prospective transformation.

The Colonial Era

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, new norms of international law began to prevail. The slave trade and slave raiding, and eventually slavery itself, were outlawed, and religious toleration gained widespread acceptance in the West. Algerian Muslims could now travel in Europe as merchants or diplomats. In the same period, the position of Jews in Algeria became, at moments, insecure, as occurred with attacks led by the Janissaries of Algiers in 1805. The principle of self-determination of nations gained popularity in Europe, but it drew far more support when it came to the rebellion of Christian Greece against the Ottoman Empire in the 1820s than it did when Hamdan Khodja, an Algerian Muslim with experience in Europe, pleaded for the withdrawal of French forces from Algeria.

The dominant theme in the nineteenth century came to be a new wave of European imperial expansion. But Algeria's status in this new order was an ambivalent one. It was not an imperial territory retaining its own distinct order under the domination of an imperial power.[36] Starting in 1848, the three coastal provinces north of the Sahara, where the bulk of the population lived, became an integral part of France. The French vision for Algeria at this time was tied to the idea that French settlement there could parallel American expansion into the West, easing the sort of social and economic tensions that could lead to revolutionary outbursts.[37] But the demographic and economic dynamics that made the American model work were not present in Algeria. By the end of the nineteenth century, Europeans were no longer moving to Algeria to find agricultural opportunities. Rather, Algerians were moving to France as industrial workers or soldiers, and Muslims remained the overwhelming majority of the population in Algeria.

As France consolidated its control over Algeria in the 1830s and 1840s, a new legal framework emerged. The Enlightenment had helped to generate a perspective that held that Muslims living in territories conquered by a European power did not have to accept conversion or be expelled. Rather, they could retain their religious identity and live as colonial subjects. Such an approach was taken by Catherine the Great in dealing with the Russian Empire's growing Muslim population in the late eighteenth century. Under this approach, "tolerance" was linked to the establishment of centralized religious institutions under control of the imperial government.[38] Muslim subjects could be educated in government schools, even called on to serve in the imperial power's army. Within the French system in Algeria, they lived alongside Europeans who were citizens, but they remained native subjects, denied access to political power and subject to the special penal laws of the *code de l'indigénat*. In largely Muslim rural areas, Muslims lived under the traditional authority of chiefs appointed by the French and supervised by French native affairs officers. But in urban areas, Muslims lived outside this traditional framework, and by the late nineteenth century, they began turning to voluntary organizations and to a new class of political leader who gained their position through election.[39]

The French conquest raised an agonizing question in terms of Islamic law. Once it was clear that resistance was no longer possible, some legal scholars argued that *hijra*, or flight to a Muslim land, was compulsory.[40] Others argued that if flight posed major practical difficulties, a Muslim could remain under French rule as long as the French respected Islamic law and religious practices. There was a major wave of *hijra* during the initial period of conquest. As the French took measures to grant recognition and support to Islamic legal and educational institutions in the 1850s, the pressures for *hijra* diminished.[41] Such pressures reemerged periodically from the 1860s until just before the First World War as the French introduced measures that would permit compulsory military recruitment of Algerian Muslims, imposing the responsibilities of citizenship without granting the accompanying political rights. Comparable patterns developed in the Russian Empire in the nineteenth century. There the number of *muhajirs* who departed, voluntarily or under compulsion, to the territory of the Ottoman Empire was considerably larger than in the case of Algeria. But over the last half of the century, an emphasis on incorporating Muslim communities into Russian imperial structures came to prevail.[42]

The status of those Algerians who did flee to such places as Tunisia, Morocco, or Syria was ambiguous. The Ottoman Empire (which included Tunisia and Syria) and Morocco maintained diplomatic relations with France, and so an Algerian in these territories could claim to be a French subject and register this status with the local French consul.[43] Only in the 1880s would

Ottoman authorities start to insist that Algerians choose between French or Ottoman legal status. But many in the Algerian *muhajir* community, notably the prominent intellectual figure Tahir al-Jaza'iri, came to favor the alternative of an Arab national identity.[44] 'Abd al-Qadir al-Majjawi returned to Algeria after a stay in Syria, bringing with him Jaza'iri's ideas on modern education. His efforts to promote cultural revival within the French imperial framework bear some resemblance to those of his contemporary, the Crimean Tatar Ismail Bey Gaspirali.[45]

As Turkey was transformed into a nation-state following the First World War, and British and French mandates were imposed on the Arab territories of the Middle East, *hijra* was no longer feasible. Some *muhajirs* returned to Algeria, and there was an effort to find a new formula for the status of Algerian Muslims, one that would combine respect for their Islamic identity with civic equality. At this time, new principles of international law began to emerge that supported self-determination and civic equality. But in Algeria, these new principles pointed in two different directions: independence for Algeria, or the transformation of a trans-Mediterranean France into a multicultural democracy.

During the struggle for independence after 1954, Algerians were welcomed in other Arab countries, especially in Egypt, not as refugees but as fellow Arab freedom fighters, expected to return home with the triumph of their cause. The intensification of repression in Algeria, with the establishment of special powers for the military in 1956, helped Algerians gain legal acceptance in Western countries outside of France within the new legal framework of international refugee law, established in 1951.[46]

Labor Migration, Ethnicity, and Community

In looking at the legal framework within Algeria, it is important to consider customary law and institutions. In the mountainous region of the Greater Kabylia, just to the southeast of Algiers, Tamazight (Berber) was the common language. The people followed their own customary law. The French recognized their law, and some French authorities held out hopes that the Kabyles might be effectively assimilated to French society since—in French eyes—they had their own distinct ethnic identity, rather than having an identity tied to Islam.[47]

The French colonial emphasis on ethnicity has obscured other dimensions of Algerian society involving not ethnic identities but regional communities, and their patterns of migration to cities for work or trade. Within the major cities of precolonial Algeria, immigrant workers from rural areas were classed as *barrani*, or outsiders. These workers were organized into groups according

to their place of origin in a mountain region or a desert oasis. Slaves from sub-Saharan Africa were similarly organized by place of origin. Government authorities appointed leaders for each group.

Initially the French maintained the *barrani* institutions in these cities, but in the 1870s, as traditional crafts declined and the cities became predominantly European, they lost official recognition. Slavery was abolished in 1848, and the black former slaves, with no formally recognized status, became a sort of invisible element in Algerian society.[48] It is widely recognized by Western scholars that Kabyle workers, living in a region conveniently close to the port of Algiers, began coming to France in the 1890s. Less attention is paid to changes in migration patterns in the other sources of *barrani* workers and merchants—the Aurès Mountains, and the oasis complexes of the Mizab, Biskra, Ouargla, and the Souf. Movement from these areas to Tunisia and Tripolitania was common, helping these regions sustain an Eastern connection that would be of considerable political importance. The Zuwawa of the "Lesser Kabylia" had been active supporters of 'Abd al-Qadir's resistance movement, and members of this group formed an important part of the Syrian *muhajir* community.

The End of Colonial Pluralism and New Forms of Migration

In the twentieth century, Algerian Muslims came to France in growing numbers, as workers, soldiers, or students. Legally, most of them remained subjects, but for those who had acquired French cultural skills, the new environment was less restrictive than colonial Algeria.

They could form political ties with French groups or enter relationships of friendship or marriage, blurring the line between citizen and subject.[49] France's humiliation in the Second World War, and the liberation of Algeria from the pro-German Vichy regime by American armed forces in 1942, helped raise once again the question of applying universal legal principles in Algeria. In 1947, all Algerian Muslims gained citizenship rights while keeping their Islamic legal status. But their citizenship rights were limited, making their status all the more ambiguous.[50]

The combination of limited citizenship rights with the maintenance of a separate identity, along with an authoritarian colonial administrative tradition and the racism predominant among many in the settler community proved to be an explosive formula. A difficult element in this problem was whether Islamic institutions and organizations could be fully removed from the supervision of government, creating a basis for Islamic civil society.[51] This would raise Islam from a subordinate role, where Muslims were tolerated on the condition of submission, to one of equality, in which Muslims were respected and empowered. There was some hope for building this new

framework in the brief period from 1947 through the early 1950s. An especially problematic issue at the time was the return of religious endowment properties to Muslim control. This was one episode in the larger picture of the French Fourth Republic's pursuit of the vision of a multicultural democratic empire that came to an effective end with France's defeat in Vietnam in May 1954. In November 1954, armed conflict broke out in Algeria, and in 1956, special powers were accorded to the military, in effect eliminating what rights Algerians had to free expression and due process, and dismantling what there was of a framework of negotiation.

With independence in 1962, and especially with restrictions on immigration to France in the 1970s, the question shifted to how French citizens of Algerian origin, or from other Muslim territories, should be assimilated to French society.[52] Algerians also began heading to other destinations around the world. Islamic institutions in France evolved from working under the control of the French government, to operating with subsidies received from the governments of Muslim countries.[53] But there were also efforts to develop organizations that might be seen as part of a Muslim civil society in France, independent of governments, and engaged in dialogue with other religious communities.

There were elements in French politics that strongly opposed public expression of Islam, and by 2004 they managed to pass a law, with echoes of the Spanish decree of 1568, that outlawed wearing religious dress in school.[54] Yet the most serious problems involving North African immigrants had little to do with Islam. The limited effectiveness of efforts at assimilation was dramatically demonstrated by riots in the French urban *banlieues* in 2005.[55] The marginalized youth of second- and third-generation North African immigrant communities had taken on the identity of *beur*, a term arguably derived from *barrani* (in the French transcription, *berrani*).[56]

Independent Algeria emerged as a heavily centralized state, emphasizing the homogeneous character of the Algerian nation, with its identity based upon the Arabic language and Islam.[57] Hopes remained high through the 1970s, but eventually the authoritarian political environment and lack of economic opportunity drove new movement across borders. Three streams of movement emerged starting in the 1980s. One was composed of those drawn by a dedication to Islamic values to serve in military or civilian capacities in frontier conflicts in Afghanistan, Bosnia, or Chechnya. A second involved clandestine migration, mainly across the Mediterranean, to look for work. This came to be known in colloquial Arabic as *harraga*. Finally, there were migrants with strong educational qualifications who headed to Western countries. Some were political activists and came as asylum seekers, but others were mainly concerned with employment opportunities.

Experiences of Socialization and Acculturation

The ability of an individual or group to navigate their way through the stormy seas of conflict and suspicion depends in large measure on their background and experience, the ways in which they communicate individually and disseminate news and ideas at a collective level, their status, and their networks of relationships.

From Slaves and Prisoners to Diplomats

In the three centuries preceding the colonial era, the most likely exposure to outsiders for North African and Andalusian Muslims was in the sharply constraining atmosphere of a prison, or as a slave, or in the reverse situation where they encountered an "other" who was a slave or captive. In such settings, it was the very young who had the best chance of assimilation to the dominant society.[58] Older slaves were vulnerable to being taken before an Inquisition court and charged with secretly practicing their original faith.[59]

But in the transitional era of the late eighteenth century, prison or captivity experiences could help to produce skilled diplomats, as in the case of both Richard O'Brien, an American captain captured in 1785 and held in Algiers for ten years, and the Algerian leader Hasan Pasha. By this time it was becoming possible for some Algerians to travel in the West, taking on the role of diplomatic representative, entering discussions with Westerners interested in negotiation with the government of Algiers. Ahmad Ben Ali can be seen as a transitional figure, learning cultural and linguistic skills as a prisoner in Naples, then after his escape taking on the role of diplomat in New York, with the assistance of a French intermediary with his own diplomatic agenda to pursue. The 1810s and 1820s presented opportunities for Algerians to travel in Europe, and also in Morocco and the Ottoman Empire, serving in diplomatic roles and learning political and cultural skills as they went, and becoming involved in discussions with European thinkers such as Jeremy Bentham about how to build a new world order in a critical time of transition.

Colonial Subjects

Once the French had consolidated their control over Algeria, it was no longer possible for Algerians to be recognized as diplomatic agents of their own country working to defend their country's interests. When they entered relations with foreign powers, the question was whether that foreign power would lend support to an effort at rebellion, and what price the foreign power might expect for this favor.

Within Algeria through the first decades of colonial rule, most Muslim subjects, living in rural areas, were kept in relative isolation from French society,

encountering only military and administrative personnel. But by the early twentieth century, Muslims were moving in increasing numbers to urban areas. The most basic arena for encounters between members of different groups in urban colonial Algeria was the anonymous "street." Here an individual who ventured into territory identified with a different community would be quickly categorized and labeled with a derogatory term. The hostile dynamics of the colonial Algerian street and the potential for violence there are reflected in Albert Camus' classic novel *The Stranger*. Yet the colonial system produced many institutions and settings through which Algerians developed individual relations with the French.

The emphasis placed by Western social scientists on putting people into categories can prove problematic in this sort of setting, where categories are easily oversimplified, and this can make it difficult to understand an individual's relations with those in other categories. Among sources written by Algerians, including many of those in Arabic, one often finds a focus on individual biographies or collections of biographical narratives, probing the complexities of individual relationships and shedding light on connections between generations.

Statistics can certainly be valuable when it comes to studying the movement of people, but statistics that accurately reflect realties can be hard to come by in dealing with the movement of Algerians. Some of the best statistical sources come from the records of the urban Arab Bureaus of Algiers and Constantine in the late 1850s and 1860s. This reflects the fact that during this period one finds modern-style bureaucrats working in tandem with traditional social institutions. This balance broke down after 1870 and gave way to the dominance of centralized institutions that often failed to connect effectively with local communities. Thus movement outside of officially monitored frameworks became common, a phenomenon most dramatically seen in the late twentieth century with the development of *harraga*, or clandestine migration, and the movement of volunteers setting off to join distant *jihads*.

This study draws extensively on individual narratives.[60] Such material helps one to see the different patterns of encounter between members of separate groups, and the nuances involved in particular encounters. It also helps one to see how an individual evolves, with key experiences early in life often shaping later perspectives. It might be argued that building a public sphere at the intersection between religious and cultural groups requires individual recognition. One needs to move off of the "street," where strangers perceive each other in simplified categories, to the public square, where they sit down and talk.

FAMILY TIES

In the colonial era, there emerged a wide array of relationships and institutions that both shaped the identities of Algerians and helped them develop

skills that would allow them to engage in relations with the members of other communities. Among relationships, the most basic is that of the family, and the networks that extend from the family to form a community, and sometimes to form links between separate communities. Women are of course an integral part of family. In environments not dominated by religious conflict, such as coastal West Africa or Brazil, the presence of different communities gave rise to mixed-marriage families and a new social category, the *métis* or *mestizo*.[61] In Algeria, a special identity was recognized for the offspring of Ottoman Janissaries and local Muslim women, namely that of Kulughli. They were concentrated in urban environments, with an especially important concentration in the politically sensitive setting of Tlemcen, close to the border of Morocco.[62] Affiliated with the Hanafi Islamic rite that prevailed in the Ottoman East, and having a familiarity with the Turkish language as well as Arabic, the hybrid Kulughlis had a broader perspective than most Algerians. Well-traveled Kulughli figures such as Hamdan Khodja and Muhammad Ibn al-'Annabi were the most insightful commentators on possible solutions to Algeria's dilemmas in the critical period leading up to and following the French invasion of 1830. Ahmad Ben Ali, author of the 1794 letter to U.S. Secretary of State Edmund Randolph, also seems to have been a Kulughli.

Marriage links between communities played an important role in *muhajir* communities, especially for elite figures.[63] Such marriages could create alliances with local political elements and lead to the incorporation of later generations into the elite of the host society. Choosing not to enter into such intercommunal marriages could maintain the family's sense of separation, and its link to Algeria. In a plural marriage household, such as that of 'Abd al-Qadir in Damascus, one could find some branches of the family still tied to Algeria, with members deciding to return there, and others that had a sense of belonging in Syria thanks to maternal ties. It is ironic that in historical studies that place the emphasis on nationalism, 'Abd al-Qadir has become an archetypal patriarchal figure. Yet to understand the experience of his family in Damascus and the network he built there, it is crucial to understand the role of women. They not only helped build alliances, but in the cases of two women who were part of this network, 'Adila Bayhum al-Jaza'iri and Naziq al-'Abid, they became important historical actors in the public domain.

In colonial Algeria in the nineteenth century, intermarriage between Europeans and Muslims was not common. It often involved unusual figures with hybrid identities, marginal to French society, such as Ismail Urbain and Isabelle Eberhardt.[64] But in the twentieth century, mixed marriage became more common, occurring usually outside Algeria and involving Algerian men, who had acquired French linguistic and cultural skills through school, work, or

military service, and French women. As the Algerian diaspora evolved after independence, patterns of intermarriage became more varied, and so did the identity choices of mixed couples' offspring, and child custody battles could become quite dramatic.[65]

SCHOOL, MILITARY SERVICE, AND WORK

Schools, military units, and the workplace were environments separate from the private sphere of family and community in which complex relations could be built. In the colonial era, Algerians could work out negotiated relations with the French in institutional settings, albeit at a disadvantage since they were in most cases only subjects. Among the most important figures in this group were military interpreters and diplomatic agents who facilitated French relations with Muslims in settings from West Africa to the Middle East.

Experiences of school, work, and military service not only helped Algerians gain an understanding of French culture and society. They also worked to separate them from traditional authority structures, especially when these experiences involved spending long periods away from home. Such separation could produce two very different results. In the case of high-ranking figures, it could produce devoted servants of the French Empire, such as Qaddur Bin Ghabrit, founder of the Paris Mosque, or Colonel Sharif Cadi, the first Algerian graduate of the École Polytechnique. But among those at lower levels, it could give rise to figures who sharply challenged French domination and helped build a new national identity, such as the political leader Messali Hajj, or the philosopher Malik Bennabi.

The most prestigious French-educated individuals in the late nineteenth century were medical doctors, people who had acquired knowledge in a domain where the French could make a plausible argument that they had brought benefit to the Algerians, who had suffered from the ravages of plague in the decades before the French invasion, then from cholera and typhus following their arrival.[66] Because their education took them outside the colonial framework to France, medical professionals emerged as some of the most independent-minded political spokesmen in Algeria in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Education provided a means for individual advancement in colonial Algeria, but access to it for colonial subjects was limited.[67] Higher education, especially in science, became a priority for the government of independent Algeria. Promising students were sent abroad, often to countries other than France, to pursue their studies. Ironically, this would help to prepare some of postcolonial Algeria's most prominent Islamic thinkers and political activists, such as Anwar Haddam and Rashid Mesli.

THEATER AND MEDIA

Another key factor in this setting was communication technology. As local clashes linked to wider conflicts play out, a crucial element is how news related to the wider conflict is circulated in the local setting. In the late Ottoman era and through much of the nineteenth century, handwritten documents, often relayed and amplified by word of mouth, were the primary means for the circulation of news within Algerian communities. Especially in desperate times, this lent to a prophetic style of discourse and to wild rumors that liberation from the colonial yoke was imminent.[68] In calmer times, one found a discourse of caustic disrespect rather than active resistance. Such discourse was usually oral, expressed by the popular storyteller or those who presented stories through *Karagöz* shadow-puppet theater.[69] In the United States, theater and literature played a major role in shaping American images of Algeria during the first American-Algerian encounter in the late eighteenth century.

In the colonial period, there developed a domain of public communication—theater, print media, radio, and film—that could reach wide audiences but could also be monitored and controlled with relative ease. Theater proved an especially suitable means for presenting the sorts of conflict and negotiation that occurred on the cultural frontier.[70] Algerian playwrights gained wide recognition starting in the 1920s. The Association of 'Ulama used theater to promote a sense of cultural renewal in the 1930s and 1940s. The importance of theater in this setting might be explained by its ability to present directly to an audience all the elements of cultural interaction, from dress to tone of voice to facial expression, and linguistic code switching. It also provided a key domain for promoting changing gender roles.

Access to print media initially involved cooperation with foreigners or the permission of French authorities. Here the discourse was often aimed at promoting self-respect or gaining the respect of others, or advocating measures of practical change. By the early twentieth century, Algerians were publishing newspapers of their own, both in Arabic and in French, within Algeria, and in Syria and Egypt. Such newspapers were often read aloud and commented on in a public setting such as a café, and they naturally took on a more self-assertive tone. Newspapers presented not just reports on events, but philosophical and religious discussion, poems, and stories. By the 1940s, print publications involved not just words, but the visual image of the *bande dessinée* (*b.d.*), or comic, a medium that lent itself to the Algerian tradition of acerbic humor.

By the mid-twentieth century, electricity was transforming communication, and it helped to transform linguistic dynamics. Arabic had once been divided between the classical written language of religious scholars and the dialects spoken in everyday life. Now a modern standard Arabic emerged, with Cairo

as the center for diffusion of new media.[71] Speakers could have their words amplified to reach large crowds. The Voice of the Arabs could transmit programs from Egypt reaching radios in Algeria. Film, in the form of newsreels or movies, lent itself to exaggerated images in a setting where the audience could call out its approval or condemnation.

One important effect of the revolutionary conflict of 1954–62 and the draconian repression it unleashed was to dramatically erode civil society in Algeria, the space independent of the government where expression was relatively free.[72] In July 1962, the French handed over power to the externally based FLN, which proceeded to impose its authority from above, a problem emphasized by the Islamic philosopher Malik Bennabi, seen by some as a forerunner, by others as a critic of later efforts to develop political expressions of Islam.

The new independent state came to exercise strong control over public expression, and it gained control over a wide range of economic resources—which in private hands might have helped sustain civil society.[73] Messianic images of heroes from the early anticolonial resistance movement, shaped in part by mid-nineteenth-century European romanticism, became an important element in the promotion of a uniform national identity.[74] Muhammad al-Muqrani, leader of the 1871 revolt, was among these heroes. But he is a hero who, archival evidence suggests, has an official historical narrative that is, in effect, mythical. His story may indeed support the saying popular in the early years of independent Algeria that the only true hero was the people.

Only in the late 1980s, after a severe downturn in oil prices, was there a period of opening. By this time, new forms of communication more difficult to control had entered the scene. Videotapes and compact discs could be circulated from hand to hand, and messages could be sent over the Internet. In the Western world, the new media helped contribute both to an image of Algeria's Islamist opposition as a reincarnation of the Barbary Pirates, and to criticism of the Algerian government and the defense of refugees by human rights groups.[75] Within Algeria, new media also helped sustain a diversity of opinion that would present an obstacle to any movement seeking to claim, as the FLN had in the 1960s, overwhelming popular support. Unfortunately, key indexes of the independent-mindedness of journalists in the 1990s were the high number of those who were killed (and whose killers have never been identified) or who fled into exile.[76] Many prominent singers, actors, and dramatists also were killed or went into exile.

CONFINEMENT AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

The colonial system produced a number of highly restrictive settings carrying echoes of the Inquisition. These emerged especially in times of conflict

when colonial rule was challenged. Following a rebellion in 1864–65, and then famines and epidemics in the late 1860s, Catholic orders set up orphanages in Algeria, with the goal of raising Algerian children as Christians.[77] Rebels who surrendered or were captured were held in prison. Conditions might be adapted to the degree of cooperation offered by the prisoner or to the prisoner's prestige, connections, or special skills. The experience of the resistance hero 'Abd al-Qadir after his surrender in 1847 offers a striking illustration of this. In some cases, prison could prove a sort of monastic environment, an opportunity for study and the development of strong self-discipline, as was the case for Mohand Tazerout, who used his prison-camp experience in Germany in the First World War to prepare himself as an expert on German philosophy.

But other prisoners faced more difficult conditions. In the 1860s and 1870s, rebels were sent to prison colonies in French Guyana and in the South Pacific, cut off from their families and living in harsh conditions. The South Pacific colony of New Caledonia, in particular, became a symbol of Algeria's colonial ordeal. Two prominent pre–World War I journalists, 'Umar Bin Qaddur and 'Umar Rasim, emerged from wartime confinement with their spirits broken, too gloomy to speak out for the emerging nationalist movement.

Conflicts of the mid-twentieth century produced a new range of prison experiences. Among the most dramatic were those that occurred under the repressive Vichy régime from June 1940 through November 1942, when members of the French Left—both Communists, such as Roger Garaudy, and Social Catholics, such as Jean Scelles—were imprisoned as well as Algerian political and religious leaders. At the same time, confinement in psychiatric institutions became a common practice in French North Africa, setting the stage for debates launched by Frantz Fanon on the relationship between colonial oppression and psychological disorders.[78]

As the Algerian struggle for independence got under way after 1954, the French turned to a new tactic, psychological warfare, the central front of which was the prison, where isolation, torture, and psychological manipulation were used in an attempt to sway prisoners from rebellion to submission, and even active service for the French cause.[79] Internment camps, meant to isolate civilians from the rebels, were another domain for the pursuit of psychological warfare. While the French resumed conscription of Algerians into the regular armed forces, they also recruited troops for several types of supplementary units, the most notorious of which were the *harkis*. They might be seen as holding a position somewhat similar to that of the *moriscos* of the Inquisition era, never fully trusted by their colonial masters, yet scorned by their own countrymen.[80]

In the end, these efforts at domination proved of no avail, not just because

of Algerian resistance, but because of sharp divisions within France. The withdrawal of the French from Algeria in 1962 might be seen as a sort of mirror image of the expulsion of Moors and Jews from Spain after 1492. In both cases, frameworks of cultural and political negotiation had crumbled. Those who were included through compulsion, the *moriscos* and the *harkis*, found themselves in a problematic cultural and political space. But because France itself was no longer monolithic, there was also space for *immigrés*, who maintained their identities and their connections to Algeria, and the new debate would be on how they had to modify those identities to gain full acceptance in France, and how French society had to modify itself to become more accommodating.

Algeria's independence by no means brought an end to ordeals in prison. Ahmad Talib Ibrahimi, who had spent five years in prison in France during the struggle for independence, found himself confined once again and harshly treated under Ben Bella's government.[81] Harsh repression and arbitrary violence would again emerge as major themes in the 1990s, driving many Algerians to seek refuge elsewhere.

ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS AND NETWORKS

Islamic values and identity are transmitted through rituals and celebrations, schools and voluntary associations, and travel for religious purposes. Through the Ottoman era, travel was interwoven with commerce, with a well-established network connecting Algeria and the rest of the Maghrib to Cairo. With the imposition of French colonial rule, there emerged efforts at strict controls on movement across borders to help reinforce French control in the area of religious affairs.

Through much of the nineteenth century, Sufi *turuq* had played a major role in resistance, first against the Ottomans in the early nineteenth century, and then against the French in the first half century of colonial rule.[82] The *turuq* networks of communication linked together local communities within Algeria and connected them with ideas and news coming from the wider Islamic world. A particularly striking example of this can be seen in the Darqawa rebellion, starting in 1805, which connected Algeria to the turbulence in Egypt after the departure of Napoleon, and to efforts by "neo-Sufi" orders to revitalize the Islamic world in a time of decline.

In the late nineteenth century, as the French Empire expanded into the Sahara and West Africa, French colonial authorities became adept at working out friendly relations with Sufi orders.[83] By the early twentieth century, the colonial administration had established what seemed to be stable relations with both the urban Islamic establishment and the *turuq*. But two factors worked to undermine this apparently stable relationship. One was the passage of a law, in

1905, separating religion and the state in France, applied in Algeria in a gradual and confused fashion starting in 1907. The other was the outbreak of the First World War, and efforts by the Germans and Ottomans to use Islam against the French.[84]

Recognizing the challenge posed by transnational Islamic movements, government authorities have sought strategies for promoting official Islamic establishments. In response to their enemies' attempts to use Islam against them in the First World War, the French sponsored an official North African pilgrimage to Mecca in 1916. The chief architect of the French protectorate in Morocco, Marshal Lyautey, envisioned at this time the creation of a "Western Islam" loyal to a benevolent France. This vision led to the establishment of the Mosque of Paris in 1926, forerunner of such later official Islamic institutions in France as the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman.

But in French Algeria, this approach faced serious obstacles. Within the settler-dominated local government, budgetary concerns and the principle of separation of religion and state weighed against it. In the course of the 1920s, independent local Islamic associations emerged, coming together to form the Association of 'Ulama in 1931. The Association established Islamic schools that offered a modern education in the Arabic language, and they organized community activities to support their cause.[85] Their work had a major impact on the socialization of youth and the expression of community identity. The Association's greatest problem was how to deal with a perilous political environment, facing pressures and appeals both from the French administration and from competing Algerian political parties and factions. A combination of expanding activities and a growing need for financial resources, along with an effort to escape political pressures, led to demands for a return of the *waqf* endowments expropriated by the French in 1834, a measure that would have created a new autonomy for Islamic institutions.

Failure to resolve this problem resulted in the Association's reinforcing its external connections, with both leaders of the organization and graduates from its schools heading for the Middle East, mainly to Cairo, but in some cases to Saudi Arabia. Cairo in the 1950s was an especially vibrant environment, with lively debates over what should be the relationship between those seeking a vision for the revitalization of Islam and those pursuing strategies to create strong, independent Arab governments.[86] Algerians involved in the Association of 'Ulama came up with a wide variety of responses to this question. The fundamental question involved here—whether Islam should be subordinate to the state, should dominate it, or should find an autonomous base in civil society—is an enduring one.

Postcolonial Patterns

Following the independence of Algeria in July 1962, there was a large-scale return of refugees to the country. In spite of support for the Algerian cause from John F. Kennedy since his speech as a senator in July 1957, Ben Bella's government enthusiastically endorsed Third World and socialist causes, notably Castro's Cuban revolution.[87] With the establishment of a new government under Colonel Huwari Boumediene in 1965, emphasis shifted to Algeria's Arabic and Islamic identity. Arabic language education was given more emphasis in schools. Yet the emphasis on technological advance seemed to push in the opposite direction, with students being sent to Western countries to pursue higher education.

The Association of 'Ulama and its schools had been dismantled by the French in 1955, so the new government was able to create a state-controlled religious establishment, in effect subordinating what had been an important element in an emerging civil society to the power of a centralized state.[88] Boumediene, who took power in 1965, was more effective than Ben Bella in integrating the Islamic element into Algerian nationalism. The Boumediene era of the late 1960s through the 1970s carries echoes of an earlier period of hopeful change, the 1780s. Like the ruler of that time, Muhammad 'Uthman Dey, Boumediene had a public image of austere simplicity. The defeat of the Spanish attacks, and the ultimate liberation of Oran in the earlier era, and the nationalization of the oil industry generated wide popular support and hopes for a better future.[89]

But fulfilling such populist and progressive hopes required both further engagement with the outside world, maneuvering between rival great powers as conflicts in the Middle East intensified, deft management of factional rivalries within Algeria, and an effective strategy for economic development. These were challenging tasks, and neither leader achieved full success. Boumediene's ambitious endeavor ended with a mysterious illness, leading to his death in December 1978. As was the case with Muhammad 'Uthman, his successors have had little popular appeal. They have managed to contain rebellions, but they have also helped revive the well-established Algerian tradition of acerbic scorn for government officials.

Grand visions of progress may have helped to intensify the sense of disappointment that emerged in the mid-1970s and intensified in the 1980s. At the same time, another great imperial power controlling Muslim frontier territories began to weaken. Algerians were recruited into the service of Islamic movements in critical conflicts along the Russian frontier, in Afghanistan and in Chechnya, and in the conflict in Bosnia. As service in French colonial forces or in the liberation struggle had shaped earlier generations, these new intense experiences

transformed identities. Yet compared to those earlier waves of mobilization, the one that began in the late 1980s was relatively small in scale, with parallels to the Darqawa rebellion of the early 1800s. It helped produce some dramatic but ineffective efforts to pursue armed revolution against the establishment in Algeria. The leaders of the political wing of the Islamist movement were, in many cases, products not of participation in frontier *jihads*, but of higher education in Western countries other than France.[90]

The conflicts that resulted within Algeria helped to produce a new wave of job-seeking immigrants, drawn by what they saw as better opportunities in the West, and refugees, driven by a sense of despair. The settings where these new border crossers find the most effective support are those such as Montreal, where there is already a substantial Algerian immigrant community, and where elements of local civil society, including humanitarian and Christian associations, can be mobilized to speak out for them.[91]

Enduring Questions

The history of encounters of Algerians—and more broadly of the Muslims of North Africa and Spain—with other societies has some segments that evoke a sense of despair, others that lend to optimism about the prospects for conflict resolution and the establishment of a global *convivencia*. For different cultural communities engaged in political, economic, and social relations, it is crucial that there be a viable framework of negotiation. When such a framework is seriously eroded, clashes set in. The "other" becomes a demon or a disease carrier, and one feels justified in employing whatever means are necessary to extirpate this threat.

This book examines the Algerian experience to ask what factors make it possible to build or maintain a viable framework of negotiation, and what factors can lead to its breakdown. One can search for these in conditions—political, economic, military, diplomatic, environmental, demographic, and technological—that sustain or erode the framework. One can also look at the strategies and ideas taken up by those who have contributed to supporting the framework, and those who have attacked it. These questions are relevant to dilemmas in many parts of today's world, involving both people crossing borders, and local and regional conflicts with global ramifications. Since the focus is on frameworks of negotiation, this study cannot offer scientific, definitive conclusions. Its goal is rather to stimulate further exploration and exchange, and to promote understanding of the grief and despair that can occur when negotiation fails.

1

A Failed Transformation, 1775–1830

Algerian rulers in the turbulent era of the late 1700s and early 1800s faced multiple challenges. They needed new technology, especially in the domains of firearms and shipbuilding, both to defend Algeria and to aid the Ottoman Empire as it faced Russian expansion. They had to come up with the financial resources to pay for such technology, to support their military forces, and to pay for needed public expenditures. They needed the diplomatic skills to negotiate agreements with European countries and with the United States. They had to cope with periodic outbreaks of plague, food shortages, and earthquakes. They needed to muster public support as they faced these challenges, both among the popular storytellers of the street and among Muslim religious figures and their followers.

To a remarkable extent, the rulers of Algeria in the late eighteenth century, both the deys Muhammad 'Uthman (1766–1791) and Hasan (1791–98), and the provincial beys, Muhammad al-Kabir in the west (1780–9?), and Salah Bey in the eastern province of Constantine (1771–92), succeeded in this task. But starting in the early 1800s, things began to fall apart. The quality of Janissary soldiers available was deteriorating, as a result of both Ottoman military setbacks at the hands of the Russians in the Black Sea region, and the refusal by the rulers of Ottoman Algeria to recruit forces locally. There were rebellions led by Sufi orders, an outbreak of anti-Jewish violence in the city of Algiers, and vicious rivalries within the ruling order. Efforts begun to promote commercial opening failed to gain momentum. The long conflict in Europe offered some opportunities for diplomatic leverage, but it presented Algeria with hazards as well. At least on one occasion, the Darqawa rebellion starting in 1804, a European power contributed to provoking internal unrest. When a new order took hold in Europe, Algeria was in a far weaker position than it had been in the 1790s, as was demonstrated by the Anglo-Dutch attack under Lord Exmouth in 1816.[1]

The years from that attack until the French invasion of 1830 were somewhat

more stable in political terms, but the most striking product of this time lay in intellectual developments, notably works by Hamdan Khodja, aimed at French public opinion, and by Muhammad Ibn al-'Annabi, calling for Algeria to join Muhammad 'Ali's Egypt on a course of vigorous reorganization.

It might be argued that the key figure in Algeria's diplomacy in the early period, Hasan Pasha, had the instincts needed to face Algeria's challenges. He understood the need for diplomatic engagement and economic opening, and he had a particular ability to forge personal ties with foreigners that helped to facilitate negotiation. But he lacked a vision that fit these changes into a coherent pattern and that offered a justification for change in terms of Islamic values. The start of Hasan's reign coincided with that of Ottoman Sultan Selim III. Selim pursued reform and opening to Europe at the center of the empire, but also failed, facing opposition from both Janissaries and the Islamic religious establishment.[2]

Developments and problems in all three of these periods involved Algeria's connections with the outside world—with the Ottoman East and the wider Islamic world, and with Europe and the United States. These connections were forged by the movement of people, both voluntary and forced, and the communications that resulted. The process of communication was also shaped by the context of events in Algeria, from military triumphs and setbacks, to outbreaks of disease, especially plague, to changes in the weather, locust invasions, and earthquakes.

In the background lay the problem of Algeria's geographic diversity. It had only become a unit in the early 1500s, when Ottoman forces arrived to help stem the incursion of Christian Spain. The eastern province of Constantine was completely rid of Christian military enclaves, and by the late eighteenth century was becoming strongly engaged in commerce with Europe, exporting grain and livestock products, and licensing the gathering of coral along the coast.[3] It had a strong center of provincial rule in the city of Constantine. The western province was engaged in an ongoing conflict with the Spanish in Oran, which was not resolved until the Spanish withdrawal in 1792. Events there were strongly influenced by the neighboring Kingdom of Morocco, with which western Algeria shared important elements of religious and political culture. To the south lay the oases of the Sahara, where the provincial rulers of both Constantine and the West extended their control in the 1770s and 1780s.

One of the most valuable sources for the period under consideration is the *Mudhakkirat*, or Memoirs, of al-Hajj Ahmad Sharif al-Zahhar, a member of a prestigious Algiers family, born in 1782.[4] Following his family tradition, he served as the *naqib al-ashraf* in Algiers, the leader of those claiming descent from the Prophet Muhammad. He was expelled from Algiers by the French

in 1832 for his opposition to their arbitrary measures of property confiscation and the takeover of mosques. He went to Tunis and then came to Constantine, where he served as a secretary for Hajj Ahmad Bey, the provincial ruler of Constantine who was resisting French expansion. After the fall of the city of Constantine in 1837, he went west to work with Amir 'Abd al-Qadir. As the French gained the upper hand in the west, he took refuge in Morocco, returning to live in Algiers in the late 1840s. He opened up a shop there and set to work writing his account of Algeria's crucial decades of transition.

Zahhar's work is essentially a series of stories about different personalities and episodes. It clearly draws upon popular traditions of storytelling with their caustic sense of humor and their penchant for colorful episodes that convey a historical analysis indirectly, but in many ways more effectively than a conventional historical account. It needs to be read bearing in mind principles developed by oral historians, namely that stories can change as they are transmitted, but that the changes themselves can be of interest as well as the "facts."[5]

Spain Held at Bay: 1775–1785

To understand the dynamics of Algeria's clashes with Spain in the years 1775–84, one needs to see how they were connected to events and developments around the Mediterranean. This was a time of Ottoman setbacks as the empire faced the challenge of Russian expansion toward the Black Sea. Contraction of the Ottoman Empire had begun in the late seventeenth century, with its military setbacks in southeastern Europe and the cession of territory in the Treaty of Karolowitz in 1699. The process accelerated in the late eighteenth century with the southward expansion of the Russian Empire. The Treaty of Kuçuk Kainarja in 1774 marked a serious setback for the Ottomans and put them in a position where they saw the need to make diplomatic concessions to such European powers as Spain. But imposing such concessions on Algiers was not a simple task.

The Algerians had played an important role in stemming Ottoman losses by sending naval units consisting of light, maneuverable ships that proved highly effective in the Aegean. The top Ottoman naval commander at the time, Hasan Pasha Cezayirli, was a man who had begun his experience in Algeria. He had served as Bey of the West, but departed for Istanbul when he became involved in a dispute with the brother of the Dey 'Ali Pasha.[6]

'Ali Pasha, who ruled from 1754 to 1766, promoted ties with the English. After his death in 1766, Muhammad 'Uthman became dey, and with the outbreak of conflict between the Ottoman Empire and Russia in 1768, he shifted his alliance to the French because they supported the Ottomans, while the British

supported Russia. Hasan Cezayirli was instrumental in enlisting Algerian naval help in that conflict.[7]

The Spanish, whose control of their vast overseas empire was diminishing, were pursuing strategies to strengthen their hand in the western Mediterranean. Toward this end, they sought agreements with the sultan of Morocco, the first of which was concluded in 1767. But such agreements were tenuous because it was difficult for a Muslim ruler to justify conceding to Spain control of the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, on the north shore of Morocco. Sultan Sidi Muhammad was unable to prevent attacks on these cities in 1774. The Spanish also sought to regain control of Gibraltar, a key British naval station at the intersection of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. The outbreak of troubles in Britain's American colonies seemed to offer Spain a chance to pursue its plans in the western Mediterranean by attacking Algiers.[8]

The Spanish Failure at Algiers, 1775

In the spring of 1775, the Spanish assembled a massive fleet under the command of Alejandro O'Reilly, an Irishman who was a favorite of King Charles III and who had proven effective in asserting Spain's control over Louisiana in the early 1770s. The problem was that the Spanish lacked good intelligence on the situation in Algiers, not having diplomatic representatives on the spot as had Britain and France. Catholic monks engaged in the ransoming of captives seem to have been their main source of intelligence.[9]

In contrast, the Algerian ruler had access to good intelligence thanks to commercial links in Marseille. Merchants in this southern French port transmitted to Algiers news of the impending Spanish attack as early as May. O'Reilly's fleet would not arrive off Algiers and begin landing troops, horses, and artillery until early August. This gave the Algerians time to prepare their fortifications and to mobilize forces from as far away as the Saharan oasis of Biskra. Many explanations have been advanced for the disaster of the O'Reilly expedition. Spanish sources emphasize a tactical error, the Spanish having been tricked by a feigned retreat of the Algerian forces. Pious Algerian sources speak of the intervention of a long-dead local saint.[10] The most colorful or, as it were, odoriferous explanation is that advanced by Zahhar, who claims that the smell of camels, which arrived on the fourth day of the battle from Biskra, at the edge of the Sahara, spread terror among Spanish horses.[11] One interesting detail, in light of later developments, is that the Jewish community of Algiers celebrated the defeat of the Spanish.[12]

The Algerians had won a great victory, but it was a defensive victory that yielded few assets other than hundreds of Spanish prisoners, and their value could only be realized by entering into negotiations with the Spanish. Spain

still controlled the ports of Oran and Marsa al-Kabir in the west, where there was a long tradition of popular hostility toward Spain.[13] And there were no channels of communication through which to negotiate.

Hasan Pasha: From Captive to Negotiator

At least there were none until 1776. Early in that year, Hasan Pasha, a close adviser of the Dey Muhammad 'Uthman, was on his way back from a mission on which he carried tribute to the Ottoman sultan. He stopped off in Tunis and considered continuing his journey by land but was assured by the local French consul that since he was traveling on a French ship, his safety was assured. This turned out to be wrong. The Spanish seized the ship and its cargo and took Hasan Pasha to Cartagena. While there, he appealed to the French government to intercede on his behalf, which they eventually did. In the meantime, Hasan had formed a close personal connection with his captor, Alejandro Bassaline, who accompanied him on the English ship that brought him back to Algiers in May 1776.[14] Henceforward Hasan Pasha would be the key channel for diplomatic communication with Spain, which led finally to a long-term truce in 1786. Bassaline would be a frequent visitor to Algiers.[15]

Clearly, Hasan's connections in both the Ottoman capital and in Spain were important to his role in promoting a diplomatic solution. The problem was that he could not find the means to publicly advocate such diplomacy in Algeria. The memoirs of Zahhar provide key insights on Algerian public opinion at this time. The long-ruling dey of this period, Muhammad 'Uthman, was held in high respect. He was renowned for his austerity, seldom buying new clothes but simply having those he had repaired. He also kept his distance from the sorts of intrigues that arose among rival networks of Janissary officers, often based on marriage ties. His council had pressured him to marry, but, according to Zahhar's story, he countered that it would be too expensive. In the end, he consented to marry a slave woman and then had the last laugh by divorcing her the next morning.[16]

By contrast, Hasan Pasha was known in the streets of Algiers for his indulgence in luxury and his propensity for accepting gifts in return for diplomatic favors. Word on the street had it that the Spanish, at his release from captivity in 1776, had given him a picture of a sheep in which the fleece was made of jewels, and the legs of precious stone. Zahhar noted that "people spoke a great deal about the meaning of this."[17] The implication here is worse than the accusation that Hasan Pasha offered Christians favors for bribes. It is that he had become a sheep under the control of an infidel shepherd, a situation captured by the term *ra'ia*, which means "flock" but also is applied to the status of "subject" or "dependent." For instance, those tribes living in the vicinity of Oran who

collaborated with the Spanish were referred to as *ra'ia*. The American captive Cathcart reported similar stories, noting that the Spanish had given Hasan "many civilities."[18]

The Spanish sought to find a formula for a truce and redemption of their captives in the years that followed the disaster of 1775, but their occupation of Oran and Marsa al-Kabir remained an insuperable obstacle. They sought to find a solution to this in 1780 by promoting the idea of exchanging their Algerian holdings for the British port of Gibraltar, but the British expressed no interest in this, though they did return Minorca to Spanish rule. With the negotiations following American independence, the territories of Florida and Honduras were restored to Spain, but not Gibraltar. It was at this point that the Spanish again went on the offensive against Algiers, this time with naval expeditions.

In the summers of both 1783 and 1784, there were large-scale expeditions led by General Antonio Barcelo against the port of Algiers. The first attack caused considerable damage, inspiring the Algerians to look for improved means of defense. They found a stranded Spanish gunship on the beach and set to work building a large number of these in order to keep the Spanish ships out of range of the port the next time they attacked.[19] The problem was that manning these ships was a highly risky business. Crews needed a financial incentive to man the boats, yet the dey, with his treasury nearly empty, had to cut their pay, prompting angry protests.[20]

Not only were defense efforts costly, but the attack made it impossible to carry out corsair raids and it impeded trade. Thus Hasan Pasha finally carried the day. Negotiations proceeded, and by 1786 the Spanish and the Algerians arrived at a long-term truce, and the Spanish paid a hefty fee for the release of their captives.[21] The one major stumbling-block remained Oran and Marsa al-Kabir. The agreement stipulated that the Algerians would not threaten these Spanish posts, but it was difficult for the dey to restrain Muhammad al-Kabir, the bey of the western province, now centered in Mascara, from carrying out attacks on Oran, which would give him immense popularity with the local population, but also give him the opportunity to benefit from trade with Europe.

The First Algerian-American Encounter

The glow of the Spanish defeat in 1775 quickly faded as Algeria faced a prolonged drought that both drove up food prices and limited the amount of grain that could be exported. But in 1783, a far-off event helped to alter Algeria's fortunes. A volcanic eruption in Iceland sent up an immense dry cloud that

brought cooler summers and shorter growing seasons to Europe, and drove food prices sharply higher.[22] But the change in weather patterns benefited Algeria. It helped to raise agricultural production, and it brought more attractive prices for Algerian products in Europe. Unfortunately, the changing conditions also helped set off a plague epidemic.[23]

Especially for a pragmatist such as Hasan Pasha, the increased grain production opened the door to a prospective transition in which Algeria would shift to a broader commercial engagement with Europe and away from corsair raids. The changing atmosphere of Europe in the Enlightenment facilitated this plan, for it diminished the emphasis on confrontation with the Islamic world.

Well aware of developments in Spain, Hasan Pasha most certainly heard about the emergence of a new nation across the Atlantic. While a devious British consul may have urged the Algerians to capture American ships off the coast of Portugal in the summer of 1785, it seems likely that the Algerians needed little prompting. This was the only path that was available to begin the process of engagement with the United States, just as Hasan Pasha's capture by the Spanish had been the only way to begin engagement with Spain.

Algerians in America, Real and Imaginary

What remains a mystery is whether Hasan Pasha, or some other figure in the Algerian leadership, pursued another course of action, namely sending Algerians to America to report back on the political situation and the economic possibilities in this land about which the Algerians had meager secondhand information. Such a measure would certainly not have been inconsistent with Hasan Pasha's outlook.

There are two recorded cases of Algerians turning up in the United States, and it is interesting that these both occurred soon after the seizure of American ships by Algerians, first in 1785, and then in 1794. The first recorded instance involved two men and a woman who turned up in Virginia in late 1785, bearing documents written in Hebrew and announcing that they wanted to get to Philadelphia. Their arrival, soon after Virginians had received news of the capture of two American ships, set off a wave of paranoia and revived speculation about what had become of a prominent Virginian, Dr. Spence, who had disappeared at sea and was rumored to be a captive in Algeria.[24] Since the Algerians spoke little English, and nobody was available who was able to translate their Hebrew documents, the Virginians could only speculate. Lacking a legal basis for holding the Algerians, local authorities sent them on to the South Carolina port of Charleston.

There is no documentary evidence as to what became of them after that, but

there is at least suggestive literary evidence. In 1787, a book was published in Philadelphia with the provocative title *The Algerine Spy in Pennsylvania*.[25] This work fits in the genre of "spy literature," composed of letters allegedly sent by a spy from a Muslim land that comment on the political situation both within the Western country being "spied" upon and in the spy's Muslim country of origin.[26] The book has been attributed to Peter Markoe, a Philadelphia author connected to writers such as Benjamin Franklin Bache who were strongly identified with the emerging Democratic Republican Party of Jefferson, and opposed to the Federalists.[27] A major goal of this party was to oppose Federalist efforts to link political rights to religious identity.[28] *The Algerine Spy* consists of a series of letters written by a man named Mehmet.

What is remarkable about this work is that it seems well informed about the situation in Algeria, and the path that an Algerian might follow from Algiers to Philadelphia.[29] Mehmet the "spy" mentions that he was sent by an important figure in the Algerian government to gather information on America. He made his way from Algiers to Gibraltar, and then Lisbon, pretending to be French, though revealing his identity to his Jewish hosts in both places. He had high regard for his host in Gibraltar, a progressive figure living in the age of the Enlightenment, but contempt for his very traditionally minded host in Lisbon—who eventually betrayed him to his enemies in Algiers. When Mehmet got to Philadelphia, he could not reveal his identity to anyone, though he must have had some intermediary to facilitate the sending and receipt of letters. Presumably this would have been, as it was in Gibraltar and Lisbon, a member of the local Jewish community. One possibility would have been Jacob Raphael Cohen, leader of the local Jewish congregation, whose family had come from Algiers and who had himself grown up in England before coming first to Montreal and then Philadelphia.[30]

While Mehmet was in Philadelphia, he learned that his ailing son had died in Algiers, and that his wife had run off with a Spanish household slave, an event one might connect with the liberation of Spanish captives in 1786. He also learned that he was on the losing side of intense rivalries in Algiers, a subject to be explored below. This prompted him to decide to stay in America, and he bought farms in rural Pennsylvania, inviting his wife and her new partner to come and stay. As in the case of the Algerians who set off the furor in Virginia, there were thus two men and a woman. This may of course be a coincidence, or it may be that the author had heard about the Virginia case and was simply playing creatively with the facts he had learned. But it is clear there were lines of communication connecting *The Algerine Spy* with the actual situation in Algeria, and that Jewish commercial networks played a key role in facilitating such communication.

The book also sets forth a perspective that would allow Americans to engage in dialogue with Algeria. America is portrayed as a "new Carthage," a commercial power (the original version of which was near modern-day Tunis) that negotiated its relations with local communities rather than imposing itself in the fashion of imperial Rome. This perspective is key to understanding America's position in the Mediterranean at this time. Mercantilist policies restricted America's access to British and French markets. The best prospects for trade, in what was a time of economic hardship for America in the mid-1780s, were in Spain, Portugal, and the Italian states.

Minor Diplomatic Skits amidst Major Changes in Algerian Political Scenery

Initial American efforts to negotiate the release of the hostages from their two ships held in Algiers bore no fruit.[31] The federal government had few resources they could call upon, either to placate or to threaten the Algerians. The initial envoy sent to Algiers, John Lamb, showed little skill in dealing with the situation. Thus the two dozen captives festered away, though two of them, Richard O'Brien and James Leander Cathcart, formed close ties with Hasan Pasha and gained a broad knowledge of the local political situation that would serve them well when they became diplomatic consuls in North Africa after their release.

Their initiation to the Algiers political scene was facilitated by their discussions with members of the local European diplomatic and commercial community, above all John Wolf, an Irish Jew who had converted to Christianity. Wolf had experience working for the British in Tripoli and Algiers, dating back to at least 1777. When the British lacked a regular consul in Algiers, he took on this role. He also sought appointment to serve as consul for Spain or the United States. He no doubt had a command of Arabic, and there is evidence he had a close relation with Hasan Pasha. As Richard O'Brien put it in a letter to Thomas Jefferson in June 1786, "no one in Algiers is better acquainted with the ways and policy of this Regency."[32] It is interesting that a report on the failure of John Lamb's mission in Algiers in 1786 compares his situation to that of "a Lamb among wolves."[33] One can read this as a reflection of the view that one needed someone with the experience and skills of a person like Wolf to deal with the rough-and-tumble of Algerian politics. Certainly he helped O'Brien become initiated to this scene and form a tie with Hasan Pasha. In 1788, Wolf died, leaving behind a wife and two children. By this time, O'Brien was capable of fending for himself.[34]

The political situation in Algiers in the late 1780s and early 1790s was full of dramatic developments. The prosperous trade in grain and other products,

centered in the eastern province of Constantine, stimulated rivalry over who would control the proceeds, the dey in Algiers or the ruler of the province of Constantine, Salah Bey, who had been in charge since 1771 and had won wide popularity. He was keenly aware of the importance of infrastructure investment, putting resources into mills, irrigation work, and bridges.[35]

In 1788, according to Zahhar, a quarrel broke out between Salah Bey and the Dey Muhammad 'Uthman over who had the right to authorize grain exports. The immediate victim of this quarrel was the dey's treasurer, or *khaznaji*, who also happened to be the father-in-law of Hasan Pasha, a man whose name is never mentioned in any available source. It is symptomatic of the convoluted political situation that Hasan Pasha was promoted to *khaznaji* after his father-in-law's execution.

According to Zahhar, Hasan Pasha's wife concluded that Salah Bey had been the culprit in this case. Her sister was also married to a key figure in the Algiers government, 'Ali Burghul. Zahhar reports that they both told their husbands: "You must outwit the one who was the reason for our father being killed, and we will kill him."[36] When Hasan became dey in 1791, he did indeed scheme to get rid of him, setting off a conflict that would end in Salah Bey being killed in 1792.

James Leander Cathcart, the American who served as personal secretary to Hasan Pasha and was a witness to these events, adds a detail to this account, pointing to the key role of Hajj Mansur, a religious figure with great influence in the area of the Iron Gate, the key passage from Algiers to Constantine. His daughter was married to the son of the previous bey of Constantine. Her son evidently hoped to displace Salah Bey. Muhammad 'Uthman was annoyed that a payment from the bey of Tunis had not been transmitted to him. He concluded that the culprit in this was the *khaznaji*, a man with close ties to Hajj Mansur, and he ordered his execution. Hearing of this, Hajj Mansur threatened rebellion, and the dey released Hasan and the wealth he had seized from him. As for 'Ali Burghul, in Cathcart's view he was "a false intrigueing Man, a great tyrant, but has a very good understanding" of the international political situation.[37]

In the west, another dynamic provincial ruler, Muhammad al-Kabir, launched attacks against the Spanish in Oran, in spite of the 1785 truce agreement. More than any other Algerian leader of his time, Muhammad al-Kabir cultivated the support of religious leaders and scholars, mobilizing Islamic students.[38] He knew they had limited military skills, but he appreciated the rewards in terms of public support for his rule. The attacks at first proved ineffective. But in 1790, an earthquake devastated the city of Oran. The Spanish garrison managed to ward off attacks, but it became clear that holding on to Oran was a losing proposition. In

1792, the Spanish government agreed to hand over its ports of Oran and Marsa al-Kabir to the Algerians.

For a few years, Muhammad al-Kabir basked in the glory of his victory and worked to rebuild Oran, with the help of both Jewish merchants and Spanish technical experts.[39] Sometime after the takeover of Oran, Muhammad al-Kabir came to Algiers bearing tribute to the dey. But on the way back to Oran, Muhammad al-Kabir died of a mysterious illness that Zahhar's account attributes to poison put in his water bag.[40] The implication is that Muhammad al-Kabir, like Salah Bey, had been eliminated to strengthen the hand of the dey. In this case, however, Muhammad al-Kabir's son 'Uthman was appointed in his place. But he would be deposed by the Dey Mustafa in 1802. According to Zahhar, the English consul in Oran had sought to arrange for him to flee by ship, suggesting that this internal political conflict was linked to Anglo-French rivalry.[41]

The deaths of Salah Bey and Muhammad al-Kabir can be seen as marking a key turning point and illustrating a crucial difference between Hasan Pasha and Mustafa and their predecessor, Muhammad 'Uthman. The latter had promoted the emergence of these provincial leaders, both of whom had strong local bases. Instead of making alliances with rural religious leaders such as Hajj Mansur, they both promoted urban religious centers, providing funding for mosques and schools. Muhammad 'Uthman himself refused to become ensnared in a political network forged through marital relations. He was very much a traditional Janissary figure, simple and austere. He also seems to have realized that Algiers was in a unique situation, binding together the east and west of Algeria, and connecting North Africa to the Ottoman Empire. It needed to be ruled by a professional soldier, not a hereditary ruler. Hasan in effect reversed this formula, seeking to establish rule passed through family connections in Algiers and eliminating powerful provincial rulers. The very favorable peace agreements, first with Spain, then with the United States, helped him to pursue this path of consolidation of control. But in the long term, this would contribute to Algeria's unraveling.

These events need to be seen in a wider context. In 1789–90, the Ottoman Empire suffered a new series of defeats at the hands of the Russians, and the leader of the last-ditch attempt to hold them off, Hasan Cezayirli, died in the process. As in the case of Muhammad al-Kabir, there were reports that he had died from an illness, but rumor had it that he was executed.[42] The military setbacks of the late 1780s had disrupted traditional recruitment patterns, producing a military that was both less effective and more difficult for the sultan to control. Selim III had been impressed by Hasan Cezayirli because of his success in transforming the Ottoman navy, and he attempted to bring a similar transformation to the army but with little success.

It was in October 1793, soon after the death of Salah Bey, that the Algerians went on the attack against American shipping, seizing some eleven ships in a brief interval, just after the British had brokered a truce between Portugal and Algiers. Possession of Oran, a port closer to the Atlantic, certainly facilitated this operation. The U.S. government was thus thrust into the position where they needed either to come to terms with the Algerians or put together a large naval expedition.

Finding a Language of Diplomacy

Algerian accounts indicate that Hasan Pasha was ambivalent about the attacks, a fact that may help to explain why he would dispatch envoys to the United States to, at the least, gather intelligence, and perhaps promote negotiation. Such a mission fits this niche in time, for in 1792, Selim III had dispatched envoys to the major countries of Europe, and particularly France, to provide him with reports on strategies for modernization. It is conceivable that the French would have facilitated the transport of the two Algerians to America. The republican French were on friendly terms with the Ottoman Empire at this time. Whatever the case, it seems unlikely that Ahmad Ben Ali's story of escape from a prison in Naples was the full story. His own writing, at the bottom of both letters, is in Turkish, demonstrating that he was no simple sailor, but a member of the Ottoman elite.

Ahmad Ben Ali, Algerian Envoy in America

Compared to the Algerians who set off the wave of panic in Virginia in 1785, Ahmad Ben Ali had a good story. In fact, he seems to have been able to tell different stories that might appeal to different audiences. He was also able to communicate that story, and to make connections that would lead to the highest level of government. The two letters sent to Secretary of State Edmond Randolph in Ahmad Ben Ali's name suggest that he had connected with at least two different intermediaries. One was presumably French. Already, in June 1794, according to Talleyrand, who was in exile in Philadelphia at the time, the Jacobin government in France had signaled their willingness to serve as an intermediary with Algiers through the consul, Citizen Fauchet, whose alleged effort to bribe Randolph led to his resignation as secretary of state in 1795. Since Talleyrand does not record any role he had in serving as an intermediary here, the suspicion falls on Citizen Genêt, the previous consul and now a refugee, who might well have sought to be of service here to alleviate the hostility generated by his own role in equipping privateers against the British.[43]

The two letters sent to Randolph are strikingly different in style.[44] The one written in fluent English is full of the conventional deferential terms of diplomatic correspondence. This is the letter that explains his capture by the Neapolitans, and it does not mention political connections in Algiers that might help win release of the Americans. The other letter, written in Frenchified English, lacks diplomatic formality but instead is full of appeals to Masonic brotherly solidarity. In this letter, there is no reference to capture by the Neapolitans, suggesting that this contrived explanation for his arrival in the United States was not necessary. This letter came right to the point: that Ahmad Ben Ali could serve as an intermediary in negotiations.

A Maine Privateer Learns to Navigate North African Seas

If Ahmad Ben Ali was prepared to navigate the waters of American politics, who was it that helped to prepare him? One possible candidate here is Richard O'Brien, the American captive with the greatest influence in Algiers. There are strong indications that he had developed a discourse that would help to win the sympathy of the Algerian rulers, including, in particular, the argument that America was not a nation founded on Christian principles, and thus not to be associated with Algeria's old enemies. This was found in phrasing made famous by the Tripoli Treaty of 1796, for which Joel Barlow, the man sent to negotiate the release of the captives in Algiers, was the chief negotiator, but in the formulation of which O'Brien had a major role.[45]

Article 11, with the phrase, "the government of the United States is not in any sense founded on the Christian religion," has been a subject of intense controversy. It has been argued that the Arabic version of the treaty does not contain this clause, but in between articles 10 and 12 contains a copy of a letter from the dey of Algiers urging Tripoli's ruler to come to terms with the Americans.[46] The Christian religion clause is thus thought to exist only in the English-language version, inserted by the American envoy Joel Barlow as a sort of literary and political flourish to please a certain American audience.

It is worth noting that Richard O'Brien himself used similar phrasing in a letter to the United States secretary of state dated April 16, 1797, in which he urged that the United States immediately send an envoy from Algiers to Istanbul, with a letter of support from the dey, "to counteract the Christian nations' influence."[47] For O'Brien, without such diplomatic effort, the Americans would find "all our hopes of being a sharer in the valuable branches of Mediterranean commerce blasted."[48]

O'Brien's terminology may have been derived from his discussions with Algerian leaders during his ten years in Algiers. Their practice was to refer to

Europe as "*al-umma al-masihiyya*," the Christian nation. Or when they felt a grudge against a particular country, they would call it "*al-umma al-kafiriyya*," the pagan nation.[49] O'Brien represented a country that had just rebelled against a power that was part of "the Christian nation," raising the prospect that it should not be classified in that category, and that it might offer the basis for building a new kind of relationship. For Americans, this alternative could be expressed in Masonic terms. Ideas about the compatibility of Islam and modern secular ideas were also being advanced by French revolutionaries at this time as they courted Sultan Selim III.[50] Efforts by the growing number of Algerian Muslim merchants in Europe to win acceptance by entering the Masons can be traced back to as early as 1785.[51] It should be noted, however, that the Tripoli treaty came toward the end of the period of opening that would expire with Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798.

The substitution of the letter from the dey of Algiers for Article 11 is not a minor distraction but rather an important clue to the vision pursued by Barlow and O'Brien. America had succeeded in building a relationship with the dey of Algiers and hoped to use his influence to open doors first in Tunis and Tripoli and then in Istanbul. They had built this relationship in part on a vision of American exceptionalism, the idea that America was very different from Europe and could be a commercial power without threatening to impose its domination. The idea of an alliance and the rationale for it had been established with Hasan. And it was evidently assumed by the treaty's writers that the phrasing with regard to Christian principles would make sense to American policymakers of this day, many of whom were committed Freemasons. But the phrasing of Article 11 might have made little sense to the bey of Tripoli. What did make an impression on him was the evidence of a United States–Algiers alliance, confirmed by the letter from Hasan Dey. Support from the dey of Algiers and the bey of Tunis, both backed by the United States, could help consolidate his position as ruler of Tripoli. An additional factor in the situation was that the French consul in Tripoli pushed Yusuf to hold the ship and seize the money O'Brien was carrying to pay the redemption price promised to Algiers. According to Cathcart, it was Hasan Pasha's letter that convinced Yusuf not to do this.[52]

One foundation for the budding United States–Algiers relationship was Hasan Pasha's realization that the United States could provide him with the best-quality ships and naval supplies. It is likely that O'Brien helped him to come to this realization, for O'Brien came from a family in Machias, Maine, a center for the production of some of the best-quality shipbuilding lumber then available.[53] O'Brien also demonstrated his skills as a sail maker, and he likely confided to Hasan that he, too, had once served as a privateer—in America's

war for independence against England. The closeness of their relationship is illustrated in the story that Hasan had once suggested that O'Brien marry his blind daughter, Khadija, if only he would convert to Islam.[54] The story can all too easily be dismissed as insignificant until one becomes aware of the crucial role that marriage relations played in forming connections within Algeria's ruling elite.

Napoleon in Egypt and the Emergence of New Islamic Movements

Not long after Joel Barlow and Richard O'Brien had successfully forged diplomatic agreements with the North African rulers of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, the factors that contributed to the making of those agreements began to unravel. One turning point was Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798, which marked a shift from the quest for cross-cultural alliances by French revolutionaries to a cold-minded plan of imperial domination, designed by Talleyrand.[55]

But the change in international dynamics was intertwined in Algeria with the growing importance of Islamic movements. The popularity of Ottoman rulers in Algeria had owed a great deal to their success in dealing with the age-old enemy, Spain. This was particularly crucial in the western province of Oran, where Muhammad al-Kabir paid special attention to cultivating the support of Muslim scholars and to building mosques and Islamic schools.

The Islamic factor was important in western Algeria not simply because of the long-term conflict with the Spanish but because of the strong influence of the Moroccan sultans, rulers who were not under Ottoman authority and who had religious legitimacy rooted in local tradition.[56] Islamic scholars and Sufi leaders discontented with Ottoman rule frequently took refuge in Morocco. Strong, independent-minded religious leaders were seen by the Ottomans as a threat. An important illustration of the fading popularity of Ottoman authorities among religious circles can be seen in Abu Ra's al-Nasiri, a scholar who celebrated Muhammad al-Kabir's victory over Spain in 1792, but by the late 1790s had gone into exile in Morocco.[57]

It is these dynamics that helped to make the province of Oran a fertile ground for new Islamic movements in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. These movements emerged when local religious figures traveled to the East and made contact with currents of Neo-Sufism that had been developing in another key Islamic frontier of the time, India, where the British were building a new empire.[58]

The best-known of such movements are the Tijaniyya and the Sanusiyya. The Tijaniyya Sufi order was launched in the 1780s by Ahmad al-Tijani in the town of Ain Madi, at the edge of the Sahara. This occurred at the time when

Muhammad al-Kabir, the provincial ruler, was expanding his control in the south. In 1789, Ahmad al-Tijani took refuge in Morocco. Later, in the early 1820s, his son would lead an unsuccessful revolt in the province of Oran.[59] The Sanusiyya was founded by Muhammad Bin 'Ali al-Sanusi, who had set off from Algeria to the east in the 1820s. He did not return to Algeria but set up the headquarters of his new order in Cyrenaica, in eastern Libya.[60] Both orders would have great success in building their influence in the Sahara, and the Tijaniyya would have a major impact in the societies of the West African Sahel on the southern side of the Sahara.[61] Both orders would have great importance as the French sought to expand their influence in the Sahara starting in the 1890s, with the Tijaniyya being incorporated as a French ally, and the Sanusiyya becoming the icon of Islamic opposition to France. But in the early 1800s, locally based orders proved a greater concern for the Ottomans.

The Darqawa Rebellion: New Islamic Aspirations and British Calculations

The Darqawa was an order that began in Morocco and, with its emphasis on austerity, appealed to the tribes living in the poor hill and mountain regions of western Algeria. The Darqawa leader in western Algeria, 'Abd al-Qadir bin al-Sharif, led a rebellion against Ottoman rule in 1805. The bey of Oran, Muhammad al-Maqlash, seeing Moroccan influence behind this, took heavy measures to repress it. Initially he was unsuccessful. He managed to bring it under control only by making strategic alliances with local leaders.[62]

A more important and perplexing event is a rebellion whose instigation is attributed to the Darqawa, and that broke out in the province of Constantine in 1804 and went on for some three years. The origins and nature of this rebellion are especially murky. The commentary on it that is available in both Zahhar's memoirs and in Édouard De Neveu's *Les Khouan*, published in 1846, is strongly rooted in popular narrative. The key figure here was a man by the name of Muhammad Ibn al-Ahrash, apparently of Moroccan origin, who claimed to be a *sharif*, or descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, related to the Moroccan royal family. De Neveu insists that his real name was Muhammad Bu Da'ili, and that his claim to be a *sharif* was mere pretense.[63]

He had been in Egypt at the time of Napoleon's invasion in 1798, apparently returning from the pilgrimage to Mecca, and took part in resistance to the French, mobilizing members of the North African community in Cairo, as well as Maghribis who had come from the Hijaz to fight the infidel. There was a large community of North African merchants in Cairo at the time, and they had a tradition of putting together militia forces to serve in local rivalries. The

Maghribi merchant community of Cairo was the hub of networks of travel and communication connecting the Arabian Peninsula to Tripoli, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco.[64]

According to some sources, when the British chased Napoleon out of Egypt in 1801, they helped to prompt Ibn al-Ahrash to set off on his new venture in Algeria, equipping him with a special gun that could fire three shots without being reloaded.[65] Some sources claim that the British transported Ibn al-Ahrash and his followers by ship directly from Egypt to Annaba. Others mention transit through Tunis, and a meeting with the local ruler Hamuda Pasha.

As an outsider in the province of Constantine, Ibn al-Ahrash must have had some means of winning local credibility. Conceivably Hamuda Pasha, the bey of Tunis, had a role in this, and saw the revolt as a way to end exactions imposed on him from Algeria. He may have been accompanied by individuals from the North African community in Cairo who could serve in this intermediary role.[66] But the documentation available is scanty.

Mustafa, the dey of Algiers from 1798 to 1805, seems to have initially opposed the French after Napoleon went into Egypt, but growing French power in the region, with their takeover of Malta from the Knights Hospitaller, combined with effective French diplomacy, persuaded him that neutrality was the best policy. As a result, he was seen as favoring the French, a position decried by popular opinion in Algiers.[67] One factor in this was that the export of grain to feed Napoleon's troops in Italy, and then in Egypt, drove up local prices. To add insult to injury, the French made purchases on credit and would never pay, a factor leading to Husain Dey venting his anger at the French consul in 1827, the incident that was to help justify France's invasion in 1830.

An additional challenge Mustafa Pasha had to deal with was an earthquake centered at the village of al-Qali'yah near Algiers on November 7, 1802. He went out to help distribute aid to the survivors, but the event may have been taken to be a sign of divine wrath with regard to his diplomatic and political choices.[68] An environmental factor more directly contributing to the troubles was a shortfall in agricultural production, brought on by a combination of plant disease, drought, and locust invasion. The shortages were compounded by the outbreak of conflict, which made it more difficult to carry out agricultural tasks.[69]

Ibn al-Ahrash moved to an area around the city of Constantine, where he forged an alliance with 'Abdullah al-Zabushi, a leader of the Rahmaniyya, the most influential Sufi order in the region.[70] De Neveu's account stresses that Ibn al-Ahrash told his Kabyle forces that they should not allow themselves to be distracted by looting, but this is precisely what happened.[71] The rebel force was so large that they surprised and initially overwhelmed the forces of

the bey. But as they were distracted by looting and some of them were high on opium, the bey's forces were able to escape into the city and close the gates, then fire down on the crowd, killing large numbers. The rebels retreated into the countryside, blaming Ibn al-Ahrash for his failure to deliver the appropriate miracle. Conceivably this story, read with that of the British gift of the three-shot gun, implies that Ibn al-Ahrash had raised hopes that the British would supply weapons equal to or better than those in the hands of the bey.

Hearing of the assault on Constantine, Mustafa Pasha sent a letter instructing 'Uthman, the bey of Constantine, to go out and catch Ibn al-Ahrash and kill him. 'Uthman knew this was a difficult proposition but reasoned, "I would rather be killed on my horse than strangled by Jews in a prison in Constantine."[72] 'Uthman initiated negotiations with the Kabyle rebels, promising rewards if they turned over Ibn al-Ahrash. But the rebels deceived him, eventually forcing him into a retreat during which his horse's hooves got stuck in the mud.[73] The rebels took advantage of this to kill him. A few years later, during a meteor shower, the rebels saw his grave light up. They concluded their victim had saintly powers and built a tomb for him so that he might be worshipped as a marabout.[74]

The popular narratives make it clear that Ibn al-Ahrash was an outsider and did not have a local following, and that there were tensions between him and the rebels. To gather a large rebel force he must have been able to convince local leaders to support him, but there is no clear evidence as to how he did this. What is clear is that his goals included seizing power in the provinces of Constantine and Oran, where his cohort 'Abd al-Qadir Bin Sharif would start a rebellion in 1805. Whoever planned these rebellions was well aware of the disaffection with Mustafa Pasha in both these provinces. It is also important to note that the English seem to have been willing to seize the opportunity to support this revolt. This is especially important in light of the role of English naval officers with experience in the Middle East and North Africa, such as Sir Sidney Smith and in particular Edward Blaquiere, in promoting plans for a "Universal League" to invade Algeria.

Hostility to Local Jewish Communities

A striking theme in the years of intense crisis in Algeria in 1804–5 is the emergence of hostility to the local Jewish communities.[75] There was an incident involving Darqawa forces when they made an incursion in Mascara, the former capital of the western region, in 1805.[76] By far the better-known incident occurred in Algiers, also in 1805, when Janissaries initiated attacks against the local Jewish community, starting with the murder, on June 29, of Naphtali Busnach, a

prominent merchant seen as having a strong influence over the Dey Mustafa.[77] He had started his commercial career in the province of Constantine, the major grain-exporting region. Soon the violence spread. Estimates of deaths range from one hundred to two hundred. While the Janissaries initiated the violence, members of the local Muslim community joined in, supported by a dissident member of the Islamic establishment, Muhammad Ibn al-Malik.[78] The Ottoman authorities eventually suppressed the rioters, but hundreds of Algiers Jews fled for their safety, mainly to Livorno, but also to Tunis and Smyrna.

Certainly an important factor in the outbreak in Algiers in 1805 was sharply rising food prices resulting from both environmental factors and political turmoil in the province of Constantine. Prices for food in some places rose to fifteen times what they had been before the crisis.[79] Since Jewish merchants had a major role in organizing exports to Europe, particularly to France, and were closely associated with the ruling elite in Algeria, they were easily made into scapegoats.[80]

The outbreak of violence against the Jews of Algiers was soon followed by the murder of Mustafa Pasha himself, and a period of great instability over the years until 1818, during which five deys died violent deaths, one died from the plague, and only one died from natural causes. The Darqawa revolts did not succeed, in part because the rebels lacked adequate firearms and horses, but also because they involved an alliance between a figure with a grand political vision—and, perhaps, important political connections in distant places—and ordinary people who were discontent with the fiscal exactions of the beys and made desperate by hunger. But these revolts did deliver a serious blow to the Ottoman system in Algeria, one from which it would never recover.

The Internationalization of the Algerian Question and the Emergence of New Algerian Thinkers

The collapse of Napoleon's regime in France in 1815 brought the emergence of a new global order, dominated in the Mediterranean by Great Britain. It also brought widespread discussion about the legal and intellectual foundations that should underpin that new order, focusing on questions of slavery and freedom of navigation. Algiers, which had long served as a sort of theatrical backdrop for debates over such grand issues, now became the focus of proposals for action. The continued holding of Christian prisoners taken captive by corsairs was an issue raised in a conference on the sidelines of the Congress of Vienna in 1815, where the key figure was a British naval officer with long experience in the Ottoman east, Sir Sidney Smith. In broader discussions, the issue

of slavery itself, whether that of Christian captives or Africans brought across the Sahara, was raised at the time in connection with Algiers.[81]

The Americans were the first to insist on an agreement by the Algerians to cease all piracy, sending Commodore Stephen Decatur to Algiers in 1815. But the key watershed was the Exmouth expedition of 1816, involving a large naval force of mainly British but also Dutch ships. One of the developments leading up to this expedition had been outbreaks of violence against people from the Italian states who were engaged in commercial activities in Algeria, especially in the eastern city of Annaba.[82] The dey was hesitant to accept conditions demanded by Exmouth, so the expedition opened fire on the city of Algiers at close range, causing widespread destruction. The dey agreed to release all Christian prisoners and to cease all corsair raids.

Stability did not return until after a serious outbreak of plague in 1817. Like the epidemic of 1785, this may have been related to a volcanic dry fog, in this case resulting from the Tambora eruption in the East Indies.[83] The following year, Husain Pasha became dey, and he would rule until the French invasion of 1830. He began his reign with an effort to negotiate with Britain to find satisfactory terms for their relations and to revise some of what he saw as arbitrary measures imposed in the wake of the Exmouth expedition. The mission bore little fruit and may have contributed to exacerbating tensions between Britain and Algeria, leading to further British naval visits in the years up to 1824. The leader of the delegation, 'Ali Ra'is, seems to have been a typical Ottoman statesman of the day, highly sensitive to matters of decorum. The man who served as his interpreter, Tahar Khodja, quit the mission, suggesting tensions between the traditional Ottoman statesman and a new breed of diplomat with greater experience in the West.[84]

From Mixed Marriage to Intellectual Exploration: Hamdan Khodja and Muhammad Ibn al-'Annabi

Husain also pursued diplomatic engagement with Morocco, the Ottoman Empire, and Muhammad 'Ali's Egypt. While these efforts did not preserve Algeria from colonial conquest, they did contribute to important intellectual responses to Algeria's challenges. These responses came from scholars closely tied to the Ottoman government of Algiers, notably Hamdan Khodja and Muhammad Ibn al-'Annabi.

Both these men came from Kulughli backgrounds, the products of marriages between Ottoman Janissaries and local women. Ineligible for recruitment to the military, but well connected, men from these backgrounds tended to enter government service in administrative or judicial roles, or to enter commerce.

By this time, local "Moorish" commercial houses were also flourishing and, according to U.S. Consul William Shaler, they were displacing Jewish merchant houses.[85] It appears that the local urban educated population of Algeria in the 1820s was adapting to the changing global environment, while the Janissaries, observing their elimination in the center of the empire, were in a desperate, defensive position. Filippo Pananti, who was in Algiers in 1814–16, observed that the Janissaries at this time were from "the lowest dregs of the people of Smyrna and Constantinople."[86]

The best-known of these two figures in the West is Hamdan Khodja, author of *Le Miroir*, published in France in 1833, a desperate plea for the French to choose not to pursue plans for the conquest of Algeria, but rather to work with a new Algerian regime that would cooperate with them and bring important changes to Algeria.[87] From a prominent Kulughli family, Hamdan Khodja had extensive experience outside Algeria. At the age of eleven, in around 1784, he went to Istanbul with his uncle and remained there some seventeen years.

Hamdan Khodja began his experience in Europe with a trip to France in 1820. Over the next decade, he had experience in Spain, the Italian states, and England as well. He was a close associate of the Tripolitanian Hasuna Daghies, a man with close ties to the ruling Qaramanli family of Tripoli. Both combined the roles of merchant and unofficial diplomatic representative, and seemed to have devoted a good deal of their time to intellectual pursuits.[88]

Both Daghies and Hamdan Khodja worked to engage liberal thinkers in France and Britain, arguing that the best plan of action was to pursue a course of pragmatic reform in North Africa. Daghies got to know the famous English thinker Jeremy Bentham, who by now was in his last years and was looking for foreign lands where his ideas might be applied. A key issue with respect to Tripoli was the slave trade, for Tripoli was the Mediterranean port the shortest distance from sources of slaves in sub-Saharan Africa. With the end of piracy, the slave trade became of increasing financial importance. Daghies argued that simple abolition was not a solution to the problem, that the promotion of commercial activity in Africa was the real solution.

Daghies may have coached Hamdan Khodja in his approach to French liberal opinion for it was he who translated Hamdan Khodja's Arabic version of *Le Miroir* into French.[89] The thrust of this book's argument was similar to the one Daghies presented to Bentham: that the best course of action for both the French and the Algerians was one of pragmatic change, introducing political reform and pursuing opportunities to further open commercial relations.

There were some liberals on the French political scene who responded positively to Hamdan Khodja's appeal, and he had the support of Robert Saint John, the British consul in Algiers. But the military and the political

mainstream in France called for continuing the conquest of Algeria, and authorities in London raised no objection. Hamdan Khodja left France to live out the remainder of his life in Istanbul.

While there, he pursued another theme in his writing, that of promoting changes in the area of medicine, both through the study of new medical knowledge produced in Europe and through the application of such knowledge in public policy. As local rulers in Algeria and Tunisia faced repeated outbreaks of plague in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, they had attempted to take measures similar to those pursued in Europe, both with respect to quarantine and to treatment of the bodies of those who had died of plague and the sealing off of houses where they had been living. There was opposition to these moves, both on grounds of Islamic tradition and because of concerns over property rights.[90]

Hamdan Khodja was doubtless familiar with that experience, and he denounced narrow-minded Islamic traditionalists who refused to come to grips with the importance of modern science. He presented his work on modern medicine to Sultan Mahmud at just the time that the sultan was vigorously promoting Western-style medical education, inaugurating a new medical school.[91] Hamdan Khodja's sons maintained a close connection to Tripoli after it was brought back under direct Ottoman control in 1835. One of his sons, 'Ali Ridha Pasha, served as governor of Tripoli in 1866–70, and again in 1872–74.[92] It is worth raising the question as to whether he might have had a role in laying the foundations for Muqrani's revolt, which broke out in 1871.

A rather different figure, less well known in the West, is Muhammad Ibn al-'Annabi. Like Hamdan Khodja, his family can be classified as Kulughli. One of his ancestors had come from Greece, first to the eastern port city of Annaba, then to Algiers, where they served in judicial positions and as secretaries to high officials in the government. Ibn al-'Annabi began his career as a *qadi*, or Muslim judge. He started his diplomatic career in the tumultuous times following the Exmouth expedition of 1816, going to both Morocco and Istanbul.

In 1826, while he was in Egypt, he penned a work entitled *al-Sa'i al-mahmud fi nizam al-junud* (The Praiseworthy Effort in the Organization of Soldiers).[93] In it he brought to bear his skills in Islamic jurisprudence to argue that there was no contradiction between extensive change in the domains of ideas and organization and the principles of Islam. Indeed, the need to protect Muslim countries from economic and political decline and from foreign conquest required such changes. He placed particular emphasis on military reorganization, a reflection of his experience in Algeria watching the increasingly dysfunctional role of the Janissaries, and his observation in Egypt of the changes in military organization instituted by Muhammad 'Ali.

While Ibn al-'Annabi was producing this forward-looking vision, Husain Dey was venting his wrath against the Europeans and particularly against the British. In a letter to the Ottoman sultan, he denounced British "wicked, satanic schemes" to spread word about the "New Order" that would lead to the disbanding of the Janissaries, sending copies of an announcement from their base in Malta to tribal leaders in Algeria. He implied that the British for some time had pursued such schemes to subvert tribal leaders for their own purposes.[94] The implication here may be that the British had tried a similar scheme in helping to incite the Darqawa revolts of 1804–6, which had been aimed at dismantling the Ottoman order. The chronic unrest in the countryside, both in the east and the west,[95] was compounded by a major earthquake in 1825 that destroyed the city of Blida, just to the south of Algiers, reportedly killing all but three hundred of its approximately fifteen thousand residents.[96]

Husain's comments help to elucidate why Ibn al-'Annabi wrote his call for reform in Egypt—such a call would not have been tolerated in Husain's Algeria. Nevertheless, Ibn al-'Annabi had returned to Algeria by the time of the French conquest in 1830, and he took the position of *shaikh al-Islam*, a position in which he could independently set forth authoritative Islamic judicial responses to whatever questions might arise. He spoke out forcefully against the French seizure and destruction of property in the city, and by 1832, he was expelled from the country by the French commander, Marshal Clauzel. The position of *shaikh al-Islam* was abolished, eliminating any national level judicial authority until a short-lived national-level council was created in 1866.[97] He went to live in Alexandria, where there was a large community of Algerian exiles. He was appointed by Muhammad 'Ali as *qadi* of the Hanafi rite for Alexandria. He lived on there until his death in 1851.

A key factor in the development of these new ideas is that both Hamdan Khodja and Ibn al-'Annabi had extensive experience outside of Algeria. This was facilitated by their Kulughli background, which gave them a wide perspective and helped them establish connections outside of Algeria. At the same time, however, it limited their ability to appeal to public opinion within Algeria.

The Search for an International Legal Framework for Transforming Algeria

At the same time that these Algerian thinkers were looking for a new way forward, Europeans were also debating the future of Algeria. Ideas for a multinational expedition to occupy Algeria and transform it, bringing in European settlers but also improving the lives of native people, were initially put forward by Edward Blaquiere, an English Royal Navy officer and the son of a

French aristocrat who had taken refuge in England. Blaquiere was an enthusiastic supporter of Jeremy Bentham—who, as noted above, was also engaged in discussions with Hasuna Daghies. It was Blaquiere who translated from Italian Filippo Pananti's *Narrative of a Residence in Algiers*, published in 1818. He had extensive experience around the Mediterranean, including in Tunis. His vision for transforming Algeria needs to be seen as part of a larger vision for transforming the Mediterranean region. In the 1820s, Blaquiere would be an outspoken advocate for Greek independence, a project that may have distracted him from his earlier focus on North Africa.[98]

But others carried forward the idea for a multinational invasion. In 1826, the same year as Ibn al-'Annabi penned his call for widespread reform, in France a continuation of Abbé Raynal's famous work on global transformations was published. One section of the work dealt with Algeria. This work drew extensively on English sources, such as Pananti's *Narrative of a Residence in Algiers*, and made frequent reference to Sir Sidney Smith, the Royal Navy Officer who championed the cause of abolishing slavery. It formulated an argument that later would become incorporated into much French commentary on Algeria: under Muslim rule, this territory was in serious decline, failing to fulfill its potential in terms of economic productivity or population. It suffered from tyrannical rule and slavery. A solution lay in a multinational European expedition, carried out by an organization called the "Universal League," portrayed as a new, secular version of the Order of the Knights of Malta. It was to take over the territory and introduce progress. Jacques Peuchet, author of the extended version of Raynal, did have one reservation, however. Such a venture, while justified in terms of high principle, might easily devolve into brutal oppression and exploitation, in which case it should not be carried out.[99]

Yet another work published in 1826 was that of William Shaler, the American consul in Algiers from 1815 to 1824, who had observed the regency through some of its most difficult years. His conclusion was that the Ottoman regime was no longer viable and that a European takeover was in order. Like some English observers at this time, he called for a multinational venture, and settlement of surplus European population. He advanced the argument that North Africa was a good terrain for European settlement because Europeans could assimilate the local population through intermarriage, which they could not do with black Africans. Shaler referred here to the American South, but he may also have had in mind the English settlement project in the Eastern Cape region of South Africa that was under way at this time.[100]

Proposals for a multinational venture in Algeria stirred little enthusiasm. But Shaler's book received a positive reception in France, where it was translated and published in 1830.[101] If Shaler expressed greater confidence about a

French venture in Algeria than did the extended version of Abbé Raynal, one might explain it by his American point of view. The very year that the crisis with Tripoli flared up, 1803, was marked by another far more important event, the Louisiana Purchase. By the 1820s, new settlers would be pouring westward, opening up a vast new area for agricultural production. The diminishing transport costs resulting from coal-powered ships and trains opened up vast new possibilities for the supply of urban markets.

Algeria had bright prospects for grain exports to Europe during the era of good weather in Algeria and high prices in Europe that prevailed in the 1780s and 1790s. By the time the French had consolidated their control over Algeria in the 1850s, the rationale of Algeria as a place of settlement for surplus population and a source of food had considerably diminished. Colonial Algeria took on new roles for France as a source of manpower, first military and then, by the early 1900s, industrial, and as a strategic base for expansion into North Africa and the Sahara. Both tasks would be complicated due to the fact that by the mid-nineteenth century there were numerous communities of Algerians living in exile—in Syria, the Hijaz, Egypt, Cyrenaica, Tripoli, Tunisia, and Morocco—who could use their influence to challenge French authority within Algeria and complicate its plans for expansion. And they could forge alliances with major powers seeking to create problems for France, just as Ibn al-Ahrash had done when he won support for his schemes from British officers in Egypt following the expulsion of Napoleon.

2

Colonial-Era Border Crossing, 1830–1911

The French colonial conquest dramatically reshaped patterns of Algerian border crossing. Force, or resistance to force, was a major factor in the movement of Algerians to other Muslim territories. At the outset, the French expelled the Janissaries based in Algiers to Anatolia, and they soon banished individuals, such as Muhammad Ibn al-'Annabi, whom they saw as closely associated with the old regime.[1] Many Algerians fled as *muhajirs*, or refugees, fleeing infidel conquest, heading for Morocco, Tunis, Tripoli, or the Middle East, with their most important concentration emerging in Damascus.

It can be useful to distinguish between the classical model of *hijra*, where devout Muslims take refuge among tribal peoples living beyond the control of a central state, and the modern phenomenon of the refugee or exile who flees or is expelled to a territory controlled by a friendly, or at least accepting central government. The classical *muhajir* can tap into the '*asabiya*, or solidarity of tribal people, adding a unifying religious dimension. But the refugee or exile comes to a territory already under the control of a government with its own goals and interests.

As the colonial regime became well established in the second half of the nineteenth century, the French enrolled Algerians in new forms of border crossing to serve French imperial interests around the world and to promote France's policy of cultural assimilation within Algeria. The English, who had been in many ways the most important European power in Algeria from the early 1800s to the mid-1820s, were now present mainly as exotic-destination tourists.[2] By the 1870s, Germany had become the most likely source of support in Europe for the Algerian struggle against the French.

France's policy toward the most prominent Algerian refugee of this era, Amir 'Abd al-Qadir, was deeply ambivalent. They sought to cultivate his goodwill to further French projects in the Middle East, such as the building of the Suez Canal. By this time, 'Abd al-Qadir had become a powerful symbolic figure, much like his contemporary Imam Shamil, leader of the resistance against

Russia's expansion in the Caucasus.[3] But as a refugee dependent on the good grace of imperial powers, it was difficult to tap into that symbolic power to obtain substantive political results.

In the second and third generations, 'Abd al-Qadir's family became split into pro- and anti-French factions. Maternal ties often contributed to the different choices. There was extensive travel and communication linking the Damascus refugees to Algeria, contributing to occasional upheavals, but also connecting Algeria to new intellectual developments in the East. A figure who comes closer to the classical model of the *muhajir* is Muhammad Bin 'Ali al-Sanusi, who left Algeria in the late 1820s and eventually established a Sufi order based in the remote area of Cyrenaica, in what is now eastern Libya.

Within Algeria, particularly in the major cities of Algiers and Constantine, an old pattern of movement of workers and merchants from and back to rural areas and oases continued through the first decades of the colonial era. The *barrani* communities were organized into groups based on their region of origin and had leaders who reported to the French administration. With the transition to civilian rule in the 1870s, the growing number of European workers in the cities, and imports of manufactured goods that displaced traditional crafts, the *barrani* corporations were disbanded. But this migration pattern was soon transplanted to France. The migration of Algerian workers to France, which began in the 1890s, was initially limited mainly to the Kabyles, from the mountain area southeast of Algiers. As for *barranis* from the oases of southeastern Algeria, Tunis became a popular destination, especially for Souafa from the El Oued region. The Biskra region produced an important number of *muhajirs*, fleeing to both Tunisia and the Hijaz.[4]

Closely related to the question of labor migration is that of military recruitment. Under colonial rule, earlier patterns of local military recruitment were retained and modified, with the creation of the *tirailleurs indigènes*. It was these Algerians who had the most intensive experience of crossing borders in the years before the First World War, serving everywhere from Mexico to Vietnam. The experience in Morocco in 1906–12 helped lead to the imposition of military conscription on Algerian Muslims in 1912, a measure that would have far-reaching ramifications.

An important element in understanding patterns of labor migration and military recruitment is demography and epidemiology. Plague had been the most important epidemiological factor in the late Ottoman era, posing a threat primarily in urban areas. Cholera burst onto the scene in the mid-1830s, and unlike plague, it moved easily into the countryside as it was transmitted through the infection of water sources. Cholera combined with famine in the late 1860s to produce a sharp drop in the native population of Algeria. Yet that

population had resumed growth by the 1880s, and this growth of population, combined with the deterioration of traditional urban economies and rural poverty, would set the stage for new patterns of migration.

Only limited effort was put into the training of Algerian doctors, with about a dozen completing their training in France by 1914.[5] These doctors, however, would assume a role disproportionate to their number as cultural and political spokesmen for their fellow Algerian Muslims from the 1880s through 1914. They helped initiate an important stream of discussion in Algeria focusing on how the study of science could facilitate the engagement of Muslims in contributing to the development of modern civilization, rather than simply making them a subordinate element in a European nation's empire.

Colonial-Era Refuge Seeking and Return: The Complexities of *Hijra*

The idea of *hijra* goes back to the earliest days of Islam, when the Prophet Muhammad and his companions fled from the oppression of the dominant Quraysh in Mecca. For Muslims in Ottoman Algeria, it was a term that evoked more recent events. Especially in coastal cities, many prominent families were descended from Muslims who had fled or been expelled from Andalus. And just as in fourteenth-century Andalus, the proposition that conquest of one's territory by Christians required that one undertake *hijra* was a complex and debatable proposition.[6]

One problem with the proposition that *hijra* was obligatory was a practical one. It might involve risk if the conqueror did not permit such movement, as eventually was the case in Algeria. It might prove difficult to carry one's property with one, as a group of pastoralists found in 1860 when they tried to leave with their hundreds of animals, but had many animals stolen as they made their way to the border.[7] And one had to find a destination where one could find a suitable economic and social niche. This depended to a large extent on social networks rooted in kinship ties or membership in a Sufi order. Another side of the debate was more political. Would it not best serve the interests of Islam and the Muslim community to stay in the land under infidel rule and do everything possible to protect Muslim interests, especially if the ruling power respected Islamic law and religious practice? Moreover, local regimes in Morocco and in Ottoman Syria might find problems in the presence of Algerians, especially in large groups, in their territory. The Ottomans often were struggling to accommodate larger refugee flows from newly independent Balkan lands and from territories in the Caucasus region that were being incorporated into the growing Russian Empire.[8]

Many of these considerations were raised in a vigorous debate over the obligation of *hijra* during 'Abd al-Qadir's resistance to the French. The leading figure in the argument against it being obligatory was the Maliki mufti of Algiers, Mustafa Bin al-Kababti—who himself would eventually become a *muhajir*. The argument for *hijra* was set forth by the amir's secretary, Qaddur Bin Ruwila, who had left the city of Algiers at the time of the French conquest.[9] The context of debate changed after the surrender of 'Abd al-Qadir when the meaning of *hijra* clearly shifted from leaving French-occupied territory to join the resistance forces, to leaving the territory of Algeria for another Muslim land.

An additional problem in the study of Algerian refugees is that it can be difficult to define who was a *muhajir* and had presumably broken all connections with France. At least up to the 1880s, Algerians living outside Algeria often had no clear legal status, and they could invoke their status as French subjects when it was convenient. For instance, in Tunis, it became common for Algerian women to go to a French court to secure a judgment of divorce—divorce under Islamic law, of which the French judges had only a dim understanding. Tunisian notaries refused to recognize the validity of these judgments, prompting an interesting debate on what it really meant to be both "French" and "Muslim."[10]

Phases in the Movement of Refugees

With the surrender of Algiers to the French on July 5, 1830, an agreement was signed promising respect for the lives, property, and religion of the inhabitants. But within a short time the French were violating these agreements. They tore up the cemetery outside Bab el-Oued, the gate on the western side of the city. They took over houses where it suited them, for instance to make a drill ground for their troops on what is now the Place des Martyrs, the large plaza next to the New Mosque. Perhaps most dramatic was the takeover of the Katshawa Mosque in 1834, to make it into a church. In a vain effort at resistance, Muslims barricaded themselves inside the mosque.[11]

Some of Algiers' civilian leaders resisted from the outset, including Muhammad Ibn al-'Annabi, the mufti of the Hanafi tradition. The French expelled him, and he went to Egypt, where he already had some experience, writing his book on military reform there in 1826. Mustafa al-Kababti, the mufti of the majority Maliki tradition in Algiers, had initially opposed calls for *hijra*. But as the French imposed measures to teach French in Islamic schools and to impose their control over the Islamic religious establishment, he found himself in an impossible situation. The final blow was the French decision in 1843 to annex religious endowment (*waqf*) properties to the state-controlled Domaine. This

measure of confiscation gave the French colonial administration direct control over mosques and appointment to religious offices. Kababti refused to accept this, provoking the rage of the military administration. He was expelled and went to join his fellow mufti, Ibn al-'Annabi, in Alexandria.[12]

During the turbulent period of the early years of the French conquest, there were some Algerians who initially fled to neighboring Muslim lands, but then, as the French consolidated their control and as they found limited opportunities in their lands of refuge, they came back to Algeria. Al-Hajj Ahmad Sharif al-Zahhar came back from Morocco to live in Algiers and write his lively historical narrative. A French report of 1847 noted that many Algerian refugees who had fled to Morocco wished to return to Algeria. They came mainly from the more prosperous tribes of the Oranais, and the women in particular resented their impoverishment in Morocco.[13]

Tunisia offered a more hospitable environment. Because it, too, had been an Ottoman province, it offered a familiar environment to Algerians. Also, there were well-established patterns of trade between Tunisia and the Algerian east, especially the oases of the Souf and Biskra. While there were notable instances of flight from Algeria to Tunisia, there was also a movement back and forth of merchants, workers, and students. For those Algerians strongly committed to their ties with the Ottoman Empire, Tripoli was the logical destination, especially after the reassertion of direct Ottoman control in 1835.

There were numerous incidents of group migration heading to Syria. The first of these occurred at the end of the Ottoman period and was not, properly speaking, *hijra*, but rather should be termed travel for military service. Facing a serious challenge from Muhammad 'Ali's Egypt, and having just abolished the Janissary corps, the Ottomans recruited troops from the mountains of eastern Algeria to serve in the defense of Syria. Later, they were assigned the task of guarding the *hajj* caravan heading from Damascus to the Hijaz. According to one report, there were one thousand soldiers in this group.[14] These soldiers were recruited from the Zuwawa people of eastern Algeria, a subgroup of the Kabyles, a people who would also be among the *muhajirs* who came to Syria after 1847.[15]

After the initial consolidation of French control, there were periodic waves of *muhajirs* coming out of Algeria at times of political or economic crisis. The years from 1864 to 1871 were marked by continual crisis: first a revolt in 1864, accompanied by cholera and famine that devastated the population; and then another revolt in 1871, at the end of the Franco-Prussian War. There was a new wave of movement in the late 1880s, set off in part by the application of measures to bring the Algerian Muslim population under closer control, requiring that they be registered under the État Civil.

In 1893, there was a surge of *muhajirs* heading toward Mecca, accompanied by rumors that the Mahdi would appear at the pilgrimage and launch the redemption of Muslim societies, a theme promoted by the Sanusiyya through the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[16] There was further movement to Mecca in 1896. *Muhajirs* who settled in the Hijaz tended to come from the oasis region of Biskra, notably from the town of Sidi 'Uqba. Movement from this region was driven by several factors, including a sharp reduction in the number of mosques, conflicts over water management, and a growing European presence stemming from the arrival of the railway in the 1880s.[17] The most dramatic wave of *hijra* would start in 1911 as a result of the imposition of military conscription and support for the cause of Pan-Islam stirred by the Italian invasion of Libya.[18] But the application of conscription would ultimately move far more Algerians to the battlefields of France than opposition to it moved them as refugees to the east.

Muhajirs adapted to their new social and political environments in different ways. Some became absorbed into their new environments. Ahmad al-Zuwawi's family came originally from the Lesser Kabylia. His parents took refuge in Mecca, where he was born. He was raised there following the locally dominant Shafi'i tradition rather than the Maliki, which prevailed in Algeria. In 1906, when Sharif 'Aun became the local ruler of Mecca, Ahmad al-Zuawawi found himself a target of a new campaign to eliminate the influence of smaller Sufi orders. He took refuge in Java, in the Dutch East Indies—where the Shafi'i rite also prevailed. Under Sharif Husain, he would become the Shafi'i mufti of Mecca, and the vice president of the Arab Senate.[19] Clearly, he had become closely involved in the local scene, in both political and religious terms.

But many refugees did maintain a sense of identity and community. Ahmad Tawfiq al-Madani, in his autobiography, *Hayat kifah* (A Life of Struggle), recounts a story that is quite revealing in this respect. Madani was descended on his father's side from refugees from Granada in Spain. On his mother's side, he was descended from a Turkish Janissary who had died fighting against the French attack on Algiers in 1830. His forebears had fled east from Algiers in 1830 to the mountainous rural region of Jurjura. After taking part in the Muqrani rebellion of 1871, they came to Tunis. On an occasion shortly before the French takeover of Tunisia in 1881, the prime minister, Mustafa Bin Isma'il, sent word that he wished to marry Madani's father's sister. His father responded with a decisive refusal; he then went out to buy a gun and stood at his front door ready to shoot anyone who came to take his sister. When he needed rest, his sister took the gun and guarded herself. After a few days, a member of the Algerian refugee community proposed marriage, and his proposal was accepted.[20]

The underlying theme here is the tensions that could arise between prominent members of the Algerian *muhajir* community and the local political elite. The Algerians might secure advantages by forming local marriage ties. But this would dilute the solidarity of the Algerian refugee community and might weaken their dedication to returning to an independent Algeria. This theme would also come up in the experience of Algerians in Damascus, a community centered around Amir ʻAbd al-Qadir.

ʻAbd al-Qadir and the Algerian Refugee Community in Syria

ʻAbd al-Qadir began his development as a cosmopolitan figure at a young age. It was probably in late 1826 that he set off with his father on the pilgrimage to Mecca, going overland to Tunis, then by boat to Cairo. From there, they joined a caravan to Mecca, and after the *hajj*, they went up to Damascus, and then on to Baghdad, home of the tomb of the founder of the Qadiriyya Sufi order, of which his family were members. The experience opened ʻAbd al-Qadir's eyes to political and military change: he was in Muhammad ʻAli's Egypt at virtually the same time as fellow Algerian Muhammad Ibn al-ʻAnnabi was writing his treatise on military reform there. It also deepened his understanding of spiritual themes. In Damascus, he visited the tomb of Ibn ʻArabi, a great mystic of the 1300s, who would take on great meaning to ʻAbd al-Qadir during his long exile in Damascus.[21]

Resistance Leadership and Chivalric Image

ʻAbd al-Qadir's career as a political leader began when he was only twenty-four, in 1832. The French takeover of Algiers set off a complex chain of events in the west, beginning with the request of the Moorish community of Tlemcen to come under the suzerainty of the Moroccan sultan, and the ensuing conflict with the Kulughlis of that city. As it became clear that Moroccan Sultan Mawlay ʻAbd al-Rahman could not exercise effective control in the province of Oran, three major tribal groups launched the project of creating their own political authority. ʻAbd al-Qadir's father, Mahi al-Din, proclaimed that he was too old for the job, so it was the young ʻAbd al-Qadir who became amir, a position that initially was seen as subordinate to the sultan of Morocco.[22]

Thanks to his geographic location, ʻAbd al-Qadir could get in touch with the British, based in nearby Gibraltar, to gain both diplomatic insights and modern arms.[23] Though British aid did help to stave off the French conquest for a while, the more enduring British contribution lies in the image that was created of ʻAbd al-Qadir. A key figure here is Charles Henry Churchill, who was serving as an army officer in Portugal and Spain during the Carlist insurrection

in the 1830s, then moved on to a career as a consul in Syria and Lebanon. He first met 'Abd al-Qadir on a visit to Bursa, in Anatolia, in 1853. When the amir made his entry to Lebanon in 1855, he stopped by to visit Churchill. In the 1860s, Churchill would listen to 'Abd al-Qadir tell the story of his life, and he put it into a book published in 1867.[24]

Churchill's presentation of 'Abd al-Qadir reflects a weaving together of romantic themes that came to prevail in England at the height of 'Abd al-Qadir's career, particularly Thomas Carlyle's hero worship, with political ideals of universal values. The preface to the book was written by Robert Saint John, the man who had been British consul in Algiers in the early years of the French occupation and had worked to promote Hamdan Khodja's idea of French withdrawal together with the establishment of a new independent, progressive government in Algeria.

Navigating the Political and Diplomatic Tides of Exile

When he surrendered to the French in late 1847, 'Abd al-Qadir thought he had secured an agreement to let him go into exile in the east, in either Alexandria or the Hijaz.[25] But French authorities reneged on this agreement and took him and his retinue first to a prison in Toulon, then to a more luxurious captivity at the Château d'Amboise near Tours. Through his four years of captivity in France, 'Abd al-Qadir received a constant stream of dignitaries from all walks of life who would come to talk with him about every conceivable topic. This helped to build 'Abd al-Qadir's image in France, and it also helped him to build his understanding of Europeans and how to deal with them. He was able to use these skills to persuade the new Emperor Napoleon III to allow him to go into exile in the city of Bursa, near the coast of Anatolia in 1852. 'Abd al-Qadir arrived in Bursa with the family members and entourage who had been with him through his captivity in France. He soon began to draw a stream of visitors from Algeria.[26]

'Abd al-Qadir's carefully crafted political and social strategy in Bursa was captured by Fanny Blunt, daughter of the British consul, Daniel Sandison. Her mother, Mary Zohrab, was the daughter of a Persian refugee father and a mother from a Venetian aristocratic family. Blunt told the story of Allal, a young nephew of 'Abd al-Qadir, who had been with him in France, where he had learned French and adapted to French upper-class social norms. In Bursa, he liked to attend dances at the British consulate. One day he joined Fanny and her sisters for a horse ride. When 'Abd al-Qadir encountered them, he turned to face a wall to avoid viewing this shameful scene. Shortly after this, Allal was locked up for a week in prison.[27]

During 'Abd al-Qadir's three years in Bursa there were dramatic developments

in the Middle East. The Crimean War broke out in 1854, and the British and French both rode to the rescue to prevent further Russian advances in the region. This was the first occasion on which the French used Algerian Muslim troops outside of Algeria. In the wake of the war, the sultan's European friends pressured him to enact a package of reforms, the Hatt-i-Humayun, which gave full rights to religious minorities living within the empire.

As if to underscore the far-reaching political changes about to take place, an earthquake devastated the city of Bursa in 1855. 'Abd al-Qadir was able to make use of this event to persuade the French to let him move to a new, more congenial home, in Damascus, at the end of 1855. There was already a considerable Algerian community in the region. The first major group of those fleeing the French conquest was led by Ahmad al-Tayyib Bin Salim, one of the leading officers serving under the amir, who came in 1847. A group belonging to the Rahmaniyya Sufi order, led by al-Mahdi al-Saklawi, arrived from Dellys, in eastern Algeria, in 1853. Many from the same region were settled in rural areas in Syria and in northern Palestine.[28] French financial assistance permitted 'Abd al-Qadir to pay off his debts and build marriage ties with members of the Syrian elite, provoking the resentment of his senior wife, Lalla Khaira, who was from Algeria.[29] He also invested extensively in land and had a major role in promoting agricultural exports to Britain and France.[30]

With his heroic reputation, and with his links to both Britain and France, he was difficult for the Ottoman authorities to control. An event in 1860 confirmed their worst fears and consolidated his heroic image in Europe. The reforms of 1856 had set in motion intercommunal conflicts in Lebanon and Syria, pitting Druze against Christians.[31] 'Abd al-Qadir intervened, at the head of his own Algerian militia, to protect the Christians. This won for him great admiration in France at a time when the Catholic church was seeking to extend its influence in the Middle East, and the French saw Orthodox Christian Russia as their chief rival.[32]

When the Ottoman authorities made the people of Damascus contribute to an indemnity payment to compensate the Christian victims of violence, the Algerian community was exempted.[33] But they also began a policy of deliberately dispersing Algerian refugees to rural areas at some distance from Damascus.[34] News of 'Abd al-Qadir's heroic defense of Syrian Christians was circulated widely in the European press and contributed to his already-established heroic image.[35] Algerians, too, paid great attention to news of 'Abd al-Qadir and speculated that he would soon be appointed by the Ottoman sultan to govern Algeria. In this case, news was spread orally by travelers, then embellished as it circulated.[36]

His next major step was highly enigmatic. In 1863–64, he went to the Hijaz

for the pilgrimage and for a prolonged spiritual retreat. During this time a major revolt broke out in Algeria. There are no indications that ʿAbd al-Qadir instigated this revolt. Indeed, he acquiesced to the republication of a document originally issued in 1852, proclaiming that he would never again take up arms against the French.[37] The revolt was suppressed, but it made the French realize they needed to cultivate Muslim political support in Algeria, perhaps even creating there an "Arab kingdom" of their own design with ʿAbd al-Qadir at its head.[38]

When the amir emerged from his spiritual retreat, his relationship with France was at its apex. He came for a visit to Paris, was given a glamorous reception by the emperor, and visited the Universal Exposition. He also took the occasion to go on a side trip to England. France's main concern at this time was to secure permission from both the Egyptian khedive and the Ottoman sultan to proceed with construction of the Suez Canal. The amir had known Ferdinand De Lesseps, the chief proponent of the Suez project, since his internment in France in the years 1848–52. ʿAbd al-Qadir used his influence to help facilitate the project, beginning with his visit to Egypt on his way to the pilgrimage in 1863.[39]

It was at this time that a controversial event took place. On his return from the *hajj* through Egypt in 1864, he apparently visited a Masonic celebration in Alexandria, news of which received wide circulation in Europe. It is claimed that ʿAbd al-Qadir was actually initiated into the Masons on his visit to Paris in 1865. For those who see ʿAbd al-Qadir as a devout Muslim and the Freemasons as a secular, godless organization, this seems impossible. For those who see him as a key link between Islam and the West, a sort of spiritual equivalent of the Suez Canal, this is a very positive development.[40]

But the most useful way to look at this story is to examine it within the historical context of the years 1864–69, when it seemed that the French and ʿAbd al-Qadir might work out a formula for his reintroduction to Algeria. It was during this period that the French made a notable effort to win over the support of Algerian Muslim scholars, creating a new framework for Islamic law that gave the Muslim judiciary considerable autonomy in matters of family law.[41]

Such a vision of Franco-Muslim entente, however, had limited support in decision-making circles in France. In 1870, an alternative strategy for return to Algeria presented itself. As the French faced a disastrous military defeat at the hands of the Prussians, they sought to mobilize Algerian Muslim troops. It was resistance to this measure, a refusal by *spahi* cavalry forces near the town of Souk Ahras in the east Constantinois, in January 1871, that was the first act in what became a widespread rebellion centered in the mountains of eastern Algeria in 1871.[42]

Even before the outbreak of this rebellion, one of 'Abd al-Qadir's sons, Mahi al-Din, had set out for Algeria disguised as a merchant, traveling from Egypt to Malta to Tunis. He made his way from Tunis to the Algerian border, entering at the town of Tebessa, probably in October 1870. According to some sources, his trip was facilitated by the Germans. In Tunis, he linked up with Nasir Bin Shuhra, an Algerian long active in promoting rebellion who had ties to the sons of Hamdan Khodja, now living in Tripoli.[43] At the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War in August 1870, the French published a letter from 'Abd al-Qadir firmly rejecting a proposal from Bismarck that he support the Prussian cause. But the phrasing ("May your arrogant and unjust nation be buried in dust!") suggests the document was prepared by a French propagandist.[44]

After their surrender to the Prussians in early 1871, the French turned their attention to suppressing the Algerian insurgency. Mahi al-Din returned to the east, but had to stay away from Damascus because of the hostility of the French consul. He would become a leader of a staunchly pro-Ottoman faction among 'Abd al-Qadir's sons.

Second- and Third-Generation Muhajirs

As one moves to the next generations of 'Abd al-Qadir's family and the different political choices they made, one needs to develop a framework for explaining their choices. This should include the ties and commitments developed through schooling, military service, family and marriage links, and membership in associations.

The French made concerted efforts to recruit sons and grandsons of the amir to their own camp. The most notable case here was that of al-Hashimi, who became embroiled in a dispute with Ottoman authorities in 1892 and took refuge in the French consulate in Beirut. Born shortly before 'Abd al-Qadir's surrender to the French, he was the son of an Algerian black woman. In Damascus, she seems to have worked as a servant for Lalla Khaira. While his brothers forged marriage ties with the Syrian elite, and his sisters married within the extended family or the local Algerian community, he married a Circassian refugee. Initially, the consul urged him to go to Egypt. But the French finally relented and allowed him to come to Algeria with his family, staying first in Algiers, then in the remote setting of Bou Saada, at the edge of the Sahara in eastern Algeria, far from the amir's home base of Mascara. Once he was settled, al-Hashimi decided to marry a twice-widowed woman from the Bu Talib family, who were relatives of the amir, presumably to enhance his prestige and connections within Algeria. This prompted his Circassian wife to return to Syria.

His sons, Khalid and Mustafa, were admitted to the Lycée Louis le Grand, a

prestigious secondary school in Paris, in 1893. They had been prepared for this experience by their study with French Catholic priests of the Lazarist order in Damascus.[45] From the lycée, they went on to study at the French military academy Saint Cyr. They were exempted from the requirement that they become French citizens, a measure applied to Algerians who became French army officers. Mustafa would die in 1905, but Khalid went on to an eventful military, then political career.

There was also a third path that 'Abd al-Qadir and the Algerian refugees in Damascus might pursue: to support autonomy, and ultimately independence for the Arab provinces. The idea of 'Abd al-Qadir as head of an "Arab kingdom" could be incorporated into this plan. When calls for "decentralization" of the Ottoman Empire were first raised, following the suspension of the short-lived Ottoman constitution, in 1877, 'Abd al-Qadir seemed to support them. But the amir was in an ambiguous position: he supported decentralization, but he also felt a loyalty to the Ottoman ruler. Midhat Pasha, the local Ottoman governor, proved adept at keeping the situation under control, however, channeling forces of change in directions compatible with Ottoman interests, as illustrated by his promotion of the educational reform efforts of Tahir al-Jaza'iri.

Tahir's father, Salah, had emigrated to Damascus from the mountains of eastern Algeria in the mid-1840s.[46] Like many others in the Algerian *muhajir* community of Damascus, he was of Zuwawa origin.[47] In Damascus, Salah was named mufti for the Maliki rite and took up a career as a teacher.

Tahir pursued a diverse educational course, studying traditional Islamic fields and getting a modern education in a government school. A key influence on him was the Muslim scholar 'Abd al-Ghani al-Ghunaymi, who led him to a vision of the pure Islam of the early days, a vision that rejected Sufism. Tahir mastered numerous languages, including Arabic, Turkish, Farsi, and French. By the late 1870s, he was emerging as a major figure in the promotion of modern education and in the collection and preservation of manuscripts. He also founded a charitable society aimed at raising funds for schools. Initially, he was supported by the Ottoman authorities in Damascus, who appointed him as inspector of schools.

But by 1886, he had fallen out of favor. He was dismissed as school inspector, then quit his teaching position to assert his independence. He lived frugally and put forth his ideas in a study circle that included some figures who would later go on to prominent careers in Syrian politics. They also included military officers, among them Tahir's nephew Salim al-Jaza'iri, whom he had raised himself and steered toward a military career.[48] Tahir's major goals included the promotion of modern education, stressing the idea that science was perfectly compatible with Islam, and restoring the Constitution of 1876, which would

give Syria a degree of autonomy. It should also be noted that he was initiated as a Freemason.

As well as supporting political change in Syria, he contributed to calls for *hijra* from Algeria, a cause promoted in a newspaper launched in Beirut, *al-Muhajir*, edited by Muhammad Bin Shattah.[49] As he supported the Decentralization Party in Syria, Tahir al-Jaza'iri was pressured to take refuge in Egypt, where he went in 1907.

It was in Cairo, in 1910, that there first emerged an organization that aimed at promoting North African independence and unity, al-Ittihad al-Maghribi. It was founded by Salah Yusuf, editor of the newspaper *al-Muayyad*. Its appearance was contemporaneous with that of another organization sponsored by Ottoman authorities, the Society of Algerian-Tunisian Brotherhood, founded by Salah al-Sharif and Isma'il Safayahi, which promoted a view that was Pan-Islamist rather than nationalist.[50] In the short run, Pan-Islamist ideas would have the greatest impact in efforts to undermine the French war effort. But the First World War would demonstrate the ineffectiveness of Pan-Islamism, and its liability to be manipulated by great powers for their own purposes. In the longer term, the nationalist approach would prove more effective. Cairo would become the most important center for advocating not only the end of French colonial rule in the Maghrib, but the unification of the region—a role that Cairo had arguably initiated, at least in rudimentary form, a century earlier with the Darqawa revolt.

Kinship and Marriage Networks of 'Abd al-Qadir's Family

To unravel the links that 'Abd al-Qadir maintained with Algeria throughout his exile, one needs to look at his kinship and marriage connections, and particularly at the family descended from his father's brother 'Ali Bu Talib. This family not only provided 'Abd al-Qadir and his Damascus-based family with connections in Algeria and Morocco. In a sense, they served as a mirror image. While 'Abd al-Qadir, his sons, and his grandsons clearly had political aspirations, and in several cases were trained as military officers, the Bu Talibs for the most part stayed in the religious domain, serving as Muslim judges in Algeria. One of their relatives, 'Abd al-Qadir al-Majjawi, became an important Muslim intellectual figure there.

While ties with the Bu Talibs helped maintain the links of 'Abd al-Qadir's family to Algeria, the family also developed local ties in Syria through marriage. 'Abd al-Qadir's son 'Ali married the sister of Ahmad Izzat Pasha al-'Abid, a prominent Damascus political figure who served as second secretary under Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid and was a prominent figure in promoting the Hijaz

Railway project. In 1908, with the fall of 'Abd al-Hamid, he would take up exile in Paris, then in Cairo, where he would have a role in the intricate maneuvering between the French, the British, and Sharif Husain. Indeed, it seems to have been Ahmad Izzat Pasha al-'Abid who, in 1914, originally suggested the project of making Husain head of an Arab kingdom. In Cairo in 1915, he would host his nephew, 'Abd al-Qadir Bin 'Ali not long before 'Abd al-Qadir went off to his fateful encounter with T. E. Lawrence.[51]

'Ali Bu Talib's offspring included Lalla Khaira, who was 'Abd al-Qadir's first wife, and Zuhra, who married his brother Mustafa.[52] 'Ali's son Ahmad served as a *khuja*, or secretary to 'Abd al-Qadir, then as the chief of the Flittas tribe. But by the early 1840s he took refuge in Morocco, coming to live in Tetouan, where he barely eked out a living. Soon after 'Abd al-Qadir's surrender, he asked the French consul in Tetouan, Léon Roches, for permission to return to Mascara. This was denied.

The Bu Talibs: Choosing French or German Alliances

As the French began to implement their first systematic organization of the Muslim courts in Algeria, Ahmad saw an opportunity. He asked for appointment as a *qadi*, or Muslim judge. His request was soon granted, and he was appointed as *qadi* of Setif, a new urban center created by the French in eastern Algeria.[53] The choice of location was highly significant. It was far removed from the family's home turf in the Mascara region of western Algeria. It was also close to the very critical region where land routes between Algiers and Constantine passed, a setting for major rebellions, including one to come in 1871. The dominant Sufi order was the Rahmaniyya, which had a frequent role in mobilizing popular forces against the government, be it Ottoman or French—and which had strong ties to the Algerian *muhajir* community in Damascus. As a Muslim judge, Ahmad Bu Talib would be dealing with issues of property rights in a politically sensitive region.[54] Ahmad's appointment was the beginning of a stream of Bu Talibs coming into Algeria and finding positions in the Muslim judiciary.[55]

No doubt the most colorful member of the Bu Talib family was Ahmad's son 'Ali. He apparently served briefly in the *tirailleurs indigènes* in the early 1860s. He then took up a life of travel and adventure that took him to Paris, Damascus, Baghdad, and India. He finally ended up in Morocco, where he served as an interpreter for the German explorer Dr. Oskar Lenz on his voyage to Timbuktu in 1878–79. The French saw him as a shady character who used his connection to 'Abd al-Qadir and his personal charm to do everything from pedaling amulets to women to selling to the German consul in Tangier his services as a go-between to secure mining rights from the Moroccan sultan. In

cultivating relations with the Germans, he helped prepare the venture of 'Abd al-Qadir's youngest son, Malik.[56]

Born in 1869, Malik followed a career as an Ottoman army officer but fell out of favor in Istanbul in 1901, apparently because of his "compromising relations" with dissident Kurds.[57] He then set off for Morocco, where he joined in rebellions, first that of Bu 'Amama, then Bu Himara. He found both "too individualistic" so he offered his services to Moroccan Sultan 'Abd al-'Aziz. At one point, in 1908, he fell afoul of 'Abd al-Aziz's rival, Hafidh, and was imprisoned in Fez. He was rescued by his nephew Khalid, now a French army officer, who came to Fez disguised as a muleteer.[58] He then went to Tangier, where he served as inspector of police. When the war broke out in 1914, he was taking a health cure at the spas of Vichy in France. By 1915, he would be leading a revolt against the French, with German help, in Morocco.

Still another branch of the Bu Talib family stemmed from 'Abd al-Qadir Bu Talib, who was known for his opposition to the amir and his support for the Darqawa brotherhood.[59] His grandson Ahmad al-Mujahid studied in Tunis in the 1850s with the renowned Shaykh Muhammad Bayram al-Kabir. When his mother, a cousin of the amir, died in Cairo in 1864, he went to Damascus, where he studied with 'Abd al-Qadir and other prominent scholars. He returned to Algeria, where he served as *qadi* of Setif, then lived for a while in Algiers, developing ties with prominent scholars and religious officials in that city. Of all the numerous Bu Talibs in this generation, it was he who seems to have had the best scholarly credentials, the closest ties to the amir, and the widest network of contacts among Algerian Muslim scholars, including his relative through marriage 'Abd al-Qadir al-Majjawi.

Abd al-Qadir al-Majjawi: Bringing Science from the Arab East

Majjawi came from a family of scholars in Tlemcen, where he was born in 1848. When he was a child, his family became refugees in Morocco, living first in Tangier, then going to study in the more austere environment of Tetouan. Like Ahmad al-Mujahid, he spent some time studying in Damascus in the 1860s. It was most likely his link to the Bu Talibs that brought him to the city of Constantine in 1869, first as a private teacher, then as a teacher in the government-run Médersa, in 1878.

Just before that appointment, in late 1877, he had published a pamphlet in Cairo, entitled *Irshad al-Mut'allamin* (Guidance for the Educated). This pamphlet articulated a view very similar to that of the emerging movement of cultural renewal in Syria and Egypt. His views were much like those of Tahir al-Jaza'iri, and it may well not be a coincidence that the time of the publication of Majjawi's pamphlet coincided with Tahir al-Jaza'iri launching his program

for educational reform in Syria. Majjawi decried the intellectual and cultural inferiority into which Algerians had fallen. He challenged the view that modern science was incompatible with Islam, putting forward the argument that science could indeed be used to prove God's existence.[60]

Majjawi's pamphlet aroused the ire of the more traditional segments of Muslim public opinion in Algeria, but it was pronounced "useful" by Robert Arnaud, a prominent French authority on native policy. Arnaud's approval was decried by a local French settler newspaper, *Le Progrès de l'Est*, which saw his position as undermining efforts to promote French culture in Algeria. Arabic culture, the author argued, should be left to wither away like Basque or Breton culture in France.[61]

Majjawi thus launched a crucial debate in Algeria. Central government officials responsible for native policy, at a time when France was working to expand its control and influence in Muslim North and West Africa, could see that the French needed to cultivate articulate Muslim spokesmen who could reconcile Islamic religious values and French interests. Though the influence of such officials was at a low point in the 1870s and 1880s, the situation had changed by the 1890s, when France's imperial expansion was running full throttle. At that point, Majjawi was brought to Algiers to play a prominent role in the Médersa Supérieur, housed in an elegant new building, one of several built in Algiers at this time in a neo-Mauresque style.[62]

Abu Bakr Bu Talib: Distinguished Siditoyen

Majjawi served as a teacher for Ahmad al-Mujahid's son Abu Bakr, who, like so many others in his family, went on to a judicial career. Abu Bakr also engaged in writing to support a progressive Franco-Muslim vision of Algeria in a book published in 1901. It was written in Arabic, and the Arabic title was *Rawdat al-akhbar wa nuzhat al-afkar* (The Garden of News and the Stroll through Ideas), a title formed in the traditional, poetic Arab style. The back cover had a French title, *Histoire de l'Algérie depuis l'occupation romaine jusqu'à 1900*. The book put forward conventional arguments that would be pleasing to the French administration. Turkish rule, after the glorious epic of Khair al-Din Barbarossa, he said, had descended into "tyranny and oppression." Algerians had become very "coarse" and did not know the "foundations of religion" (*usul al-din*). He praised the progress in education which the French had brought to Algeria, and he went on at great length about material progress, including the telegraph, tramways, and gas lighting. If Algerians suffered from poverty, he argued, it was up to them to take responsibility and begin saving, recognizing that unlike the capricious Turks, the French respected private property.[63]

For the French, Abu Bakr Bu Talib must have seemed a sign that their

policies were succeeding. By the early 1900s, a Muslim middle class was emerging—or, to be accurate, reemerging—in Algeria.[64] The French had fostered an Islamic judicial and educational establishment loyal to the colonial state. And they seemed to have tamed the historical heritage of 'Abd al-Qadir. A well-publicized visit in 1908 by Captain Khalid to the home of Abu Bakr in Blida, just south of Algiers, where he was serving as *qadi*, seemed to express this success.[65]

But in the decade preceding the outbreak of the First World War, two pieces of French legislation were enacted that would undermine this imperial synthesis. Both applied French republican principles. First, there was the separation of religion and state, enacted in 1905. The colonial administration endeavored to delay its application and minimize its effects in Algeria, but to no avail. Islamic voluntary associations, separate from both the colonial administration and from the Sufi tradition of hereditary religious authority, began to emerge before the First World War, and came into full flower by the 1920s. Second, there was the application of military conscription to Algerian Muslims in 1912. This law set off a new wave of *hijra* to the Middle East. It also would uproot a whole generation of young men from their traditional settings, leading some to traumatic ends, but others to new opportunities. Though Amir Khalid emerged as an important figure at the end of the war, conscription, along with broader social and political changes taking place, had seriously undermined the principle of hereditary power that Khalid embodied.[66]

This change of atmosphere was foreshadowed in November 1911. Abu Bakr Bu Talib was strolling on the Place de la Régence in downtown Algiers when he was the victim of an assassination attempt. The attempt may have been, as a Muslim newspaper of the day had it, "futile,"[67] but it can be seen as symptomatic of the changing atmosphere, one in which distinguished *notables indigènes* were increasingly mocked in the streets and cafes as "*siditoyens*."[68] This term, which might be translated as "sirtizen," conveyed the contradictory status of individuals who, as members of an elite, were admitted to the egalitarian status of citizen.

The Emergence of New Forms of Border Crossing

The tensions between members of the emerging urban native elite and members of rural immigrant communities reflected in the Bu Talib assassination attempt need to be seen in terms of changing patterns of movement of workers within Algeria, and factors that shaped the image of the new elite, many of whom were educated in France. As opportunities in the traditional urban craft economies faded, more Algerians were recruited into military service for

France, and then as workers in France. The imposition of military conscription in 1912 exposed not just elites but ordinary Algerians to life in France and raised the question of whether a democratic conception of citizenship could be applied to Algerian Muslims within the French system.

Internal Migration: The *Barrani* Communities

Internal migration of workers and merchants from mountain and oasis areas to cities of Algeria was shaped by a variety of factors. One of these was the patterns of demographic geography, which differed sharply between the eastern and western parts of Algeria. The migration of *barranis* to cities was found primarily in the eastern half of Algeria. There is considerable documentation on the large communities of Algiers and Constantine, both of which had some 4,000 to 5,000 *barranis*, divided into six different groups. But this form of migration is also documented for smaller cities in the center, including Blida, Médéa, and Miliana, and in the east, such as Guelma and La Calle.[69] The institution of *barrani* corporations seems to have been brought by the French to the Oranais, where there were fewer migrants, involving only two groups, workers from the Moroccan Rif, and Mzabi merchants.[70]

The eastern half of Algeria is more mountainous than the west. There are two major mountain areas, the Greater Kabylia and the Aurès. The mountains are rugged terrain, difficult for a central government to control. On the other hand, they catch rain. At the edge of the Sahara in the east, the runoff from the mountains helped support a string of oases, including the Mzab, Biskra, Ouargla, Touggurt, and the Souf oasis complex around El Oued.

The situation is reflected in a statistic: the east of Algeria at the outset of the colonial period had only 3 percent of its population living in cities, and most of these were in the large cities of Algiers and Constantine. In the west, 10 percent lived in cities, but they were smaller cities such as Mascara, Mostaganem, Tlemcen, and Mazouna.[71]

The second important factor was epidemiological. Ottoman Algeria was frequently struck by outbreaks of plague, which affected primarily urban areas. The most sensible response was to withdraw from cities to rural areas when the plague struck. Members of the elite took refuge in villas in the countryside. *Barrani* workers or merchants could head home. Since they usually came as single men, the women and the children remained in the relative safety of their mountain and desert homes. As they traveled, *barranis* could bring with them news, rumors, correspondence, propaganda tracts, and smuggled goods or weapons.[72]

The *barrani* was usually regarded as of lower status by the established city dweller because of his lack of education. Most *barranis* were single men, living

together in a café; a *funduq*, or commercial depot; or a mosque. In these settings, they were particularly prone to the use of hashish.[73] Thus they seemed to pose a threat to peace and order within the city. Though they were not technically classified as *barranis*, the *tirailleurs indigènes*, or native troops, fit into this social category for they often came from the same areas, in the case of Constantine from the Lesser Kabylia area between Collo and Djidjelli, and they were also single men.

While one can safely classify *barrani* migration as a "traditional" pattern in Algeria, it is hazardous to jump to conclusions about the scale of rural-urban migration. There is a basis for suggesting that the period of resurgent power of the Ottoman rulers in the late 1700s led to an increase in the scale of migration. There were large building projects, including mosques in Algiers and a bridge over the gorge in Constantine. Bringing in workers from remote areas, some of them at the Sahara's edge, which had only recently come under government control, was a way to consolidate the relationship of the political center to the periphery. Not all were enthralled with these developments. A blind popular singer in Constantine, Shaikh Bilqasim al-Rahmani al-Haddad, composed a song in about 1802 denouncing the influx of workers from the oases and mountains whom he saw as poorly behaved and subservient to the bey.[74]

Barrani Organization

Ottoman Algeria had kept the *barranis* under control by organizing them into corporations based on their place of origin. Each corporation had an *amin*, or chief, who reported to the *qa'id al-dar*, "the head of the house" in charge of urban administration. The *amin* recruited workers or militia forces for the administration in time of need and could levy fines or punishments. He would report any suspicious activity or the arrival of peculiar newcomers to the authorities. The French initially paid little attention to this institution. This changed starting in 1848 when the establishment of the Second Republic led to enhanced civilian authority in urban areas and raised the question of how egalitarian republican ideals might be applied in Algeria. The official recognition of disciplinary powers for the *barrani* tribunals by a decree of September 3, 1850, gave rise to fears among urban population that their status and power were being undermined.[75]

The best data on *barranis* come from the city of Constantine.[76] The reports for that city in the 1850s show a clear sense of hierarchy within the *barrani* communities. This can be seen as an ethnic hierarchy. But the real foundation of hierarchy was occupation, and this also comes across in the data. The most prestigious crafts were those involving high levels of skill and investment in tools and facilities. First on the list of ethnic communities were the Kabyles,

who in Constantine came from the Lesser Kabylia region. They pursued a wide range of high-status trades, including baker, butcher, ironsmith, carpenter, mason, potter, and tanner. But they also made up the vast majority (460 out of a total of 470) of gardeners, and they provided some unskilled labor as well. The Chaouis, from the Aurès Mountains southwest of Constantine, also followed a wide range of trades with notable concentrations of tanners, café operators, and bath keepers.

Kabyles and Chaouis were engaged in a variety of commercial specialties, but the domain of *épicier*, or grocer, was monopolized by Mzabis, a group from an oasis complex directly south of Algiers who followed the Ibadi rite of Islam.[77] The Biskris, who came from an oasis complex closer to Constantine, had a number of skilled occupations, but were primarily found in less-skilled occupations, with that of porter being a specialty with which they were identified.

While most groups, except for the Mzabis, contributed to casual labor categories, including day laborer, porter, and water carrier, these categories had large numbers of blacks, and also of a category known as "Mziti," a term that has disappeared from Algerian usage today. The Mzitis also dominated the craft of tile work (143 out of 147). The category of Mziti was also present in substantial numbers in the *barrani* population of Algiers. Given their apparent low status, it may be that they were from the oasis of Ouargla, where there is a large black population.

The data also provide information on gender ratios and births in the *barrani* communities. Though men dominated the Kabyles and Chaouis, there was a substantial number of wives and children. But those from oasis communities—the Biskris, Mzabis, and Mzitis—had few women or children. This may reflect the long distance that had to be traveled from their homes. It also indicates that there were economic or social barriers that prevented their marriage to local women.[78]

A major rationale for the revival of *barrani* corporations in the early 1850s was security considerations. A key reason why such thorough data on the *barrani* exist for the city of Constantine is that in 1848 the native *qa'id al-dar*, 'Ammar el-Guechi, was dismissed as a result of a report that he and other urban notables had been in touch with Hajj Ahmad, the former bey of Constantine, who was related by his mother to the powerful Ben Gana family, who controlled the Biskra region (whose founder was an ironsmith from the Lesser Kabylia), and who was still leading sporadic resistance. He was replaced by a retired French military officer, Captain Gasselin.[79]

Records from the 1850s suggest that the native administrative structure of Constantine was effective in containing outbreaks of intercommunal violence and in providing intelligence to the French. But the idea of maintaining

separate administrative structures for the native population, an idea captured in the term "Arab kingdom," received a severe blow with the disastrous famine of the years 1866–68. As civilians gained the upper hand in the early 1870s, *barrani* institutions faced diminished official support and were left to wither away. One might well see a connection here with incidents of intercommunal violence that began to appear in the 1880s.[80]

The Demise of the Urban Craft Economy

As the traditional structures withered, the economic foundations for many of the trades pursued by the *barranis* were undermined by a combination of factors. These included competition from cheap imported manufactured goods, changing tastes, the growth of the European working-class community, urban-planning decisions that took no account of the needs of particular crafts, and the legal and fiscal impediments created by the French system.

Leatherworkers, one of the largest groups of craftsmen, provide a prime example of the decline of urban crafts. One can date their decline from the 1860s. By 1865, the railway from the port of Philippeville (Skikda) arrived in Constantine, bringing cheaper goods and new styles. This also stimulated the export of raw hides to Europe. In 1867, an urban-planning decision displaced a large number of tanners from their neighborhood. There had been 101 tanners in 1850. By 1882, there were only 57 tanners left, and by 1903, only 7.[81]

By that time, there were efforts to salvage leather crafts in Constantine, inspired at least in part by the Arts and Crafts movement that spread over Europe at the turn of the century. The revival effort was sponsored by forward-looking Muslim community leaders who had founded the Cercle Salah Bey in 1906, and supported by French community members. The city government offered to help purchase new equipment, but the remaining leatherworkers were distrustful of this offer and turned it down.[82]

The situation reflects broader developments in Algeria. The French central administration had, since the 1890s, resumed cultivating a Muslim scholarly elite, represented by 'Abd al-Qadir al-Majjawi, by now a professor at the Médersa of Algiers; and they put up government buildings in a neo-Moorish style to express Algeria's hybrid identity, the most visible example being the Central Post Office in downtown Algiers. But the old urban community structures, and their networks of links in the countryside, were disintegrating. The French by now came to look at Muslim Algeria as a source of manpower, either military or industrial. Algerians who might once have gone to work as urban craftsmen now joined the *tirailleurs indigènes* and went off to fight for the French in Morocco, where the French would deliberately work to preserve

traditional social and economic structures—including a still flourishing leather industry.

Epidemiological and Environmental Disasters and the Emergence of Modern Medicine and Global Perspectives

Muslim Algeria is thought to have experienced serious demographic decline in the late 1860s, dipping, according the official count, from 2.7 million in 1866 to 2.1 million in 1871. This was a result of outbreaks of cholera; famine brought on by locust invasions, drought, and the early onset of winter; and military repression. Since there was not yet an effective system of population registration, one might question the accuracy of these numbers. Population levels recovered rapidly, reaching 3.4 million by 1886.[83] This growth is a key to understanding the crucial role that Algerian Muslim manpower would assume for France.

Certainly the disasters of the late 1860s did produce a decline in numbers that had important ramifications. But it is also useful to consider the ways in which Algerian Muslims responded to environmental and epidemiological challenges, and how these responses changed over time. These responses were related to new patterns of education and the spread of new ideas.

Disease was certainly the area that offered the greatest scope for modern medicine to prove its value. Though the need for medical doctors in Algeria was obvious, the French put limited effort into recruiting Algerian Muslims as medical students. The dozen or so who did complete their medical studies before the First World War became prominent figures. Since they had studied in France, they were highly assimilated to French culture. But they also had the confidence to speak out strongly in defense of Algerian interests. The degree to which they could rally popular support and link science to Islamic values varied between settings.

Among the first Algerians to study medicine in France was Muhammad Bin L'arbi, who came from a family of Andalusian origin in the coastal town of Cherchell. While studying in Paris, he became a friend of Victor Hugo, and he took a trip to his own ancestral homeland in southern Spain in 1883. According to a brief biography published in 1911, while he was there "he renewed his Islam." His trip to Andalus coincided with a time when both Muslims and Christians were adapting a new historical perspective, looking at such sites as Cordoba and Granada not as symbols of conflict, but as monuments pointing to future reconciliation.[84]

When Bin L'arbi returned to Algeria in the mid-1880s, he found the power of French settlers at its height. Their drive to make Algerian cities entirely

French was expressed in a project to tear down the New Mosque in downtown Algiers. It was the most visible symbol of the city's connection with its Muslim past. Bin L'arbi's biography relates an incident in which he led a popular protest against these plans.[85] As a result of these protests, the New Mosque was saved, and by the 1890s, French urban-planning policy had shifted in a new direction, promoting neo-Moorish style in official buildings.

Another notable figure at this time was Dr. Hajj Tayyib Morsly of Constantine He was the son of a *spahi* officer. He was married to a French woman and had adopted a very European lifestyle. In 1885, he accompanied Algerian pilgrims to Mecca at a time when plague and cholera posed serious threats. Having performed the *hajj* and taken risks to help his fellow Muslims, he managed to escape the conventional stereotype of Frenchified *notable*.[86]

The problems created by drought offer a different perspective on the ways in which new knowledge affected Algerian Muslim responses to disaster. In the 1880s, wildfires became a serious problem during times of drought, especially in the province of Constantine. When they occurred, settler property owners and politicians often claimed that the fires had been deliberately set by natives. They had a strong motive for making this argument. If this were the case, they had a basis for claiming compensation. If the cause had been, for instance, passing Italian workers, or sparks from a steam engine, they could not expect compensation.[87] Following fires that occurred during a drought in 1881, Muslim leaders in the city of Constantine, led by al-Makki Bin Badis, a prominent figure in the Muslim judiciary, set forth their own argument in a pamphlet. On the one hand, their argument was traditional: "God alone, the creator of all things, knows the reason, and one needs to submit to his will." But they also noted that there had been huge fires in the United States, also accompanied by drought. The problems that the government could address were the lack of infrastructure and low educational levels. "To obtain this result," they argued "one needs to treat the problem as one treats a physical illness; one also needs time."[88]

This pamphlet is striking in several ways. It illustrates how the Muslim leaders of Constantine were aware of world news. It suggests that the paradigm of medical science had taken hold and served as model for a practical response to problems, but was accommodated to the Islamic view that God was all-powerful. Finally, this was a case where urban leaders—some of whom were also major rural landowners—took the lead in standing up to settler efforts to secure more land concessions, and arbitrarily punish natives. It was a response where Muslim leaders appropriated the arguments of science, and where the French authorities had no opportunity to co-opt the religious argument, as they did in the New Mosque case. It is likely that an important contributor to

this argument was 'Abd al-Qadir al-Majjawi, who helped connect Constantine to new currents of Islamic thought emerging in the east.

The Revolt of 1871 and Exile in New Caledonia: Connecting with the French Left

The prolonged drought, locust invasions, and outbreaks of cholera in eastern Algeria starting in 1866 helped to set the stage for the last major rebellion against the colonial conquest in 1871, which occurred at the time of France's defeat by Prussia, and the humiliating peace by which France ceded territory to the new German Empire along its eastern border. The combination of natural catastrophes and armed insurrection brought an end to the efforts of the colonial military administration of the Second Empire to create an Algeria in which traditional authority structures were maintained while modern policies, above all the allotment of what had been collective land into individual property rights, were put into place.

The revolt took place in the same region as the Darqawa revolt of 1804, and it involved the same religious order, the Rahmaniyya. There was another similarity. In the years of crisis preceding the revolt, there were rumors that military assistance would be coming from the east, from Amir 'Abd al-Qadir, who was now at the height of his prestige and influence.[89] In 1869, rumors spread by the Rahmaniyya commented that the French and the Russians, with all the other European powers except the English, were preparing to attack the Ottoman sultan.[90]

The rumors did have substance. One of 'Abd al-Qadir's sons, Mahi al-Din, traveled to Algeria via Egypt, Malta, and Tunis, reaching the inland town of Tebessa, close to the Tunisian frontier, in October 1870, before the outbreak of the rebellion. He proceeded from there to the city of Constantine, where he met with cousins from the Bu Talib family. Mahi al-Din circulated letters from the amir to local leaders, which may have suggested that the Ottoman sultan would come to the aid of an Algerian revolt.[91] But the rumors were mistaken as to the benevolent European power involved. It was the Prussians, not the English, who apparently arranged his transport from Alexandria to Tunis.[92] In any case, no aid was forthcoming from any outside source.

The military leader of the revolt was Muhammad al-Muqrani, one of the most prominent tribal leaders of the region. But the revolt also had an important religious element. The religious leader was Shaikh Mohand Amezian al-Haddad, a man who had emerged as a dominant figure in the Rahmaniyya order only recently. As his name indicates, he came from a family of ironsmiths, and apparently spent his earlier years in this trade. It is noteworthy that his

growing influence occurred at the time when traditional opportunities for rural immigrant craftsmen in Constantine were declining. His growing influence among the Rahmaniyya came at the expense of a hereditary religious chief, Muhammad al-Sa'id Bin 'Ali Sharif.[93]

By the time of the revolt of 1871, Shaikh Haddad was quite elderly, probably in his early seventies. During the revolt, he sat on the sidelines while his son 'Aziz took an active role. Both would be imprisoned in Constantine. The elderly Shaikh died in prison. His sons 'Aziz and M'hammed were among some two hundred Algerians shipped off to the remote French South Pacific island colony of New Caledonia in 1873. There they joined some 4,200 Communards, French radicals who had taken part in the revolt of the Paris Commune in 1871. While they were there, close friendships developed between Algerian rebels and Communards.[94]

The Communards were given amnesty by the French government in 1881, but the Algerians would not benefit from a similar measure until 1895. However, 'Aziz al-Haddad managed to escape first to New Zealand, then to Australia in 1881. From there he managed to reach Mecca, where he lived under an assumed name to escape the notice of the French consul in Jiddah. Thus he was present in Mecca in 1893 when rumors circulated that the Mahdi would appear there. But this campaign seems to have been the work of the Sanusiyya, and there is no indication that Haddad had any role in it.

In 1895, when the amnesty was issued for Algerian prisoners in New Caledonia, Haddad asked for permission to return to Algeria. Governor General Cambon vigorously opposed this request. To win support, Haddad went to Paris to visit an old Communard friend, Eugène Mourot. He became ill and died there, and left no money to pay for the transport of his body back to Algeria. The aging Duc d'Aumale, the French commander who had accepted 'Abd al-Qadir's surrender in 1847, and Henri de Rochefort, himself a Communard who had escaped from New Caledonia to Australia, both pitched in to pay for this.[95] It might be noted that the once left-wing rebel Rochefort had by now moved to the right, and in 1898 would be a major spokesman of the anti-Dreyfus campaign.

The Enigma of Muhammad al-Muqrani

As for the military leader of the revolt, Muhammad bin Ahmad al-Muqrani, he was reported to have been killed in combat in May 1871, and this has been dutifully recorded in all published works on the rebellion. Yet evidence available in the Tunisian archives raises questions about this. A man by the name of Muhammad Bin Ahmad Bin 'Abd al-Salim al-Muqrani is reported to have

taken refuge in Tripoli in 1871. Conceivably this was a relative of the Bash Agha, rather than the Bash Agha himself. In any case, the trajectory of this individual is revealing.

After a stay in Tripoli, he went to Tunis in 1873. With no financial resources, he wrote a desperate request to Amir 'Abd al-Qadir pleading for help and noting that his father had served as a *khalifa* for the Amir. 'Abd al-Qadir invited him to Damascus and secured a pension for him from the Ottoman government, but this was cut off after the amir's death in 1883.[96] In 1889, Muqrani was granted amnesty, and moved to Tunis, where he once again lived in poverty, and pleaded with the French government to help him.[97]

In Damascus, Muqrani had become the protégé of one of the amir's sons, al-Hashimi. His poor standing with the Ottoman authorities was connected to his patron's arguments with them. Al-Hashimi's standing was in sharp contrast with that of his brother Mahi al-Din. This may have owed in part to his black mother having lower status. After helping spark the rebellion of 1871 in Algeria, Mahi al-Din had returned to Syria and become a leader of the pro-Ottoman faction within the family. Al-Hashimi, by contrast, looked to the French to negotiate his return to his home. At the same time as Muqrani sought to negotiate his return to Algeria, in 1890, al-Hashimi began his efforts, finally returning in 1892. His sons Khalid and Muhammad would soon be enrolled at the French military academy Saint Cyr.

One can question whether this was indeed the real Muhammad al-Muqrani. Yet it seems unlikely that such a prominent figure as al-Hashimi would be successfully deceived by an imposter or distant relative. By early May 1871, when the Bash Agha Muqrani's death was reported, it was becoming clear that the French, using mainly forces of *tirailleurs indigènes*, were managing to keep the situation under control. A review of the available evidence provides several elements that would help explain a decision by Muqrani to leave Algeria. Initially, he had simply sought autonomy in control of his region in the High Plateaus. When the French refused this, he asked for permission to depart for Tunis. Only after this request was refused did he call for rebellion, in March 1871. There are different accounts given of his death. One story is that he was killed by a *tirailleur* at Friday prayers in front of ten thousand faithful, near the town of Bouira. Another is that he died a heroic death fighting near the summit of a mountain. The third is simply that he died in combat. It is also reported that his death was kept a secret for five days so that his forces would not be demoralized.[98] These conflicting accounts, and the story of a delayed announcement, cast shadows over the story of Muqrani's death.

A critical factor in looking at Muqrani's action is the realization that in

order to succeed, the rebellion needed outside help, above all from the Ottomans. Tripoli was the logical place to go to lobby for that help. Key intermediaries would have been the sons of Hamdan Khodja, who had helped arrange Mahi al-Din's trip to Algeria, and who were living in Tripoli, home of their father's old friend Hassuna Daghies. But with no external aid forthcoming, Muqrani was left in the lurch.

The experiences of 'Aziz al-Haddad and Muhammad al-Muqrani illustrate both the political and social dynamics of the exile experience, and the changing political horizons of the late 1800s. Having been torn from their native land by the suppression of a failed rebellion, they needed to make connections in their new environment. By this time, French allies, made sympathetic by their political values, or by sentimental nostalgia, seemed more reliable allies than the Ottoman government. By the 1880s, the Ottomans had shifted their focus to defense of their remaining territories, and they insisted that members of the amir's family abandon all connections to France and accept their Ottoman identity. Some of them, such as Mahi al-Din, accepted this. Others, such as al-Hashimi, rejected it, and Muqrani fell into their camp. Still others were caught in between, and their dilemma would become acute in the First World War.

Soldiers and Interpreters

From the earliest days of the French conquest, the recruitment of native troops was an integral part of the Algerian colonial experience. In predominantly Muslim settings such as Morocco and the interior of West Africa, Algerian interpreters played an important role, both in translating from French to Arabic and in lending legitimacy to French imperialism by attesting to its compatibility with Islamic values.

The most important native military units were the *tirailleurs indigènes*, infantry units that gradually emerged over the first decade of the conquest. The patterns of recruitment varied between regions. In Oran, Ottoman forces put up no resistance to the French. Having been frequently engaged in putting down rebellions in the region and seeing few opportunities in returning to the east where Janissary forces had been dismantled, they found it logical to offer their services to the French. Since initial recruitment came from these sources, it was natural that the emerging military units retained many Ottoman traditions, especially in their uniforms. Their dominant role in the early days explains why these forces were commonly referred to as "*turcos*." Recruitment soon drew on other sources, particularly tribal units such as the Duwa'ir and Zmala, who had been loyal to the Ottoman beys.

In the provinces of Algiers and Constantine, Ottoman forces had been

involved in resistance to the French. In Algiers, the Ottoman Janissaries were soon dispatched to Anatolia. In Constantine, they defied the French up until the capture of the province's capital in 1837. In these areas, recruitment drew on rural groups, some of which had traditions of providing militia forces in the Ottoman era. They often came from the same areas that provided *barrani* workers to the cities. In a large city such as Constantine, the *tirailleurs indigènes* were socially very much part of the *barrani*, and particularly the Kabyle and Shawiya communities, and posed the same problems of social control.[99]

To find new recruits for the *tirailleurs*, sergeants were sent out into the countryside. Their recruiting efforts stimulated some interesting rumors. In the region of Collo (in the Lesser Kabylia, an important recruiting ground) in 1858, rumors circulated that the French were taking two giant men around the tribes to impregnate native women in order to "perfect the race." "The best-looking children" would be taken for the *tirailleurs*.[100] Clearly this was a popular commentary on the emphasis placed by recruiters on the physical qualities of size and strength.

Global Experience of the Tirailleurs

The *tirailleurs* not only placed emphasis on strong, healthy recruits. They paid close attention to maintaining their health, providing them with medical care, and seeing to the quality of their food and sanitary conditions. During the Crimean War, as cholera took a devastating toll on many other units (and brought fame to Florence Nightingale), the *tirailleurs* suffered few losses from the disease. The French attributed this to the good nutrition and sanitary conditions they maintained, and this is indeed a plausible explanation.[101] It may be that since the *tirailleurs* were a newly formed unit, they benefited more than other, tradition-bound units from new practices.

The *tirailleurs* were involved in numerous campaigns outside of Algeria, starting with Crimea in 1854–55, and including those in Italy (1859), Senegal (1861), Mexico (1862–64), Cochinchina (southern Vietnam), France in the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71), Tonkin (northern Vietnam) (1883–86), Madagascar (1895), and Morocco (1907–12). Starting in 1863, *tirailleur* units were posted to Paris on a regular basis to help impress them with the glories of French civilization. The *tirailleurs* provided a setting in which Algerian Muslims gained experience in other parts of the world, and in which they interacted intensely with French officers. French officers resented the duplicity and insolent tone that seemed common in their interactions with *tirailleurs*, but they gained a great respect for their ability to withstand harsh conditions and their great courage.[102] As they developed, the *tirailleurs* established

traditional practices, such as bringing back embroidered banners that told of their exploits in war, and placing them at the shrines of popular saints.[103]

The most important military figures, in terms of their wider and long-term impact, were the interpreters. Initially, the French seem to have taken young men from prominent families, in some cases virtually as captives, to have them study in France. These included Ahmad Bin Qaddur Bin Ruwila, whose father had been 'Abd al-Qadir's secretary, and had been a chief exponent of *hijra*.[104] Another was 'Ali, the son of the popular history writer al-Hajj Ahmad Sharif al-Zahhar. By the 1890s, the French could call on a new category of interpreter who had come up through the French educational system in Algeria.

Ahmad Ben Meshkan: Bringing a Model of Islamic Renewal from South of the Sahara

One such figure was Ahmad Ben Meshkan, who had grown up near Tizi Ouzou at the center of the Greater Kabylia, and had attended the École Normale, or teachers' training school, at Bouzaréah, near Algiers. Ben Meshkan served as an interpreter with the Mizon expedition, which set off in 1892 to attempt to establish a French protectorate in the region of Adamawa at the border of what would become northeastern Nigeria and Cameroun. Adamawa was the easternmost part of the Sokoto Caliphate, the Islamic state created by the *jihad* of Shehu 'Uthman Dan Fodio in the early nineteenth century. This venture was intended to create a connection between French West African and Central African territories. Ben Meshkan was no doubt an unfamiliar sort of figure to the people of Adamawa, who made him swear on the Quran ten times that he was actually a Muslim. But he did establish a rapport with traders from Ghadames in southern Tunisia. With their help, he was able to persuade the local ruler to sign a treaty with the French that promised that France would provide him with modern weaponry. The treaty was signed on November 22, 1892, and when word reached London, the head of the Royal Niger Company issued an outraged reaction. Six months later, the commander of the French expedition in Adamawa, Mizon, was recalled to France. But Ben Meshkan remained in the area for another two years with a small group of Senegalese troops.[105]

During these years, he became a close friend of a prominent Muslim scholar of Yola, Hasan Bin Jamm, and through him became familiar with the writings of the leader of the Sokoto Caliphate, Shehu 'Uthman Dan Fodio. When he was suddenly forced to leave Yola in late 1895, he took with him a copy of one of the Shehu's works, *Nur al-Albab*. Ben Meshkan took part in further campaigns in what would become southern Chad and was finally invalided back to Algeria, where he died in about 1904.

Another Algerian interpreter who served in the same region was a man

referred to in the available sources simply by his last name, Redjem. He reportedly came from a good family in the city of Constantine and graduated from a French *lycée*. Redjem was reportedly highly trusted by the French Commandant Gentil. He became involved in internal intrigues among the royal elite of the Kingdom of Bornu and manipulated Gentil to execute a leader of one faction on the basis of contrived evidence. Redjem then disappeared from the scene, along with Gentil's cash box, and headed for the local headquarters of the intensely anti-French Sanusiyya Sufi order at Bi'r Alali.

While Redjem disappeared without a trace, Ben Meshkan left an enduring heritage, though one little noticed by historians. When he returned to Algeria from Adamawa in 1896, he encountered a fellow military interpreter, Isma'il Hamet, one of the most productive Algerian writers of the turn of the century. Hamet published a translation of *Nur al-Albab* in 1898. In his introduction, he contrasted the vitality and clarity of the Shehu's writing with the dismal levels of Islamic learning, and the fatalistic complacency that had taken hold in Algeria. He took aim in particular at the urban Islamic establishment in Algeria who were beholden to the government and had no sense that they needed to be leaders of their people.[106]

In the introduction to *Nur al-Albab*, Hamet also took on another prominent issue of the day, that of the education of women. 'Uthman Dan Fodio gave considerable emphasis to the education of women, and his own daughter Asma'u became a prominent scholar in her own right. Hamet commented that "the feminist leagues of Europe would learn with considerable surprise, that at the beginning of the century a black prince declared, in the name of the Qur'an, that God did not condemn women to be confined to the tasks of housekeeping, but only the egoism of man brought her down to that position." It is striking that a military interpreter could produce at this time far more lively writing than someone like Abu Bakr Bu Talib, a man with prestigious connections, but part of the class of government functionaries derided by Hamet for their lack of initiative and leadership.[107] It is also noteworthy that Ben Meshkan and Hamet were drawn to the comprehensive vision of 'Uthman Dan Fodio, rather than to the Sanusiyya, a Sufi order with a heroic reputation but that offered no comparable vision.

The Zuwawa Eastern Connection

The diplomatic service also produced some Algerian interpreters of interest. It is among these interpreters that one finds Algerians inclined to engage in promoting sets of ideas that accommodated North African Muslims to French purposes. One was Abu Ya'la al-Zuwawi, who was an employee of the French consulate in Damascus in the years shortly before the First World War. Born

in the Lesser Kabylia in 1862, he began his career in the Muslim judiciary, but then went on to a more adventurous life of travel and diplomatic service. His Zuwawa origins were important in this setting because many of the Algerian *muhajirs* living in Syria were Zuwawa.

The most prominent of these was Tahir al-Jaza'iri, who had become a prominent advocate of Islamic reformist and Arab nationalist ideas. He had so antagonized the Turkish administration that he took refuge in Cairo in 1907. Al-Zuwawi had heard about al-Jaza'iri from the Maliki mufti of Algiers, Muhammad al-Sa'id Ibn Zakri, a fellow Zuwawa and a staunch advocate for Islamic reform. Tahir al-Jaza'iri had visited his homeland in 1893 and called upon Ibn Zakri and his fellow teacher at the Médersa of Algiers, 'Abd al-Qadir al-Majjawi. Ibn Zakri reported that he had been impressed with the unique qualities of the Zuwawa and their distinctiveness from neighboring groups.[108]

Abu Ya'la was struck by this observation and so in 1912 wrote a letter to Tahir al-Jaza'iri, proposing that he write a history of the Zuwawa people. In the letter he set forth the idea that Zuwawa distinctiveness owed to the fact that they were in fact of European origin. Tahir al-Jaza'iri apparently never took up this idea, but he seems to have thought it interesting enough to deposit Abu Ya'la's proposal in a Cairo library. For an understanding of the letter's underlying logic, one needs to look at the context. The situation in Damascus in 1912 was very tense, and the Algerian refugee community was split between those who supported and opposed Ottoman rule. Tahir al-Jaza'iri was so strongly identified with the latter that he had taken refuge in Cairo. Under the circumstances, the French might have hoped that they could co-opt anti-Ottoman Algerians, and the appeal to local Zuwawa identity can be seen as part of such a strategy. But for both Abu Ya'la al-Zuwawi and Ibn Zakri that local identity was strongly tied to a commitment to a reformist vision of Islam.

Abu Ya'la eventually returned to Algeria and became an active member of the Association of 'Ulama in the 1930s.[109] Though he called for social and educational reform, he did not directly oppose the "marabouts," local saints and their descendants who often served as teachers and leaders of religious rituals. He should not be seen as a "Kabyle" nationalist but rather as an individual who was fascinated with his own very particular identity, and—perhaps temporarily—captivated by European racial theories of the early twentieth century.

One finds a rather different figure in Qaddur Bin Ghabrit, who was born in the western Algerian town of Sidi Bel Abbès, according to some accounts in 1873, others 1868. He began his career as a judicial interpreter and a minor Muslim court official, but then in 1892 he made an critical move, becoming an interpreter at the French legation in Tangier. He had a key role in the complex maneuvers that led to the establishment of the French protectorate in Morocco

in the years 1907–12, and won the trust of key French figures such as Marshal Lyautey, chief architect of the French policy of indirect rule in Morocco. At the outset of the First World War, Lyautey put forth the concept of "Western Islam," an Islam separate from the Ottoman caliph, and loyal to France. Ben Ghabrit would have key roles in putting this idea into practice, first in leading the French delegation on the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1916, and then in the foundation of the Mosque of Paris, founded in 1926.

3

The Last Jihad and the End of *Hijra*, 1911–1920

As the French became increasingly engaged in conflicts with rival European powers in the 1890s and early 1900s, they grew more reliant on their ability to recruit colonial subjects for their service, especially in Algeria. They mobilized Algerians, bringing them to France as workers and military conscripts and to serve French imperial interests in the Middle East in elite military and diplomatic roles. At the same time, the Ottomans and their German allies sought supporters among the Algerian *muhajirs* in the Middle East under the flag of Pan-Islam. Members of the *muhajir* communities worked to promote a new wave of refugees from Algeria before the First World War, opposing the announcement of military conscription for Algerians. During the war, they encouraged desertions on the western front and sought to recruit Muslim prisoners of war to fight for the Ottoman cause. They called for an uprising in Morocco with German and Ottoman support. Libya also emerged as an important base for military efforts against the Allied powers.

Escalating global conflicts placed Algerians in a dilemma where they were under pressure to support a non-Muslim power, either France or Germany. Before the First World War, many Algerians spoke out against conscription. Once the war had begun, those who spoke openly against it inside Algeria paid a heavy price. Outside Algeria, it was possible for an Algerian with links to both sides to engage in a kind of bidding war, and even to switch sides when the bids, or the credibility of the bidders, changed. But this could be a hazardous game.

The war brought a change in organizational dynamics. During the war, the French relied on the support of Algerian subjects who had been trained through the colonial education system, and then rose through the military or diplomatic hierarchy. Their enemies focused on recruiting those with traditional religious prestige, and they exploited traditional networks tied to Sufi orders, through which they could move personnel, messages, and weapons

across borders. But the war worked to accelerate the unraveling of old hierarchies, both imperial and traditional, and to galvanize new forces of nationalism, both in Algeria and in the most important center for Algerian *muhajirs*, Syria.

The end of the First World War would bring a large-scale return of Algerians to their homeland, bringing with them new attitudes, ideas, and skills. Not only did soldiers and workers come back from France. Figures who would play key roles in the new Association of 'Ulama came back to Algeria from Tunisia and Syria. The alternative of *hijra* as a response to the colonial predicament had come to an end as the Europeans took control of nearly all Arab Muslim territories, and as nationalism took hold in Turkey.

Prelude to the Great War

In the decade that preceded the outbreak of the Great War, French policy with respect to Islam in Algeria and to the political rights of Algerian Muslims came to face increasingly difficult choices. This was a time when the French carried out a successful campaign to take over Morocco, making it into a protectorate in which traditional institutions were preserved. The French were also consolidating their control over remote areas of the Sahara, in Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad. French specialists increasingly came to see advantages in promoting friendly ties with those traditional Islamic leaders willing to work with them, including leaders of Sufi orders, and, by 1912, the sultan of Morocco. Marshal Lyautey, the leader of France's conquest of Morocco, went so far as to propose the establishment of a "Western Caliphate" to create a separate identity for France's Muslim territories in North and West Africa.

In urban settings in Algeria, however, many Islamic leaders worked to promote a new vision of Islam, and they had an active role in the progressive *cercles* that promoted science and modern education in Algerian cities. Some of the most prominent of these leaders, including 'Abd al-Qadir al-Majjawi and Abu Bakr Bu Talib, had ties with the Algerian community in Damascus, and through this, a connection with political and intellectual developments in the Middle East. But they were also government employees and needed to use this new vision in a way that avoided stirring up trouble. Characteristic of this cautious tone is a statement in the government-supported weekly *Kawkib Ifriqiya* (Star of Africa) commenting on the appearance of a comet: "Only ignorant fools who still cling to superstition think that the appearance of comets is a sign of coming wars and suffering and disorder."[1] But someone who did read the appearance of the comet in that way would have found plenty of evidence to confirm his view over the coming decade.

Shockwaves from the Tripoli Crisis, 1911–1914

The Italian invasion of Libya, starting in 1911, stirred a strong response from the progressive notables of urban Algeria, and indeed throughout the Muslim world. A key element in this was the Red Crescent, the Muslim version of the Red Cross. Its origins can be traced to the conflict in the Balkans in 1876–78, but its emergence as a formal organization came in 1912, and its most important bases were in India and Egypt.[2] Whereas the Red Cross, with its base in Switzerland, had emerged as a symbol of neutrality in a Europe torn by national rivalries, the Red Crescent was an expression of the rising tide of Islamic resistance to European imperialism. It built on the same pattern of transnational fund-raising efforts that had financed the building of the Hijaz Railway, which had been completed from Damascus to Madina by 1912.

In Algeria, there were public meetings called to support the people of Libya, and donations were collected for the Red Crescent to aid the wounded. This campaign was led primarily by urban notables, though some contemporary comment suggests that they were doing this to compensate for their support of military conscription.[3] It is revealing that some 344,000 francs out of the 410,000 raised in these campaigns came from the province of Constantine, which had the closest ties with Tripoli.[4] Separate collections were raised from Algerians and Mizabis living in Tunisia.[5]

A particularly intriguing figure at this time is ʿAbbas Bin Hamana, a Mizabi merchant who was living in Tebessa, near the border of Tunisia. He had founded the first Arabic-language modern independent school in Algeria, but it was closed down by the local mayor. For Bin Hamana, supporting the Tripoli resistance was not an abstract political question.

As a merchant, he had ties in Tunisia and Tripoli, including with Sulayman al-Baruni, a key figure in linking Algeria to new developments in the Arab east. Tebessa was a point of transit from Algeria to Tunis and Tripoli, not only for goods but for migrant workers and travelers, including clandestine pilgrims heading for Mecca. Baruni came from an Ibadi community in the Jabal Nafusa, a mountainous area south of Tripoli.[6] Like the Ibadis of Algeria's Mizab, they were strongly involved in commerce. Baruni had studied in the Mizab for three years with the noted scholar Muhammad Bin Yusuf Atfiyash in the late 1890s. Atfiyash and his son Ibrahim, who had studied with Majjawi in Constantine, had major roles in linking Ibadi communities to emerging trends of Islamic reform and nationalism, and with defending Mizabi interests against an increasingly intrusive colonial regime.[7] Al-Baruni's motive for going to study in the Mizab may not have been entirely educational. At the time, there had been

an order for his arrest issued by the local Ottoman governor in Tripoli. Only after Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid issued a pardon did he return.[8]

In the early 1900s, Baruni went to Cairo, where he established a short-lived periodical, *al-Asad al-Islami* (The Islamic Lion), and also a publishing house. He strongly encouraged the development of new print media in Algeria. New newspapers in both Arabic and French would have a key role in stirring support for the Tripoli resistance in 1911–13. With the return to constitutional rule in the Ottoman Empire, Baruni served as a deputy for Tripoli in the Ottoman parliament. After the Italian invasion, he returned to Tripoli to help lead resistance, and in the process developed ties with Enver Pasha and with 'Ali Bin 'Abd al-Qadir, and his son 'Abd al-Qadir, who had come from Syria to help in the resistance efforts.

Following the Ottoman withdrawal in late 1912, he led an effort to create an independent republic in Tripolitania. This ended with the Italian victory at Asaba'a in March 1913, when he and supporters took refuge in Tunisia. But Sulayman al-Baruni would soon return. Given his ties in eastern Algeria, his return would have political ramifications there. Like many nationalists at this time, Baruni was willing to cooperate with whichever foreign power suited the purposes of the moment.

On July 16, 1914, 'Abbas Bin Hamana was killed, apparently by local political rivals. But some observers were convinced that, in this case, as in the earlier assassination attempt on Dr. Bentami in Algiers, the colonial administration was behind it.[9] Malik Bennabi, who grew up in Tebessa, and was nine years old at the time, recalled thinking that Bin Hamana's assassination was what started the First World War.

Another figure who illustrates the importance of connections with the east at this time and the beginnings of social and cultural ferment in Algeria is Jeanne Desrayaux. She was the daughter of a French *lycée* professor in Algiers and studied Arabic in school. She accompanied her father on a trip, sponsored by Governor Jonnart, to Tunisia and Egypt and studied new endeavors in girls' education in those settings. Starting in 1906, she launched a biweekly Arabic publication, *al-Ihya'* (Revitalization) that would continue for nearly two years. She also published a book to promote the teaching of Arabic to girls. She argued that assimilation had proven a failure in Algeria and that the best path forward was education in Arabic and moral reform based on Islamic principles.[10] Desrayaux died while still quite young, in 1914. It was not until the late 1940s in Algeria that this vision would be vigorously promoted, particularly by Ahmad Rida Huhu. But in Syria, women connected with the Algerian community would take prominent roles in the turbulent years following the First World War.

Military Conscription and the Last Wave of *Hijra*

On the eve of the First World War, the debate over conscription of Algerian Muslims intensified. French settlers vigorously opposed conscription because they could see its political, economic, and social ramifications. It would give Muslims a strong argument for increased political rights. It would shrink the available force of cheap labor. And it would increase the number of Muslims who, like the *tirailleurs indigènes*, showed scant respect for local authority figures. Many Muslims also opposed the new law, for they saw this as a measure that would compel young men to go and fight in the French campaign against fellow Muslims in Morocco. But the lowering of benefits for *tirailleurs indigènes*, and the reduction of the conscription period for French citizens from three years to two, had created a serious shortage of military personnel.

The most noted protest was seen in the clandestine emigration of more than five hundred individuals from the city of Tlemcen, heading for Syria in 1911. The prospect of military conscription was but one element contributing to this. The extension of the railway into Morocco had reduced the economic importance of Tlemcen. Traditional crafts were in sharp decline. And there was an active campaign, centered in Damascus, to once again promote *hijra*. There were other incidents at this time, notably violent protests in Tunis over the French administration's lack of respect for the Djellaz Cemetery, which contributed to the tensions.[11]

There were other smaller centers of *hijra*, notably in the Setif region. This was an area that had long-established connections with the Algerian community in Damascus, so individuals emigrated not just because of their sense of despair, but because they were drawn to Damascus and the new ideas of religious reform and nationalism being promoted there. Among the *muhajirs* from the Setif region was Muhammad al-Bashir al-Ibrahimi, a young man from a family of religious scholars whose age at the time could have made him liable to be drafted. Ibrahimi headed first to Cairo, where he stayed for three months, encountering Rashid Rida, an advocate of an Islamic vision of Pan Arabism. Then he joined the Algerian community in Madina. When the Turks evacuated civilians from Madina in early 1917, he headed to Damascus, a city where he clearly felt more at home, politically and intellectually.[12] If there is any Algerian who can be seen as a successor to Tahir al-Jaza'iri, with his lively and independent character and, allegedly, membership in the Freemasons, it is Ibrahimi.

The pilgrimage to Mecca, which had been banned in the years since 1909, was permitted by the Algerian administration in 1913 and proved difficult to

manage. Many Algerian pilgrims went through Damascus, now linked by rail to Madina. They were urged to stay by established *muhajirs* and given promises of substantial aid from the Ottoman government. But faced with an influx of refugees from the Balkans and an outbreak of cholera, the Ottoman administration was not prepared to make helping Algerian refugees a priority, and many pilgrims sought to return home.[13] Even those who gave no consideration to staying in Syria, such as Messali Hajj's cousin 'Abd al-Qadir Memchaoui, caused quite a stir when they returned to Algeria telling stories of their encounters with descendants of Amir 'Abd al-Qadir in Damascus.[14] Throughout this period, the French made efforts to use the government-subsidized Arabic press to discourage *hijra*.[15]

Pan-Islamic and Nationalist Aspirations and Great Power Strategies

In the years that preceded the outbreak of the First World War, there was an extraordinary flowering of organizations and publications through the Middle East and North Africa promoting new political visions based on Islam or nationalism, or a combination of the two. Imperial powers sought to harness these to their own purposes, and to muzzle them when they appeared threatening.

"Pan-Islam" is a loose term, encompassing efforts led by both traditionalists and reformists, Ottoman loyalists and Arab nationalists, and those sponsored by different powers for different purposes. Moreover, the relationship between any European power and an Islamic cause was bound to be awkward, vulnerable to Islamic distrust of the European power's motives and sincerity, and to the misjudgments of European Orientalists assigned to manage such relations. Indeed, Enver Pasha, chief architect of the Ottoman alliance with Germany, would proclaim after the war that "German imperialism used us for its bandit aims. But our desire was only to safeguard our independence." By 1919, he was happy to switch his alliance to the Bolsheviks.[16]

A key element in the attempt to stir Muslim opposition to colonial powers was the use of modern-style organizations and print media to bolster their own cause and discredit their enemies.[17] Along with Istanbul, Cairo became an important center for activists championing North African anticolonial causes. In 1911, an association taking the name "Maghrib Unity" was established in Cairo. According to French diplomatic sources, its members were all Egyptian, and its purpose simply to bolster Egyptian leverage in their dealings with the British.[18] But one should recall that in the early 1800s, the large Maghribi merchant community in Cairo had been the springboard for the Darqawa rebellion. The line

dividing "Egyptian" and "Maghribi" was by no means clear. This association did send envoys to Algeria, who made contact with noncommissioned officers in Algerian military units. Though the association lasted for only two years, the theme of "Maghrib Unity" would continue to be promoted in Cairo from the 1920s through the 1950s.

The association promoted by the Ottoman authorities in Istanbul was called the Association for Algerian-Tunisian Brotherhood, implying the loyalty of former Ottoman provinces to their old sultan rather than a new regional political vision. The fact that the Ottomans and Germans also sponsored a revolt in Morocco led by 'Abd al-Qadir's son Malik suggests a vision of splitting Algeria, with the west being joined to Morocco, and the east to Tunisia and Tripoli.

Algero-Tunisian Networks

One reason for Bashir al-Ibrahimi going to Madina at the time he did—in 1912—was that a new Islamic university was being established there. A key figure in its establishment was a man from an Algerian *muhajir* family, al-Makki Bin 'Azuz. His family came originally from the oasis town of Tolga, near Biskra, where they served as leaders of the Rahmaniyya Sufi order. They emigrated to Nafta in Tunisia in the 1840s. Al-Makki studied at the Zaytuna in Tunis, then served as mufti of Nafta, and after his dismissal from that position, devoted himself to serving the Rahmaniyya order in Tunisia and eastern Algeria, and to scholarly activities. In the arguments that raged between traditionalists and reformists in Tunis, he took the traditionalist side. In 1905, he emigrated to Istanbul.

He maintained contacts with Algeria, particularly through his son Kamil, who ran a *zawiya* for the family religious order in the town of Souk Ahras. One of his messengers for communications with Algeria was al-Hajj Muhammad Khuja, who was known to have stayed for several months at the Sanusi center of Derna, in Cyrenaica, on one of his trips. With fellow *muhajirs*, Bin 'Azuz established the Jama'ia al-Shurafa, or Society of Religious Nobility, in 1913, a group that contributed to the calls for *hijra* from Algeria.[19] By its very name, this society appealed to the traditional religious aristocracy, often associated with the leadership of Sufi orders. It held little appeal to adherents of the emerging movements of Islamic reform and nationalism.

Al-Makki Bin 'Azuz's maternal nephew, Muhammad al-Khidr Husain, was also part of the *muhajir* community in Nafta and went on to study at the Zaytuna. In the first years of the twentieth century, he became active in speaking out against French colonial rule, and in 1911 he called for volunteers to fight against the Italians in Libya. As the French cracked down on such resistance,

he headed to Syria. During the First World War, he went to work for the Ministry of War in Istanbul, under Enver Pasha, who sent him to Berlin to work at recruiting North African prisoners of war to serve the Central powers in campaigns in Muslim lands. He was not, however, on good terms with Jamal Pasha, the Ottoman commander in Syria, and was imprisoned at the time of the crackdown on Algerians suspected of opposition to Ottoman rule in May 1916. His ties with Enver Pasha helped to get him released, but it seems clear that he was more favorably disposed to Islamic reformist and Arab nationalist currents of thought than some of the other pro-Ottoman Algerians. He would move to Cairo after the war and eventually rise to the position of grand imam of al-Azhar, becoming active in support of North African nationalist movements.[20]

Muhammad al-Khidr Husain might be contrasted to Salah al-Sharif, who also came from a family of Algerian refugees who had settled in Tunisia. He opposed Tunisian Islamic reformists in debates that broke out in the early years of the twentieth century, and he left Tunis for Istanbul in 1906.[21] While he liked to be called Salah al-Sharif (the noble, descendant of the Prophet), his detractors demoted him to Salah "al-Tunisi" (the Tunisian). He was a strong advocate of Pan-Islamic solidarity between Turks and Arabs, and it was this position that led him into a ferocious argument with Rashid Rida in 1909, in what became known as "the Damascus incident." This incident can be seen as a continuation of earlier arguments between reformists and traditionalists—whose cause Salah al-Sharif vigorously advocated.

Salah al-Sharif took part in the war in Tripoli in 1911, and became a friend of Enver Pasha, the Young Turk military commander and the figure who would be most responsible for the Ottoman Empire entering the war on the side of Germany. Sharif went to Berlin during the war and, like Muhammad al-Khidr Husain, worked to recruit North African Muslim prisoners to serve the Central powers. He offered his advice to the German Islamic affairs specialist Max von Oppenheim, with whom he worked in a special section of the Foreign Office dedicated to stirring *jihad* against Germany's enemies. Among other issues, he discussed how to win the loyalty of Sharif Husain.[22] In early 1915, the German Society for the Study of Islam published his tract *Haqiqat al-jihad* (The Truth of Jihad), in which he set forth a doctrine explained by German Orientalists as "partial jihad." In this sort of conflict, Muslims took up arms in alliance with friendly non-Muslim powers to combat non-Muslim powers who occupied Muslim lands. Muslims living in those occupied lands were forbidden to take up arms against their fellow Muslims.[23] According to French diplomatic sources, he was "one of our worst enemies, the author of violent pamphlets against our administration, and the organizer of movements of emigration from Algeria to Syria."[24]

The arrest of Muhammad al-Khidr Husain in 1916 is an indication that Ottomans may have had an easier relationship with the more traditionalist Islamic figures than they did with those inclined to support Islamic reform and Arab nationalism. It is ironic that modernist Young Turk leaders would make this choice. One of the reasons certainly is that they shared the same enemies: Arab nationalist reformers such as Rashid Rida and Tahir al-Jaza'iri, who fled Syria in 1908 for Cairo. Hereditary leadership and Sufi orders could be seen as more compatible with imperial strategies, and they may have had a particular appeal to German advisers to the Ottomans.

Libya and Morocco as Resistance Bases

For any effort to dislodge the French from Algeria to have practical effect, it needed to secure a base in a neighboring territory still not under strong European control. Vulnerable zones included Morocco, where French control was still contested; Libya, embroiled in the fight against the Italian invasion; and territories deep in the Sahara.

The Sanusiyya played an important role for they had long been adamantly opposed to the French, and they had a base in eastern Libya that could still be easily reached from Turkey. They started a new military campaign against the Italians in Libya in late 1914. Then, in May 1915, they stirred rebellion deep in the Algerian Sahara, and in the Aïr Mountains of central Niger. This happened at the same time as the revolt of 'Ali Dinar against the British in Darfur. Had the Sanusis been able to establish a secure base in the Sahara with links through Libya to Turkey, this might have posed a serious threat to the French, especially because it diverted military resources from other fronts. But the recently completed Lagos-to-Kano railway in British Nigeria facilitated the provision of troops, weapons, and supplies, allowing French forces to quickly prevail in the Aïr. Along with the defeat of 'Ali Dinar in Darfur, this secured Anglo-French domination of the greater Sahara region.

Another element of such military efforts against the French in North Africa was led by 'Abd al-Qadir's son Amir Malik, in Morocco, where his father was still a popular figure, especially in the mountainous Rif region of the north, conveniently located next to neutral Spanish-controlled ports. The opening of the First World War found Malik taking a cure for asthma in the French resort town of Vichy. He set off for Spain, where he renewed long-standing contacts with German diplomats and made arrangements to start a rebellion in Morocco. His apparent goal was to establish a kingdom that would include both Morocco and Algeria, or at least western Algeria. In this effort he had the help of German and Ottoman military advisers, as well as material assistance.

That help would end in 1918, but Malik would later become involved in the Rif Rebellion and be killed in battle in 1924.[25]

Historians of North Africa have tended to pay a good deal of attention to the Sanusi activities during the war, and to the rebellion in Morocco, but less attention to Sulayman al-Baruni in Tripoli. In 1916, he was brought by a German submarine to Tripoli, where Nuri Bey, the brother of Enver Pasha, was already at work stirring resistance to the Italians.

Al-Baruni's activities there may have contributed to the rebellion that broke out in the Aurès Mountain region in Algeria in 1916–17. The French worried about an even wider outbreak of resistance in the south Constantinois. Among their concerns was the position of Bu 'Aziz Ben Gana, from a prominent family of tribal chiefs, who apparently had ties through marriage to 'Abd al-Qadir's family. But he took no action against the French.[26] Baruni contributed to an effort to establish a republic in Tripoli after the war, and attempted to come to terms with the Italians. But this effort failed, and he went into exile. He was turned away not only by the British and the French, but by Turkey, and he finally settled in the Ibadi stronghold of Oman in the south of the Arabian Peninsula.

It is particularly interesting that Baruni called into question the existing borders in North Africa. He saw little affinity between Tripolitania, with its urban center and commercial tradition, and Sanusi-dominated Cyrenaica. He also saw a logical division between the west of Algeria, with its strong historical ties to Morocco, and the east, which had stronger ties to Tunisia and Tripolitania. His view is consistent with that of Salah al-Sharif and 'Ali Bash Hanba, whose Algero-Tunisian committee sent a telegram to President Wilson at the Paris Peace Conference in early 1919, asking him to support independence for a combined Algeria and Tunisia.[27] At the time, with Malik still at large in Morocco, they might have envisioned him taking over the Oranais, and uniting it with Morocco.

Ultimately, all of these efforts to rouse Islamic forces against the French in North Africa and the Sahara failed, but it is instructive to ask today, amidst fears of a "global jihad," why these efforts failed. To understand this failure we need to examine developments within the Algerian Damascus community, and within Algeria itself during the war.

Caught between Feuding Empires: 'Abd al-Qadir's Family in Damascus

Since the death of Amir 'Abd al-Qadir in 1883, his sons and grandsons living in Damascus came under increasing pressure to choose between loyalty to the

French and loyalty to the Ottoman Empire. Different elements of the family made different choices. Al-Hashimi, son of a black mother, married to a Circassian woman, and thus a marginal figure within the Algerian Damascus community, returned with his family to Algeria, and sent his sons Khalid and Mustafa off to Saint Cyr to be prepared as French military officers. The leader of the pro-Ottoman faction was 'Abd al-Qadir's oldest surviving son, Muhammad, author of the amir's biography, *Tuhfa al-za'ir*, published in 1897 with a dedication to Sultan Abdulhamid. For his services, he was promoted to the rank of general and given the title of pasha. He died in 1913.[28]

By the eve of the First World War, the leading figure among 'Abd al-Qadir's sons in Damascus was Amir 'Ali. He had become a prominent Ottoman political figure, serving as vice president of the Ottoman Parliament and married to the sister of 'Izzat Pasha al-'Abid, who had been Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid's second secretary and had gone into exile when the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) took power in 1909. In 1910, 'Ali and his brother 'Umar were involved in protecting Christian communities near Jerusalem who were being threatened.[29] 'Ali managed to stay in the good graces of the new Ottoman leadership and was sent by them, in 1911, to help rouse resistance against the Italians in Libya. He helped to mediate the potentially difficult relationship between the secularist Young Turks and the Sanusiyya.[30] When the Italians prevailed, he proceeded on to Tunis, where he met with his nephews Khalid, by now a captain in the French spahis, and Abu Bakr Bu Talib. He then went to France, where he apparently tried to win recognition as the rightful heir to Amir 'Abd al-Qadir and thus secure his pension.[31]

Muhammad al-Sa'id Bin 'Ali: Searching for an Intermediary Role

Having failed in that effort, he returned to Damascus, where his activities seemed to take on a decidedly anti-French character. He played host to the notoriously anti-French Salah al-Sharif during a forty-five-day visit to Damascus. His son Sa'id plied Algerian pilgrims passing through Damascus with anti-French propaganda.[32] Soon after the war began, he visited Germany and assisted the Germans in preparing leaflets aimed at North African Muslim troops to be dropped by German planes over the front lines.

Muhammad al-Sa'id bin 'Ali had a complex role during the war years. He also turned out to be the one member of his family to survive until well after the war (until 1968) and write accounts of his activities. According to his account, Enver Pasha, the minister of war, asked him to help mobilize forces for an attack on Egypt in late 1914. But Jamal Pasha, the governor of Syria, deeply distrusted him, and in particular scorned the notion that he should

serve as an "intermediary" with local communities such as the Druze. Thus he was diverted to accompanying the German archeologist Leo Frobenius, a man with experience in Algeria who was heading for the Sudan.[33] Sa'id was led to think that they would be going through Libya to Tunisia and Algeria, where he would lead heroic resistance against the French.

By the time they reached Wahj, on the Arabian coast, Sa'id had second thoughts about the trip. According to his own account, he was worried because the mission was carrying fuel and he could imagine that he was "a sheep to be grilled." According to T. E. Lawrence, who claimed that Sa'id had spent time in an insane asylum in 1911, it was that Frobenius did not treat him with "sufficient dignity."[34] But given that Frobenius had a hazardous trip down the Red Sea and then was sent home by the Italians once he reached Somalia, it can be suggested that Sa'id had good judgment.

Sa'id parted company with the German mission and went to Mecca, where he met with Sharif Husain. According to his account, they exchanged their views of the situation, both agreeing on their dislike of the Turkish Unionists but seeing the need for continued loyalty to the Caliphate. Sa'id claims that he arranged for the visit of the sharif's son Faisal to Damascus in March 1915, during which he met with many supporters of the Arab nationalist cause.[35] Jamal Pasha looked on with deep distrust, but at this time acted with restraint, knowing that Enver Pasha saw the need to use Sa'id as an intermediary, or *wasta*, with Faisal and his family.[36]

Abd al-Qadir Bin 'Ali: Lawrence's Nemesis

Sa'id's brother, 'Abd al-Qadir Bin 'Ali, was a more adventurous character. According to French diplomatic sources, he turned up in Cairo in November 1915 at the same time as the Young Tunisian activist 'Ali Bash Hanba, and Salah al-Sharif. The French tried to lure them into a rendezvous where they might be arrested, but they were not successful. The source offered no explanation as to what the purpose of the meeting might have been, nor did it comment on the ideological divide that separated 'Ali Bash Hanba and Salah al-Sharif. And no mention is made of two figures who might have been receptive to a visit by 'Abd al-Qadir, who were in Cairo at the time: his maternal uncle, 'Izzat Pasha al-'Abid, and Tahir al-Jaza'iri.[37]

In the absence of further details, one is reduced to speculating about the purpose of this trip based on what one knows of the chronological context and the personalities involved. November 1915, when the visit occurred, was well after the failure of the Ottoman attack on Suez in February of that year, and at a time when the British attack on Gallipoli was going poorly. The British had

not yet secured an alliance with Sharif Husain and were allegedly attempting to come to a deal with Jamal Pasha. 'Abbas Hilmi, the deposed khedive of Egypt, now living in Damascus, had ties to 'Abd al-Qadir's family and may have had a role here.

The three men mentioned were well qualified to play on the negative image of France in North Africa and to highlight news of advances by the Sanusiyya in the Sahara and Malik in Morocco. Raising the prospect of autonomy for Syria, on the Austro-Hungarian or German-Bavarian model, would also have made sense. It might have appealed in particular to 'Abd al-Qadir's uncle, 'Izzat Pasha al-'Abid.

It is clear from Sa'id's writing that he and his brother saw their roles in this situation as intermediaries who could facilitate negotiation between the Ottoman authorities and elements they had to work with in order to prevail in the long term. He also made it clear that Jamal Pasha, the man in charge of Syria, arrogantly rejected the idea of mediation, and distrusted 'Abd al-Qadir's family because of their connections both with the French and with Arab nationalism. It was rather Enver Pasha, whom 'Abd al-Qadir had met on the mission to Libya in 1911, who was inclined to sponsor such mediation.

Initially, Jamal Pasha prevailed. Using evidence acquired from the French consulate in Beirut, he arrested many supporters of Syrian autonomy or independence, and on May 6, 1916, had twenty-one of them put to death, an event celebrated in Syria today as "Martyrs' Day." These included 'Umar al-Jaza'iri, a son of Amir 'Abd al-Qadir, and Salim al-Jaza'iri, an Ottoman army officer and nephew of Tahir al-Jaza'iri, then in exile in Cairo.[38] For good measure, Jamal had 'Ali and his sons interned at Bursa, in Anatolia.

According to 'Abd al-Qadir's own account, he slipped out of Bursa on the second day of Ramadan and rode on a horse for thirty-three days to reach Damascus.[39] According to Lawrence, this story was without basis. He claimed that 'Abd al-Qadir had been released by the Ottomans at the request of 'Abbas Hilmi. Muhammad al-Sa'id offers a more nuanced account. At the time of 'Abd al-Qadir's departure from Bursa, he claimed, the Ottomans had decided to allow the family to return to Damascus. But 'Abd al-Qadir was worried by the delay in his brother's arrival from Istanbul and thought that something was amiss, so he departed clandestinely.

But perhaps the most revealing comment on this comes from 'Abd al-Qadir himself. In a letter to his cousin Captain Khalid in Algiers, he said that he had tried to persuade his father, 'Ali, to come with him, but that his father had refused at the last moment and as a result, "I thus had a falling out with him." Conceivably he said this to protect his father in case the contents of the letter should be revealed to Turkish authorities.[40]

Once 'Abd al-Qadir Bin 'Ali reached Damascus, he may well have learned that the Ottoman authorities had released his family from detention. From Damascus, he made his way by late September 1917 to Aqaba, at the tip of Sinai, which the Sharifian forces had already taken from the Ottomans. While in Aqaba, he sent a servant to Cairo to get in touch with the French consul, Defrance. The servant informed Defrance that 'Abd al-Qadir wanted to see Sharif Husain.[41] While in Aqaba, 'Abd al-Qadir met with Colonel Brémond, head of the French military mission there, and assured him that Arab forces, including Ottoman deserters of Maghribi origin, could reach Damascus within a month. He asked if his cousin, Captain Khalid, could come and join them.[42] By October 4 he was in Mecca, in time for the celebration of 'Id al-Adha, and he was warmly received by Sharif Husain. He came across as strongly anti-Turkish and projected a dashing image. As a French observer put it, he was "very beduin, very much a horseman and apt for war."[43] This is precisely the image associated with his famous grandfather, whose name he bore.

While he was in the Hijaz he had several encounters with Algerian Muslims associated with the French military mission. They reported on the arguments that he put forward to condemn the Turks. These included their execution of his uncle 'Umar, and their profanation of his grandfather's tomb. He also mentioned the suppression of Islamic courts and the marriage of Muslim women with non-Muslims, particularly Turkish women marrying Germans. He claimed that the Druze would rise up against the Turks "even at the call of a woman from the house of the Amir ('Abd al-Qadir)." But, the Algerian reporting on his activities concluded: "He is a big talker who gives himself more importance than he really has."[44]

Yet Sharif Husain recognized his importance, both because of his prestigious ancestry and because of his potential as an intermediary in negotiation with pragmatic Ottoman authorities who could recognize the need for compromise. As a mark of this recognition, Husain gave him the Sharifian flag, a flag that was to take on great symbolic importance. While he was still in the Hijaz, 'Abd al-Qadir wrote in a "secret" letter to his cousin Khalid: "We will plant the Sharifian flag in Syria and we will avenge our martyred uncle . . . and bring the revival of our glory in restoring the desecrated tomb of our forebear. . . . Be certain, oh my brother, that this flag, if it pleases Allah, will be the first to penetrate Syria."[45] In considering Husain's action, one needs to bear in mind that in October 1917, the conclusion of the war was far from certain, and that Russia was on the verge of revolution. Also, there were tensions between Husain and Faisal because of the latter's independence and his close ties with the British.[46] A further consideration may have been his recognition of 'Abd al-Qadir's links with a support base within Syria.

The head of the French military mission, Colonel Brémond, was deeply suspicious of 'Abd al-Qadir and was certain that he had been communicating with his cousin Malik, who was leading resistance to the French in Morocco with German and Turkish support.[47] He insisted that 'Abd al-Qadir write a letter to Malik putting the French in a good light. He eventually complied, apparently calculating that he needed to deal with the French so that they might serve as a counterweight to Faisal's British connection. In this letter, he denounced the Turks for their abandoning traditional Muslim practices in such areas as gender roles and dress. He also brought up the Armenian massacres, claiming that the Turks planned to transfer 200,000 Arab families from Syria to Anatolia to replace dead and deported Armenians.[48]

'Abd al-Qadir headed from Mecca up to the north, where he joined Lawrence and Faisal, who were pursuing measures against Ottoman forces from the east as General Allenby and conventional British forces moved on Palestine from the west. Part of their strategy was to destroy bridges linking Palestine by rail to the main line up to Damascus so that Ottoman forces would not be able to flee by rail. Within the region around Deraa, 'Abd al-Qadir claimed that he could count on the support of local Algerian refugee and Druze communities. For Lawrence it seemed that this would be an asset for his plan to blow up bridges. But when he broached the plan to 'Abd al-Qadir, the latter balked. He did not want to assist in the killing or capturing of Ottoman soldiers, many of whom might be Arab. Rather, his priority was to kill Jamal Pasha and take over Syria.[49]

'Abd al-Qadir thus deserted Lawrence's camp, going first into the Jabal Druze, and then to Deraa. Initially the Ottomans treated him with suspicion and scoffed at his story of an Englishman planning to blow up bridges. They arrested him and sent him up to Damascus. But when an attack did, in fact, occur, they took him seriously. The attack on the bridge failed, according to Lawrence's account, because one of his men dropped a gun and drew the attention of an Ottoman soldier.

It was following the failure of that attack that the most controversial incident in Lawrence's adventures took place. He claimed that he went into Deraa under disguise to scout it out and plan for an attack on the fortress. He claimed to have been arrested by Ottoman forces, then sexually assaulted and beaten. Placed in the hospital to recover, he was able to make his escape. There is no evidence to support Lawrence's account, and substantial reason to doubt it. Recent research suggests that instead he had gone to Aqaba, sixty miles south of Deraa, at the time in question.[50] A critical element in explaining Lawrence's antipathy to 'Abd al-Qadir may be that not long after the Deraa incident, Jerusalem fell to Allenby, and Jamal Pasha returned to Istanbul, to be replaced as

commander in Syria by Jamal Pasha al-Marsini, sometimes known as "Jamal Pasha the lesser." He had led Ottoman forces in seeking to fend off the Allied attack in Palestine, and thus was well aware of the need to come to terms with local political forces in Syria. The grandsons of Amir 'Abd al-Qadir could work with the new Jamal Pasha.

A Death in Damascus

In the summer of 1918, Jamal Pasha al-Marsini approached Sa'id and admitted to him the exhaustion of Ottoman forces. He argued that Sa'id, as a descendant of the prophet (or *sharif*), and with a long record of loyalty to the Ottoman sultan, was well suited to work at arranging a truce. On August 10, 1918, after slipping through the battle lines, Sa'id had a meeting with Faisal at al-Salt in eastern Jordan. According to Sa'id, they agreed on a formula of loose federation and Ottoman recognition of Sharif Husain's authority over Damascus. Jamal Pasha al-Marsini relayed this proposal to Damascus, but the CUP leadership in Istanbul rejected the offer.[51]

As British and Sharifian forces bore down on Damascus, Sa'id and 'Abd al-Qadir prepared for a final effort to create a situation in which Damascus was liberated and placed under the authority of Husain, but without a legitimate basis for either the British or the French to claim that a liberated Syria came under their imperial domain. 'Abd al-Qadir had the role of mobilizing local forces to maintain order once the Ottomans withdrew, a role with certain parallels to his grandfather's in maintaining order in 1860. He also had the key symbolic element, the Sharifian flag given him by Husain in October 1917.

After Ottoman forces withdrew on September 30, and before the entry of British and Sharifian forces to Damascus, the Algerian brothers proclaimed the establishment of a new government, under Husain's authority, and they raised his flag over the city hall. Soon thereafter, on October 1, the British and their Sharifian allies entered the city. There was a dramatic confrontation in the city hall, in which 'Abd al-Qadir allegedly attempted to attack Lawrence, but was fended off by Lawrence's loyal Arab allies. While there were obvious political aspects to the confrontation between the two men, there was also a symbolic aspect. According to Sa'id, Lawrence was wearing a *khanjar*, or golden dagger, which, by traditional protocol, was worn only by the *sharifs* of Mecca.[52] For 'Abd al-Qadir, this added insult to injury.

The Sharifian forces soon took control of the city, and both Sa'id and 'Abd al-Qadir were arrested. But soon thereafter Faisal declared an amnesty and they were released. Since Faisal felt an intense hostility to the Algerian brothers, his move was probably motivated by pressure from local Damascus leaders.

On November 7, 'Abd al-Qadir was killed by Sharifian forces. The precise circumstances—whether they sought to arrest him but he acted provocatively, or whether he was deliberately killed—will probably never be known.[53] It is striking that this killing occurred just two days before the Anglo-French announcement of their plans for protectorates. Though the announcement was made in ambiguous terms that could be read as a confirmation of plans for Syria's independence, this could also have been taken as a cause for stirring up opposition.[54]

The killing of 'Abd al-Qadir evidently became a major issue. Though Lawrence was no longer in Damascus at the time it occurred, he was put under pressure to explain what had been his relationship with 'Abd al-Qadir. On June 28, 1919, in Cairo, he wrote a long letter presenting his account, in which he described 'Abd al-Qadir as a Muslim fanatic who had once been consigned, along with his brother, to a lunatic asylum. It is in this letter that Lawrence also first elaborated his story of having been captured by the Turks in Deraa, sexually assaulted and beaten. He blamed this on 'Abd al-Qadir since he had just recently deserted Lawrence's camp and told the Turks of his activities, providing a description of Lawrence that allowed them to capture him.[55]

Given the evidence pointing to Lawrence's story being a fabrication, one must see his account as a reflection of his intense antipathy to 'Abd al-Qadir and the feeling of vulnerability that 'Abd al-Qadir aroused in him. The key to the story is that Lawrence and Faisal rejected a negotiated solution to the future of Syria and the greater Middle East.[56] They saw 'Abd al-Qadir and his brother not as mediators who could help negotiate a viable long-term solution but as mere pawns of the Turks. One can argue that they made the same mistake as Jamal Pasha.

It is interesting that in his account, Lawrence refers to 'Abd al-Qadir as "Abd el Kader el-Jezairi"—the Algerian. This was a surname that gave him a national identity rather than indicating his sharifian status. In one of his confrontations with Faisal, 'Abd al-Qadir reportedly shouted at him: "You are from a family of amirs, so am I!" If one was to establish an Arab kingdom in Syria, Amir 'Abd al-Qadir's descendants were logical claimants. After all, the amir had been the original focus of discussions of an Arab kingdom in Syria in the 1860s and 1870s. The real problem was that there was no family with a traditional claim to hereditary rulership in Syria, and support by a European power certainly did not enhance one's claim. Fayiz al-Ghusain, a Syrian supporter of Faisal, would later argue that 'Abd al-Qadir failed to recognize the political and organizational weakness of the Arabs, and their inability to pursue a successful revolt on their own.[57]

Algerian Roles in the 1916 Pilgrimage and Hijaz Military Mission

As the Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side of the Germans, and as the French pursued plans for establishing a protectorate in Syria, France was under considerable pressure to shore up its image in the eyes of its Muslim subjects. When the Arab Revolt broke out in May 1916, the French saw that it was important to foster their influence in the Hijaz. They could only do so with the help of Muslim subjects, and these had to be Algerian since Tunisians and Moroccans were protégés, not subjects. The idea for sending a French mission to Mecca originated with ʿIzzat Pasha al-ʿAbid, the Syrian political figure and high official under Sultan ʿAbd al-Hamid, who was now in exile in Cairo.[58]

Origins of the Mission

ʿIzzat Pasha was a man with a sophisticated grasp of the dynamics of both international diplomacy and internal Syrian and Ottoman politics. His son Muhammad ʿAli al-ʿAbid, future president of the Syrian Republic (in 1932), had briefly served as Ottoman ambassador in Washington, dismissed by the Young Turks only six weeks after his appointment.[59] By 1916 he was an important financial figure in Paris. ʿIzzat Pasha's sister was married to ʿAli Bin ʿAbd al-Qadir, leader of the Algerian community in Damascus.[60] In debates within the Syrian exile community in Egypt at the start of the war, ʿIzzat Pasha seems to have argued that the most realistic strategy for Syrians was to ally with the French, a view strongly opposed by Pan-Islamists such as Rashid Rida.[61] With Jamal Pasha's harsh repression, it made sense for advocates of Syrian independence such as ʿAbd al-Qadir Bin ʿAli to enter into discussions with ʿIzzat Pasha, seeking to chart a course through the stormy waters of imperial conflict.

As the idea of a Hijaz mission was circulated, French administrators in North Africa reacted in different ways. Marshal Lyautey in Morocco had nourished dreams of establishing a "Western Caliphate" in North Africa, but this had been rejected as unrealistic. Nevertheless, he hoped that the Hijaz mission could be presented as representing a "Western Islam," seeking parallels in the split between Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches. French administrators in Algeria had limited enthusiasm for the mission, in particular fearing that it would lead to commitments for covering pilgrimage costs, especially the return fares of stranded, penniless pilgrims.[62]

The central figure of the mission was to be Qaddur Bin Ghabrit, from a prominent family in western Algeria. He had entered the service of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1891, going to work as an employee at the French consulate in Tangier. He was to have an important role in the political

maneuvering leading up to the proclamation of a French protectorate in Morocco in 1911, serving as the grand chamberlain of Sultan Mawlay Hafidh.[63] He had won the confidence of Lyautey, and of the man who was to become head of the French military mission in Arabia, Colonel Brémond. He was seen as a figure who would be adroit at the sorts of subtle intrigue that had prevailed in the Moroccan setting as opposed to the formal diplomatic approach of the British embodied in the Husain-MacMahon correspondence.

Bin Ghabrit was a diplomatic representative of France, not a religious representative who could articulate an Islamic defense of French policies. The French thought they had found such a figure for the mission in the person of Mulud Bin al-Muhub, the mufti of Constantine, an important figure in the reinvigoration of the official Islamic establishment in Algeria since the 1890s.[64] But Bin al-Muhub presented the French with a doctor's certificate explaining that he had a liver ailment that prevented him from traveling. There may well have been a pun here, with the implication that his condition of faith (in French *foi*) did not permit him to travel, rather than the condition of his liver (*foie*).[65]

Bin al-Muhub's hesitancy in this situation suggests that he felt under pressure not to undertake a venture that would openly identify him as lending an Islamic sanction to the French war effort. As a progressive figure, he understood that medical science could provide a suitable excuse. It is noteworthy that he had a highly antagonistic relationship with the young 'Abd al-Hamid Bin Badis, future leader of the Association of 'Ulama. Though Bin Badis later gained a reputation as an advocate of Salafi Islam, which condemned Sufi practices, at this time he was on friendly terms with al-Tahir al-'Abidi, a Sufi leader in the southeastern oases of El Oued and Touggurt.

'Abidi was a member of the 'Azuziyya branch of the Rahmaniyya Sufi order, while Bin Badis was associated with another branch, based in the city of Constantine, led by members of the Bash Tarzi family.[66] 'Abidi had ties to the head of the 'Azuziyya branch, the *muhajir* al-Makki Bin 'Azuz, who was working in Istanbul to foster a rebellion against the French in southern Tunisia and southeastern Algeria.[67] The anti-Sufi stance of Bin Badis is so deeply entrenched in Algerian nationalist historiography that the allegation of Sufi connections in his earlier years provokes a strong reaction.[68]

The explanation to this conundrum may be that Bin Badis was consistently independent of the colonial administration. At the time of his visit to, and correspondence with, al-'Abidi (1917–18), the latter had a clear Pan-Islamic connection, with his link to Bin 'Azuz. But both men seem to have exercised caution. It was only after the war that French policy clearly shifted from support of a progressive Islamic establishment, embodied in such figures as Majjawi and

Bin al-Muhub, to a policy uniquely focused on promoting loyal Sufi orders. By 1953, the 'Azuziyya, once linked to Pan-Islam, had come full circle to support the last-ditch French effort to enlist Sufi orders against nationalist movements led by 'Abd al-Hayy al-Kittani and al-Hajj Tuhami al-Glawi.[69]

Algerian Soldiers and Diplomats in the Hijaz

Once the official pilgrimage reached the Hijaz, its tensest moment came with a confrontation between Bin Ghabrit and Rashid Rida, the Syrian-born disciple of Muhammad 'Abduh, and outspoken advocate of Islamic reform and Arab nationalism. It was Wingate, the British governor of the Sudan, who had argued for allowing Rida into Mecca at this time.[70] Rida was characteristically outspoken in denouncing French plans for the takeover of Syria. Bin Ghabrit countered that there was no reason for getting so worked up over a question that was bound to be resolved through a diplomatic process at the end of the war. Ultimately, Ahmad al-'Zuwawi, the Shafi'i mufti of Mecca, and son of an Algerian *muhajir*, served as mediator and persuaded Rida to take a less aggressive position.[71]

On the military side, the mission leader was Colonel Sharif Cadi, a truly unique figure. He came from a family of religious leaders near the eastern city of Guelma. In the early 1850s, they had taken part in a rebellion in the region and had lost property and gone into exile, much like the Bin 'Azuz family. But they managed to curry the favor of the French administration, regain their lost property, and land positions in the judiciary, taking the name Cadi (*qadi*, or Muslim judge) as the family name they entered in the État Civil. In an age when Muslim colonial subjects tended to be excluded from specialized education, Sharif Cadi entered the prestigious École Polytechnique, became a French citizen, and entered the artillery corps. When he was called by Colonel Brémond, a champion of specialized technical education for Muslim subjects, to serve on the Hijaz mission, he was serving on the western front at the Battle of Verdun. He was promoted from commandant to lieutenant-colonel to bolster his prestige.

A key question in military strategy in the Hijaz in 1916 was how to prevent an Ottoman counterattack on Mecca from their base in Madina, and whether Sharif Husain and his allies had adequate forces to drive the Turks out of Madina. The French, unlike the British, were willing to provide artillery. The problem was that Sharif Husain insisted on having only Muslim soldiers involved. Colonel Cadi was the only qualified Muslim officer, though there was also a French officer on the scene, Captain Ibrahim Depui, who had converted to Islam. French Muslim troops were able to help hold off Ottoman efforts

to move on Mecca, but unable to dislodge the Ottoman forces from Madina, a factor that ultimately weakened the hand of the Arabs in determining who would have the upper hand in Syria. In fact, Colonel Brémond saw this as advantageous for the French.[72] It might also be noted that Colonel Cadi, highly assimilated as he was to French language and ways, often made awkward gestures in the unfamiliar setting of the Hijaz. He was a figure who had gained important technical qualifications, but at the expense of being uprooted from his own culture.[73]

While the Hijaz mission produced no outstanding results for the French, it did establish their presence in the city that was at the heart of the Arab Revolt, and gave the French a channel of direct communication with Sharif Husain. It laid the foundation stone for an institution serving Muslims of French colonial territories, the Société des Habous et des Lieux Saints. But the main result of this effort over the long term was not to enhance France's presence in the Hijaz, but to establish an official presence for Islam in France in the form of the Paris Mosque, officially opened in 1926, with Qaddur Bin Ghabrit at its head.

Transforming Experiences of Wartime

While the experience of most Algerians in the Middle East during the war can be seen in terms of political dilemmas shaped by the competition of imperial powers, that of Algerians who spent the war years within the French colonial sphere in North Africa, or in Europe involved social, psychological, and intellectual transformations that would serve as the foundations of new political enterprises. The factories and trenches of France and the prisons of North Africa and Germany were key settings for these transformations.

In the background were those left in the villages and towns of Algeria as they tried to make sense of the heavily censored news that was available and the lavishly embellished rumors that circulated. While there were outbreaks of anti-French violence, in 1914 near Mascara, and in 1916–17 in the Aurès, the main concern of those who remained in Algeria was coping with food shortages and rising prices, and taking advantage of opportunities when they arose. The war years saw a continuation of already-established trends such as the movement of Muslims to urban centers, large and small, and thus away from traditional religious and administrative authority structures. The ramifications of this would be seen after the war.

Some of the most striking transformations on the individual, psychological level occurred as a result of prison or internment experience in these years. It can be argued that such experience helped to dismantle the earlier generation

of leaders who had been active in the press and voluntary organizations in the prewar years, and at the same time helped to launch a new generation of leadership with wider perspectives, better able to articulate their arguments to European audiences as well as Muslim ones.

Breaking the Spirit of Arabic Journalists

Two of the most outspoken Arabic language journalists in the prewar years were ʻUmar Bin Qaddur and ʻUmar Rasim, the first of whom was interned in the south, the latter imprisoned, then interned, during the war years. Bin Qaddur grew up in Algiers and attended the government-run Thaʻalbiyya Madrasa, where he studied with ʻAbd al-Qadir al-Majjawi and ʻAbd al-Halim Bin Smaʻia, a strong opponent of conscription. He spent three or four years in Cairo and Tunis, where he was initiated to new trends in journalism, returning to Algiers in 1908. He wrote articles opposing conscription, which he argued would lead to Algerian Muslims being obliged to fight against other Muslims, as had occurred in Morocco. In 1913, he established his own newspaper, *al-Faruq*, in which he advocated the establishment of a society to promote cooperation between Muslims in Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco.

In mid-1915, the French authorities shut down *al-Faruq* and interned Bin Qaddur in the south, first in Laghouat, then in ʻAin Madi. In the latter, the spiritual headquarters of the Tijaniyya Sufi order, he seems to have turned away from his previous activism to a more contemplative life. He died in 1930, in his mid-forties.[74]

ʻUmar Rasim came from an Algiers family with a strong artistic tradition. He, too, went to the Thaʻalbiyya Madrasa, but was expelled after a short while. With his artistic background he chose to publish a lithographed magazine with illustrations, *Majallat al-Jaza'ir*, which appeared only briefly in 1908. He felt that such a publication would have greater appeal to the common man. He seems to have spent a short while in Cairo in 1912, then returned to launch another short-lived newspaper in Algiers, *Dhu al-Fiqar*. The paper had a strongly populist character, emphasizing the need to alleviate poverty. He claimed that the publication's political director was Henri de Rochefort, the Communard turned anti-Semite who had shown sympathy for ʻAziz al-Haddad in his final days, and that the religious director was Muhammad ʻAbduh.

In articles he contributed to other papers, he strongly opposed conscription and launched bitter attacks on the *nukhba*, or elite, who supported it, alleging that they came close to being non-Muslims. In 1915, British authorities in Egypt discovered a letter he wrote to the Cairo newspaper *al-Shaʻab* in which he called on Muslims to support the Ottoman sultan. They relayed news of

this to the French, and 'Umar Rasim was imprisoned in August 1915, then three months later interned in the south. The letter had been written before Turkey's entry into the war, so there is reason to believe that his arrest was motivated by the hostility of individuals in the French administration, and members of the Algerian Muslim elite whom he had attacked with such virulence.[75]

He was not released until 1921, and only as a result of pleading by French liberals and prominent Algerians. When he regained his freedom, he was a bitter, angry man. While he was in custody his father and uncle had died, his mother had gone blind, and the family was reduced to poverty. He denounced the optimism that seemed to prevail in Algeria in the 1920s as a delusion, asserting that this new spirit was "the sugar that coats vile things and smoothes the way to evil."[76] He told Ahmad Tawfiq al-Madani that he thought the enthusiasm stirred by Amir Khalid in the early 1920s was like a fire in dry grass that would quickly go out. Emerging from his prison experience impoverished and in poor health, he felt completely alone and darkly pessimistic about the condition of the Muslim world, casting aspersions on the new leader of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal, as a *kafir*, or renegade.[77]

But 'Umar Rasim managed to find a refuge in his family's traditional occupation as an artist. His brother Muhammad is better known—indeed he became a widely celebrated artist in the 1930s. But 'Umar also produced fine miniatures and trained a number of future prominent artists.[78] On the eve of the Second World War, he even lent his artistic and calligraphic skills to the production of a magazine for North African soldiers, *Ya Allah*.

Prison as Redemption from Colonial Moral Turpitude: Ahhmad Tawfiq al-Madani

Rasim's wartime prison experience offers an interesting contrast to that of Ahmad Tawfiq al-Madani. Born in 1899, Madani was an impressionable youth at the time of the turbulence in Tunis stemming from the Djellaz Cemetery conflict. He portrays himself in his autobiography as a precocious youth who spoke out in favor of reform, even against his own Qur'an school teacher. Soon after the war broke out, he became involved in a scheme to launch a rebellion in southern Tunisia. The French administration apparently found out, and he was imprisoned. One detail that Madani does not bring into his account is that his uncle Muhammad Bu Yaraz was in Istanbul and took on a prominent role, along with such figures as Salah al-Sharif, in attempting to stir up resistance against the French, especially in the strip of territory through southern Tunisia and the south Constantinois that was linked to the Ottoman base in Tripoli.

This connection, along with Madani's outspoken character, probably helped to focus the attention of French security services on him.

Madani at first was very frightened, fearing that he would be taken before a military tribunal and dealt with harshly. Early in his prison experience he had a vision in which encountered two Sufi saints, and then the Prophet Muhammad, who assured him that he would be under his protection in this life and the next. Madani was not sent before the tribunal. He learned later that an influential relative in Algiers had intervened on his behalf, sending the Martiniquan lawyer Maître Lamiral to argue to the French authorities in Tunis that dealing harshly with a sixteen-year-old, especially one with important connections in the Algiers elite, would not serve French interests.

So young Ahmad Tawfiq al-Madani spent the war years in a prison in Tunis. He gradually gained access to more and more reading material and, in the process, greatly improved his command of French and explored a wide range of new ideas. In retrospect, he saw his prison years as a positive experience, not only in intellectual and political terms, but in terms of health and longevity. This perspective reflects how Madani was deeply influenced by the debates of his youth.

The issues to which Madani implicitly referred were presented in graphic terms by the Constantine Young Algerian leader Chérif Benhabyles in a piece published in 1914. He described the typical "city kid" (*ouled el-bled*) who got up at eleven in the morning, wandered around the streets, then slipped into a bar where, "sheltered from inquisitive looks, he asks the waiter for his favorite liquor which will open the treasures of marvelous enjoyment: absinthe." At night, he proceeded to the *Dar Zbantout*, politely translated, the "Maison des Célibataires," where he played cards and purchased the favors of a Jewish prostitute.[79]

Both progressive assimilationists and Islamic leaders saw a great potential for the corruption of Muslim youth as they moved into European cities.[80] In Madani's account, one of his fellow conspirators in attempting to stir a rebellion in the south was lured by Europeans into corrupt activity and wound up being killed. Madani was thankful that he was saved from this during his most vulnerable years by being kept in the austere environment of a prison. The experience helped him to understand the need for the creation of new social institutions in the urban environment that would engage Muslim youth and preserve them from the decadence of the European environment. Such puritanism was certainly not limited to Muslim environments at this time: had Madani been an American at this time, he no doubt would have been an enthusiastic supporter of Prohibition.

New Horizons: German Prison Camps, French Streets

Many Algerians spent the war years in prison camps in Germany. The Germans made efforts to win the loyalty of colonized Muslims and recruit them for combat in Middle East theaters. Lieutenant Rabah Boukabouya, a graduate of the École Normale, or teachers' training school, of Algiers was the most prominent figure serving the Germans. But his influence in the prison camps was limited, both because he was opposed by more traditional Muslim figures working for the Germans in these camps and because the prisoners often faced poor conditions and humiliating treatment. Boukabouya wound up working on published propaganda and collaborating with Algerian and Tunisian refugees such as 'Ali Bash Hanba and Salah al-Sharif on the campaign to promote Algerian-Tunisian independence.

A prisoner of war with a very different experience from Boukabouya's was Mohand Tazerout. Rather like Madani, he took the idle years of his incarceration as an opportunity for learning. He learned German and immersed himself in the study of German philosophers. In the postwar years, he would launch a distinguished academic career in France, publishing works on German philosophers and traveling around the world in pursuit of a global vision inspired by those philosophers. His explanations of their emphasis on the factors that drove the rise and fall of civilizations would have an important influence on Malik Bennabi as he elaborated his own philosophic vision in the 1930s and 1940s.

Within France itself, there was a huge influx of Algerian soldiers and workers during the war. Many of the workers were requisitioned rather than coming voluntarily, and they were organized in quasi-military fashion. As more Algerian workers came, they tended to congregate in their own "ghettoes," and the North African Muslim emigrant culture so widely discussed and debated in France today began to emerge.[81] It was a culture marked by frequent incidents of conflict with surrounding French communities, but also by the recognition on both sides of the need to build alliances, both political and personal. Building ties with Algerian workers was particularly important for the French Left and labor unions.

The iconic figure representing such alliances is Messali Hajj. He had grown up in the western Algerian city of Tlemcen, in a family of Kulughli origin. His family name, Messali, referred to a Janissary forebear's roots in the region of Mosul in northern Iraq. He had the good fortune of being conscripted late in the war and thus never having to endure the trauma of battle. He stayed on after the war as a worker, marrying a French woman and forming links with the Communist movement. While Messali eventually separated himself from the

Communists, his version of Algerian nationalism was strongly influenced by socialist ideas, and indeed socialism would be a major element in the emerging Algerian nationalist movement.

Tazerout's and Messali's acquisition of new forward-looking visions during the war might be contrasted with the tragic death of 'Abd al-Qadir Bin 'Ali in Damascus, and the failure of Pan-Islamic ventures during the war. The effort to end colonial rule carried out by *muhajirs* with the support of external powers had failed. As nationalism took hold in Turkey and the Arab East came under European control, *hijra* was no longer a viable option. At the same time, the prospect of Algeria being divided between a Morocco-linked West and an East tied to Tunis and Tripoli also was eliminated. As a postcolonial Algeria began to emerge, it would be shaped more by new ideas and by populist appeals than by tradition and hereditary leadership. This was by no means a new development, as one can already see these trends in early-nineteenth-century Algeria, reflected in the works of Hamdan Khodja and Hajj Ahmad Sharif al-Zahhar.

4

Exchange and Innovation in the Revolutionary Era

With the end of the First World War, Algeria entered a new phase. North Africa was no longer a theater of imperial rivalry. Algerians no longer had roles in conquering new territories for the French empire and thus winning a privileged status within the imperial order. *Muhajirs* abroad faced the choice between return to Algeria or incorporation into their host society. During the period from 1920 until shortly before the outbreak the revolution in 1954, Algerians were mainly confined to operating within the sphere of a trans-Mediterranean France, with strict controls being placed on travel to the Middle East.

But within that limited sphere, the connections forged by Algerians in all domains—political, cultural, social, and religious—became increasingly diverse and complex. This development was a result of greater numbers of Algerians living in urban settings within Algeria, or going to France to study, work, or serve in the military. The new situation raised the challenging question of how Algerians could be incorporated into a French framework in a manner that gave them equality, yet respected their Islamic identity.

Underlying this was the question of whether Algeria could be transformed from a frontier territory under tight colonial control to an integral part of a pluralistic, democratic France. Algeria, in the quarter century before the outbreak of the revolution, saw the precarious emergence of Muslim civil society, a domain independent from control by the colonial administration and traditional leaders, and also small but growing breeches in the walls that had separated European from Muslim society. Academic discussions of the concept of civil society in this context often see it as a future, modern ideal, rather than recognizing that its emergence depends on particular conditions, and that modern developments in technology and communication, along with changing global political dynamics, can just as easily thwart the development of civil society as promote it.[1]

Women had significant roles in the new developments. The emergence of civil society involved women pursuing education and taking on public

roles, including in Islamic expression and in interfaith dialogue. A striking illustration of the breeches in the walls lay in the small but growing frequency of marriage between Muslims and non-Muslims. Unlike the patterns in sub-Saharan Africa, where European men entered into what was usually temporary or "customary" marriage with local women, producing an intermediary *métis* class, these were formal marriages that usually involved Muslim men and European women.[2] Rather than resulting in an intermediary class between Europeans and natives, they could contribute to building alliances that cut across racial boundaries, and to promoting social equality. But intermarriage could also result in agonizing dilemmas since such marriages had an ambiguous legal status and left the partners vulnerable to accusations of disloyalty to their culture of birth.[3] Similar developments occurred in the *muhajir* community. 'Abd al-Raziq 'Abd al-Qadir, a descendant of Amir 'Abd al-Qadir, became a Marxist and married an Israeli woman, Tsalina Kinstler, who shared his Marxist commitment. He was probably the only individual to fight for Israel in 1948 and then join the Algerian FLN.[4]

To explore these transformations, this chapter first surveys changing forms of popular expression in the domains of theater, art, and music, and looks at how these affected new forms of Islamic expression. Next, it considers efforts at dialogue between Christians and Muslims. It then examines administrative and political dynamics that bore on Islamic expression at the local level and ultimately thwarted the possibility of a transition to democratic pluralism. This theme is examined in detail in looking at the life of Bashir Ibrahimi, the leader of the Association of 'Ulama from 1940 to 1952. His life illustrates the transitions from *hijra*, to return to Algeria, and then to revolution-era refugee. He made a major contribution to building the Islamic dimension of civil society before the revolution, and to resisting pressures to subordinate religion to politics during and after the revolution.

Finally, this chapter examines the Algerian perspective on Islam and globalization developed by a new generation of bicultural intellectuals, represented by the dramatist and writer Ahmad Rida Huhu and the philosopher Malik Bennabi. They illustrate Algeria's broadening intellectual horizons and offer insights on the continuing question of how Muslims can respond to the challenges of life in the West and in the modern world.

Cultural Infrastructure and Interchange in a Transitional Urban Environment

The First World War did not start the process of social change in Algeria, but it certainly accelerated that process. Algerians were moving out of their

traditional environments in rural areas into cities and towns in Algeria, and also Tunisia, and across the Mediterranean to France. There had been a long-established pattern of migration by *barrani* communities from rural areas to cities, and recruitment of soldiers in rural areas. But the craft industries and the community identities associated with those old patterns were weakening, and a new, broader pattern of movement was taking shape. With this process came the challenge of forging new institutions and choosing new leaders, both political and religious.

The economic depression of the 1930s further contributed to the process of change, bringing more impoverished Algerians from the countryside into the cities searching for work, and contributing to an atmosphere of insecurity and the intensification of racial stereotypes in the minds of European settlers. The new economic conditions also opened the door to women's employment outside the home, mainly in domestic service. Before this time, women's moneymaking opportunities had been related primarily to crafts, such as embroidery, which offered little income. Government-sponsored schools had stressed craft training for girls.[5] The new atmosphere lent itself to support for girls' education, preparing them for wider prospects of employment, and to girls and women taking part in public events.

One might take as one variant of this larger process the city of Batna, at the heart of the Aurès Mountains, the area where the first event of the revolution would take place in November 1954. Like other smaller cities, such as Setif and Orléansville, Batna had started as a colonial urban center, populated mainly by European settlers. Initially, the center of native life in Batna was outside the city limits, in what was called the "*village nègre*," a settlement populated by the retinues of chiefs from the surrounding region. The only mosque available was that of the *village nègre*.[6]

But the power and influence of those chiefs went into decline after 1871, with the end of Napoleon III's regime and its policy of supporting tribal chiefs. By the 1890s, the Muslim population was growing within the city itself, made up not only of individuals who had come from the surrounding area in search of work, but of others who had come from more distant areas following commercial opportunity, or on assignment as a government functionary. As the old mosque, associated with the authority of traditional chiefs and inconveniently located, began to crumble, Batna's Muslims called on the government to provide funds for construction of a mosque within the city.[7]

French authorities at first resisted this demand. The separation of religion and state, created in France by a law of 1905, had been extended to Algeria by a decree in 1907. The additional expense of new construction seemed a financial burden, and one that could be begged off from by invoking the separation of

religion and state. By 1920, the Muslim community leaders of Batna were pursuing a twofold approach, collecting funds within the community and mobilizing their political influence at higher levels to seek financial support to build a new mosque. The prefect of the Department of Constantine made it clear that the separation of religion and state stood in the way of any government contribution for a new mosque, so they pursued the project with community funding alone. As if to confirm the gravity of the changes occurring, in 1924, not long after the new mosque was completed, an earthquake demolished what remained of the old mosque.[8]

New Forms of Community Activity

As Islamic institutions, both mosques and schools, emerged inside the colonial city, authorities had to deal with the question of how these institutions should be financed and regulated. In legal and financial terms, complete independence made sense. Yet this would allow for the emergence of influential voices independent of the colonial government, and also for the development of conflicts over who could speak with religious authority.

An important element in the strength of the reformists lay in their ability to raise funds that were used mainly in the establishment of new *madrasas*, or Islamic schools. Just as with traditional Sufi orders, fund-raising was associated with events in the ritual cycle. But in the new urban environment, the ritual cycle was transferred from the *zawiya*, or tomb, of a long-dead saint, associated with established popular narratives, to modern urban gathering places, often a theater. In the process, new narratives were created, mainly by the students and teachers in these schools, narratives that looked to the future as much as the past. Such events, which started in the early 1920s, became increasingly common in the late 1940s as the number of students and schools grew, and as the atmosphere became increasingly politicized. They were doubtless stimulated by the emergence of Algerian theater at the national level, led first by Alloula, then by Mahi al-Din Bachtarzi and Rashid Ksentini. Theater, more than any other medium, lent itself both to a sense of local community and to the elaboration of a national identity. Theater also lent itself to cultural blending, adapting elements and techniques from other cultures to Algerian purposes.

It is fitting that Ksentini had a truly global background, and it is also perhaps symptomatic of the political environment of Algeria that there are different accounts of the chronology of his life. According to Bachtarzi's *Mémoires*, published in the 1960s, Ksentini had been working on a ship early in the First World War that was sunk by a German U-boat. After being rescued, he began world travels that took him to India, China, and North

America, finally returning to Algeria with a French wife in 1925, to the surprise of friends and family who had not heard from him for years. But according to a piece published on the occasion of his death in July 1943, the world travels of Ksentini (born in 1887) as a merchant seaman had occurred before the war, and he worked in a munitions factory in France during the war, giving him an image of loyalty to France.[9] Ksentini himself might have pointed out that to tell a good story one needs to take account of the circumstances and the audience.

The events presented in theaters, typically on holidays such as Mawlid al-Nabi, the Prophet's birthday, were a combination of traditional and modern materials.[10] There would be recitations from the Qur'an, but also skits put on by the students. The principal rationales put forward for these skits were to strengthen morals, promote the value of education, teach the history of the country, and provide examples of the proper way to speak Arabic. In the early years, some people apparently saw these performances as examples of "immorality" (*tahatuk*) and "frivolity" (*istikhfaf*).[11]

Following the arrival of American forces in late 1942 and the subsequent removal of the pro-Axis Vichy regime in Algeria, enrollments in the *madrasas* grew rapidly. In the city of Constantine, the annual increase in enrollment, which had been in the range of 100 to 150, jumped in 1943–44 to 449.[12] The number of girls at these schools in particular increased, and judging from newspaper accounts, the girls had a growing role in popular celebrations. In a school in a village between Djidjelli and El Milia in February 1948, a girl by the name of Fatima Zuhra al-Najjar stood before the audience and proclaimed: "The time is not a time for delay and laziness. People must understand that this is an age of speed and power, and it is up to those who hope to succeed in this life, and in the competition among nations, to prepare all her sons and daughters to be a people ready for a life of competition and struggle."[13]

Another such gathering at the same time, in Tiaret, put on a play about Tariq Ibn Ziyad, the leader of the Muslim conquest of al-Andalus beginning in 711. It presented a sharp contrast between the Muslim policy of tolerance toward other religious groups and French colonial policies of discrimination and repression.[14] In the context of the late 1940s, this play can be interpreted as holding out the hope that Algeria might become a democratic, pluralistic society under Muslim leadership.

Such presentations, coming at the high point of hopes for effective reform and political opening in Algeria, are illustrations of the dynamic atmosphere that prevailed, albeit briefly, in the late 1940s, following the reforms of the Statut d'Algérie, passed on August 27, 1947. They demonstrate that Algerian Muslims, not just at the elite, but at the grassroots level, were able to take on,

quite eloquently, key issues in their discussions with Europeans, particularly gender roles and religious tolerance.

This transformation, highlighted by the effective use of theater to promote new ideas and raise funds for modern Islamic schools, can be seen as the product of a number of factors. One of them was the encouragement for them coming from Algerians with long experience in the Arab east, notably Abu Ya'la al-Zuwawi, who had spent several years in Cairo, the main center of Arabic cultural innovation at the time, during the war.[15] Bashir Ibrahimi, as is explained below, paid great attention to the importance of girls' education.

Cultural Cross-Fertilization in Popular Theater, Music, and Art

A key factor in the transformation of cultural life in interwar Algeria was collaboration between Algerian Muslims and Europeans with experience and skills in new forms of media, in areas including music, theater, and visual illustration. One of the most prominent of these was the singer and playwright Mahi al-Din Bachtarzi. He began his career in his youth, chanting the Qur'an at a mosque in Algiers. In this urban environment, his talents were noticed by Edmond Yafil, an Algiers Jew who was a prominent musical figure in the city. He also claimed to have drawn inspiration from the composer Camille Saint-Saëns, who spent his twilight years in Algeria.

Bachtarzi recalled in his memoirs, written in the 1960s, that the 1920s had been a time of "intellectual mixing which drew together the diverse ethnic elements of the country, a fraternization of Muslim, Jewish, and Christian youth in the domains of art, culture, and sport."[16] But he looked at the role of his European mentors with mixed feelings. They had helped him to break out of traditional patterns and learn new techniques and skills, but they viewed Arabic Islamic culture "with a little bit too much *complaisance*."[17]

His initial experience in using his talents for fund-raising occurred on a trip to Paris in 1924, when Qaddur Bin Ghabrit asked him to sing classical Arab songs on Radio Paris to help raise money for the building of the Paris Mosque. When he returned to Algeria, he became involved in singing for charity events to raise money for local causes, especially to support the new Islamic schools. His experience in entertainment made him realize that one could not simply preach to the audience. One had to appeal to them, using popular language and imagery. As he put it: "What would best serve Algerian theater? To have ourselves applauded by 150 intellectuals (of whom 149 had been given free tickets) or a gathering with 1,200 spectators who came to hear a play that they understand?"[18]

He began writing plays that took on popular themes of the time, his first

work being entitled *The Fake Scholars*. This play made a mockery of *marabouts*, the traditional, hereditary religious leaders of Algeria, ending in a scene where a traditional leader and his son were booed off the stage by the audience, who had rousing cheers for the students of a new *madrasa* who had stood up to them.[19] By the early 1930s, the French administration made it clear that they disapproved of his new political direction, and they withheld official favors.

While theater lent itself to messages of religious reform and political mobilization, music presented a different dynamic. Popular music was traditionally associated with secular celebrations, above all weddings, which were occasions for exuberant expression. The new technology of the record player made it possible to bring popular music out of the private, domestic domain, into the public domain of the café, the bar, and the music hall. Perhaps the best example of this was Shaikha Rimitti, who came from an impoverished background in western Algeria, the home of *ra'i* music. She began in a traditional role, singing at weddings. By the mid-1930s, she made the shift to commercial song, making her first recording. She developed a reputation for what some would see as the promotion of loose morals, others as someone who challenged a dysfunctional, patriarchal order. During the years of the revolution, she was criticized for not bringing politics into her music. Yet her message was certainly not one of fatalism and resignation.[20]

The visual arts present yet another dynamic. As printing techniques evolved, the visual arts could be made into a means of popular expression, notably through the *bande dessinée*, or comic. In this domain, it was French artists who prevailed in the 1920s through the 1940s. The initial venture was launched by ten students from the University of Algiers, who founded "the Salon of Laughter" with its headquarters on the Rue d'Isly, one of the main thoroughfares of the city.

One of their specialties was the caricature of Algerian Muslim figures, with captions that were mainly colloquial French, but with the occasional Algerian Arabic term well known to Algeria's settlers, such as "*bizef*" (a lot).[21] With the outbreak of the Second World War, members of this group, notably André and Eugène Mathiot, lent their skills to the preparation of the monthly magazine for North African Muslims in the French armed forces, *Ya Allah*, which mixed conventional war reporting in French with satirical images and stories in colloquial Arabic. Every issue had at least one story about Djeha, a popular figure in Algerian folklore, renowned for his doltish behavior but also for his ability to get the best of others. The new version of the publication that appeared after the Allies had taken over North Africa, *an-Nasr*, had more conventional propaganda images vaunting Allied triumphs and disparaging Hitler.

Though the *bandes dessinées* of the Mathiot brothers were used for wartime

propaganda and can be seen as the expression of a condescending colonial mentality, they also need to be recognized as an example of the cultural fusion characteristic of the interwar years, a fusion that was promoted by members of the European Left, both secular and Catholic. In the vision of French Algerian culture supported by the *grands colons*, which came into full flower in the brief period of the Vichy administration, such popular art had no place.[22] The work of the Mathiot brothers can be seen as a forerunner of a vigorous tradition of Algerian *bandes dessinées*, or *b.d.*s, that developed after independence, one of the best-known examples of which is the work of Slim.

Christian-Muslim Dialogue

The intense divisions and pervasive sense of fear that had come to prevail in Algeria's colonial urban society did inspire some innovative efforts to bridge the divide by the early 1950s, especially among Catholic activists. Up to the early 1950s, Catholic leaders concerned with France's relations with Muslims had tended to take a condescending attitude, promoting benevolent works and professing respect for Arabic Islamic culture, but affirming France's superiority. One example of this outlook is the prominent scholar Louis Massignon, noted for his calls to promote the teaching of Arabic in France, and for his defense of Muslim interests in Jerusalem. But Algerian Muslims saw his overtures as empty gestures.[23] The Pères Blancs, a Catholic missionary order working in Algeria, met with a similar rejection by Algerian Islamic reformists and nationalists.[24]

Catholic efforts to reach out to Muslims found their most positive response in the case of Tayyib al-'Uqbi, the principal leader of the Association of 'Ulama in the city of Algiers. The dialogue between Algiers Catholics, and also Jews, and al-'Uqbi can be dated back to 1934. In that year, 'Uqbi, along with Catholic activists Jean Scelles and Jeanne Scelles-Millie, and Elie Gozlan, a participant in the first Zionist Congress at Basel, Switzerland, in 1897 and a friend of many Algerian political leaders, set up the Union des Croyants Monothéistes. Their action was a response to the outbreak of violent clashes between Jews and Muslims in the city of Constantine.[25]

It is rather a conundrum that only two years later 'Uqbi was charged with having incited the assassination of the mufti of Algiers, Mahmud Kahhul, which occurred in August 1936.[26] The accusation seems to have been based not upon evidence, but rather upon 'Uqbi's reputation as a rabble-rouser, a reputation related to his ties to Algiers port workers, many of whom, like 'Uqbi, had their origins in the Biskra region.[27] The Kahhul assassination, taking place in a highly charged political atmosphere, has given rise to endless speculation on

who was actually responsible. In any case, once he had been cleared of charges in 1939, 'Uqbi became more cautious. Unlike Bashir Ibrahimi, he was not interned in 1940, or after the Setif events of 1945.

'Uqbi's dialogue with Catholics reached its most intense phase in 1949–50, in the aftermath of the creation of the state of Israel, in which the Abu Madyan *waqf*, a religious endowment property in Jerusalem, was expropriated by the new Jewish state. This endowment was initially established after the departure of the Crusaders by the grandson of the twelfth-century Islamic scholar and mystic Shua'yb Abu Madyan (Sidi Boumediene), whose tomb near the city of Tlemcen was a popular site of pilgrimage. With the support of Louis Massignon, 'Uqbi set off for Jerusalem, along with Muhammad Ben Houra, who had been a prisoner of war in Germany during the First World War and had emerged as a spokesman for Algerian loyalty to France in the interwar years. They went to Jerusalem in March 1950 to call for the endowment's return and to appeal for the city of Jerusalem being given a special international status. Jean Scelles and his wife, the architect Jeanne Scelles-Millie, from the Algiers Catholic community were active in the Comité d'Entente France-Islam. Scelles-Millie wrote of 'Uqbi's venture in Jerusalem in glowing terms, emphasizing how 'Uqbi was highly effective in articulating the common elements in the heritage of Muslims and Christians.[28] On his return, 'Uqbi took up the publication of a periodical entitled *Asa Musa*, or the Moses Foundation, which engaged in polemics attacking Bashir Ibrahimi, calling him an "Algerian Stavisky," implying that he was a sort of financial con man in the same mold as the Ukrainian Jewish immigrant to France at the center of a financial scandal in 1934.[29] The jibe was evidently aimed at Ibrahimi's innovative fund-raising techniques.

The issues of Palestinian refugees and Israeli control over west Jerusalem offered what seemed a golden opportunity for allowing France to portray itself as a defender of Islam, and indeed of spiritual values in general at a time when materialism seemed on the march everywhere, with its consumerist variant prevailing in the West, and its Communist variant in the East. The trip to Jerusalem gave 'Uqbi an opportunity to claim that he was a more vigorous defender of Islam than was Bashir Ibrahimi, now president of the Association of 'Ulama. But Ibrahimi countered that the first priority of Algerian Muslims should be to reclaim endowment properties long ago confiscated by the colonial state. From his perspective, the focus for Algerian Muslims should not be the Abu Madyan *waqf*, in Jerusalem, but rather the tomb of Abu Madyan in Tlemcen, which stood as a symbol of unity for Muslims in Algeria.[30]

It is only in the early 1950s that one sees efforts to pursue a different approach, one that emphasized inclusion of both secular and Catholic elements

of the European population in a dialogue of equals with Algerian Muslims. This effort took an organized form in 1953, with the emergence of the Association of Algerian Youth for Social Action. The group emphasized joint efforts to address problems of poverty, and to promote interaction among European and Muslim youth groups, particularly Scout organizations.[31] This effort coincided with the appearance in 1952 of a new newspaper aimed at Muslim youth, *Le Jeune Musulman*, which published pieces by many bicultural Muslims who would later have prominent intellectual and political roles in independent Algeria.[32]

Administrative Intervention and Political Rivalry in Religious Affairs

Throughout the three decades preceding the revolution, political tensions and apprehensions affected cultural and religious expression in two ways. On the one hand, there were administrative measures. The separation of religion and state had been decreed in principle in 1907, yet there were no clear rules or a financial basis for implementing this decree. The colonial administration continued to have a large role in the appointment and promotion of "official clergy," those who worked in mosques financed by the government. In principle, mosques were to be run by local Associations Cultuelles Musulmanes, but these often proved ineffective, allowing provincial prefects to step in and name personnel, making positions in mosques part of the larger administrative patronage system.[33] On the other hand, because the rules were so ambiguous, religious leaders needed to cultivate political support to protect themselves, and in the process they could be caught in a web of political rivalries.

An Ambiguous Legal Framework

Criteria for appointment involved not only the candidate's avoiding any activity that could be construed as expressing support for an organization or ideology opposed to the colonial administration, but also his having family connections that could serve to ensure that the candidate, once appointed, would continue his good behavior.[34] By the same principle, politically objectionable behavior on the part of one family member could lead to disciplinary measures against another. While such measures were meant to sustain French control, they undermined the authority of the religious establishment, enhancing the prestige of the independent Association of 'Ulama.

Since this association had its own financial base, there was little the administration could do to control it directly. Moreover its leader, 'Abd al-Hamid Bin

Badis, came from a prestigious and wealthy family in the city of Constantine that the administration was reluctant to alienate. They did, however, claim the right to authorize the opening of schools, as long as they were schools that provided conventional academic education and not Qur'an schools. But since the *madrasas* provided both religious and conventional academic education, it was sometimes hard to make the determination.[35]

When a local administrator did take an aggressive stance, schools mobilized support from Muslim political leaders, and even from members of the local European population. In Ain Milia, Ahmad Loucif opened a school without authorization in 1934. The local administrator saw him as someone who had taken part in anti-French protests the previous year, and claimed that his opening a school without authorization was a symptom of a "crisis of authority." But when prominent political figures, including Dr. Bendjelloul, came to his defense, the prefect of Constantine ruled that the affair needed to be "re-examined."[36]

One reason that administrators, especially in smaller towns classified as "*communes mixtes*," objected to the establishment of *madrasas* was that they seemed to transform local attitudes. The administrator of Akbou claimed that the opening of a school in the village of Bori changed what had been "reputed to be the easiest place to administer in my commune to what is at present the most difficult." Inhabitants of this village now resisted the collection of taxes and committed "outrages" against government agents.[37] It can be suggested that this observation reflects how the new independent Islamic schools of this time need to be understood not simply as educational institutions, but as centers of a new community ritual life that lent to a new sense of self-confidence and of belonging to a wider community.

Conflicts involving Islamic schools depended to a large extent on local variables. In August 1948, Bashir Ibrahimi wrote a piece for the Association of 'Ulama's newspaper, *al-Basa'ir,* in which he complained that members of the Association were hounded by police when they came to Annaba, being taken to the police station for hours of questioning and having papers and books impounded. He lamented that Annaba had become like a "piece of foreign soil."[38] At this time, the Association was working to overcome a setback that had occurred during the war, when their local school had been destroyed by a bombardment.[39]

But interference by the local police was not the only problem the Association faced in Annaba. Moderate political leaders supported a school run by a teacher who was a *muqaddim* of the Tijaniyya order and had wide support from other Sufi orders in the city.[40] In 1947, a new *madrasa* was established in the city with support from members of Messali Hajj's Parti du Peuple Algérien

(PPA). Dr. Omar Guèche attempted to revive the Association's Annaba section in 1948 but had difficulty gaining momentum.[41]

The influence of the PPA within the Annaba region was also reflected in the nearby town of Mila, where one of the Association of 'Ulama's leading figures was 'Abbas Bencheikh El Hocine, a supporter of the PPA who would later take a prominent role in the Islamic establishment in France. He came from a wealthy family of traditional Islamic leaders, but as younger members of such families often did, he shifted to the reformist view of Islam, lending his support to a top Association of 'Ulama figure, Mubarak al-Mili, who came from the town. A decision to sell off traditional ritual items from the tomb of the *marabout* Sidi Bu Yahaya in 1942 set off an argument with the government-appointed imam of Mila. The imam was vexed that supporters of the reformists were deserting the official mosque, and the local French administrator was also disturbed by the implications of this development.[42]

As more and more Islamic schools opened and their enrollments grew, they needed the political support of prominent officeholders and the financial support of wealthy individuals in the community. Political leaders were in many cases medical doctors, men whose education helped make them capable of articulating their views in French, who had prestige in European eyes, and, in some cases, came from prominent families. The education of Muslim doctors seems to have been accelerated by the increased reliance on Muslim recruits and conscripts in the French army during the First World War. Their shared educational experience helped to create a network among them at the national level. Contributing their support to the new Islamic schools helped them to gain public recognition and cultural and religious legitimacy.

A prime example of this can be found in the case of Dr. 'Abd al-Qadir Smati, a prominent political figure in the region of Setif. Dr. Smati came from a family of rural tribal leaders. In the 1920s, his family took on as a religious teacher Bashir Ibrahimi, himself a native of the Setif region who had recently returned from Damascus. The relationship between the French-educated doctor and politician, and this Islamic scholar was in some ways awkward, yet it was necessary in a setting where Algerians were launching a movement of Islamic revitalization, but also attempting to negotiate with the French.

Bashir Ibrahimi: Working for a Progressive Islamic Vision and Separation of Religion and State

The return of Bashir Ibrahimi to Algeria in 1920 has a special significance because it came at the end of his stay during three very turbulent years in Damascus, where he had been taken by Ottoman authorities as the situation in

Madina grew more critical in the winter of 1916–17. Few details are available on Ibrahimi's experience during those three years. The only formal account of his life is that which Ibrahimi provides in an autobiographical sketch entitled "Who am I?" originally published in Cairo in 1955.[43] In that setting, Ibrahimi was struggling to come to terms with the new Arab nationalist regime of President Nasser, an effort that, not long after the essay's publication, proved futile. Thus one should not be surprised that he minimized his connection with figures who might have been construed as Pan-Islamist.

The 1955 account makes no reference to connections he formed with members of the Algerian *muhajir* community in Damascus, but only recounts his favorable reception among the scholarly community and his appointment to a teaching position at the prestigious Madrasa al-Sultaniyya after the establishment of an independent Arab government in October 1918. He briefly mentions that Faysal decided to send him back to Madina to teach there, and that his rejection of this appointment was what prompted his return to Algeria in 1920.[44]

In an unguarded moment in a speech promoting new approaches to education in 1949, Ibrahimi shed some unusual light on his experience in Damascus. To promote the importance of education for girls, he recounted a story told to him by none other than Lawrence's nemesis, 'Abd al-Qadir Bin 'Ali. The story involved an incident that occurred in 1916 during his confinement in Bursa in Anatolia, where he had been sent by the despotic Jamal Pasha. The story involved the focus of Ibrahimi's talk: girls' education. 'Abd al-Qadir Bin 'Ali's daughter was five years old at the time and beginning kindergarten. She was accompanied on her first day of school by her nanny, who found it impossible to control the girl's angry outbursts. Yet within a few days the teacher had won her over with kindness, making her so love school that she was reluctant to go home.[45]

The vignette is revealing both of Ibrahimi's commitment to girls' education and also of the connections he made with members of the Algerian *muhajir* community in Damascus and the social networks with which it was interwoven. This was a community in which women were taking on an increasingly important role in the postwar years. A key figure was Naziq al-'Abid, granddaughter of Izzat Pasha al-'Abid, a prominent political figure under Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid until his ouster by the Young Turks in 1908. 'Ali Bin 'Abd al-Qadir was married to a woman from this family.

Naziq al-'Abid was the founder of the Madrasat Banat al-Shuhada, or School for the Daughters of Martyrs, founded at the end of the war to provide education to orphans, particularly those killed in the repression unleashed by Ottoman authorities in May 1916. Gertrude Bell visited a ceremony at the school in October 1919. She noted that one of the students was a boy from

'Abd al-Qadir's family, most likely a son of 'Abd al-Qadir Bin 'Ali, who had been killed by sharifian forces in November 1918. Naziq al-'Abid had been educated in Beirut and, according to Bell, was fluent in French and spoke "passable English."[46] In the 1920s, she would play an important role in Syrian resistance against the French, coming to be known as the "Syrian Joan of Arc." Another important figure in women's education and volunteer activities in Syria was 'Adila Bayhum. She came from a prominent commercial family in Beirut and was married to a grandson of 'Abd al-Qadir. She would later serve as president of the Syrian Women's Union.[47]

On his return to Algeria, Ibrahimi said little about his Damascus connections. As he put it in his autobiographical sketch, "I veiled myself in humility and tractability."[48] Only much later, in an interview published with the Cairo newspaper *al-Jumhuriya*, on the day of Algeria's independence, July 5, 1962, did he vent his inner feelings about the situation in Damascus at the end of the war. He decried Sharif Husain for having collaborated with the British. Asked why his words about this had been so rare, and whether they had also been rare in Damascus at the end of the war, he replied that his words—of criticism for Husain's collaboration—were indeed rare at that time. He went on to explain: "The police deterred me. The dogs were hovering around my house looking for an opportunity. But a nationalist movement does not give meat to dogs, so from there I came back to Algeria."[49]

Building a National Organization

When he initially returned to Algeria, Ibrahimi became, in the words of a French administrator "*un taleb besogneux*" (a needy scholar) in the service of the influential Smati family near his birthplace in Setif.[50] He was frequently at the side of members of the Smati family at ceremonies such as the opening of a new mosque.[51] But up until 1930, he held his tongue on political issues, as one observer put it, "crouching in the seclusion of his house."[52]

Yet beneath this veil of political discretion, he had worked out a strategy for cultural and religious rejuvenation in Algeria, one that emphasized the role of schools. In an article written shortly after he had accompanied two *qa'ids* from the Smati family in the opening of a mosque in the town of Tocqueville (Ra's Wadi)—which happened to be his birthplace—in early 1930, he explained: "The necessity for the future of the reform movement is that our efforts be spent in the founding of schools, not in the founding of mosques, because the nation needs education more than worship places." He explained that in earlier times the mosque also had the role that clubs and schools had taken on in modern times.[53] In the context, he was clearly taking a jibe at his benefactors, the Smatis, for putting the priority on a place of worship.

From soon after his return, he got in touch with 'Abd al-Hamid Bin Badis, whom he had known in Madina in 1913. Much of the period 1927–33 he spent in Laghouat, a city at the edge of the Sahara, where he may have managed to gain a greater degree of independence than he had in Setif. By 1930, he was working with Bin Badis on "secret propaganda" to undermine the celebrations supporting the centennial of colonial rule.[54] Along with Bin Badis, he helped to found the Association of 'Ulama in 1931 and became the organization's vice president.

His first major task in this role was to gain a foothold for the Association and its Reformist message in the western Algeria city of Tlemcen, starting in 1933. Up to this point, the reformists had been confined mainly to the province of Constantine, and to the city of Algiers. Ibrahimi's experience in the Middle East had both uprooted him from his home turf in the Setif region and helped him develop the skills and adaptability he needed to succeed in Tlemcen, a city with a glorious past and a strong sense of tradition. Sufi orders, particularly the 'Aliwa and the Tijaniyya, had a strong base of support in the city and its surrounding region.

During the seven years he spent in Tlemcen, Ibrahimi was able to rally a following for the Association of 'Ulama, particularly among the city's merchants. But he encountered opposition from the local administration, from the Sufi orders, and from supporters of the PPA, the party of Messali Hajj, a native of Tlemcen. Within a few years, Ibrahimi had won substantial popular and financial support, and by 1935 the reformists were able to launch a new independent school, the Dar al-Hadith. He managed to fund it through a system of shareholding, rather than through the conventional method of charitable contributions, which apparently avoided the usual government oversight. But by 1938, the opposition prevailed, and the administration ordered the closing down of the school.[55]

As Ibrahimi sought to spread the influence of the Association of 'Ulama in the Oranais, the Association dispatched a close associate of his, Fudayl al-Wartilani, to spread its message among Algerian workers in France. Wartilani had qualifications that suited him for this role: his ethnic background was Kabyle, so he could communicate with Kabyle workers in their native tongue; he had performed his military service in France, shortly after the war, so he was familiar with France and with the French language; and he had refused to marry so he could dedicate himself full-time to his work.

Initially Wartilani was successful in this work, setting up some thirteen schools, fourteen clubs, and six associations. But both the French government and Messali's supporters in the North African Star viewed these activities with suspicion. Perhaps the most important long-term result of

Wartilani's activity in France was the connections he made with prominent Muslim scholars who happened to be visiting France, including 'Abd al-Rahman Taj, future Shaykh of al-Azhar; Muhammad Darraz from Egypt; and 'Umar Baha' al-Miri from Syria. Facing growing obstacles in his work in France, Wartilani departed clandestinely for Egypt in 1938, where he became active in the Muslim Brotherhood and would again link up with Ibrahimi in 1952.[56]

Surviving Confinement and Building Alliances

The next phase of Ibrahimi's career began in April 1940 with his internment in Aflou, in the southern Oranais. This occurred just a week before the death of the president of the Association of 'Ulama, Bin Badis, and it may have been aimed at securing succession to the presidency for Tayyib al-'Uqbi. The reason given for Ibrahimi's internment was that he had refused the pleas of First World War veteran and ex-prisoner of war Muhammad Ben Houra, a close associate of 'Uqbi and Louis Massignon, to make speeches supporting France's war effort for the radio. Aflou had been chosen for its remote location, and for the lack of local supporters of the Association of 'Ulama. But with modern communication and transportation, it was wishful thinking to believe that Ibrahimi could be isolated in Aflou. He soon was meeting with residents of the town who came from Tlemcen and Laghouat. Residents of Laghouat, some 73 miles away, where Ibrahimi had spent the years 1927–33, traveled to see him. It is revealing that among the ways he passed his time there was in writing theater pieces in verse. A few months after the arrival of the Americans, in late December 1942, Ibrahimi was released and moved to Algiers.[57]

In Algiers, he set about relaunching the activities of the Association of 'Ulama and entering into discussions with prominent political leaders, especially the moderate Ferhat Abbas. He also had an encounter with the French Communist Roger Garaudy, who had been imprisoned in the Sahara under the Vichy regime. While there he had a transforming experience that began the long process that led eventually to his conversion to Islam: seeing a group of Ibadi Muslim soldiers refuse an order to fire on a group of recalcitrant Communists from the International Brigades who had fought in the Spanish Civil War.

On his release, Garaudy came to Algiers, where he engaged in activities to promote dialogue between French and Arab-Islamic culture. Soon after his arrival in Algiers in mid-1943, he met Bashir Ibrahimi, accompanied by Amar Ouzegane, who was at the time secretary general of the Algerian Communist Party but would be expelled from the party in 1947. Ibrahimi was sitting under a portrait of Amir 'Abd al-Qadir, which inspired a discussion

of Islamic mysticism. Ibrahimi explained that the Sufi orders of the present day had strayed from the true message of Sufism as articulated by Ibn 'Arabi and 'Abd al-Qadir. He explained that for 'Abd al-Qadir, Sufism was a means of "re-centering" on God, and that his military and political activities had been the external manifestation of his spiritual faith. For Garaudy, Ibrahimi's words opened a dramatic new perspective in which religious values took the place of Marxism.[58]

The Ibrahimi-Garaudy encounter is a striking illustration of Ibrahimi's ability to translate his religious ideas into terms understandable to a European Marxist. It also demonstrates how Ibrahimi saw the Algerian struggle as part of a wider conflict, one in which the Algerians would need help from outside. It is this perspective that helps explain why he sought to go to Cairo for the Pan Arab Conference of March–April 1945. But the French administration, as always apprehensive about Algerians forging external links, denied him permission to go to Cairo.[59]

The troubles that broke out in Setif on May 8, 1945, brought a reaction of blind repression on the part of French authorities, including the arrest of many prominent Algerian leaders, including Bashir Ibrahimi. He was initially imprisoned in Algiers, kept in an underground cell in solitary confinement for seventeen days. Then he was moved to Constantine to await trial, but his health deteriorated, and he was moved to a military hospital.[60] Elements of the French Left pushed for amnesty for those arrested in the wake of May 8, and it was granted in April 1946. Soon after his release, Ibrahimi gave a speech to the Amnesty Committee in Algiers, in which he proclaimed: "To stay in prison for ten months or ten days or ten years is not the question; the real question is whether one suffers for an ideal and does not modify one's attitude."[61] His response to a prison experience that clearly enhanced his popular credit makes an interesting contrast with the experiences of 'Uqbi in the late 1930s, and Malik Bennabi in postwar France, where the arrest seemed arbitrary, the product of a personal vendetta or bizarre political scheme, not a sacrifice for a noble cause.

Following his release, Ibrahimi launched efforts to revitalize the Association of 'Ulama and took charge of the Association's newspaper, *al-Basa'ir*, when it restarted publication in 1947. While Ibrahimi's activities are often analyzed by Western scholars in terms of his ideological position and political ties, his real impact is perhaps better understood through looking at his personal qualities, above all his extraordinary eloquence.

Through the late 1940s and early 1950s, he traveled around Algeria, often to small towns, usually to support the efforts of new schools. At the small town of Hanaya, in June 1950, he held forth on the condition of the nation:

> How often people say of our nation: she died. Often those who gloat over others' misfortune rejoice at her death, and often the colonialists announce her death in our hearing. They gave glad tidings of her death at their centenary festival; they went beyond that, holding a public funeral for Islam, which is what defines this nation. They said, "She died, no mercy of God," and those who were weak of faith believed them. Those people said instead, "She died, God's mercy be upon her." As for us, we say, "She is sick and diseased, but there is hope for her if the doctor comes and administers the right medicine." May God confirm what I say and thwart the words of the deceivers and give lie to their hopes. The doctor did come when he was needed and ordered reform (*islah*) for the sick. As a result, the burdens flew off and the chains were broken. So what we see today (a new school) is not an illusion but something that is visible and real.[62]

Ibrahimi's remarks on this occasion connect to a common theme in Algerian discussions at this time, the problem of how to strengthen and revitalize the nation. But they also reveal how Ibrahimi incorporated modern ideas, in particular the value of medicine, into his vision for Islamic revival. It is revealing, in this connection, that his son Ahmad Talib Ibrahimi pursued a French-language education and went on to study medicine, as had so many members of the Algerian political elite in the interwar years. By 1955, he was president of the Union of Algerian Students in France, and he would later be imprisoned for his support of the FLN.

Eastern Connections: 'Ali al-Hamami and Fudayl al-Wartilani

No doubt the thought of returning to the Middle East often passed through Ibrahimi's mind. This certainly happened on the occasion of the funeral of 'Ali al-Hamami, a rare example of an Algerian who had remained a politically active exile in the interwar years. Born in Tiaret in 1902, Hamami had gone on the *hajj* with his parents as a young man, shortly before the war, but stayed on in Alexandria, Egypt, when they returned to Algeria. He spent some time fighting in the Rif in northern Morocco with 'Abd al-Qadir's youngest son, Malik, and with the Moroccan rebel 'Abd al-Krim. Following combat in the Rif, he traveled widely in Europe and in the Soviet Union and got to know Shakib Arslan in Switzerland, whom he served as an emissary to King 'Abd al-Aziz of Saudi Arabia.[63] In the 1930s, he settled in Iraq to teach; after the war, he moved to Cairo, where he became active in the Maghreb Bureau.

While in Cairo, he ventured into an effort to create a style of literature that would help inspire the new French-educated youth of North Africa, writing a

book entitled *Idris*. This told the story of a young man from the Rif who had gone to study at the Qairawiyyin University in Fez and was killed by colonial forces when he joined a nationalist demonstration.[64]

In 1949, Hamami went to Karachi, Pakistan, to attend the International Congress on the Islamic Economy, along with Dr. Habib Thameur, head of the Maghreb Bureau in Cairo. At the conference, he took up a favorite theme of Ibrahimi in this period, denunciation of the colonial regime's confiscation of religious endowments and their continued authority over personnel in official mosques. He had also been holding forth on these themes in *La République Algérienne*, the newspaper of Ferhat Abbas's UDMA Party. He made a reputation for himself as a vocal critic of Messali's PPA, and in particular its connections with Trotskyists. On the way back to Cairo from Karachi, his plane crashed, and both he and Dr. Thameur were killed. Ibrahimi delivered the address at his funeral in Algiers on January 1, 1950, a funeral attended by all Algerian parties except the Communists.[65]

The growing importance of connections in the wider Islamic world, and not simply the Arab world, is illustrated by a meeting Ibrahimi had in the early 1950s with the Malaysian Islamic activist Hussein Alatas. Alatas, like Ibrahimi, was interested in exploring the relationship between Islam and socialism. In later recollections, Alatas claimed that his visit with Ibrahimi had been inspired by discussions he had in Indonesia with Ahmad Ben Bella in the late 1940s.[66]

The problem with this recollection is that Ben Bella did not visit Indonesia at this time, and it is highly unlikely that he would have had much favorable to say about Ibrahimi, even if he had visited that country. The far more likely candidate for this role is Fudayl al-Wartilani, Ibrahimi's longtime protégé, who is documented as having visited Indonesia in early 1952, shortly before Ibrahimi went to Paris for a United Nations meeting, a likely site for an encounter with a Malaysian who was staying in the Netherlands at the time.[67]

During his years in Cairo since 1938, Wartilani had developed strong ties with the Muslim Brotherhood. In 1944, he helped establish the Front for the Defense of North Africa, headed by Muhammad al-Khidr Husain, the descendant of Algerian *muhajirs* who had come from Tunis to Damascus, and then had fled Ottoman tyranny to Cairo. In 1947, Wartilani was dispatched by the Brotherhood to assist the Free Yemeni Movement, who were attempting to overthrow Yemen's reigning Imam Yahaya and replace him with Sayyid 'Abdullah al-Wazir, who they thought would promote their program of reforms. Wartilani was accused of having a role in the killing of Imam Yahaya in 1948 and for this reason was banned from entry into Arab countries; he spent the next few years in such settings as Turkey and Indonesia. Wartilani

consistently denied involvement in the imam's assassination. His comments on the incident reflected a rather ambivalent view. He denounced the violence and stated that he had nothing against hereditary rulers as individuals, but he rejected the principle of monarchy.[68]

Moving to Cairo—and into the Jaws of the Islamist-Nationalist Debate

By early 1952, Ibrahimi was becoming increasingly frustrated with the situation in Algeria—with the lack of progress on his efforts to secure the separation of religion and state, and the return of endowment properties; with quarrels he had with 'Uqbi on religious issues, and with Messalists on political issues; and with the never-ending stream of accusations that he was a corrupt "Algerian Stavisky," a Kharijite heretic, or a godless Freemason.[69] He may well also have been wary of being arrested yet again, particularly after the French had replaced Muhammad V as king of Morocco. In effect, he saw that the opening of a space for civil society, which had started in the 1920s and accelerated in the late 1940s, was coming to an end.

In March 1952, after the U.N. meeting in Paris, Ibrahimi set off for Cairo, where Wartilani, recently pardoned for his role in the Yemen affair, took on the role of his secretary. He soon forged close ties with the Muslim Brotherhood and took to broadcasting his denunciations of colonialism on the radio.[70] During the brief rule of General Neguib, Ibrahimi seemed quite welcome in Egypt. But once Nasser had taken over and begun to crack down on the Muslim Brothers, that welcome wore thin. At the same time, leaders of the Association of 'Ulama who remained in Algeria grew impatient with Ibrahimi's prolonged absence, and his apparent move away from nationalism to the Islamist program of the Muslim Brotherhood.[71]

In the year preceding the outbreak of the revolution in 1954, there were numerous signs that Ibrahimi had the ambition to claim a prominent role in the struggle against the French, with the support of the Muslim Brotherhood, which promoted such activities as a boycott of French goods.[72] In the course of the year 1954, events moved in a direction that marginalized Ibrahimi, with the Egyptian government cracking down on the Muslim Brothers, and the FLN taking charge of the Algerian struggle.

Once the revolution began, Ibrahimi initially lent his support to the FLN, signing a pact of union with them in early 1955. But he irritated FLN leaders with a radio address on the Voice of the Arabs on June 6, 1955, in which he spoke of the ways in which Islamic law regulated the conduct of war, including strict exclusion of torture, mutilation, and the killing of women, children, and old men, and the destruction of crops and trees.[73] One might construe this as an attack on French conduct in the war, but given Ibrahimi's background, it

could also be seen as a criticism of the FLN. By August 1955, targets would include moderate nationalists who criticized the FLN's tactics, such as Alloulah Abbas, nephew of UDMA leader Ferhat Abbas.[74] Ibrahimi's June 5 talk was the last occasion on which he spoke on the Voice of the Arabs.

These events came at a time when there were rumors that Ibrahimi was considering backing Messali's Mouvement National Algérien (MNA), whose representative in Cairo was arrested in July 1955.[75] Given the way in which Ibrahimi tended to be a magnet for wild accusations, and considering his approach over the long term, it seems likely that he sought to place himself in the role of mediator between Algerian nationalist factions. By late 1955, there were rumors that Nasser's government planned to intern Ibrahimi in Aswan, in southern Egypt. The FLN made a last-ditch attempt in December 1955 to bring Ibrahimi in line, through the mediation of 'Abbas Bencheikh El Hocine, a member of the Association of 'Ulama who had once supported Messali's PPA. But in 1956, Ibrahimi issued a *fatwa* criticizing the FLN for its violence against civilians.[76]

Both he and Wartilani began to spend more and more time outside of Egypt, until by 1956 they made a clean break with this center of Arab nationalism. Soon after his own arrival in Cairo in April of that year, Ahmad Tawfiq al-Madani asked Muhammad Khider, head of the FLN political wing, about his views of Ibrahimi and Wartilani. Khider replied that the FLN was still on good terms with Ibrahimi, having him serve as their representative in Iraq and then in Saudi Arabia. But as for Wartilani, he complained: "I have never in my life known such a self-centered man. The nation is him, the *jihad* is him. . . . Working with him is simply impossible."[77]

Ibrahimi went first to Saudi Arabia, but seems to have felt ill at ease in the narrow doctrinaire atmosphere there, as he had on his earlier stay in Madina in 1912–16. On that earlier stay, he was not favorably impressed by traditionalist advocates of Pan-Islam, such as al-Makki Bin 'Azuz, but retained a favorable impression of an Indian Muslim scholar from Deoband, Husayn Ahmad al-Fayd, who had been turned over by Sharif Husain to the British, who interned him in Malta. Al-Fayd was still active in Pakistan in the 1950s, and this was one factor that drew Ibrahimi to that country in the fall of 1956.[78] Not long after his arrival in Pakistan, he suffered a serious accident, slipping in a shower in a Karachi hotel and injuring his back. His long recovery and weakened condition made it impossible for him to maintain an active role. His protégé Fudayl al-Wartilani was excluded from most Arab countries and spent his final years in Turkey, where he died from natural causes in 1959.

After recovering from his accident, Ibrahimi traveled to Iraq and Syria, and then returned to Egypt in August 1957. He was no longer as active as he had

once been. He offered formulaic political statements for ceremonial occasions and devoted considerable attention to his personal passion, Arabic poetry.[79]

As for the FLN's intermediary with the Islamic reformists, 'Abbas Bencheikh El Hocine, he went on to become the representative of the Algerian Provisional Government (GPRA) in Saudi Arabia. His diplomatic work there had begun with a visit, along with Ahmad Tawfiq al-Madani, in April 1957. Their assignment to this task can be explained by their fluency in classical Arabic. Bencheikh El Hocine became Algeria's ambassador to Riyadh after independence. He then returned to Algeria to preside over the Superior Islamic Council, but when Boumediene ousted Ben Bella in June 1965, he resigned from this position, claiming that the new government deprived this council of its independence.[80] But one can well suspect that this decision reflected the divergence of his views with those of Ibrahimi, a critic of the secular orientation of Ben Bella. Bencheikh El Hocine's sons Soheib and Ghaleb would later go on to become prominent spokesmen in France for a vision of Islam compatible with French principles of *laïcité,* and ardent critics of Tariq Ramadan.

After Algeria's independence, Ibrahimi kept his distance from Ben Bella's government. He gradually emerged as a focal point for criticism of Ben Bella's secular, socialist regime. At the anniversary of the death of Ben Badis, on April 16, 1964, Ibrahimi delivered a sharp criticism of Ben Bella's government. As the FLN had done earlier in Cairo, Ben Bella at first tried to bring him back into the fold. He also offered a high-level position to his son Ahmad Talib Ibrahimi. But he refused the offer and as a result was arrested in July and held in prison until the following February.[81]

Bashir Ibahimi's funeral in late May 1965 proved a catalyst for bringing together the elements that would support the ouster of Ben Bella on June 5 and establish a new regime under Huwari Boumediene that would place more emphasis on reformist Islam as a key element in the Algerian national identity.[82] But while the Islamic reform movement had been rooted in civil society, and Ibrahimi had campaigned for the separation of religion and state, the Islamic religious establishment was now under the control of the state, and education was the preserve of government schools. The fact that the French had completely dismantled the Association of 'Ulama during the revolution, and that the new government had oil revenues to sustain its dominant role made it difficult to find an alternative course.

Looking back from a perspective forged by the turmoil of the 1990s, it is easy to see Ibrahimi as a forerunner of the later Islamist movement because of his ties with the Muslim Brothers and his rejection of secular socialist elements in Algerian nationalism. But this overlooks a consistent element in Ibrahimi's outlook. He saw religious reform, above all the promotion of independent

schools, as a way to bring together and revitalize communities, and he saw his own role as an Islamic leader as one in which he would promote the reconciliation of rival factions, holding all of them accountable to Islamic legal principles. He did not support the insulation of religion from politics, as did figures such as ʿUqbi and Massignon.[83] Rather, he saw a need for Islamic engagement in political questions without Islamic leaders becoming subordinate elements in any particular party. During the revolution, he clearly denounced excessive violence on all sides, basing his judgment on Islamic law. Pursuing such a vision was to prove a difficult task.

A New Generation

The Second World War brought the exhaustion of the European powers, the emergence of the United States and the USSR as global superpowers, and turmoil in East and Southeast Asia. And it brought renewed emphasis on the principle of self-determination, now embodied in the United Nations Charter. The setting presented opportunity and hazard for Algeria. For a brief period starting in 1947, there seemed to be an opportunity for a creative transition away from colonial subordination to a multiethnic society in which all citizens were equal yet maintained distinctive identities. In the pursuit of this transition, an important role was played by individuals with a strong exposure to both French and Islamic cultures who could serve as intermediaries and promote the negotiation necessary to make the transition successful.

The new generation of bicultural intellectuals had to deal with some challenging questions, in particular how Algerian Muslim culture needed to be transformed in order to make the project successful. Two of the most dynamic figures in the new generation, Ahmad Rida Huhu and Malik Bennabi, pursued different approaches to this question. Huhu focused on grassroots activity to promote social and political change, and he met a tragic end, killed by security forces in Constantine in 1956. Bennabi focused on intellectual and psychological transformation, and he managed to survive, taking up exile in Cairo as did many other Algerian political and religious leaders.

The Riddle of Ahmad Rida Huhu

Ahmad Rida Huhu (1910–1956) is a figure whose life story is complex, in some ways almost contradictory. He came from a family that had a privileged place in the colonial native administration establishment, closely tied to the Ben Gana family, who dominated the oasis complex of Biskra. His father, Muhammad Huhu, was the dominant figure in the town of Sidi ʿUqba. Ahmad Rida Huhu

left home in his teens to attend a French middle school in the coastal city of Skikda, where he and other promising young students from Biskra spent the school year at the *château* purchased by the Bash Agha of Biskra, Bu'Aziz Ben Gana from the French settler politician Paul Cuttoli.

Yet by 1935 the Huhu family had taken refuge in Madina, and Ahmad spent the next ten years in the Hijaz and pursued an education in Islamic law. One might assume, based on stereotypes of Saudi Arabia, that such an experience would have made him into a conservative *salafi* Muslim. Yet after he returned to Algeria in 1946, he became one of the most strongly progressive figures in the Association of 'Ulama, vigorously advocating women's rights and making an alliance with left-wing Catholics.

These apparent contradictions can be resolved by examining the contexts in which Huhu operated. The Biskra oasis was dependent on water flowing down from the Aurès Mountains, a situation that lent itself to control by a single authority figure. But Biskra was also closely tied to Algeria's coastal cities, linked by rail since the early 1880s. This link facilitated commerce and tourism, and it also reinforced the tradition of Biskri workers moving to cities in the north to find jobs. As the traditional Biskri occupations in Algiers such as water carrier disappeared as a result of new infrastructure, Biskri workers began heading to France, where they encountered new influences. A striking example of this can be found in Shibbah Makki, who went to France in the early 1920s, where he became involved in Messali's North African Star, and also pursued an interest in theater. He returned to Sidi 'Uqba, where he recruited local youth into a theater company to promote new political ideas. One of his recruits was Ahmad Rida Huhu.[84]

By the early 1930s, political tensions were growing in Biskra. The Ben Ganas turned against Muhammad Huhu, the leader of Sidi 'Uqba. In a local festival, his oldest son was killed by a celebratory gunshot, an apparent accident, but seen by the family as a deliberate act following the instructions of the Bash Agha.[85] As a result of these tensions, the Huhu family moved to Madina in 1935. Muhammad told French authorities that they were simply going on the pilgrimage in order to secure their permission. The choice of Madina can be explained by the presence there of families who had left Sidi 'Uqba during an earlier crisis, in the mid-1890s. The Hijaz region had only recently (in 1924) come under the control of King'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud, and it retained a degree of autonomy in social and cultural life, as well as connections with the wider Islamic world sustained by the *hajj*. The region saw efforts to promote girls' education, led by Iffat al-Thunayyan, the wife of Prince Faisal. She had been raised in Turkey, in a family related to the Al Sa'ud, who had been taken from the Hijaz by Muhammad 'Ali's forces after he conquered the Hijaz in 1818.[86]

In Madina, Huhu studied Islamic law. In 1940, he moved to Mecca, where he worked at the post office. He took up writing for local magazines, *al-Manhil* (The Watering Place) and *Sawt al-Hijaz* (The Voice of the Hijaz), in some of his articles discussing French cultural icons such as Molière and Victor Hugo. He returned to Algeria in 1946 and became a prominent figure in efforts to promote an Arabic literary revival. In 1949, he helped to found a cultural association, the Mazhar Society, that put on theatrical and musical productions. Huhu's first important work was *Ghadat Umm al-Qura* (The Fair Maiden of Mecca), which told the story of a woman rejecting an arranged marriage to a wealthy older man. In his other works, Huhu was outspoken in his defense of women's rights. He also had a special appeal to youth who, in this setting, tended to have more radical political views than their elders.[87]

Huhu had strong ties to French leftists, serving as a delegate to the World Congress of Peace in Paris in April 1949, along with, among others, the Catholic leftist André Mandouze, a scholar dedicated to the study of Saint Augustine, who had lived in eastern Algeria in the fifth century. For leftists such as Mandouze, Augustine was not a symbol of French colonial legitimacy, but rather of the demanding and important challenge of trans-Mediterranean dialogue. Mandouze was closely associated with Léon Étienne Duval, another Catholic leftist who served as bishop of Constantine from 1947 to 1954, then as archbishop of Algiers. He would support the cause of independence, gaining the nickname "Muhammad" Duval among right-wing French settlers. Another important figure in promoting Christian-Muslim dialogue, especially among youth, was Anne-Marie Chaulet, who worked as a *surveillante* at a girls' *lycée* in Constantine and was a girl scout leader.[88] Huhu was sharply criticized by leaders of the Association of 'Ulama for taking part in the World Congress of Peace. They insisted that it be made very clear that he was not representing the Association, even though he was a member of it.[89]

It is a reflection of Huhu's engagement in local community activism that he remained in Algeria after the outbreak of the revolution rather than retreating to the safety of exile. In 1955, he was active in supporting boycotts of Jewish and Mizabi merchants in Constantine and defending Muslim merchants who gave financial support to the FLN. By early 1956, the conflict in Algeria was spinning out of control. In a desperate attempt to restore order, on March 25 the French government authorized special powers allowing the French military in Algeria to resort to new measures to suppress the rebellion. On March 29, the head of the police force of Constantine was killed by rebels. Ahmad Rida Huhu was among a group of rebels rounded up by French forces and summarily executed to avenge the police captain's death.

Malik Bennabi and the Search for Islamic Strategies at the Global and European Levels

Malik Bennabi came from a family that might be seen as part of the colonial Muslim establishment that emerged from the 1890s through the 1920s. His forebears had been well-established notables in the city of Constantine. His uncle Mami Smail was the editor of *al-Najah*, a newspaper published in that city that sought to promote a modern vision of Islam and avoided voicing challenges to French rule, a vision of which the mufti of Constantine, Mulud Bin al-Muhub, was a prime advocate. Bennabi's father was a secretary-interpreter for the mayor of the city of Tebessa near the Tunisian border, which lay on an important artery of communication and travel between Algeria and Tunis and Tripoli.

In his youth, Bennabi pursued a pattern typical for those aspiring to join the colonial Muslim elite before the First World War. He attended the government *médersa* in the city of Constantine, a school that prepared students for careers in the Muslim courts and in the official mosques. But by the time he graduated, in the early 1920s, such careers offered few rewards. In 1925, he set off for France, where he took jobs as a manual laborer, but he soon tired of such strenuous, poorly paid work and returned home. He worked briefly as a clerk in a Muslim law court in the remote southern Oranais town of Aflou. While this experience gave him insights on life in a part of Algeria very different from Tebessa and Constantine, it failed to satisfy his ambitions.

Hazards and Opportunities of France

He set off once again to France, in 1930, this time to attempt to gain admission to the École des Langues Vivantes Orientales, which he hoped would lead to an illustrious career as a high-level government official. But he failed to gain admission and was convinced that it was because he was an Algerian "native" rather than a Frenchman. But Bennabi's situation was quite different from that of workers following the *barrani* tradition, living in their own tightly knit communities. Like other educated Algerians, he came as an individual, and he knew the French language. Thus he faced the opportunity and the challenge of negotiating his way to a place in French society.

Adrift on the streets of Paris, he gradually found a new direction, one that was rather different from that of most Algerian Muslim students and workers in his day. First, rather by accident, he made connections with French Catholic students, venturing into their club one day in search of a cheap meal. They accepted him, and his commitment to his own faith, and thus began his

engagement in interfaith dialogue, which would continue into the 1960s, in spite of his rancorous relationship with the Orientalist scholar and devout Catholic Louis Massignon.[90] He would soon marry a French Catholic woman, Paulette Philippon, who converted to Islam and took the name Khadija. Other Algerians living in France as individuals, such as Messali Hajj, married French women, forming a relation that crossed cultural and religious boundaries but that was shaped by a common ideological or intellectual commitment. Bennabi also found a new educational opportunity, attending a technical school, and in the process starting a fascination with science that would become a mainstay of his later intellectual endeavors.

The early 1930s in Paris were a time of intense ferment among North African Muslim students, and Bennabi joined in their efforts to promote the nationalist cause. But he soon caught the attention of police informers, and as a result, his father was dismissed from his position in the city hall of Tebessa. Through a visit from a policeman, Bennabi was made to see that this was his fault. He was then asked to come see the illustrious French scholar of Islam, Louis Massignon, who greeted him in the company of Husain Lahmak, a Muslim convert to Catholicism, whose book *Lettres algériennes* had appeared at the time of the 1930 Colonial Exposition in Paris and had been distributed there by members of a missionary order, the White Fathers.[91] The implication seemed to be that if Bennabi agreed to refrain from offensive behavior, Massignon might intervene to help his father.

In his memoirs, written in the early 1960s, Bennabi recognized that he had handled the situation awkwardly, failing to make an even limited, diplomatic overture to Massignon. His father remained unemployed and grew increasingly impoverished, and Bennabi associated Massignon with his plight. Through the rest of his life, Bennabi often felt that he was being followed by a devious, vicious "spider" that he connected with Massignon.[92]

By the late 1930s, Bennabi was qualified for skilled work but could find none. In 1938, he joined in the efforts led by Fudayl al-Wartilani to bring the Islamic reformist message to Algerian workers in France, teaching without pay in a school in Marseille. But this effort soon faded after Wartilani left for Egypt.

At the time of France's surrender in June 1940, Bennabi was living with his wife in the town of Dreux, in Normandy, part of German-occupied territory. Dreux happened to be the hometown of Maurice Viollette, champion of reforms in Algeria in 1925–27 as governor general, then during the Popular Front with his support of the Blum-Viollette law. Bennabi claims to have witnessed Viollette, a partisan of the political Left, volunteer to work for the German administration. Viollette, who would later be interned on the orders of the

Vichy government, seems to have supported accusations, lodged after the war, that Bennabi and his wife had been collaborators.

There was some circumstantial evidence for this, at least in the case of Bennabi himself. In early 1942, he went to Paris, where he encountered an old friend, Ahmad Belghoul, who was the owner of a café in the Latin Quarter. Belghoul was setting up a Muslim section of Jacques Doriot's right-wing Parti Populaire Français, and he asked Bennabi to work in the office he was setting up. Bennabi accepted his offer and spent five months working in this office. In his memoirs, he treats this simply as a job, dismissing the PPF as "nothing serious."[93] But certainly he was aware of the political implications of this choice.

It is an episode that needs to be placed in historical perspective. In the First World War, the Germans and their Ottoman allies had made serious efforts to recruit North African allies and support rebellions such as that of Malik in Morocco, or the Sanusis in the Sahara. But Nazi Germany, by June 1940, was allied with the right-wing Vichy regime in France, a regime strongly supported by most settlers in Algeria. They seized the opportunity to revoke the Crémieux Decree of 1870, thus stripping Algerian Jews of citizenship, and they took measures to "Aryanize" Jewish commercial property. The Nazis and their French supporters, obsessed with upholding their own racial superiority, had no coherent program to offer prospective Muslim allies. Bennabi quit his job with the PPF in June 1942, when they asked him to swear an oath of loyalty to PPF leader Jacques Doriot on the Qur'an, an idea inspired by the visit to Paris of two Algerian Muslim supporters of the PPF, one a partisan of the Fédération des Élus, the other a prominent Sufi leader.[94]

Bennabi spent a good deal of those five months in Paris pursuing his favorite activity, reading books in a library. He does not mention in his memoirs what it was that he read during that time, but certainly it helped to lay the foundation for the book he would write at the end of the war, *Le phénomène coranique*. It is clear that he had developed a fascination with the works of Friedrich Nietzsche, both with his theory of the rise and decline of civilizations and with his acute sense of psychological isolation.

After leaving Paris, Bennabi went to Germany to work for some eighteen months at a factory in Bomlitz, near Hamburg. It seems likely that his departure was part of a program arranged by the Vichy government to secure the release of French POWs by sending workers to Germany, with three workers being sent for each prisoner returned.[95] While in Germany, he was appointed as a delegate to represent French workers to their employers. As conditions became increasingly difficult in late 1943, he returned to France.

Soon after the liberation of France in June 1944, Bennabi and his wife were both arrested and charged with collaboration with the German occupation. They were held until April 1945, then arrested again in October. French authorities, including Maurice Viollette, sought individuals who would come forward with information that would sustain a conviction, but none was forthcoming. Bennabi was finally released in May 1946 and headed back to Algeria to see his family for the first time in seven years, to explore the rapidly changing situation there, and to reconnect with friends.

Bennabi looked back on his ordeal in prison as part of a succession of schemes pursued by the "Psychological Service" to break the resistance of uppity colonial subjects like himself. In contrast to the case of Ibrahimi, there was no obvious political motive for incarceration. Rather, on one level there was the petty spite of ordinary individuals in Dreux, resentful to find an Algerian Muslim living not in an urban ghetto but in their midst, with a French Catholic wife who had converted to Islam. At another level, he perceived the designs of Massignon, who was delighted to have bright Muslim students as his loyal protégés, but outraged when they rejected his benevolence. The term "Psychological Service" seems to have been originated by Bennabi's friend Dr. Khaldi, who used it in an essay published in the newspaper *La République Algérienne* in early 1954. The fact that an English-language term was used here conveyed the sense that this was a product of the growing influence of America and of postwar France's subordinate role in the Cold War alliance.

A Modern Intellectual with Roots in Popular Culture

Soon after he was released from prison, Bennabi began his publishing career. His first work, *Le phénomène coranique*, published by the newly established Éditions En-Nahda in Algiers in 1946, was the work he had begun to form in his mind during the war, then composed while in prison. It was an effort to present an analysis of the Qur'an to the new generation of European-educated Muslims that was an alternative to that presented by European Orientalists, whose efforts to place the Qur'an in a historical perspective he felt undermined its spiritual vitality. At the same time, he sought to demonstrate the Qur'an's compatibility with the spirit of science. It was a book that showed Bennabi's aspiration to be a scholar. But the turbulent setting of Algeria in the late 1940s was not conducive to a scholarly life.

Bennabi's subsequent works were aimed at a wide audience. *Lebbeik*, also published by En-Nahda, was a short, didactic novel, rather like 'Ali al-Hamami's *Idris*, intended to promote a moral reawakening.[96] The works that clearly established Bennabi's intellectual reputation were *Discours sur les conditions*

de la renaissance algérienne, published by En-Nahda in 1949, and *Vocation de l'Islam*, published by the prestigious Parisian publishing house Éditions du Seuil in 1954, but completed by 1952. These two works set out Bennabi's fundamental ideas, usually summed up in memorable catchphrases. The Algerian people, he claimed, suffered from "*colonisabilité*." This was a psychological malady that was a product of the "Post-Almohadean" condition, the decline into which Islamic civilization in North Africa had fallen since the end of the Almohad Empire in the early 1200s, an empire that had ruled much of North Africa and southern Spain. For Bennabi, the most notable product of this era was Ibn Rushd, a figure who confirmed the capacity of Islamic civilization to be at the forefront of science.

One of Bennabi's strategies for awakening Algerians was to be as provocative as possible in his descriptions of various groups among them, often engaging in wordplay. Much of his work appeared originally in the newspaper *La République Algérienne* and was pitched to a wide audience, drawing on the Algerian penchant for bilingual puns and caustic humor. Algeria's political leaders engaged, he said, in a game called "*boulitique*." Readers who knew only French would chuckle politely, thinking of the game of *boules*. But young Algerian readers would howl uproariously at the suggestion that their leaders' activities could be equated to an Arabic word that, politely expressed, meant to relieve oneself. As for the intellectuals, they engaged in *alpha-bêtisme*, which might be translated as "liter-assy."

But having launched his provocations, Bennabi went on to put forth a serious message—that Algerians needed to stop simply blaming their dismal fate on others and recognize that they needed to take responsibility for their own future. They needed to stop using ideas as mere objects of fashion and to understand the ideas. And they needed to develop skills and strategies that would allow them to regain the "efficaciousness" (*éfficacité*) of their Almohad forebears.

Bennabi's pugnacious style irritated many of his Algerian contemporaries, both among political activists and in the Association of 'Ulama.[97] But his broad vision and his eloquence won respect, including among French Catholic intellectuals. The introduction to *Vocation de l'Islam* was written by Jean-Marie Domenach, an exponent of the postwar philosophy of personalism, soon to become editor of the journal *Esprit*. Rather like Bennabi, Domenach had initially accepted working with the Vichy regime, entering the administrators' training school at Uriage. But he later joined the Resistance and after the war was a staunch opponent of totalitarianism of the Left or Right.[98]

A small ad in the newspaper *La République Algérienne* on April 2, 1954,

announced a collection of funds being organized to help Bennabi go to Cairo to study. The most prominent donation was that of Dr. Jacques Couniot of Oran, who described his contribution as coming from "a Christian to help in the study of the Muslim religion." It was not only the financial contribution that was important. Bennabi had long been seeking to travel to the Middle East. In 1947, for instance, he asked permission to travel to Egypt, but French authorities denied his request.[99]

With this financial assistance, he was able to visit Cairo in July 1954. He would come for another visit in early 1955, but it was not until April 1956 that he came to stay, leaving his wife behind in France. By this time, efforts to negotiate a solution to the Algerian crisis had clearly failed, and other intellectuals, such as Ahmad Tawfiq al-Madani, also turned up in Cairo. Madani was a realist who understood that working in a large-scale political organization might at times be difficult and frustrating, and require that one not give public voice to one's criticism. He traveled around the Arab world helping garner diplomatic and financial support for the FLN. But Bennabi's vocation was an intellectual one. He spent the war years translating his earlier works into Arabic, writing new material, and forging relations in the wider Islamic intellectual community, with figures such as the Lebanese scholar 'Umar Masqawi.

From Global Visions to Personal Reflection

During the revolutionary years, Bennabi pursued a theme that had long attracted him, looking at how Algeria and the Muslim world fit into a larger global picture. In the 1930s, he had been fascinated by Japan as the only example of a non-Western country that had escaped colonial domination and gone on to become an effective industrial and military power. He had looked to Japan as providing crucial lessons for the Muslim world, above all the need for self-reliance. He also looked to it as a potential ally. In the 1950s, his search for external allies shifted to the Afro-Asian movement, and above all China and India. Yet this enthusiasm also cooled by the late 1950s.[100] His fundamental concern remained the revitalization of Islamic civilization.

Never completely at ease with the FLN leadership, Bennabi initially hesitated to return to Algeria until August 1963.[101] At the time, Ben Bella was making efforts to bring prominent Algerian intellectuals into roles supporting his regime. Bennabi was provided with an apartment on Algiers' Avenue Roosevelt to serve as his home, and also as the base of the Centre d'Orientation Culturelle. This apartment became his base for weekly meetings with university students, Saturdays being designated for French-language meetings, and Sundays for Arabic. It was through these meetings that Bennabi helped to inspire a future generation of Algerian intellectuals.

Bennabi voiced his frustration with the government of Huwari Boumediene, decrying the lack of open discussion and the focus on how to distribute patronage. For Bennabi what was needed was an effective economic vision rather than lavish dreams, such as the National Steel Company's huge plant near Annaba, which provided lucrative contracts for companies from all over Europe but was a financial drain on government resources.

Bennabi saw the execution by Nasser's government of the Egyptian Islamic radical Sayyid Qutb in October 1966 as an omen of storms to come. This was not to voice his support for Sayyid Qutb, who had scoffed at Bennabi in his *Ma'alim fi al-tariq* (Signposts along the Way): "I used to be like him. I thought in the same manner as he does today. . . . I was not then liberated from the pressure of cultural sequels which confined my spirit and my soul; these were sequels of foreign source which had no relationship to my Islamic temperament."[102] Rather, Bennabi sought to imply that if governments such as those of Algeria or Egypt suppressed open discussion that could lead to an effective adaptation of Islamic values to the demands of the modern world there would eventually be a heavy political price to pay.

While Bennabi continued to promote his ideas in books and in essays published in periodicals in Algeria, in particular *Révolution Africaine*,[103] he also launched a new venture, publishing two volumes of his autobiography, the first in French, the second translated into Arabic. The title he gave them was *Memoirs of a Witness of the Century*. They covered his life from his earliest years in Tebessa, through his years in Paris up to 1939, and he wrote them in his usual lively style, sometimes mocking his own naïveté. For instance, he told the story of how he, the future electrical engineer, almost stepped out onto the tracks of the Paris Metro to cross to the other side when he realized he was headed in the wrong direction. Fortunately, a nearby Metro staff member explained to him what would have been the shocking results of this mistake, and he climbed the overpass to reach the other side.[104]

The *Memoirs* were clearly addressed to a young Algerian audience to help them chart their way through the complex struggles they were bound to face. They also had the advantage of avoiding direct political discussion, which might have aroused the irritation of censors. But above all, they provide a crucial complement to his other works, bringing the discussion of ideas from the level of abstraction into day-to-day life. Because the second volume dealt with his life in France, it was particularly relevant to the experience of Muslims living in the West and would lend to Bennabi's importance as the exponent of a vision of Islam applicable to life in the West. Though Bennabi did not write extensively about interfaith dialogue, he continued his engagement in discussions with Christians, contributing to the Tunis-based Catholic journal

Confluent and attending the investiture of Léon Étienne Duval as a cardinal in Rome in February 1965.[105] Such engagement helped contribute to later efforts by the Catholic Community of Sant' Egidio to mediate the devastating conflict in the 1990s between Algerian Islamists and the government.

Through his final years, Bennabi traveled extensively, though Algerian authorities on occasion expressed their irritation by stopping a journey at the last moment, as they did when he was on his way to Mecca in December 1971.[106] He continued to look for a benevolent authority figure that would fit his image of a leader who would put the right values into action. Muammar al-Qaddafi, who had seized power in Libya in 1969, seemed particularly responsive to Bennabi. It is symbolically apt that Bennabi died on October 31, 1973, just as Middle East history entered a new phase with another Arab-Israeli war.

5

Algerians in an Age of Globalization

Since the 1970s, new patterns of border crossing have taken root among Algerians, shaped not only by difficult conditions within Algeria and long-term demographic trends, but also by restrictions on movement to France and new developments in global politics and labor markets.[1] From Algeria's independence in 1962 through the early 1970s, there had been considerable hope for rapid economic development, especially with the nationalization of the oil industry in 1972. But the combination of limited economic success, growing population, conflicts with Morocco over the Western Sahara starting in 1975, and the growing influence of the military created an increasingly tense situation within Algeria that helped to drive border crossing.

These new patterns included the movement of jihad recruits to such settings as Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia, and Iraq; of illegal immigrants and refugees, both across the Mediterranean and to distant destinations around the globe; and of highly qualified professionals to wherever opportunity might take them.[2] As these new patterns set in, Algerian communities in France moved on to the second and third generation, evolving from immigrants to an ethnic group within France whose members have diverse experiences and outlooks. There have also been changing patterns of movement within Algeria shaped by the development of the oil and gas industry, setting off protests in the oasis community of Ouargla, near the center of the oil fields, in 2004. Algeria, like other North African countries, has also become a transit zone for sub-Saharan illegal immigrants seeking to reach Europe.[3]

Because of Algeria's past and present turbulence, Algerian immigrants and refugees tend to bring with them an iconic status that stimulates a polarized response in their host societies. For advocates of human rights, they are easily seen as victims, and the issue of torture is frequently emphasized. For those who focus on a fear of terrorism or an uncontrolled flow of immigrants from unwanted ethnic groups, they are seen as extremely dangerous, a new incarnation of the Barbary Pirates. The bombings of the Paris Metro in 1995 by

Algerian Islamists contributed to both popular outrage and a conviction on the part of French judicial authorities that they were justified in taking preemptive measures against potential terrorists rather than waiting for them to commit heinous acts.

The difficulties in finding effective formulas for either political or economic opening in the late twentieth century contributed to the continued flow of emigrants and refugees. Many of them were highly educated, and the skills they took with them added to the difficulties of finding a viable strategy for economic development at home. Both the EU and Algeria, along with other North African countries, have recognized the dilemmas posed by migration, including the transit of many sub-Saharan Africans through North Africa. They also recognize that pursuing an effective strategy for economic development in North Africa is essential for reducing migration pressures. Especially since 2004, they have made some efforts to address the problems, leading to the establishment of the Union for the Mediterranean in July 2008.[4]

Hazards and Opportunities of Involvement in External Conflicts

There was an element in Algerian migration patterns that was to prove particularly problematic in the crisis of the 1990s. As in several earlier periods of crisis, including the Darqawa rebellion in the early 1800s and the upheavals of 1870–71 and 1914–18, emigrant or refugee communities proved to be the key link between global factors and local tensions within Algeria.

There was a well-established tradition of migration for military service that one can trace back to the Zuwawa in the Ottoman era, or even to the tenth-century rise of the Fatimids. It continued in modified form as Algerians were recruited into the *tirailleurs indigènes*, then conscripted into the French armed forces. During the revolution, young men left their homes to serve in the *maquis* or to join the ALN outside Algeria. Here the goal was to liberate the national territory.

After independence, a new pattern gradually emerged in which Algerians left their country and became involved in fighting for other Arab or Islamic causes, sometimes pursuing campaigns of violence in settings removed from the actual scene of the conflict. Starting in the late 1960s, a small number became involved in support of the Palestinians. With the economic downturn of the 1980s, going off to Afghanistan to take part in the anti-Soviet jihad seemed an attractive proposition to some young Algerians. By the 1990s, other fronts opened up in Bosnia and Chechnya. By 2007, Algerians reportedly made up the largest group of foreign fighters in Iraq, their number estimated at 1,200, or 22 percent of the total.[5] Training in Afghanistan or Iraq served as what might

be termed "*irhabi*litation," preparation for terrorist activity on return to Algeria. As some Algerians became involved in these external conflicts, the wider Algerian community abroad became increasingly vulnerable to the suspicion that they were part of a terrorist network.

An early dramatic illustration of this occurred in Norway in July 1973, when a group of Mossad agents killed a North African immigrant waiter in the resort town of Lillehammer, reportedly mistaking him for 'Ali Hassan Salameh, a Palestinian who had played a leading role in the killing of eleven Israeli Olympic athletes in Munich in 1972. The victim was Ahmad Bouchikhi. He was born in Algeria in 1943. His father was a Moroccan from the border city of Oujda, and his mother from Tlemcen. By the early 1950s, the family had moved to Arles, in the south of France. Ahmad enrolled in a Norwegian government training program for waiters, then moved to Norway in 1964. At the time he was killed, his Norwegian wife was seven months pregnant. What apparently drew the attention of Mossad agents to Bouchikhi was a chance meeting he had in a swimming pool with Kamal Benamane, a figure who remains shrouded in mystery, according to some sources an Algerian with ties to the Black September movement.[6]

The key Algerian involved with Black September had been Muhammad Boudia, well known for his role in Algerian theater. As an FLN activist in France, he had been arrested in 1958, and he took part in theater productions in prison. In 1963, he helped found the Algerian National Theater, along with Mustafa Kateb, a cousin of Kateb Yasin. A strong supporter of Ben Bella, he went into exile in France after the Boumediene coup in 1965, continuing his theater work and becoming committed to the leftist revolutionary internationalism so popular at the time, and especially to the Palestinian cause. By the early 1970s, he was involved in organizing attacks aimed at Israelis and Israeli interests. On June 28, 1973, he was killed by Mossad agents in Paris as part of operations to avenge the massacre of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972. It is conceivable that Mossad's perception of Ahmad Bouchikhi was shaped by their image of Boudia, who, given his taste for fine living, would not have been out of place in Lillehammer.

As the Afghan war developed in the 1980s, Algerian volunteers there became increasingly engaged in a global Islamic movement and formed ties that crossed over national communities. One of the most prominent among them was Bujama' Bounoua, who took the *nom de guerre* 'Abdullah Anas, derived from Malik Ibn Anas, the name of the founder of the Maliki school of Islamic law that came to prevail in the Maghrib.

Anas's venture to Afghanistan began in 1984 when, as a twenty-five-year-old Qur'an teacher, he read a report in a newspaper about a *fatwa* declaring that

it was every Muslim's duty to wage war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. He went on the pilgrimage to Mecca that year and encountered 'Abdullah 'Azzam, the Palestinian who had emerged as the leader of Arab *mujahidin* on the Afghan front. He soon joined 'Azzam in Islamabad, Pakistan, and then set off for Afghanistan, where he became an aide to Ahmad Shah Massaud. Some five years after arriving in this new setting, he married Sumaya, the youngest daughter of 'Abdullah 'Azzam.

The year 1989 was to be a watershed in Afghanistan. As the rebels gained access to new weapons from the West, particularly Stinger missiles, the Soviets were forced to leave Afghanistan in February. Usama Bin Ladin emerged as a key figure, and 'Abdullah 'Azzam was killed by a bomb on November 24. Supporters of 'Azzam blamed this on 'Usama Bin Ladin and members of the Egyptian organization Islamic Jihad, who were pushing for a global jihad, while 'Azzam had called for a focused approach, dealing first with the Soviets in Afghanistan, then with the Palestinian front.[7]

The other prominent figure to emerge from the Afghan setting was Qamar al-Din Kherbane, who had once served in the Algerian air force, and had been imprisoned for his political activities in 1986–88. On his release he made his way to Afghanistan. In the 1990s, he traveled widely in pursuit of Islamic causes, notably working with the Islamist NGO Human Concern International in Bosnia in the early 1990s. He reportedly traveled to Iran at one point and secured Israeli-made weapons, which had been part of the shah's arsenal, for use in Bosnia and Algeria.

By the late 1990s, both Anas and Kherbane had turned up in Britain and managed to secure British acceptance of their presence there, at least in part by emphasizing their opposition to Bin Ladin's pursuit of global jihad and terrorism. They could present themselves as part of the FIS's moderate "Algerianist" segment, concerned not with global jihad, but with democracy and justice in Algeria, and as potential allies of mainstream Algerian political leaders, such as 'Abd al-Hamid Brahimi, who had taken up exile in Britain.[8] But many of the rank-and-file among the "Afghan" Algerians returned to Algeria to join the GIA. It is estimated that some 1,500 Algerians received military training in Afghanistan. One key channel of movement, as had been the case in the early twentieth century, was through the oases of southeastern Algeria from the Souf to Biskra.[9]

As refugees living in Britain, Anas and Kherbane walked a fine line, having to fend off allegations that they were involved in raising funds and procuring arms for their former "Afghan" comrades in the GIA. The British government also walked a fine line here, having to hope that it would prove sound judgment to extend hospitality to political Islamists who rejected terrorism and,

at least in principle, accepted political pluralism.[10] No doubt they hoped that London would provide a setting that could help Algerian Islamist leaders come to terms with the government, as was attempted by 'Abd al-'Aziz Belkhadem in a meeting held at the home of a wealthy Algerian businessman in London in September 2005.[11] But such efforts have yielded few results other than to keep open channels of communication.

Other Algerians were less adept at making the case that they were moderates opposed to global terrorism. In many cases they are best understood as naive idealists who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. Among the most notable of these cases was that of the "Algerian Six," a group who had gone to Bosnia during the conflict there in the early 1990s, working for an Islamic humanitarian organization, and gained Bosnian citizenship through marriage. They were arrested in 2002 and eventually handed over to U.S. authorities, who alleged, on the basis of questionable evidence, that they had plotted to blow up the U.S. embassy in Sarajevo. They were among the first prisoners in Guantánamo and eventually launched a prolonged legal battle, culminating in the Supreme Court case of *Boumediene v. Bush*.[12]

International Organizations and the Algerian Crisis

As the Algerian crisis reached its peak in the mid-1990s, there was growing apprehension in Western capitals that the government might collapse. Two very different international organizations worked to address the situation. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) attempted to deal with the huge balance-of-payments deficit that had developed since the mid-1980s, and thereby maintain stability in financial relations between Algeria and the major Western powers. The Catholic church, through the lay Catholic Community of Sant' Egidio, organized a conference of major Algerian political parties at Rome to discuss what one might term Algeria's political deficit and launch a process that could lead to a stable, pluralistic democracy in Algeria.

In both cases, Algerians with considerable experience in the West were key figures. Rida Malek, who had had major roles in negotiating the Évian Accords of 1962 and, as Algeria's ambassador to Washington, in the freeing of American hostages in Tehran in 1981, took a role in dealing with the IMF. Anwar Haddam, a FIS leader living in exile in the United States, was a critical figure at the Rome Conference. The financial negotiations were, at least in the short term, successful. Yet they did not produce a formula that went to the root of Algeria's problem: how to open up a dynamic private sector in a way that would reduce Algeria's high unemployment levels, attract investment, and create sustained growth not vulnerable to volatility of oil and gas prices. The effort launched

at the Rome Conference to find a political solution was not successful in the short term, in part because the French in particular refused to let the financial negotiations be used to create pressure for political opening. Yet the Rome Conference demonstrated not only Algeria's potential for political pluralism, but also prospects for religious pluralism in Europe and the Mediterranean.

The Catholic Church

In the late colonial era, Catholics in Algeria—both community activists and members of the church hierarchy—made notable efforts to break away from the church's association with colonial domination. Léon Étienne Duval, who was to become archbishop of Algiers, was the most outstanding advocate of this effort to reinvent the church in Algeria. For his defense of Algerian Muslims' rights he was bitterly castigated as "Muhammad Duval" among the die-hard supporters of *l'Algérie Française*. But he won the respect of Algerian nationalists—not only because he had spoken out in their defense, but also because even though the *colons* departed from Algeria en masse, mainly to France, there remained a large Algerian community in France.[13] Respect for Christianity in Algeria was a logical position for those who expected reciprocal respect for Muslims in France.

The effort at bridging Algeria's political divide at the Rome Conference in late 1994 and early 1995 was facilitated by a lay Catholic group, the Community of Sant' Egidio, which had its origins among Italian youth in the turbulent late 1960s. It is a group dedicated to addressing problems of poverty, human rights, and conflict resolution, and to providing an opportunity for taking part in a devout Catholic community, but outside of traditional monastic confines.

In the early 1990s, the Community of Sant' Egidio scored a notable success in helping to bring an end to the civil war that had been raging in Mozambique. The resolution of that conflict was tied to larger changes—the transition from apartheid to democracy in neighboring South Africa, and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Protestants also had a substantial role in helping to mediate the conflict. The final negotiations took place in Rome, and this certainly enhanced the Community of Sant' Egidio's credentials as international mediators.[14]

One of the chief concerns of Sant' Egidio leader Andrea Riccardi was to promote a sense of community within the Mediterranean region, helping to foster mutual respect between religions and to mediate conflicts within the region, which were increasingly rooted in religious identity. He shared this outlook with Marco Impagliazzo, who published a biography of Cardinal Duval in 1993, with a preface by Riccardi. Duval had served as archbishop of Algiers

until 1988, the year that the Algerian crisis began, and it seemed a fitting tribute to him to continue his work by helping to mediate the Algerian conflict.

For the negotiations to have any hope of success, the FIS had to be represented. Its two top leaders, 'Abbasi Madani and 'Ali Benhajj, were in prison in Algeria. The two most important figures living outside Algeria as refugees were Rabah Kebir, in Germany, and Anwar Haddam in the United States. Kebir was unable to secure permission to leave Germany. But Haddam was, for the moment, on good terms with the U.S. administration. At the time, State Department officials were worried that the Algerian regime might collapse, as had the shah's in Iran. They saw that by working with Haddam they might position themselves to have leverage with a FIS-dominated government in Algeria.

In his dealings with U.S. authorities in the months running up to the Rome Conference, Haddam stressed two points: that he was not associated with the GIA, contrary to rumors that were circulating; and that he was strongly critical of the crackdown on Algerian Islamists led by France's interior minister, Charles Pasqua, including the expulsion of FIS activists in France to Burkina Faso. Haddam praised the United States for its pragmatism in approaching the Algerian crisis.[15]

The Rome Conference of November 20–21, 1994, brought together leaders of seven Algerian political parties for discussions of how they might put together a common platform to reopen the doors to political change in Algeria. They reconvened in January 1995 to put the final touches on their program, which called for democracy and political pluralism.[16]

In Algeria, hard-line officials who rejected any compromise with the FIS sought a strategy for undermining Haddam's standing in Washington. They understood that the way the game was played was to exercise influence through the media, and by working with NGOs that might advance the government's case in the public arena. They saw to the appointment of a new ambassador to Washington, 'Uthman Bencherif, a scholar of English and American literature who was an old friend of the neoconservative activist Daniel Pipes.

In the December 1995 issue of the *Middle East Quarterly*, Bencherif published an essay entitled "Algeria Faces the Rough Beast." His title drew on the poem "The Second Coming" written by William Butler Yeats shortly after the end of the First World War. Bencherif interpreted Yeats's poem as a warning against the rise of fascism in Europe, and he portrayed Islamism as a new form of fascism with which no compromise was possible. He thus portrayed those who sought to deal with "moderate" Islamists as the sort of weak-kneed politician who sought to accommodate Hitler in 1938, while hard-liners were draped in a Churchillian mantle.[17] The interview certainly won the support of U.S.

neoconservatives against compromise in Algeria, but his strident tone and alliance with a group known for its unreserved support of Israel were apparently not well received in Algiers.[18]

By late 1996, as the Clinton administration faced the challenge of an election, Haddam lost his privileged standing in the United States. In October, a federal court denied his asylum claim, and in December he was placed in detention. NGOs hostile to the Islamists, such as the International Women's Human Rights Law Clinic, campaigned for his deportation, and worked to advance private lawsuits against Haddam by individuals who had suffered from Islamist violence. The other key element in his fate was the use of secret evidence by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, presumably obtained from external sources and not critically examined.[19] He would finally be released in May 2000.

The ultimate failure of the Rome Platform can be traced to two causes: the upsurge in violence that began soon after the completion of the platform; and the successful negotiations for the rescheduling of Algerian debt, accompanied by an opening to partnerships with Western countries, particularly the United States. Such partnerships could begin in the financial and technological domain, but move into the strategic and military domain, as happened with the joint venture Brown and Root-Condor, established in 1994. The U.S. partner in this venture was the Halliburton subsidiary Kellogg, Brown and Root.

As a new wave of violence began in February 1995, the most dramatic incident, and the one most closely tied in symbolic terms to the Rome conference, was the kidnapping of seven Trappist monks from their monastery at Tibhirine in the mountains to the south of Algiers in late March 1996. The monks had been living peacefully among the local population, avoiding any political pronouncements, offering medical care, and occasionally organizing interfaith prayers, notably with members of the Alawi Sufi order. Their captors held them, demanding ransom, until they were finally killed on May 21. Their severed heads were found in a plastic bag at a gas station, but their bodies were never found.[20]

As with so many incidents in Algeria's civil war, this is shrouded in mystery, and the subject of very different accounts. The most credible version seems to be that the GIA had kidnapped the monks, initially hoping to gain a ransom payment, but when negotiations broke down, they were killed by their captors. Critics of the regime have put forward accounts that either blame the security services directly or hold the government responsible for handling the situation ineffectively.[21] In any case, the event had wide ramifications, both political and symbolic. It gave the government justification for refusing to enter discussions with the FIS, whose leaders remained ambivalent about the issue of violence.

And it undermined the vision promoted by Sant' Egidio leaders for incorporating Algeria into a pluralistic and peaceful Mediterranean region.

While the story lent itself to allegations of convoluted political machinations, or support for the theory of "clash of civilizations," it also presented an opportunity for Muslims who admitted the GIA's role and condemned their violence to keep open the door to interfaith dialogue. It would be Ahmad Zaoui, who had grown up near the Monastery of Tibhirine, who later would most effectively seize that opportunity.[22]

The International Monetary Fund (IMF)

At virtually the same time as the GIA launched its new offensive, in February 1995, the Algerian government reached an accord with the IMF that paved the way to rescheduling of the country's massive foreign debt. This followed an initial agreement with the IMF the previous year that had brought a standby loan and provided an opportunity to test the Algerian government's commitment to economic restructuring.

Algeria's economic situation was indeed dire. With the decline of oil prices, reaching below fifteen dollars a barrel in 1994, nearly all of Algeria's oil and gas revenue was consumed simply in the payment of interest on Algeria's massive debt. Inflation ran at 22 percent. Unemployment was also reported to be at 22 percent, and for the critical population of young men it was certainly much higher. The economy had shrunk by 1 percent in 1993. The IMF, and Algeria's major creditors in the Paris Club, were insisting on major policy changes, particularly lowering government budget deficits, ending subsidies for basic consumer goods, lowering the artificially high exchange rate for the Algerian dinar, and dismantling the country's huge and inefficient government-owned sector to expand the private sector and open up economic competition.[23]

The problem was that such measures could result in sharply rising prices and even higher unemployment, and this would most likely aggravate Algeria's already serious political conflicts. Thus the Algerians and the IMF had to negotiate a formula that would improve the country's international financial standing without plunging it into total political chaos. This was the task of the veteran politician and diplomat Rida Malek, who was prime minister during the crucial months of the initial phase of negotiations with the IMF in 1993 and early 1994.

Malek was not only a seasoned statesman. He was one of the few members of the Algerian establishment who had articulated a vision for change in Algeria that was an alternative to that of the Islamists. In *Tradition et révolution: L'enjeu de la modernité en Algérie et dans l'Islam*, published in Paris in 1993,

he argued that Algerians should not be swayed by the hope that a simplistic ideological formula could solve their problems. In effect, he recognized that Algerians had already fallen victim to this trap in the years following independence when socialism was promoted as the solution to all problems. Instead of simply embracing Islamism as a substitute for socialism, Algerians, he argued, needed to find effective strategies for dealing with the complex modern world. This required serious economic restructuring.

As soon as the initial IMF agreement was approved in February 1994, Malek stepped down as prime minister to be replaced by a technocrat. There is speculation as to why this occurred. Nevertheless, after Malek stepped down, Algeria continued on the course that he had charted for pursuing economic restructuring. There were those both in international financial circles and among leading Algerian political and economic figures who argued that economic restructuring could not be effective without political opening. But the French government, and the French head of the IMF, Michel Camdessus rejected this argument, and they saw potential economic advantages for France in coming to an agreement with the Algerian regime on economic reforms separate from political opening.[24] With the conclusion of a comprehensive plan for debt rescheduling and economic reform in early 1995, at the same time as the opposition parties put forward the Rome Platform, proponents of political opening had little leverage with which to pressure the government into negotiations.

The principles underlying the plan for economic restructuring had some serious problems. First, the major reason for the Algerian government to accept such a plan was that oil and gas prices were remarkably low in 1993–95. But beginning in 1996, prices would rise again. By 2006, the government was negotiating not to postpone payments, but rather to pay off debts earlier than scheduled. Second, it is by no means an easy task to make the transition from a heavily centralized, state-controlled economy to one based on vigorous free enterprise and international opening.

The difficulties of incorporating global economic norms into the Algerian system persisted into the twenty-first century. In spite of some measures of reform, Algeria continued to rank very low in the World Bank's assessment of ease in doing business. In 2008, it stood at 125 out of 178, well below both its North African neighbors and other major oil and gas producers.[25] Its efforts to gain admission to the World Trade Organization did not succeed, while those of Saudi Arabia did.

Algerians in France: Diversity within Diversity

The Algerian community in France in the early twenty-first century is by far the largest Algerian community abroad. It is also the most diverse in political,

cultural, and, above all, demographic terms. Algerian communities in the newer frontiers of migration beyond France tend to be made up of recent arrivals. Their members include well-educated individuals seeking job opportunities in a secure environment; political activists seeking a setting from which to pursue their platform; and young men simply fleeing the chaos of Algeria by whatever path they can find.

The Algerian community in France includes all ages, from the very old to infants; similar proportions of men and women; some recent arrivals, but many whose families have been in France for two or three generations. It is instructive to compare this situation with that of the *barrani* communities of rural immigrants to cities in nineteenth-century Algeria. Those who came from regions closer to the cities often married and became permanent residents of the cities. Up until the early 1970s, the Algerian immigrant community in France retained a resemblance to the *barrani* pattern, with frequent new arrivals and others returning home to Algeria, thus maintaining strong links with their place of origin through regular visits and marriage ties.

But with the economic crisis in France following the spike in oil prices in 1973, and the launching of an ambitious development program in Algeria, this pattern entered a process of change. New arrivals were limited to women and children entering France under provisions for family reunification. For some, identity began to shift from Algerian to "French Muslim" or "Muslim in France." Others stressed the ethnic aspect of their identity as Berbers.[26] Over time, Algerians in France came to choose marriage partners in France, often outside the Maghribi immigrant community, creating a further obstacle to movement from Algeria.[27]

Cultural Expression

France has been particularly important as a domain for Algerian cultural expression. As the products of such expression, especially books and music, are easily moved, there is no clear territorial boundary. Writers and musicians move back and forth depending on conditions.

With the growing tensions in Algeria starting in the late 1980s, the few new arrivals often included those who were fleeing growing limitations on freedom of expression and often violent attacks, individuals who might be termed cultural refugees.

One of the best-known Algerian playwrights of the years of the revolution and the first decades of independence was Kateb Yasin. He spent much of the 1950s in France, falling under the influence of avant-garde literary figures such as Bertolt Brecht. But after his return to Algeria following the revolution, he shifted to a populist approach, creating plays aimed at reaching ordinary people, and giving them political inspiration.[28]

He worked with a theater company called Théâtre de la Mer, sponsored by the Ministry of Work and Social Affairs, producing pieces such a *Mohamed prends ta valise* (Mohamed Get Your Suitcase), about the plight of the emigrant worker. But government authorities came to have reservations about Kateb's enthusiasm for Berber identity and women's rights. They named him director of the theater in the small western city of Sidi Bel Abbès and restricted his access to the media. In 1988, shortly before the outbreak of the October riots, he left Algeria for France with his family. This may have been motivated in part by his need for medical care, for he was suffering from leukemia, from which he died the following year.

His son Amazigh Kateb was sixteen at the time the family left for France. As the troubles raged in Algeria in the 1990s, he pursued his own distinctive approach, taking up music and forming a group called Gnawa Diffusion. The name refers to the Gnawa, descendants of sub-Saharan African slaves whose presence today is most evident in Morocco. He traces his inspiration for this to a trip he took with his mother in his early teens to the southern Algerian oasis of Timimoun, where he was present for a traditional celebration, the festival of the tomato. The experience inspired him to shift from his father's emphasis on Berber identity to a more complex picture of African identity that drew on a variety of sources rather than espousing a single identity bound to clash with rival identities.[29]

Another immigrant figure whose music has noteworthy political overtones and draws upon a mix of traditions is "Chico" (Jalul) Bouchikhi. He was born in Arles in 1954, and as a youth he formed ties with a local Gypsy family, the Reyes, who had fled to France from Spain during the civil war there in the late 1930s. Through this connection he gained an interest in music and in particular the hybrid tradition of flamenco that had taken shape in Andalusia. His group would perform in Norway at the first anniversary of the Oslo Peace Accords, in 1993, with Shimon Peres and Yasir Arafat in the audience. He reported that he felt both were to blame for his brother's death in Norway twenty years earlier. In 1994, after arranging a musical celebration of tolerance in their hometown of Arles, Chico and the Gypsies were named as UNESCO envoys of peace. It is worth noting that this occurred at the time when the Community of Sant' Egidio were working to foster Algerian peace negotiations.

A few years later, the group went to perform in Israel. The Israeli government offered no apologies for Mossad's having killed his brother in 1973, but individual Israelis expressed their deep regret. The concert near Haifa provided a remarkable example of the possibility of moving beyond political vendettas

and developing cross-cultural dialogue, and it took place on the Jewish New Year celebration of Rosh Hashanah. Unfortunately, the concert had limited global echoes. It took place on September 19, 2001, as the world plunged into a new era of fear and conflict.[30]

The dynamic theatrical tradition, which Kateb Yasin did so much to build, saw a revival in the brief period of opening in the late 1980s and early 1990s. A new independent theater company, Masrah al-Qala'a, emerged in 1989, producing such works as M'hammed Benguettaf's *Fatma*, a one-woman show focused on the life of a washerwoman that raised complex questions about both gender and economic exploitation. But one of the key figures in Algerian theater, 'Abd al-Qadir Alloula, was killed by members of an Islamic fundamentalist group in Oran in 1994. Islamist rage at this time was also aimed against popular musicians. The result was an exodus of actors, playwrights, and musicians, heading mainly to France.

The experience of that time is captured in a play written by the actress Nadia Kaci, called *Femmes en quête de terres* (Women in Search of Lands), based on her own experience of exile. It tells the story of a young woman, Samira, who had managed to secure a visa to France and hoped to proceed from there to England to join her fiancé. It was a situation characteristic of the 1990s, where young Algerian men fled to faraway places, appealing for refugee status because they refused to accept conscription to the Algerian army. But for women both covert migration as stowaways and making the case for asylum were more difficult. Samira was stranded in Paris, where she took a job caring for a woman with Alzheimer's disease. Through that experience she came to realize that fleeing to exile from the chaos of Algeria was much like losing one's memory.

The play was first produced in France during the 2003 "Year of Algeria," but outside the domain of government-supported productions. By this time, the situation in Algeria had calmed sufficiently that it was possible for her to return there to produce the play and to take on new film-acting roles. She also became an activist for women's rights, calling for drastic revision of the 1984 Family Code, which had left women with little ability to defend their rights in case of divorce, producing divorcees who were homeless, begging in the street.[31]

Kaci's experience and the return of other refugee theater figures, such as M'hamed Benguettaf, demonstrate how theater is very much rooted in a particular national experience. Kaci had found that in France, producers of film and theater tended to consign Algerians to stereotypical roles. Only in the Algerian setting could Algerian theater truly thrive, for the stories they told were Algerian, and often told at least partly in colloquial Algerian Arabic.

Religious Expression

In the religious domain the potential for exchange is greatest where there is minimal interference from governments. In France, there had long been efforts to place Islam under government supervision. The Mosque of Paris, inaugurated in 1926, had grown out of French efforts to create an Islamic institutional framework within the French imperial system, starting with the pilgrimage to Mecca of 1916.[32]

Initially under the purview of the French government, the Mosque of Paris was handed over to Algerian authorities in 1982, with the appointment of ʻAbbas Bencheikh El Hocine, the Association of ʻUlama activist who had formed ties with the FLN in Cairo and then served as Algeria's ambassador to Saudi Arabia.[33] But the Mosque of Paris never developed a popular base. Moreover, from the outset it had been inconsistent with principles set down by the 1905 law on separation of religion and state. As it became clear that Islam was the second-largest religion in France, the same dilemma emerged of how to create an acceptable framework for state-mosque relations as had been seen in Algeria in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

French authorities began to take on this challenge in the late 1990s under a socialist government, but it was only when the conservative Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy took over the task in 2003 that the project was pushed through, and the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (CFCM) was established, with the participation of most major Muslim organizations in France.[34]

One exception to the strong ties between government and Islamic institutions in France was the Association des Étudiants Islamique de France, a relatively small but highly visible organization. Its most prominent figure was Lʻarbi Kechat, an Algerian immigrant and Sorbonne graduate who had been imam since 1989 of the Ad-Daʻwa Mosque, situated in what had been an old clothing warehouse in the Nineteenth Arrondissement.[35] Kechat first gained visibility in 1994 when he was part of a group of Muslims arrested in the wake of the killing of five French individuals in Algeria. The decision was made by the hard-line Interior Minister Charles Pasqua, who rejected any dialogue with Islamists as spineless appeasement. But Kechat had supporters among Christian religious leaders and in the French press. He was not expelled to Burkina Faso with the other suspects, but rather was interned in France and then finally released. Allegations of connections with radical Islamists continued to nag Kechat, and in 2005 there were claims that the Ad-Daʻwa Mosque served as a recruiting base for volunteers to fight in Iraq.[36]

Kechat, a follower of the AEIF founder Muhammad Hamidullah, is a complex and controversial figure. He has been open to dialogue with other

religions in France and has been eloquent in his calls for interfaith dialogue.[37] At a conference in Geneva in 2005, he expressed his vision as follows: "The unity of God implies both the unity of Humanity and its diversity. How can one understand the enigma of a Humanity which is at once one and many? Ontologically, Humanity is one. But to thrive (*s'épanouir*), this one unit must express itself in diverse ways."[38] The conflicts that beset humanity in the early twenty-first century, he argued, were the result of particular groups claiming dominance and centrality and consigning others to positions on the periphery. A typical expression of his commitment to dialogue was his presentation of greetings at the start of Ramadan in October 2005 alongside Rabbi Philippe Haddad and Catholic Father Jean-Marie Gandeuil, all of them commenting on how fasting was a shared element in each faith, though differently expressed.[39]

Kechat also had a response to the problems of dissident urban youth in France, expressed in the violence in the *banlieues* in 2005. What was needed was to engage them through voluntary organizations such as the Scouts. He went so far as to advocate parents enrolling their children in Catholic scouting organizations in cases where Muslim communities did not have adequate resources to set up their own scouting organizations.[40] The emphasis on drawing youth into activities organized by voluntary associations is very much like that of the Association of 'Ulama in prerevolution Algeria.

Critics of dialogue, such as Alexandre Del Valle, saw Kechat's gestures to tolerance as a screen concealing designs for a Muslim plan to exert ever-larger influence in Europe.[41] One line of attack is to allege that institutions such as the Ad-Da'wa Mosque must certainly draw financing from transnational Islamic NGOs. This line of attack is similar to that used against Bashir Ibrahimi in the late 1940s and early 1950s as he sought to raise resources to finance ever more ambitious projects—though in that case the charge was mere personal corruption, not global conspiracy. One can also find interesting parallels in the case of Zubir Bouchikhi, an Algerian who pursued a course of Islamic studies in Malaysia, then in Virginia, and became imam of a mosque in Houston, Texas, starting in 2001. Like Kechat, he stressed the importance of Muslim youth becoming involved in social service activity. But in 2007, his application for permanent residence status was denied, and in late 2008, he was arrested and held in a private detention facility. His vocal criticism of the U.S. invasion of Iraq may have been a factor shaping the decision of immigration authorities.[42]

While the Ad-Da'wa Mosque hosted such controversial figures as Hani Ramadan, brother of Tariq Ramadan, the visitor who seems to have aroused the greatest fervor is Muhammad al-Sa'id Ramadan al-Buti, a prominent Islamic legal scholar from Syria. Opponents of dialogue with Islamists point to Buti's

anti-Israeli rhetoric and his opposition to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. But in doing so they miss an important point. Through the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria in the 1980s, he remained in the good graces of the Assad regime. When that regime launched an effort at reconciliation with Islamists in 1995, he served as an intermediary. Buti has proven a savvy user of the media, both television and the Internet. And he has made sure to keep his distance from politics.[43]

The Buti connection helps shed light on Kechat's approach. He has avoided challenging governments, either that of Algeria or of France. But he has also maintained his independence from the French government, a position popular with his followers and respected by leaders from other religious groups.[44] Kechat's position on social and cultural issues, like Buti's, has been a conservative one, yet nuanced enough to keep the doors open to discussion from diverse points of view, even if such discussion sometimes proves rancorous. His openness to dialogue and his large following finally helped to win authorization, in 2003, for the building of a new mosque to replace the old warehouse. The design for the new mosque was carefully chosen to fit into its surroundings. It had no minaret, and the prayer room of the new mosque held only 1,600 compared to the 3,000 who could be accommodated in the old mosque. Priority was given to facilities that helped in the mosque's role as a center for coordinating local social and cultural activities and for offering classes and meals for the poor.[45]

The World beyond France: Emigration, Exile, and Harraga

The movement of Algerians to destinations other than France presents a complex mix of factors. The image made familiar by the media is that of the politically driven border crosser, either fleeing the threat of Islamist violence or taking refuge from government repression. But job opportunities are also an important factor. The economic element has involved professionals and workers, both skilled and unskilled. Less-skilled emigrants tend to be found closer to home, in Italy or Spain, though some move on from there to other countries. As barriers to legal immigration have grown, immigrants have increasingly resorted to lawbreaking, using false documents, overstaying tourist visas, or coming with no papers at all, crossing the Mediterranean in small boats.

Starting in the time of the revolution, Algerians came to study at universities in the West outside of France. After independence, they came with government scholarships, concentrating on fields such as science and engineering. With the economic downturn of the mid-1980s, highly qualified Algerians

abroad saw scant opportunities back home, and they looked to the option of jobs in the West. Marriage ties to women who were citizens of Western countries sometimes bore on their choices as well. With the political turmoil that set in beginning in 1988, it became increasingly difficult to separate political from economic motives. It was also easier to find political refuge if one had the skills to find a job and established professional and social connections in the country of refuge.[46]

The overlap of political and economic motives on the part of refugees can lead to a legal conundrum. Claiming asylum based on the likelihood that one will be arrested and tortured by the government of one's home country often offers the best chance for legal acceptance. Yet it also constitutes a political statement that makes it far more difficult to return to Algeria. Claims of a threat of mistreatment by the government generally had a stronger legal basis than fears of attack by nonstate agents such as rebel groups. The latter claims were difficult to prove and all too easily lent to the impression that the claimants saw the asylum claim as a way to circumvent growing restrictions on ordinary immigration.[47]

From *Hijra* to *Harraga*

To gain an understanding of new migration patterns, it is useful to look at demographic factors. In Algeria, the birthrate shot up in the years following independence. The proportion of the population aged fifteen to twenty-four rose from 17.6 percent in 1970, to 20.2 percent in 1985, to 22.6 percent in 2000. The birthrate reached its peak in 1980–85.[48] As had happened in Iran in 1979, a demographic wave of young men, often from the first generation in their families to live in an urban setting and gain a modern education, began coming of age by the time of economic downturn and political crisis in the late 1980s. As political conflict turned to military conflict in the early 1990s, this generation was of age for conscription into the military and thus offered obvious targets for Islamist militants for whom killing government recruits had been justified by a *fatwa*.

In earlier, more peaceful times, conscripts had been put to work on public works projects, but now they were assigned military tasks. A common story recounted by Algerian asylum seekers in the West tells of traveling in a bus or taxi on a rural road and coming to what seemed a police checkpoint. The police would ask all young men to produce the card indicating their conscription status. But one never knew whether these were real police or Islamists dressed as police, looking for conscripts to execute or force into service for the jihad.

The situation was compounded by the complexities of conscription law, and the inefficient manner of its application. The army needed only 75,000

conscripts per year, yet there were some 350,000 young men available in each class, not to mention the hundreds of thousands previously exempted who could still be called up. Thus conscription, while not vigorously applied, kept huge numbers of young men in a chronic state of uncertainty. This was only alleviated in 1999 with an amnesty for those who had evaded conscription, yet they still had to report to the authorities to obtain a dispensation card. Even after this large-scale amnesty, conscription continued to be applied.[49]

Caught in the middle of this conflict, and with few prospects for employment or marriage, and thus for finding their own housing, these young men left Algeria in droves in the 1990s by whatever means they could: on temporary visas, with false passports, or simply stowing away on ships or setting off in a small boat. Even after the return of relative political stability and decreasing unemployment in Algeria in the twenty-first century, statistical indicators on illegal immigration continued to increase.[50]

Because of strict controls in France, they often went first to other European destinations, the top-ranked destinations being Spain, Italy, and Great Britain. Algerian popular slang developed a term for this phenomenon, *harraga*, a word conveying a sense of taking a desperate risk to escape from the despair of Algeria. It derives from the Arabic *haraqa*, meaning to burn. Those who engaged in *harraga* not only fled Algeria; they also rejected France, where they knew Algerians were frequently stopped for identity checks in the street, and where they were bound to be associated with a derogatory stereotype rooted in Islamophobia or *beur*onoia. Some traveled to far-off destinations such as Canada, which was particularly attractive because of the large Algerian community in Montreal. Another popular destination was Australia—for which Thailand and Malaysia were convenient transit points.[51] In the 1990s, Algerian refugees were able to evoke sympathy because of the chaos in Algeria, but by the early years of the twenty-first century, with greater stability in Algeria and a growing threat of global terrorism, legal obstacles to acceptance in such settings as Canada increased. Many of those fleeing came from middle-class backgrounds and had a relatively high level of education.[52]

Great Britain

The experience of the Algerian exile community in Britain has been shaped by two factors with deep historical roots in the British-Algerian connection.[53] On the one hand, Britain since the eighteenth century has produced strong currents of humanitarian idealism. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the focus was on ending slavery and piracy, campaigns in which Algiers achieved an iconic status in both philosophical presentations and in literature

and theater. In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the main themes have been defense of human rights and opposition to torture, and once again Algeria has become a familiar icon.

But while the British public forum often rings with calls for humanitarian causes, British governments have been concerned with global agendas involving the pursuit of economic and strategic interests, and rivalries and alliance building with other powers. In the modern age, pressures generated by the media, especially following a dramatic incident of terrorism, also have a bearing on government decisions. Because Algerians are recent arrivals in Britain, and because they seem potentially linked to terrorism, they have proven a challenge for British police authorities, who have lacked the skills and resources to gain accurate information on them and to put what information they do acquire into perspective.

London was indeed home to a number of Algerian veterans of Afghanistan. Some of them, like 'Abdullah Anas and Qamar al-Din Kherbane, had quarrels with Usama Bin Laden, dating back to the killing of Anas's father-in-law, 'Abdullah 'Azzam, in Afghanistan in 1989. But others, including Haydar Abu Doha, seemed to have maintained ties with al-Qa'ida. It is Abu Doha who allegedly directed Ahmad Ressam on his failed mission to set off a bomb at Los Angeles International Airport in 1999. Algerian exiles tended to congregate in the vicinity of the Finsbury Park Mosque, along Blackstock Road, in northeast London. This mosque had initially been built by Pakistani and Bangla Dashi immigrants in the 1970s. By the 1990s, it came to be dominated by radical Arab Islamists such as Abu Hamza al-Masri, an Egyptian who had first come to England as a student in the late 1970s and then gone off to Afghanistan in the early 1990s, where an explosion blinded him in one eye and led to the amputation of a hand and an arm.[54]

But the first Algerian victim of post-9/11 British police fears of Algerian Islamists was a man who had no connection to the Finsbury Park radicals. Indeed, he was cut out of a very different mold, best fitting the description of skilled job-seeking immigrant. Lutfi Raïssi was arrested by British police on the night of September 21, 2001, and taken, without any clothes, to a waiting police car. He was accused of having helped to train the terrorists of 9/11 as a flight instructor. The initial suspicion came from the knowledge that Raïssi, just like some of the terrorists, had gone to flight school in Arizona. An address book thought to be the property of the known radical Abu Doha seemed to confirm the suspicion. The FBI informed the British police that they had a video showing Raïssi in the company of Hani Hanjour, one of the hijackers. But it later emerged that the person in question was not Hanjour, but rather Raïssi's cousin. Circumstantial evidence indicating that he was in approximately the

same place at approximately the same time as terrorists eventually proved to be mere coincidence. Raïssi was kept in Belmarsh Prison for five months before police realized their mistake. In the end, he was released, but with his career in ruins and his psyche scarred.[55]

It might be maintained that like radical Islamists, Raïssi had wild, ambitious dreams, but they did not involve crashing airliners into buildings. Rather they had to do with making a respectable career out of flying them. It is striking that he came to England to pursue his pilot's career in 2000, just at the time that Rafiq Khalifa was about to launch his ill-fated project for Algeria's entrée to global capitalism by starting an airline. There is no indication that Raïssi envisioned working for Khalifa Airways, but in both cases, the ambitions grew out of a Westernized, middle-class background. Born in 1974, Raïssi was part of a generation of Algerians who came of age in a time of troubles and sought refuge in the West. Like many others in this group, he married a Westerner, in his case a French Catholic woman, Sonia Demolis, whom he had met in the United States.

Another affair that raised questions about police competence in England was the panic set off by allegations that Algerian refugees were planning to carry out deadly attacks with the use of ricin poison in early 2003. But the only fatality was a British police officer killed with a knife in a raid on a flat in Manchester by the alleged mastermind of the poison scheme, Kamil Bourgass. At the time, the ricin story proved useful in promoting the argument that Saddam Hussein had arsenals of weapons of mass destruction, including poison. But as investigations proceeded, it turned out that Bourgass was an "embittered loner," shunned by most other members of the illegal immigrant community. He had downloaded poison recipes from an American survivalist website and sought to concoct poisons in his makeshift lab with castor beans, cherry stones, and apple seeds. Moreover, experts explained that to be effective, ricin had to be injected into the victim. Thus it could hardly be conceived as a "weapon of mass destruction," even when produced by a competent technician.[56]

Nevertheless, the scare set off by the ricin incident increased apprehension over Algerian illegal immigrants. Some sixteen Algerians were detained on allegations of association with terrorist groups, and efforts were pursued to extradite them to Algeria. But, especially in the wake of the unraveling of the ricin accusations, serious questions were raised by human rights advocates over the validity of the evidence, often kept secret, and the prospect of torture and arbitrary detention for those who were returned to Algeria.[57]

Quarrels over the treatment of detainees and their extradition to Algeria took place in a context in which there were other important developments. British citizens and residents who had been detained in Afghanistan or

Pakistan in late 2001 to early 2002, then held at Guantánamo, were being returned to Britain. For some, the fact that they were caught in the war zone was proof of their association with terrorism. But narratives of the detainees, such as Ahmad Belbacha, a former soccer player and accounts clerk who had sought asylum in Britain in 1999, suggest that their motivation was a naïve sense of adventure, not a deep commitment to global jihad. He remained stranded in Guantánamo, even though his release was authorized in early 2007, because both the British and American governments refused to accept him, and he refused to return to Algeria, where he feared hostile action by both the government and Islamist rebels.[58] Similar debates swirled over the treatment of Algerian detainees in Canada and Australia.[59]

The other dimension of the context was a growing concern over illegal immigration, and the treatment of illegal immigrants at detention centers, illustrated by the riot at the Hammondsworth Detention Center in December 2006. The stories of many of these detainees evoked not a sense of danger but a feeling of sympathy. For instance, a young Algerian woman, Malha, had come to Britain in 2000 and was studying physiotherapy at the University of Central England. She was taken to the detention center with her two children, aged five and one, and experienced serious health problems as the result of conditions there.[60]

As all these debates swirled, the new phenomenon of *harraga* began to wash up on British shores. Six young men who had set out from Annaba, hoping to reach Italy, had been picked up by an American cruise ship, the *Regatta*, after their boat's engine had failed. The ship's captain attempted to leave them off at four different stops, but his request was refused. Only when he reached Liverpool was the request accepted, and the six were taken to a detention center. Not until then were they able to call their families in Annaba, who had become convinced that they, like so many other young *harraga*, had drowned in the Mediterranean.[61]

North America and Australia

The United States, Canada, and Australia all seemed far removed from Algeria before the 1990s. Most of the Algerians present in those countries had come to pursue higher education or to take up professional employment. Canada and Australia, in particular, pursued intensive efforts at recruiting skilled immigrants who came with their families.[62] In the 1990s, the number of Algerian legal immigrants and "non-status" immigrants and asylum seekers sharply increased. Though they were a small part of the overall Algerian population in these settings, the non-status immigrants and asylum seekers drew by far the most public attention.

In the United States, Lorraine Adams's novel *Harbor* offers a grim portrayal of the life of a group of young male Algerian illegal immigrants in Boston. Adams had initially connected to this phenomenon through her work as a journalist. Other American journalists have provided valuable accounts of the experience of figures who fit the *harraga* mold.

Ray Stern of the *Phoenix News Times* recounted the story of Sofaine Laimeche, a childhood friend of Lotfi Raïssi, mistaken by British authorities for an accomplice of the 9/11 hijackers. Laimeche had left Algeria in 1992, at age nineteen, to avoid conscription and seek new opportunities. He took up a life of petty crime in Italy and then set sail in 1997 for America as a stowaway in a cargo container ship, much like the central figure in Adams's *Harbor*. He made his way to Phoenix, where his friend Raïssi initially helped to support him. Eventually he got a job and married a daughter of Greek immigrants, Corinne Sakkas. On a lawyer's advice, they went to Algeria to get married, which gave him a basis for legal immigration to the United States.[63]

Ahmad Ressam left Algeria at virtually the same time as Laimeche, going to France. He had come from a relatively privileged background, but health problems had created obstacles to his educational success. He was arrested in France for overstaying his visa. Released pending his hearing, he used false documents to get to Montreal, where he petitioned for asylum as a political refugee. In Montreal, he took up a life of petty crime and was drawn into a network of radical Islamists, led by Mustafa Kamel, a Bosnian war veteran. In 1998, he visited Afghanistan for eleven months to get military training. On December 14, 1999, he attempted to enter the United States from Canada carrying explosives intended to be detonated at Los Angeles International Airport. But under the stern gaze of Diana Dean, a woman Customs agent, he panicked, and the scheme fell apart.[64]

Ressam's story stands in contrast to the broader pattern of Algerian immigration to Canada. This movement had accelerated rapidly in the 1990s, with immigrants heading mainly to Montreal. Many were well educated and brought their families, and they came with a complex mixture of economic and political motives. An example of this complexity is Janina Messali Benkalfat, daughter of Messali Hajj and his French wife, Émilie Busquant. Her mother had died from an accident in 1953, and she shared her father's ordeal of internment in France. In the early years of the twenty-first century, she came to join her daughter, who had already moved to Montreal.[65]

Because of widespread public sympathy, deportation of non-status immigrants was suspended in 1997. But with the sharp rise in fear of terrorism and the launching of political reconciliation in Algeria, deportations resumed in 2002. The dramatic situation led to public protests and to commentary on the

Algerian immigrant dilemma in film and theater, notably the play by Bachir Bensaddek, *Montréal la blanche* (Montreal the White), produced in 2004. The title is sometimes explained as referring to the sleepless nights of immigrants facing difficult situations, but it clearly refers to a common name for Algiers, "Alger la blanche," a reference to the bright white color of the buildings that rise up the hillside in downtown Algiers. The play is a collection of interviews with Algerian immigrants, interlaced with dialogue with members of the local Québecois community. The play's subtitle is *Algiers in the Rearview Mirror*, referring to a central character, Amokrane Ben Yahia. He is an Algerian professional who was threatened by the FIS for speaking out against them. In Montreal he became a taxi driver and had no desire to return to Algeria.[66]

A figure comparable to Ressam is 'Abd al-Nasir Benbrika, an Algerian immigrant in Australia accused of taking part in a major terrorist plot there in 2005. He had arrived in Australia in 1989 and eventually gained the right to stay in Australia through his marriage to an Australian citizen, Rakia Abdullah, who was part of the wave of Lebanese immigrants who came to Australia to escape the turmoil of their country's civil war starting in 1975. Like Ressam, Benbrika seems to have been a rootless figure, easily drawn into a wild scheme, only in this case with the prompting of Australian police agents rather than a genuine terrorist recruiter. His ties to the marginalized and disaffected Lebanese community were an element in the picture.[67]

These ties connected Benbrika to growing intercommunal tensions that came to the surface in riots in late 2004. As a spokesman for radical Islam, Benbrika was able to add a global political element to these local tensions. The threat of global radical Islamist networks had already been dramatically demonstrated to Australians by the attacks on tourist hotels in Bali, Indonesia, on October 12, 2002, in which eighty-eight Australians perished. Debates over Australia's military commitment in Afghanistan added to the tense atmosphere.

In November 2005, Benbrika was arrested and charged with planning to carry out terrorist attacks aimed at pushing Australia to withdraw its troops from Iraq and Afghanistan. Of the eight arrested with him, seven were of Lebanese origin, and one was an Anglo-Australian convert to Islam, Shane Kent, who had married a Muslim woman. In 2001, at the urging of Benbrika, he had gone to Afghanistan, where he spent time in an al-Qa'ida training camp. Benbrika was eventually found guilty and sentenced to fifteen years in prison in February 2009.[68]

A story with parallels to these but with a far more tragic end is that of Hassiba Belbachir. The youngest of seven children, born in 1977, she came of age in the years of turmoil in the 1990s. She had a sister living in France and

another who had moved from France to Canada, and she evidently hoped that she, too, could gain the right to live in a stable, prosperous Western country. To achieve this, she arranged a marriage to a man who brought her to Chicago. But after a month there she discovered that he had another wife. Five days after her tourist visa expired, she left the United States, heading via London for Spain, a short distance from her native Oran. But she was stopped by British authorities at Heathrow Airport due to irregularities in her travel documents. She returned to Chicago and asked for political asylum. As had become the practice in such cases, she was placed in a prison pending a hearing. There, on March 17, 2005, she died, according to prison authorities having committed suicide. The case brought a strong protest from Muslim immigrant communities in the United States, who argued that the prison authorities were at least guilty of serious neglect. The incident was similar to numerous others involving illegal female immigrants being held at detention facilities in Western countries.[69]

The stories of Laimeche, Benbrika, Raïssi, and Belbachir all reflect, in different ways, the important role of marriage in strategies, and more broadly establishing ties with local communities, in overcoming restrictions on immigration.[70] Indeed, marriage to a citizen of the host country proved more effective than appeal for asylum based on the threat of political persecution or punishment for avoiding conscription.

Underlying all of these stories is the marked imbalance in the ratio of Algerian men to women among Algerian border crossers, especially outside of France. It is mainly among the well-connected that Algerian women have the opportunity for travel and study abroad and pursuit of their own careers and life choices. An example can be found in Rym Brahimi, daughter of Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi, who studied in France, then at the Columbia School of Journalism. She became a reporter for CNN, serving as their correspondent in Baghdad in the two years leading up to the invasion. Expelled from Iraq to Jordan at the start of the war, she met and later married Prince 'Ali.[71]

NGOs, the Defense of Immigrant Rights and the Pursuit of Political Agendas

The focus of the media on dramatic incidents has tended to distort the image of emerging Algerian immigrant communities in Western countries. They are composed to a large extent of well-educated individuals, some of them politically cautious, others outspoken. As they have become established in their new homes, they have often become active in organizations, locally based Muslim

and Algerian associations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). It is the latter that have the most relevance for developments in Algeria. In ways they resemble the Sufi orders of earlier times, with networks that cross national borders and sometimes serve as a vehicle for political ambitions.

A prominent voice speaking up in defense of Algerian immigrants in Britain was that of Dr. Muhammad Sekkoum, chair of the Algerian Refugee Council. His own story reflects the situation of a great many of the refugees. He had once been a leading veterinarian in Algeria, but in 1986 he wrote a newspaper article warning that the Algerian government was marketing the meat of diseased cattle. He was arrested and held for two months. With the help of influential friends, he was able to leave for Britain. When his wife, Fatima, qualified as a medical doctor in 1989, she, too, left for Britain and joined him. But qualifying to practice medicine in Britain was an expensive challenge, and the couple and their three children lived in a small, dank, council flat in North London. Dr. Sekkoum devoted himself to volunteer work, helping out at the London Zoo and running the Refugee Council, which he set up in 1992. Having distinguished himself as a critic of radical Islamists in London, he was able to return to Algeria for a visit in 2001 and was greeted at the airport by envoys of President Bouteflika.[72]

Efforts similar to that of the Refugee Council have emerged in the Algerian community in Canada, especially with the resumption of efforts to deport non-status immigrants in 2002. It was a local civic organization, Projet Porte Parole, that sponsored the play *Montréal la blanche*. Such efforts are often led by skilled immigrants whose goal is to protect human rights, not to push a political agenda.

But many NGOs established by Algerians in exile do have a political dimension, and Switzerland has emerged as their most important base. Indeed, Switzerland has a tradition of serving as a base for North African political exiles going back to the First World War, and it was the setting for France's negotiations with the FLN leading to Algeria's independence. Algerian exiles in Switzerland can be seen as an elite, operating in an insulated environment separate from the turbulence of the larger immigrant community in Europe, and following tacit rules laid down by the Swiss government as to what is acceptable behavior.

Protocols of behavior can be a particularly sensitive issue when figures excluded from high office in Algeria are involved. During his exile in the 1980s, 'Abd al-'Aziz Bouteflika was a frequent visitor to Switzerland, though Abu Dhabi was his main base.[73] 'Abd al-Hamid Brahimi, who was Algeria's prime minister during its economic and political unraveling in the mid-1980s, has been based in London and has ties with Swiss exiles, publishing works with

the Hoggar Institute. Algeria's first president, Ahmad Ben Bella, has made Switzerland his permanent home, a place not of exile but retirement.

Ben Bella came to Switzerland soon after his release from detention in Algeria in 1981. Though he made some efforts to adopt an Islamist discourse in the mid-1980s, he soon returned to his earlier favorite themes of Third World solidarity, and what has come to be called *altermondialisme*. In 1990, he worked with the prominent French political figure Edgar Pisani to seek a mediated solution to the Iraq crisis, and also returned to Algeria for the first time since 1981 to promote opposition to the war against Iraq. Since the failure of the mediation efforts at the Rome Conference in 1995, he has tended to shun politics.

He founded the NGO Fondation Nord-Sud XXI in 1989, which can be seen as having roots in the Afro-Asian movement a half century earlier and whose second conference in Algiers was canceled after Ben Bella was removed in a coup in 1965. The foundation supports the global University for the Common Good, which focuses on such themes as effective management of water resources, meeting the needs of the world's poor, and respect for cultural diversity. While Ben Bella has been consistently critical of America, he has also been hostile to political Islamists. Ben Bella's involvement in the committee that awards the Mu'amar al-Qaddafi Human Rights Prize suggests an affinity with the Libyan leader's 1960s vintage vision, and perhaps financial support from Libya.[74]

A number of prominent figures associated with the FIS are longtime residents of Switzerland. 'Abbas Aroua, trained as a medical doctor, has had a hand in founding several organizations, including the Cordoba Foundation of Geneva and the Hoggar Institute, which makes available on its website literature supporting what might be termed a moderate Islamist perspective. A major theme among critics of the FIS has been women's rights and the FIS's presumed support for the very conservative Family Code passed in 1984.[75] The Hoggar Institute's response is presented in an article that lambastes the prominent Algerian women's rights figure Khalida Messaoudi for her support of a regime that has abused human rights, both directly and through its manipulation of armed Islamist groups.[76]

The other major NGO in which Algerian exiles are involved is Alkarama for Human Rights, an organization led by Muhammad Larbi Zitout in London, and by Rashid Mesli in Geneva. Here the focus is not strictly on Algeria, but on questions of human rights throughout the Arab world, including issues of torture, arbitrary detention, and extrajudicial killings. Alkarama has strong ties to journalists and legal specialists in England who share their passionate concern for human rights.[77]

Afghanistan + Nuclear × Algerian = "Lone Wolf"

Switzerland also was the setting for the emergence of an alleged "lone wolf" radical Islamist working outside of any formally organized network. This was 'Adlan Hicheur, a nuclear physicist working at the CERN, or Nuclear Research Center, near Geneva. Born in Setif in 1976, he had moved with his family to France when he was two years old. He excelled in school, eventually earning a doctoral degree in physics from the University of Savoy and pursuing advanced research projects in the United States and Britain before coming to work at the CERN.

On October 9, 2009, French police stormed into his parents' home near Lyon while he was on a visit there. They arrested 'Adlan and his younger brother Zituni. The latter was soon released, but 'Adlan was held and charged with forming a link to al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghrib via the Internet, and with planning terrorist attacks, most notably on the base of a French military unit located near the Swiss border, the Chasseurs Alpins, who were taking part in the war in Afghanistan.[78]

The one element of evidence discovered by the police in their search was 13,000 euros they found among his belongings. His younger brother, Halim, claimed that the money was for the purpose of building a house near Setif, a project 'Adlan intended to launch the very next day on a trip to Algeria. The narratives provided by the police and by Halim Hicheur are, in a sense, polar opposites. In Halim's story, 'Adlan seeks to escape a sense of alienation and rootlessness by returning home. In the police narrative, he sought his escape route through joining the global jihad.

To the Far Side of the World: Algerians in the South Pacific

From the perspective of area studies, the South Pacific can have at best occasional accidental connections with North Africa. Yet from a global environmental and social perspective, this region has interesting parallels with the western Mediterranean. To the south, we find New Zealand, until recently almost entirely European, except for its native Maori population. To the north lie islands that came under European colonial control. For the present discussion, these include most importantly Western Samoa, once a German colony, which came under the control of New Zealand after the First World War and gained its independence in 1962, the same year as Algeria; and New Caledonia, a French colony, to which Algerian participants in the 1871 rebellion were deported.

The New Caledonia Connection

The principal figures among the Algerian deportees managed to leave, either escaping or departing after the granting of amnesty.[79] But a small community of Algerians remained behind, often forming marriage links with the local Kanak people, centered around the town of Bourail. In the 1960s, New Caledonia's connection with Algeria reemerged with the arrival of a number of French Algerian *rapatriés* following Algeria's independence. In the 1980s, political conflicts in New Caledonia caught the world's attention with demands for independence voiced by the Kanak people, by now reduced to about 45 percent of the population. The French government sought to contain the demand for independence with Matignon Accord of 1988, then with the Nouvéa Accord of 1998. By the time of the second accord, some of New Caledonia's non-native population had come to support a multicultural vision for New Caledonia, expressed by the Future Together Party, though most Kanaks continued to support independence.

Algerians became aware of the continued presence of an Algerian community in New Caledonia as a result of a chance encounter in Malaysia in 1980 between Algerian sociologist Ta'uti Seddik and an Australian who had visited New Caledonia. Seddik later visited New Caledonia and helped to found the mosque in the town of Bourail.[80] Soon after Seddik helped spread awareness of the Algerian community in New Caledonia, a young documentary filmmaker and writer, Mahdi Lallaoui, set out for New Caledonia in 1983. Lallaoui was the son of Algerian immigrants and had grown up in France. On the basis of this experience and his archival research, Lallaoui wrote *La Colline des Oliviers*, eventually published in 1998. He also published a historical account, *Les Kabyles du Pacific*.[81] Lallaoui gained public acclaim with the documentary film he produced in 1991, with Samia Messaoudi, *La silence du fleuve*, about the brutal repression of an Algerian demonstration in Paris on October 17, 1961.

In 2001, Lallaoui came to Nouméa, the capital of New Caledonia, for a showing of his film in the city's library. But Françoise Chaverot of the anti-independence RCPR Party insisted that the library not host the showing. In spite of vigorous public objections, her insistence prevailed, and Lallaoui arranged for an outdoor screening at Kuenda Beach.[82] Among supporters of the independence movement, Lallaoui's film elicted a strong positive response.

Growing awareness of the Algerian community in New Caledonia helped set the stage for the visits of iconic Algerian French figures. Rashid Taha, a musician who had fused Algerian *sha'abi* music with other styles from around the globe, paid a visit in 2001. 'Azuz Begag, a sociologist and prolific writer who had become France's minister for equal opportunity in 2005, paid an emotional

visit in 2007. Both visits can be seen as contributing to the push for a multicultural New Caledonia, being advanced by the Future Together Party.[83]

Within Algeria, the story of the New Caledonia community was slower to gain momentum, perhaps because the theme of multiculturalism had less resonance there than among the immigrant community in France. It was not until 2005 that New Caledonia came onto the public stage in Algeria with a highly emotional visit by three members of the community of descendants of the Algerian deportees.[84] By this time, the Algerian government was working to promote reconciliation with exiled opponents, and the event could be seen as presenting Algeria's openness to the return of long-lost sons and daughters.

The celebrations and disputes relating to the history of the Algerian community in New Caledonia offer an interesting comparison to the case of "Afghans" who began arriving in Australia in the 1860s to serve as cameleers transporting goods across the desert there. In the early twenty-first century, they became the focus of contentious discussions involving boundaries between ethnic communities, the history of discrimination, and the place of Islam in Australia. An argument was even advanced that the Afghan connection made Australia, like Spain, historically a part of the Dar al-Islam, making it a target for Muslim reconquest.[85]

Ahmad Zaoui's Long Trek to New Zealand

By this time Ahmad Zaoui, a prominent figure in the FIS, had become a celebrity in New Zealand, a short distance from New Caledonia. He was the first prominent Algerian to appear in New Zealand since the arrival, in a small boat in 1881, of 'Aziz al-Haddad, who had escaped from New Caledonia and would eventually make his way to Madina, and finally to Paris, where he would die in 1904. Zaoui's celebrity in New Zealand owed a good deal to the fact that he proved a highly polarizing figure in a public arena split between a nationalist right wing and a multicultural Left. One of their central points of contention in the first years of the twenty-first century was whether to grant citizenship rights to immigrants from Western Samoa. For the nationalists of the New Zealand First Party, Zaoui was a figure who helped them link the question of immigration control to the threat of global terrorism. For advocates of multiculturalism in New Zealand's Green Party, Zaoui offered a highly articulate demonstration of the potential for dialogue among cultures.

Zaoui's itinerary to New Zealand was a long and complex one.[86] Born in 1960, he came from a family with a tradition of religious learning and local religious leadership. By the time he entered secondary school in the mid-1970s, the program of Arabization in the schools launched under Boumediene was

in full swing. Though some students, especially in the sciences, still followed a French-language curriculum, Zaoui's background made it natural for him to pursue his education in Arabic. While other prominent FIS leaders studied nuclear science in the United States, Zaoui went to Muhammad Ibn Sa'ud University in Riyadh from 1980 to 1985 to pursue Islamic studies.

His Saudi connection apparently put him in an unfavorable light with authorities in Algiers, suspicious of Saudi schemes to undermine their progressive secular regime. In 1986, Zaoui was arrested at the airport in Algiers as he sought to board a plane for France. He was held for seven days and reportedly mistreated. But by 1988 he was appointed to a position at the University of Algiers. He joined the FIS in 1991 and was elected to the national assembly. His role within the FIS was primarily one of providing guidance on religious issues—for which his education had prepared him. He also was involved in contacts with the Catholic archbishop of Algiers, Henri Tessier, seeking to explain that the FIS was open to interfaith dialogue.

As repression set in after the cancellation of elections in early 1992, he sought to leave Algeria, eventually reaching France in July 1993. He made his way to Belgium, where he applied for refugee status in 1994, and where his wife and children joined him, traveling on false passports. The mid-1990s were a tumultuous time, with the GIA extending their campaign of violence to France, prompting the French, under the leadership of Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière, to take an aggressive stance toward anyone seen as possibly connected to the GIA. Belgium at the time served as a base for some radical Islamists, and Zaoui, along with Anwar Haddam, opposed efforts to come to terms with the Algerian government, a position advocated at the time by fellow FIS exile Rabah Kebir.

As a result of these pressures, Zaoui was forced to leave Belgium. He then sought refugee status in Switzerland, where he arrived in 1997. Here, too, the allegations of his association with terrorism carried the day. He may also have been handicapped by his lack of fluency in a European language, a problem clearly brought out in the later judicial process in New Zealand. In November 1998, he was sent by the Swiss to Burkina Faso in West Africa, which the French had established as a place to confine troublesome Islamists, most notably Ahmad Simozrag, an attorney who worked with the FIS.

In 2000, Zaoui was able to make his way to South Africa, and from there to Malaysia, where one of his brothers was living. His brother was married to an Australian woman and seeking authorization for his entry to Australia. Malaysia was also a setting where the ideas of the Algerian Islamic thinker Malik Bennabi had had a considerable impact.[87] Nevertheless, the Malaysian government seemed vulnerable to pressure from Algerian authorities. Of the

limited possibilities remaining, New Zealand seemed the best choice. Prime Minister Helen Clark had voiced criticism of the Algerian government's cancellation of elections in 1992. Nearby in Australia there was another prominent FIS supporter, Samir Bennegadi, a nuclear engineer, whose FIS connection did not prevent him from getting a security clearance.[88]

In the long run, the assumption that New Zealand was a setting where there was strong support for human rights was to prove correct. But in the short run, Zaoui faced a severe challenge from a security apparatus convinced that such a figure posed a danger. When he arrived at the Auckland airport on December 4, 2002, he asked to apply for asylum. He was promptly arrested and spent the next ten and a half months in solitary confinement. It was during this time that the question of Samoans' citizenship rights was coming to the center of New Zealand's political stage, with widespread demonstrations in April 2003. The right-wing New Zealand First Party led opposition to granting Samoan citizenship rights and was among the most outspoken in insisting that Zaoui be made to leave New Zealand.

In August 2003, the New Zealand Refugee Status Appeal Authority heard Zaoui's case and concluded that the Security Intelligence Service had presented no convincing evidence that Zaoui was involved in terrorism. Some of the evidence they presented apparently came from Internet searches. They had drawn material from such dubious websites as one run by the eccentric American conservative Lyndon La Rouche, known for promoting colorful stories such as one alleging that Queen Elizabeth was a major figure in the drug trade. Still the SIS insisted on a Security Risk Certificate for Zaoui so that he could not be released from prison.[89]

But the RSAA decision did lead to Zaoui being given greater freedom, most importantly allowing him to communicate with New Zealanders outside of prison. As was the case with Algerian refugees in Canada, including Muhammad Cherfi and 'Abd al-Qadir Belaouni, support came from defenders of human rights and from religious communities.[90] As have Algerian migrants throughout the Western world, Zaoui built ties with the local community through soccer and music, domains that facilitate cross-cultural communication far better than the arena of politics. In October 2004, these supporters asked that Zaoui be permitted to make a public presentation of a paper he had written entitled "Clash of Civilizations." Zaoui was not permitted to make this public appearance, so the paper was read for him.

The paper, presented at the University of Auckland on October 19, was an eloquent analysis of the conflicts over the relationship of the Islamic world to the West that had emerged since the end of the Cold War. Zaoui argued that there was a long-established tradition in the West of "a conscience built upon

the idea of subduing the other, abrading the other's differences, and reducing the image of the other to its own image rather than dialoguing with the other." With the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, he said, the West had needed a new enemy on which to focus, and Islam proved convenient for this purpose. He expressed the opinion that "'the war on terror' is only another deal between the West and the Arab dictators aiming to secure cheap oil in exchange for continuing silence concerning human rights abuses as has happened—and still happens—in Algeria."

He explained his own long-term commitment to respect for other faiths, going back to his childhood days in the town of Zenina, near Médéa, which, according to one legend, had been founded by a Jewish woman, the Kahina, who had led local resistance to the initial Arab invasion in the late 600s. When he and his friends played soccer near a Jewish cemetery, they took care not to walk on the graves when the ball landed there.[91] He recognized that there had been a growth of ethnic movements and fundamentalisms since the 1980s, but argued that this could be seen as "an attempt to preserve national identities that are being threatened by the bulldozer of globalization." He discussed the massacre of monks that had taken place at Tibhirine, not far from his own town. Unlike some FIS supporters, he did not argue that this was the result of some convoluted government scheme, but laid the blame squarely on the GIA. He concluded by calling for the "patient building of bridges to peaceful co-existence between peoples and religions."[92]

From early in 2004, Zaoui's New Zealand supporters sought his release on bail, and they proposed Saint Benedict's Dominican Priory in Auckland as a place where he could stay. It was a fitting place for such a deeply spiritual figure who, in 1992, had been engaged in efforts to promote dialogue with Catholic leadership in Algeria. He was released to his new home in early December 2004.[93] A few months later, in March 2005, Zaoui reflected on his prison stay, seeing it as bringing him a kind of mystical experience. As he expressed it, he did not want to be back in prison but "I realize that in a strange way, prison has its benefits—it made me a poet and a philosopher, it helped me shift my focus from my own pain to the pain of humanity."[94] In some ways, Zaoui's experience resembles that of Amir 'Abd al-Qadir after his surrender in 1847. He, too, became a deeply spiritual figure, able to enter into dialogue with a wide range of religious and political personalities in France and eventually win his release to Damascus. But 'Abd al-Qadir was never able to muster the political leverage to return to Algeria, and his sons and grandsons became ensnared in global imperial rivalries.

The legal fight over the Security Risk Certificate issued against Zaoui

continued. For those who supported expelling Zaoui, the opening of the reconciliation process in Algeria provided an argument that Zaoui no longer had an excuse for not returning to Algeria. As his supporters saw it, the risk continued, and the reliance of authorities on "secret evidence" demonstrated that the regime's convoluted efforts to muzzle the opposition by spreading false rumors were ongoing.

Conclusion

The Dynamics of Fear and Hope on a Frontier between Civilizations

"Neither plague nor cholera!" This was a popular refrain among many Algerians as the conflict between Islamists and the government spun out of control in the 1990s. This formula can be taken as a metaphor condemning both an authoritarian government dominated by the military and Islamist radicals prepared to impose their agenda through violence. But we can also see this slogan as rooted in Algerians' historical consciousness, reflecting an acute awareness of catastrophes of the past but conveying a hope that an effective approach to diminish the threats of these political diseases is possible.

From this perspective, the slogan is part of a modern, global vision that involves not a search for plans to insulate the nation and confine disease carriers, but rather efforts to prevent the outbreak of disease through the promotion of communication within communities and between communities about how to resolve problems. Since bacteria move easily across borders, this communication also needs to cross borders. This vision is similar to what the philosopher Jürgen Habermas has termed a "public sphere," but in this case the sphere has transnational, even transcivilizational dimensions thanks to the extensive experience of Algerians in crossing borders. Through interweaving creative metaphorical reading with empirical analysis in looking at the history of Algeria and of the Algerian border-crossing experience since the late eighteenth century, we can search for insights that help us to understand the challenges that Algerians and, indeed, the world face in the twenty-first century. Because Algeria has such a dramatic history, it has often assumed a special iconic status in discussions of global issues, from piracy to torture to terrorism. This is a situation that can lend to the intensification of both fear and hope, which can make it difficult to resolve tensions. Avoiding this requires strategies for putting the Algerian experience into historical and comparative perspective.

Plague and then cholera struck Algeria in the critical decades of the 1780s

through the 1860s, when the Ottoman system fell apart and then the French invaded and imposed their control over the country. The outbreaks of plague in the late eighteenth century can be understood as a product of Algeria's links to the growing turbulence of the Middle East and the country's vulnerability to the spread of this disease, given the right combination of external and internal circumstances. The fleas that carried the plague came with their rat hosts from the Middle East, where the Ottoman Empire was entering a period of decline after its defeat by Russia in 1774. The rats feasted on the grain supplies that had built up in Algerian ports awaiting export to Europe as Algeria's rulers sought to make a transition from three centuries of conflict to economic engagement with Europe in order to gain access to the improving technology of the West, and to financial resources needed to strengthen the government.

The diversion of grain from local markets created popular discontent and a receptiveness to the new message brought by neo-Sufi movements that had begun in South Asia and spread through the Caucasus and the Middle East as a response to European intrusion. With many difficult-to-control rural areas, Algeria was in some respects an ideal setting for the mixing of dynamic new religious leadership with tribal *'asabiya*, as it had been in the days of Ibn Khaldun. But Algeria had become, as it were, Afghanistan on the Mediterranean. It was an area with great potential for the launching of a popular Islamic military-political movement, but one also sensitive to the shifting diplomatic and military winds coming off of the sea. First with the Darqawa revolt in the early 1800s, and then with 'Abd al-Qadir's resistance movement, these winds could bring modern weapons and diplomatic support from Britain. But the winds could die down, and indeed they did. The cyclical pattern had changed since Ibn Khaldun's day. North Africa in the centuries he observed had been an environment suitable to launching dynamic new religious-political movements such as the Fatimids and the Almohads. Both had brilliant success and then eventually fell into decline.

In looking back at history, we can see that the success of the Fatimids and the Almohads drew not only on *'asabiya*, but on effective engagement with the wider world, most notably commercial engagement in the case of the Fatimids, and intellectual engagement in the case of the Almohads. Starting in the fourteenth century, beginning with the outbreak of plague in 1348, such engagement had become increasingly difficult. By the sixteenth century, the status most common for the "other" on the western Mediterranean frontier was that of a slave. The long period of confrontation that lasted until the late eighteenth century was one in which the Ottoman territories of North Africa became a terrain where popular mobilization was difficult. The arms and fortifications of

the Janissary soldiers could both ward off Christian attacks and keep in check local rebels. Change stimulated by engagement with other parts of the world was rare. In the modern era, possibilities for internal mobilization and external engagement reemerged, but the cycle no longer involved brilliant success based on a balance between the two, followed by gradual decline. Rather there were moments of opportunity and hope—for political and economic transition, combined with diplomatic negotiation. These moments came at times of global reordering following major conflicts: after the end of the Napoleonic wars, in 1815; after the Second World War; and following the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. These moments of opening owed a good deal to external catalysts, ideas, and channels of communication that Algerians had developed outside the country.

By the early modern era, the sort of engagement and communication that had been possible at the time of the Fatimids and the Almohads seemed no longer possible. Westerners now saw themselves as superior not in subjective spiritual terms but in objective technological, military, and developmental terms, and thus with what might be seen as a scientifically based right to gain political control or strong influence in Muslim territories. For a Muslim to open communication he might profess loyalty to the Freemasons, as Ahmad Bin 'Ali did in 1794, and as 'Abd al-Qadir seems to have done in 1865. Or he could take on what Frantz Fanon has referred to as the "colonial mentality," publicly accepting his own inferiority. In a setting with such distorted communication, there could be an "imperial sphere" in which distinguished native subjects were honored for their loyalty.

It was outside of the imperial sphere, in Algerian emigrant and refugee communities abroad, and outside domains controlled by the administration within Algeria, that communication could be the most open. Marriage to foreigners became a common occurrence in these settings and had an important role in promoting communication. But open discussion was always vulnerable to the fear that it might lead to major political change or to the erosion of social and cultural boundaries. With the modern administrative and legal norms that prevailed in colonial Algeria, one was either citizen or subject. There was no official recognition provided to a hybrid group such as the Kulughlis, or a separate status for the Jewish community as intermediaries. The task of moving on to create a public sphere was an extraordinary challenge. Efforts at transition failed, leading to crisis and despair, and setting off new movement across borders.

As the French established their control over Algeria at the end of the first of these periods of reordering, they took measures to prevent outbreaks of the "plague" of religiously driven resistance. Those who carried this infection were

killed or driven into exile as *muhajirs* in other Muslim countries, or taken as prisoners to remote French colonies such as New Caledonia. The pilgrimage to Mecca was kept under strict control, with a rationale founded on preventing the spread of epidemic diseases. The government-sponsored *hajj* of 1916 marked the apex of colonial efforts to control Islam, and it became the first step toward building a postcolonial system for keeping Islamic expression safely controlled in France, with the foundation of the Mosque of Paris.

Those exiles who kept hopes of liberating Algeria from French rule had to consider the possibility of bargaining for the support of external powers such as the British, the Ottomans, or the Germans. But such ventures ended in failure, and sometimes in tragedy, as they did for 'Abd al-Qadir's son Malik, who fought against the French in Morocco with German support, and his grandson 'Abd al-Qadir Bin 'Ali, the man alleged to have betrayed T. E. Lawrence to the Turks. The critical role of the *muhajir* community in Damascus was not to serve as a base for the military reconquest of Algeria but as a center for intellectual and cultural transformation. A key figure in these efforts was Tahir al-Jaza'iri, a champion of modern education that transformed the Arabic-Islamic identity rather than abandoning it as a relic of the past. From Syria new ideas were relayed back to Algeria, notably by 'Abd al-Qadir al-Majjawi in the 1870s, and then in the 1920s by Bashir Ibrahimi. The end here was not tragedy and despair but the launching of a hopeful transformation.

By the time of the Second World War, the pattern of winds coming off the Mediterranean had become extraordinarily complex. With France's defeat in May 1940 and the establishment of the pro-German Vichy regime, there was an enthusiastic response among many of the French *colons*, and conservative elements in the military and the administration in Algeria. They sought to reinforce traditional authority structures among the Muslim population and stripped Jews of their citizenship rights. The setting was captured by Albert Camus in his novel *The Plague*. But by late 1942, the Americans had landed in Algeria and helped to relaunch efforts at political opening. Though interrupted by the severe repression following the VE Day demonstrations of May 1945, this opening had strong momentum. It resurfaced in 1947 and would continue until 1954. The event most clearly marking the failure of the transition was the Philippeville "massacre" of August 1955, an attack against French civilians that galvanized the fears of the French, leading them to take draconian repressive measures in a vain attempt to control the situation.

At the time of the third era of global transition that came with the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a brief era of political opening in Algeria, ending with the cancellation of elections in 1992. With the civil war that broke out after that, one finds patterns familiar in earlier stages of Algerian history. For

a while, some Western powers and humanitarian organizations were willing to support negotiations with moderate elements of the FIS and denounce the government's brutal tactics. The high point of hope for conflict resolution came with the Rome Conference in late 1994, which drew together representatives of diverse Algerian political groups, including the FIS.

But there was a growing fear of Islamist terrorism, starting with the attack on the Paris Metro on July 25, 1995, an attack carried out by the radical Islamists of the GIA, but allegedly encouraged by hard-line elements within the Algerian military. Many of the recruits for the GIA had experience in the new field of conflict in Afghanistan.

The wind had shifted. Once again the political leadership of the Algerian opposition was stranded in exile. Those suspected of harboring dangerous bacteria in France were sent off to confinement in Burkina Faso. The problem was that, just as in earlier times, the conditions that made Algeria vulnerable to the spread of "plague" remained. A key element was that oil revenues helped reinforce centralization, making the development of economic or political initiatives outside of government control very difficult. Algeria depended on oil and gas exports as opposed to manufactured exports to an even greater extent than did Saudi Arabia or Kuwait.[1]

The situation in Algeria did improve in some respects with efforts at reconciliation in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The political stability index as measured by the U.N. Development Program showed remarkable improvement from 1996 to 2007. But the governmental effectiveness and control of corruption indices declined.[2] The dynamics of global conflicts and the continued pursuit of triumph rather than conflict resolution helped the "plague" to flourish in far-off settings, from which it could easily be brought back to Algeria or to France. Yet Algeria was no longer as vulnerable to plague—medically or metaphorically—as it had once been. The worst outbreak of plague occurred in an al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghrib training camp in early 2009, where recruits were isolated from the wider society, living in caves—along with rats.[3]

An illuminating comparison with the recent history of Algeria can be found in Turkey. There, the AKP, or Justice and Development Party, which came to power following the elections of 2002, managed to operate within a constitutional framework. The most important Islamic movement in Turkey, that of Fethullah Gülen, kept a certain distance from politics, but became a dynamic factor in civil society. It ran a network of schools not only in Turkey but around the world from Utah to Uzbekistan. Finally, Turkey by the early years of the twenty-first century had developed a quite effective private sector of the economy building exports of manufactured goods.[4] The prospect of Turkey's

admission to the European Union helped to reinforce these developments. But the emphasis on building an effective border between Europe and North Africa helped to maintain established patterns of government control both over civil society and the economy.

Cholera had its origins in South Asia and by the 1830s had moved to the cities of Europe with devastating results. It was carried from France to Algeria. A disease spread mainly through infected water, cholera had the greatest impact on those concentrated within an urban setting, but it could easily spread from cities into rural areas. The most effective way to combat the spread of cholera was through improved sanitary measures and the dissemination of information on how to avoid infection. The fact that Algerian *tirailleurs* in the Crimean War had a lower mortality rate from disease than French troops suggests that Algerians had a strong potential for maintaining good health conditions.

In Europe, women played a prominent role in the struggle for improving medical care, at least in part because they conveyed the message that dealing with disease involved not dismal confinement to await one's death, but compassionate, effective care and a hope for continued life. In Algeria, the spread of cholera can be seen as a by-product of military conquest as rural areas came under tight control from urban centers. In the mid-1860s, cholera and also typhus had a catastrophic impact, temporarily lowering Algeria's Muslim population and leading to grand visions of a predominantly European Algeria.

But the Algerian Muslim population quickly recovered, and French-trained Algerian Muslim doctors such as Muhammad Bin L'arbi not only helped improve medical care but also became a prominent element in articulating Algerian interests within the French system. Within Algeria, women did not become extensively engaged in efforts at transformation until the 1940s, but women such as Naziq al-'Abid and 'Adila Bayhum al-Jaza'iri, who were part of the Algerian network in the more open environment of Syria, had begun such efforts during the First World War. Their inspiration contributed to later developments in Algeria.

Military recruitment systems played a prominent role in transforming the political scene in Algeria, especially after the imposition of conscription on Algerian Muslims in 1912. Conscription drove some to take refuge in the Arab East, where they came into contact with Arab nationalists and with members of the Algerian *muhajir* communities. During the First World War, conscription was extended to the recruitment of workers. Conscripts and workers who served in France were cut off from traditional forms of restraint and control, and came into contact with French leftists. A combination of these connections to the world outside helped to launch the Algerian nationalist movement after the First World War.

By this time, French authorities found themselves caught between the norms of the colonial past and new universal principles endorsed by some political elements in France. It was the ambivalence of French authorities with respect to this process of moving to the application of new principles that ultimately led to its failure. This ambivalence can be seen in particular with the application of the principle of separation of religion from the state. It was hard to come to terms with the idea that openness and dialogue, not isolation and strict control, was the best way to maintain the health of the body politic. Starting in 1954, there was a resurgence of political "cholera" carried to Algeria from Vietnam, where the French were humiliated by their defeat at Dienbienphu, and from Egypt, where Nasser took power, promoting a message of Arab pride, amplified by the radio. The delicate balance between French fear and Algerian hope was decisively broken, unleashing a deadly cycle of conflict. Intensive repression within Algeria seriously weakened those rebels with the strongest connections at the local level and thus helped bring to power the external FLN, which had been based in Cairo, in 1962.

Conscription became a key factor in shaping the lives of young men in the early years of independent Algeria at a time when the population was growing rapidly. Initially, many were channeled into public works projects, contributing to Algeria's ambitions for economic development and social justice. President Huwari Boumediene seemed to offer hope for creating a balance between central control and grassroots mobilization. But over the course of the 1970s, the concentration of power in the hands of a military elite at the center increased substantially as a result of the nationalization of oil and the crisis in the Western Sahara. Boumediene died of a mysterious health problem in December 1978. At the same time, hopes for a vigorously independent Algeria that creatively interwove modern secular ideas with Islam gradually expired.

By the 1980s, the role of conscription was not so much to maintain a military force as it was to keep rapidly growing numbers of young men in a position of vulnerability in which their loyalty to the government could be tested at any moment. With the emphasis on discipline rather than working for an ideal such as national development, service in the Algerian army lost its appeal. Some young men were drawn instead to serve in the remote struggles connected with the gradual implosion of the Soviet Union starting in the 1980s. Going off to Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, or Iraq involved for some humanitarian service, for others military adventure. Some young Algerians set off to seek opportunities in the West, mainly in countries other than France, often as illegal immigrants. Most of those departing were men. One element in this picture was that limited opportunities for finding jobs and housing within Algeria led to delays in marriage especially for men, and a sharp drop in the

birth rate, from 7.4 births per woman in 1975, to 2.5 in 2005. This reflected a general trend in the Arab world, but the drop was sharper in Algeria.[5]

In insulated all-male environments, men were easily drawn into clandestine networks, some of them engaged in criminal activities, others tied to radical Islamism. The spectacular attacks of the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century in America and Europe had an impact similar to that of the outbreak of an epidemic disease. Those who fit the profile of being likely to spread the disease came under intense suspicion.

In the nineteenth century, tight control by the colonial authorities intensified the importance of clandestine handwritten and oral communication that spread over long distances through insulated networks and lent to the spread of wild rumors and equally wild suspicions. By the 1990s, new methods of electronic communication produced a similar pattern. Given the elevated threat level, it seemed justifiable for a Western government to put a suspicious individual in political quarantine—in jail or in a detention facility—based on rumor or circumstantial evidence. Within Algeria, those who engaged in the public expression of cultural or political messages regarded as dissident faced the threat of drastic action by the government or by radical Islamists, and to some observers they were clearly acting in collusion.

The grand ambitions to build Algeria as an economic and military power in the 1970s and 1980s produced another development. What might be seen as a Saint Simonian technocratic vision inspired the government to send many young Algerian men to pursue higher education in science or technology, mainly in the West, but also in the Soviet Union. Given Algeria's ambitions, many studied nuclear science. Ironically, this program intended to promote Algeria's national power resulted in many of its most promising citizens becoming engaged in global social and economic systems, sometimes separating them from Algeria. It was from this environment that the Algerianist or moderate wing of the FIS emerged.

As Algeria's economy fell on hard times in the 1980s, and then as conflict broke out in the 1990s, highly educated individuals often found greater opportunity in technologically and economically advanced settings from Switzerland to Australia than they did in Algeria. As measured by the Human Capital Flight Index, Algeria (2.4) had one of the worst cases of "brain drain" in the Arab world, barely surpassed only by Syria and Egypt (2.3), and substantially worse than Morocco (3.1), Tunisia (3.9), Saudi Arabia (4.6), and Kuwait (5.4).[6]

With the intensifying "clash of civilizations" starting in the mid-1990s, Algerian immigrants often found themselves in a precarious situation, vulnerable to worries that they might be infected with the political disease of radical Islamism. Those who developed local networks of support and negotiated

protocols of behavior that established their reputation as "moderates" were able to survive in this setting. Great Britain, Switzerland, and Canada proved the environments most congenial to such efforts.

In this grueling cycle of conflict, there have been occasional moments of transition, times when the old order was clearly destined for change, and when there were individuals with broad experience who could formulate effective visions for transformation. The first of these was in the two decades just before the start of the French conquest in 1830. During this time, one finds Algerian Muslims who had extensive experience outside of Algeria. Hamdan Khodja, who had traveled widely in Europe, and Muhammad Ibn al-'Annabi, who had watched Muhammad 'Ali's effort to transform Egypt, both contributed to a vision for Algeria adapted to the challenges of the day. Both were Kulughlis, from families of Ottoman Janissary fathers and local women, a factor that helps to explain their broad outlook, but also their limited influence within Algeria. Hamdan Khodja made eloquent arguments for a French withdrawal but to no avail. Amir 'Abd al-Qadir can also be seen as a product of this transitional era, well aware of global changes but with his local prestige also able to inspire the mobilization of his people. At critical moments, the French might have engaged him in serious negotiation, but this never came to pass.

The second period of transition came in the period from the end of the First World War to the start of the revolution in 1954. It was a time when new visions flourished, put forward by Algerians with experience outside their country. One such figure was Bashir Ibrahimi, who returned to Algeria in 1920 after nine years in the Middle East, the last three in the politically and intellectually vibrant setting of Damascus. He was able to formulate a vision, expressed in eloquent, poetic Arabic, of a transformation of Algeria that included the promotion of modern education both for boys and for girls, vigorous new civic organizations, and a separation of religion from government control through a recovery of the religious endowments. Another such figure was the philosopher Malik Bennabi, who had gone to France to train as an engineer. After the Second World War, he put forward a vision of the compatibility of Islam and modern science, finding inspiration in the lively intellectual life of twelfth-century Andalus. He also helped to foster interfaith dialogue, a dialogue between mutually respecting equals rather than one distorted by colonial mentalities, where the European expert spoke condescendingly to the Muslim subject. Among the French population in Algeria at this time one could also find individuals working to promote dialogue, including Catholic leftists such as Jean Scelles and Jeanne Scelles-Millie. During this period, Algeria was the scene of creative cultural interaction in such domains as music, theater, art, and architecture. This environment lent to hope for

creating an effective framework of social and cultural dialogue, which could open the doors to political transition.

Once again, a hopeful transition ended in disaster, a disaster shaped by several new developments including global ideological conflicts, mass media propaganda, and urban racism. When Algeria became independent after seven years of war, the foundations of civil society had been seriously eroded. Only in the 1980s was there a degree of opening and what might be seen as another transitional era, one that began with Algeria establishing its credentials as an effective global mediator in the Iran hostage crisis. But the process of political opening ultimately led to the eruption of political rivalry. Efforts at building civil society and a public sphere were overshadowed by the focus on who would control the vast economic resources and coercive power of the state.

Many of the most important developments in Algerian cultural and intellectual life in the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century took place outside of Algeria. Such figures as L'arbi Kechat, leader of the Ad-Da'wa Mosque in Paris, and Ahmad Zaoui, the FIS leader who took up exile in New Zealand adapted new visions that focused on building interfaith dialogue at local and global levels rather than gaining control of national state power. In settings such as Great Britain, Switzerland, and Canada, there emerged voluntary organizations dedicated to protecting the rights of immigrants and refugees, often working in conjunction with local secular and Christian organizations. An important element in this formula is that many Algerian immigrants in such settings have a university education and are fluent in at least one European language.[7]

The vitality of immigrant communities in these settings can be understood through a comparison to two earlier elements in the Algerian experience. The first is that of the rural immigrant *barrani* workers in Algeria. Within Algeria through the early decades of colonial rule, rural immigrants to cities were organized in *barrani* corporations that defended their community interests through communication with local authorities, and helped new immigrants adjust to the urban environment. The most prestigious of the *barranis* worked in skilled crafts. But by the 1870s, craftsmen such as leatherworkers were virtually wiped out as Algeria became an exporter of raw material and an importer of mass-produced manufactured goods. The *barrani* corporations were eliminated and Algerians came to be seen as a source of raw manpower that would soon be set to work in the factories of France or fight in the trenches in the First World War.

The second experience is that of Algerian *muhajirs* in nineteenth-century Damascus. This community was able to defend its interests thanks to the prestige and influence of Amir 'Abd al-Qadir and also to the ties of marriage and

friendship established with the local community. Their access to new ideas and knowledge in this setting further enhanced the vitality of this community.

These two particular experiences open bridges to some key insights on the wider Algerian experience. The elimination of many skilled craftsmen in Algerian cities soon followed by the large-scale movement of Algerian workers and soldiers to France underscores how traditional social and economic structures were dismantled in Algeria, especially in urban settings. This contrasts with Morocco, where the French worked to preserve traditional cultural and economic patterns. Algerian workers and soldiers in France were dramatically uprooted and some were drawn to radical new political visions. The Damascus *muhajir* community provides an example of the kind of setting where Algerians could gain access to new ideas yet adapt those ideas to their particular identity.

In the early twenty-first century, Canada offers interesting examples of how these two themes have evolved. It was in Canada that Ahmad Ressam, an uprooted clandestine immigrant with few skills and no family, made his connection with a transnational radical Islamist network and was recruited for a mission to bomb the Los Angeles International Airport. But Canada is also a setting where highly educated Algerian immigrants have come, often with their families, and become an integral part of the diverse cultural life of Montreal.

It is important to note, however, that Algerians are not the only Muslim immigrants to be found in settings such as Canada. The Canadian census of 2006 counted 32,255 individuals of Algerian origin, but also 39,055 Moroccans and 40,575 Egyptians.[8] Dramatic stories of asylum seekers made Algerians more visible, a fact reflected in the choice of the Canadian civic organization Projet Porte Parole to have the play *Montréal la blanche* focus on Algerians rather than more broadly on North African immigrants. There are refugees around the world from other Arab and Muslim countries as well,[9] but Algerians seem to bring with them a particularly appealing narrative. It is a narrative that clearly separates them from both authoritarian regimes and radical Islamists and connects them to global values of multicultural pluralism. Hopefully it is also a narrative that can lead down a path to an insightful understanding of the wider picture of immigrants and refugees coming to the West from Arab and Islamic countries.

Narratives carried by Algerians can also help them to serve as mediators elsewhere in the Muslim world. This is illustrated most notably in the role played by Algerian diplomats in resolving the crisis involving U.S. hostages in Iran in 1980. They were aided by the prestige and respect Algeria had at this time. Algerians have continued to serve as mediators, but they have been less successful. ʿAbdallah Anas and Lakhdar Brahimi were among those who sought to promote mediation between the government and the Taliban in

Afghanistan, but these diplomatic efforts have been inconclusive. It might be argued that one factor in this is that they carry a less convincing narrative than diplomats such as Rida Malik did in 1980 at a time when Algeria could present itself as a leading defender of Third World interests, but a country open to pragmatic engagement with Western powers.

The conflict in Afghanistan is unfolding at a time in which "diseases" can move not only with the travel of living beings, but electronically over the Internet, transforming, or appearing to transform a lonely individual into a potential terrorist, and raising an already high level of fear. The failure to find negotiated solutions to conflicts in the Middle East and Afghanistan has intensified the renewed "clash of civilizations," a situation that thwarts efforts at transformation in Algeria and elsewhere in the Arab world.

The fact that this renewed clash has had a particularly strong impact on Algerians can be understood by seeing Algeria as a frontier society, lying at a critical intersection of the Western and Islamic worlds, and thus in an exceptionally vulnerable situation as the clash of civilizations intensifies. But such a frontier society also produces individuals adept at crossing borders: at building dialogue between cultures and religions and adapting traditional forms of expression to modern technology. What start as individual activities can evolve into sustained, organized efforts. These efforts are often centered not on global ideologies with claims to scientific authority, but rather on dialogue and exchange—activities that might be understood as crafts or arts. From this perspective, Algerian achievements in such areas as music, theater, illustrated publications, and film are particularly noteworthy. Science and technology obviously have a key role in the making of a modern world. But to build a multicultural global society requires the wisdom, experience, and inspiration of skilled craftspeople, and of individual activists and civic organizations who understand their task as creative interweaving. Universal visions and craftsmanship are certainly not mutually exclusive. An Algerian thinker of the twentieth century whose impact has been particularly enduring, Malik Bennabi combined a strong understanding of both religion and science with the skills of a lively storyteller.

Algerians, among many others, have contributed to building hubs of communications through which discussion and understanding between cultural groups can be developed. Such efforts are critical to preventing cases both of individual despair and of collective or institutional paranoia that are symptoms of the new clash of civilizations. And efforts at building dialogue at a global level can contribute to an atmospheric change within Algeria, creating a setting in which traumas of the past can be understood and put into perspective; political power at the center is not the be-all and end-all, and the focus

moves to efficacious problem solving; Algerians can feel that they are not living on isolated islands (*al-Jaza'ir*, the name of the country) but connected to and welcomed in the rest of the world; and outsiders, including not just workers, investors, and visitors, but also foreign spouses of Algerians and their children are welcomed in Algeria. Those who engage in these efforts can draw on more than two centuries of ideas and experience.

Epilogue

'Asabiya in the Digital Age

On December 17, 2010, Muhammad Bouazizi, a twenty-six-year-old fruit-and-vegetable seller in the streets of Sidi Bouzid, a town in central Tunisia, set himself on fire. This was his response to the local authorities having confiscated his merchandise because he had not paid the expected fees.

His act helped to set off protests throughout the Arab world, protests against authoritarian rule, the escalating cost of basic goods, and diminishing opportunities, especially for young, well-educated people. In Algerian colloquial Arabic there is a term that describes the attitude displayed by authorities: *hogra*, or contempt. It is a concept similar to what Frantz Fanon described as the "colonial mentality." He argued that people who were abused in the colonial setting normally submitted to the authorities. But inside there built up a sense of humiliation that could someday explode.

One can find many acts of despair among the youth of today's Arab world, often involving illegal border crossing in search of work or jihadist adventure. Unlike these choices, Muhammad Bouazizi's self-immolation had strong echoes throughout the Arab world, ushering in a new time of transition. Earlier such times came with global reordering at the end of major conflicts: following the Napoleonic Wars, World Wars I and II, and the Cold War. One might argue that a new transition is emerging as the U.S. military presence in the Middle East is scaled down and radical Islamism retreats to the margins. A key element in the impact of Bouazizi's death is that his friends carried out peaceful protests and relayed video images of them through the Internet to fellow Arab "netizens." Another was that he had stayed at home. Thus his own community was directly exposed to his anguish and made acutely aware of the need for their country's transformation. Within less than two months, the longtime presidents of both Tunisia and Egypt had been toppled, and regimes in Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Bahrain came under serious challenge.

Yet through this "Arab spring" Algeria stayed off the global media screen.

The nineteen-year-old state of emergency was lifted in late February 2011. Such protests as occurred focused on specific issues such as pay for medical personnel or port workers, or the acute shortage of public housing. Social media discussion seemed to focus less on politics than the prospects for the Algerian soccer team to gain a place in the finals of the African Cup of Nations. The team is named after the fennec, a small desert fox with very large ears, an appropriate choice for a nation that has learned through experience that the best strategy is to avoid danger by listening carefully.

Can electronic media lend to the sort of political revitalization that Ibn Khaldun saw as driven by *'asabiya*? The term refers to a strong sense of solidarity inspired by effective leadership, the driving force behind such successful Islamic movements in the Middle Ages as the Fatimids, who started out in Tunisia and eastern Algeria, then spread to Egypt. By the fifteenth century, new military technology led to the concentration of power, thwarting efforts at revitalization. Twenty-first-century electronic *'asabiya* lends itself to inspiring images and passionate discussion of who is to blame for problems. But ultimate success will depend upon many factors including the ability of democratic movements to form a consensus; the implementation of reforms that can encourage the development of a public sphere where discussion is lively, articulate, and civil; and the development of effective economic strategies. To shift the focus from blame to finding an insightful understanding of problems, it is important to see them in historical perspective, especially looking at earlier eras of transition and the ways in which they succeeded and failed. And one needs to bring the historical perspective into the electronic sphere.

Glossary

Common French spellings are given in parentheses.

amin: leader, responsible figure of a community
amir (*émir*): commander, prince
'asabiya: solidarity (a term used by Ibn Khaldun)
barrani (*berrani*): an outsider; the term used to refer to immigrant workers and merchants in Algerian cities
fatwa (*fetoua*): an authoritative response to a question issued by an Islamic legal authority (a mufti)
hajj (*hadj*): the pilgrimage to Mecca
harraga: a colloquial term used to describe clandestine emigration (derived from *haraqa*, to burn)
hijra: flight from infidel conquest
kafir: renegade
khuja (*khodja*): secretary, scribe
madrasa (*médersa*): school
muhajir: refugee, a person fleeing infidel conquest
qadi (*cadi*): Islamic judge
qa'id (*caïd*): local chief, administrative authority
sharif (*chérif*): noble, descendant of the Prophet Muhammad

Algerian terms

beldi: an urban dweller
berrani: rural immigrant living in a city
beur: North African immigrant youth in France
Bey: provincial governor in Ottoman period
Dey: ruler of Algeria in Ottoman period

gnawa: immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa and their descendants; the musical style associated with them

harraga: clandestine immigration (from *haraqa*, to burn; *harqa*, burning, ordeal)

Kulughli: families produced by marriage between Ottoman Janissaries and local women

marabout: (from *murabit*): local holy person

ra'i: literally view, opinion; name of a musical style originating in western Algeria

Notes

Abbreviations

AGGT	Archives Générales du Gouvernment Tunisien
AMAE	Archives de la Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris
ANA	Algerian National Archives, Algiers
AOM	Archives d'Outre Mer, Aix-en-Provence, France
AWC	Archives of the Wilaya of Constantine
CARIM	Center for Applied Research on International Migration
CNRS	Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
ENL	Entreprise Nationale du Livre
IJMES	*International Journal of Middle East Studies*
JNAS	*Journal of North African Studies*
OPU	Office des Publications Universitaires
PRO	Public Record Office, London
Rhm	*Revue d'histoire maghrebine*
ROMM	*Revue de l'Occident Musulman et de la Méditerranée*
SNED	Société Nationale d'Édition et de Diffusion
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USNA	United States National Archives

Introduction: A People on a Frontier of Civilizations

First epigraph source: USNA, M 23–1. There is another similar letter but presumably prepared by a different individual since the name is spelled "Hamet Ben Ali." This one is dated December 1, 1794.

Second epigraph source: www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0410/S00224.htm. The piece was translated into English by Tarek Cherkaoui, a graduate student at the university. Because Zaoui was still in government custody at the time, it was delivered by Professor Andrew Sharp.

1. The idea of "clash of civilizations" has roots in the works of Bernard Lewis. It was amplified

by the political scientist Samuel Huntington in *The Clash of Civilizations* (1996). One alternative view can be found in Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld*, and another in Courbage and Todd, *Le rendez-vous des civilisations*.

2. Madani, *Harb thalatha mia' sana* (The Three-Hundred-Year War).

3. Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*; Clancy-Smith, *Rebel and Saint*.

4. Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*; Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership*.

5. On the political background to this crisis, see Entelis, *The Revolution Institutionalized*. On the crisis itself, see Willis, *The Islamist Challenge in Algeria*; and Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*.

6. Étienne, *Abdelkader: Isthme des isthmes*; Kiser, *Commander of the Faithful*.

7. Malek, *L'Algérie à Évian*. In 1980, Malek was serving as ambassador to Washington. See also Christopher, *Chances of a Lifetime*, 115–18.

8. Impagliazzo, *Algeria in ostagio*.

9. Parker, *Uncle Sam in Barbary*.

10. Yacono, *Un siècle de francmaçonnerie algérienne (1785–1884)*.

11. Colonna, *Les versets de l'invincibilité*; Fuller, *The Next Fundamentalist State?*; Malley, *The Call from Algeria*; Martinez, *The Civil War in Algeria*; Quandt, *Between Ballots and Bullets*; Roberts, *The Battlefield Algeria*; Rouadjia, *Les frères et la mosquée*.

12. Resources relating to Zaoui's legal case and polemics about it in the New Zealand political arena can be found at www.freezaoui.org.nz/.

13. Allison, *The Crescent Obscured*; Baepler, *White Slaves, African Masters*; Benchérif, *The Image of Algeria*.

14. See chapter 5 of this volume.

15. White, "*It's Your Misfortune*"; Limerick, *The Legacy of Conquest*; Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*. In the Euro-Mediterranean context, the distinction between "border" and "frontier" is still in the process of being clearly established. See Cassarino, *Approaching Borders and Frontiers: Notions and Implications*.

16. For comprehensive visions of the Mediterranean, see (for the Middle Ages) Goitein, *A Mediterranean Society*; and Brett, *The Rise of the Fatimids*; and (for the sixteenth century) Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*.

17. Caubet, "Jeux de langue," in Rouchdy, ed., *Language Contact and Language Conflict in Arabic*; Bentahila and Davies, "Code Switching as a Poetic Device," 1–20.

18. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*; Werbner, *The Limits of Cultural Hybridity*; Brah and Combs, *Hybridity and Its Discontents*.

19. Eickelman and Salvatore, *Public Islam and the Common Good*; Habermas, *The Inclusion of the Other*. This theme can also be seen in Gellner, *Postmodernism, Reason and Religion*. For a long-term perspective, see Hoexter, Eisenstandt, and Levtzion, *The Public Sphere in Muslim Societies*; and Salvatore, *The Public Sphere*.

20. A valuable work that does take a long-term perspective, with an emphasis on interfaith relations in the western Mediterranean, is *Christian Science Monitor* reporter John Cooley's *Baal, Christ, and Mohammed: Religion and Revolution in North Africa* (1965).

21. Innis, *Empire and Communications*.

22. Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*; *A Dying Colonialism*; Gendzier, *Frantz Fanon: A Critical Study*; Cherki, *Frantz Fanon: A Portrait*.

23. Jayyusi and Marin, *The Legacy of Muslim Spain*; Menocal, *The Ornament of the World*.

24. Fakhry, *Averroes (Ibn Rushd): His Life, Work, and Influence*; Fiero, "The Legal Policies of

the Almohad Caliphs and Ibn Rushd's *Badayat al-Mujtahid*," *Journal of Islamic Studies* 10, no. 3 (1999): 226–48.

25. Bat Ye'or, *Islam and Dhimmitude*.

26. Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, vol. 2, chap. 6; Harvey, *Muslims in Spain, 1500 to 1614*. For a long-term perspective, see Majid, *Freedom and Orthodoxy: Islam and Difference in a Post-Andalusian Age*.

27. Perry, *The Handless Maiden*; Cook, "Navigating Identities," 63–79.

28. Yemelianova, *Russia and Islam*; Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar*.

29. Stewart, "The Identity of the Mufti of Oran," 265–301.

30. Hunwick, *Shari'a in Songhay*.

31. Bono, *Corsari nel Mediterraneo*; Escallier, ed., *L'esclavage en Méditerranée à l'époque moderne*; Belhamissi, *Les captifs algériens*.

32. Brown, *The Tunisia of Ahmad Bey*; Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia*.

33. Belhamissi, *La ville au mille cannons*; Shuval, *La ville d'Alger vers la fin du XVIIIe siècle*; Merouche, *Recherches sur l'Algérie à l'époque ottomane*, vol. 2.

34. Matar, *Britain and Barbary*; Wolf, *Barbary Coast*.

35. Taïeb, *Sociétés juives du Maghreb moderne*; Hirschberg, *A History of the Jews in North Africa*, vol. 2.

36. Pitts, *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France*; Thompson, *Barbary and Enlightenment*.

37. Tocqueville, *Writings on Empire and Slavery*.

38. Brower and Lazzerini, eds., *Russia's Orient*.

39. Ageron, *Les Algériens musulmans et la France*; Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*; Bennoune, *The Making of Contemporary Algeria*.

40. Bin 'Abd al-Karim, *Hukm al-hijra*; Khalidi, *al-Isha al-Maghribi fi bilad al-Sham*; Hallal, *al-'Ulama al-Jaza'iriyyin fi-l-buldan al-'Arabiyya al-Islamiyya*.

41. Christelow, *Muslim Law Courts and the French Colonial State in Algeria*.

42. Jersild, "From Savagery to Citizenship," in Brower and Lazzerini, *Russia's Orient*; Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar*.

43. Buznipar, "The Question of Citizenship of Algerian Immigrants in Syria," in Ma'oz, *Modern Syria*.

44. Commins, *Islamic Reform*; Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks*; Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism*; Pelliteri, *Magribini a Damasco*.

45. International Committee for Crimea, "Celebrating the Life of Ismail Bey Gaspirali."

46. For a gateway to sources on refugee law, see Mason, "Guide to International Law Resources on the Web," www.llrx.com/features/refugee.htm.

47. Addi, *Sociologie et anthropologie chez Pierre Bourdieu*; Brett and Fentress, *The Berbers*; Lorcin, *Imperial Identities*; Silverstein, *Algeria in France*.

48. Brower, *A Desert Named Peace: The Violence of France's Empire in the Algerian Sahara*.

49. Prominent examples include Messali Hajj, Ferhat Abbas, and Malik Bennabi.

50. Blévis, "Les avatars de la citoyenneté," 557–81.

51. Norton, ed., *Civil Society in the Middle East*; Zartman, *Collapsed States*.

52. Wihtol de Wenden, *La beurgeoisie*; Silverstein, *Algeria in France*; Hargreaves, *Immigration, Race and Ethnicity in Contemporary France*.

53. Césari, *Être musulman en France aujourd'hui*; Sellam, *La France et ses musulmans*.

54. Bowen, *Why the French Don't Like Headscarves*; Wallach, *The Politics of the Veil*.

55. For a valuable collection of observations on these riots, see "Riots in France," http://riotsfrance.ssrc.org/

56. The most common interpretation of the origins of "*beur*" is that it is a reversal of the syllables in *arabe*. However, this would be "bara."

57. Entelis, *The Revolution Insitutionalized*; Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership*; Naylor, *France and Algeria*.

58. For two well-documented cases, see Ilahiane, "Estevan de Dorantes, the Moor or the Slave?" 1–14; and Morsy, *La relation de Thomas Pellow*.

59. Perry, *The Handless Maiden*; Cook, "Navigating Identities," 63–79.

60. These include Bennabi, *Mémoires d'un témoin du siècle/Mudhakirrat shahid al-qarn*; Dabbuz, *'Alam al-islah fi al-Jaza'ir*; Ibrahimi, *Mémoires d'un Algérien*; al-Madani, *Hayat kifah*; and Sa'adallah, *Ta'rikh al-Jaza'ir al-thaqafi*. On autobiographical elements in Algerian literature in French, see Kelly, *Autobiography and Independence*.

61. White, *Children of the French Empire*; Metcalf, *Go-Betweens and the Colonization of Brazil*. In Brazil, the offspring of Portuguese settlers and native women were known as "*mamelucos*," a term derived from the Arabic term *mamluk*, the word used to refer to slave soldiers.

62. Bargaoui, "Des turcs au Hanafiyya," 209–28.

63. Marriage alliances and their ramifications in a different setting are taken up in "Royal Saudi-non-Saudi Marriages and Their Children," www.chezchiara.com.

64. Levallois, *Ismayl Urbain: Une autre conquête de l'Algérie*; Delacour and Huleu, *Le voyage soufi d'Isabelle Eberhardt*.

65. Streiff-Fenart, *Les couples franco-maghrébins en France*.

66. Turin, *Affrontements culturels dans l'Algérie coloniale*.

67. Colonna, *Instituteurs algériens*; Pervillé, *Les étudiants algériens*.

68. Clancy-Smith, *Rebel and Saint*.

69. Nicolas, "La comédie humaine dans le Karagöz," 75–87.

70. Cheniki, *Le théatre en Algérie: Histoire et enjeux*; among other works.

71. Shafik, *Arab Cinema and Cultural Identity*.

72. Layachi, "Algeria: Reinstating the State or Instating Civil Society," in Zartman, ed., *Collapsed States*.

73. Dillman, *State and Private Sector in Algeria*; Entelis, *Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized*; Henry, *The Mediterranean Debt Crescent*.

74. Churchill, *La vie d'Abdel Kader*. Recent Western works on 'Abd al-Qadir include Étienne, *Abdelkader: Isthme des isthmes*; and Kiser, *Commander of the Faithful*. Both emphasize that 'Abd al-Qadir can be seen as a Muslim leader who can be respected in terms of Christian values.

75. Schueller, *U.S. Orientalisms*. Quarrels over the refugee claims of figures such as Anwar Haddam and Ahmad Zaoui can be seen in terms of the framework presented in Marmura, *Hegemony in the Digital Age: The Arab-Israeli Conflict Online*.

76. Bergmann, *Saïd Mekbel: Un mort à la lettre*.

77. Taithe, "Algerian Orphans and Colonial Christianity," 240–59.

78. Keller, *Colonial Madness*. The Algerian Islamic thinker Malik Bennabi also commented extensively on the psychological impact of the colonial situation.

79. Branché, *La torture et l'armée pendant la guerre d'Algérie*; Bousselham, *Quand la France torturait en Algérie*; Lazreg, *Torture and the Twilight of Empire*.

80. Besnaci-Lancou and Manceron, *Les harkis dans la colonisation*; Meliani, *La drame des harkis*.

81. Ibrahimi, *Lettres de prison*; *Mémoires d'un Algérien*.

82. Abun Nasr, *The Tijaniyya*; Clancy-Smith, *Rebel and Saint*; Chachaoua, *L'Islam Kabyle*.

83. Depont and Coppolani, *Les confréries religieuses musulmanes*; Martin, *Muslim Brotherhoods in Nineteenth-Century Africa*.

84. Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, *France Overseas: The Great War and the Climax of French Imperial Expansion*; Hagen, "German Heralds of Holy War," 145–62; MacKale, "Germany and the Arab Question in the First World War," 236–53.

85. McDougall, *History and the Culture of Nationalism*; Merad, *Le réformisme musulman*; Bu Safsaf, *Jami'at al-'ulama al-Muslimin al-Jaza'iriyyin*.

86. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*.

87. Lefebvre, "Kennedy's Algerian Dilemma," 61–82; Merle, *Ben Bella*.

88. Jamal, *Barriers to Deomcracy*.

89. Dillman, *State and Private Sector in Algeria*; Henry, *The Mediterranean Debt Crescent*.

90. Burgat, *Face to Face with Political Islam*; Colonna, *Les versets de l'invincibilité*; Martinez, *La guerre civile en Algérie*; Quandt, *Between Ballots and Bullets*.

91. Hachimi Alaoui, *Les chemins de l'exil: Les Algériens exilés en France et au Canada depuis les années 1990*.

Chapter 1. A Failed Transformation, 1775–1830

1. On the final years of Ottoman Algeria, see Valensi, *On the Eve of Colonialism*; and Belhamissi, *Alger: la ville aux mille canons*.

2. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey*, vol. 1, chap. 7; Kinross, *The Ottoman Centuries*, pts. 5 and 6.

3. al-Zabiri, *Al-tijara al-kharijiyya l-il-sharq al-Jaza'ir* (Foreign Commerce in Eastern Algeria); Grangaud, *La ville imprenable: Une histoire sociale de Constantine au 18e siècle*.

4. al-Zahhar, *Mudhakkirat al-Hajj Ahmad Sharif al-Zahhar*. The work is edited by Ahmad Tawfiq al-Madani, a prominent intellectual figure in the emergence of the Algerian nationalist movement from the 1920s through the 1950s. A lively, outspoken figure, he found himself on the margins of the regime by the late 1960s, sent off to serve as ambassador to Nigeria, then Turkey. In a discussion I had with him in Algiers in 1980, he assured me that he spent his time in Turkey in the archives studying Algeria's relations with the Ottoman Empire—an interest that also prompted him to edit Zahhar's memoirs. The caustic political commentary in the book may help to explain why, though Madani completed his editing in 1972, it was not published until 1980, when there was a more open atmosphere following the death of President Boumediene.

5. It is African historians who have pioneered the development of systems for interpreting oral tradition (see Vansina, *Oral Tradition as History*; and Henige, *Oral Historiography*).

6. Zahhar, *Mudhakkirat*, 28.

7. Hervé, "Campagnes navales," 369–99.

8. Redinger, "The Spanish-Algerine War," in Powell, ed., *The Eighteenth Century*.

9. Friedman, *Spanish Captives in North Africa*.

10. On Algerian accounts of the O'Reilley expedition, including those of Ahmad al-'Antari and Muhammad Bin 'Abd al-Rahman Bin Raqiya al-Tlimsani, see Sa'adallah, *Ta'rikh al-Jaza'ir*

al-thaqafi (The Cultural History of Algeria), 2:350–53. For the Spanish perspective, see Sabater Galindo, "La expedición militar," 75–90.

11. Zahhar, *Mudhakkirat*, 26.

12. Sa'adallah, *Ta'rikh al-Jaza'ir al-thaqafi*, 2:350.

13. Ahmad Tawfiq al-Madani, *Harb thalatha mi'a sana* (The Three-Hundred-Year War).

14. Bu'Aziz, "Mufawadat al-sulh" (Negotiations for a Truce), 101. See also Cathcart, 313. Zahhar (*Mudhakkirat*, 34) also recounts this story but implies that it took place after the Barceló expedition of 1784, just before the truce negotiations.

15. Richard O'Brien to Thomas Jefferson, June 8, 1786, in *Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, 9:614–15.

16. Zahhar, *Mudhakkirat*, 24.

17. Ibid., 34.

18. Cathcart, "Record Book," 313.

19. Bu'Aziz, "Mufawwadat"; R. L. Playfair, *The Scourge of Christendom*, 218.

20. Zahhar, *Mudhakkirat*, 31–34.

21. Sabater Galindo, 57–82.

22. Strothers, 713–23; Barriendas and Llasat, 191–216.

23. Boubaker, "La peste dans les pays du Maghreb," 311–42.

24. James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, January 22, 1786, and October 8, 1788, in *The Republic of Letters*, 1:582; Allison, *The Crescent Observed*, 3–6.

25. Markoe, *The Algerine Spy in Pennsylvania*. This book is attributed to Markoe by specialists on the literature of the period. The note introducing the book is signed with the intials "STP."

26. Ben Rejeb, "Observing the Birth of a Nation: The Oriental Spy/Observer Genre and Nation Making in Early American Literature," in Amanat and Bernhardsson, eds., *The United States and Middle Eastern Encounters*.

27. Tagg, "The Limits of Republicanism," 503–43. Bache was married to Markoe's feisty cousin, Margaret Hartman Markoe. He was the first American charged under the Alien and Sedition Act in 1798, a piece of legislation whose inspiration can be traced to the frenetic reaction to the arrival of Algerians in Virginia in 1785. He died of yellow fever before his trial.

28. Spellberg, "Could a Muslim Be President? 485–506; Marr, *The Cultural Roots of American Islamicism*, 38–42.

29. Christelow, "The Western Mediterranean," 80–102.

30. Pencak, *Jews and Gentiles in Early America*; Corre and Stern, 23–82.

31. Barnby, *The Prisoners of Algiers*, chap. 4; Allison, *The Crescent Obscured*.

32. O'Brien to Jefferson, June 8, 1786, in *Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, 9:619.

33. In Cappon, ed., *The Adams-Jefferson Letters*, 127.

34. Playfair, *The Scourge of Christendom*, 214. Fisher, *Barabary Legend*, has scathing comments on Wolf and the debts he left to be paid by the British Crown.

35. Grangaud, *La ville imprenable*; Mercier, *Histoire de Constantine*.

36. Zahhar, *Mudhakkirat*, 51. "Burghul" means "dried wheat." This may have been a name applied to him by his opponents in Algiers since the name does not appear in references to him relating to the Middle East.

37. Cathcart, "Record Book," 314.

38. On Muhammad al-Kabir's skills in encouraging Muslim scholars to produce poems and narratives praising his actions, see Sa'adallah, *Ta'rikh al-Jaza'ir al thaqafi*, 1:203–4; 2:178, 268. The

bey's name was originally Muhammad al-Kurdi, indicating his origin in Kurdistan. When he became bey of Oran in 1780, he changed it to Muhammad al-Kabir, or "Muhammad the Great."

39. Chentouf, "Deux tentatives économiques du Bey Mohammed el-Kebir à la fin du XVIIIe siècle," 159–75.

40. Zahhar, *Mudhakkirat*, 63–64. Zahhar places this event shortly after the conquest of Oran.

41. Zahhar, *Mudhakkirat*, 83.

42. Kinross, *Ottoman Centuries*, 410–11. The new Sultan Selim III had appointed Hasan as his chief minister shortly before his death. See also Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 254.

43. Strinthcombe, "A Neglected Memoir by Talleyrand on French American Relations, 1793–1797," 195–208; Sa'adallah, "al-Alaqat al-Jaza'iriyya al-Amrikiyya" (Algerian American Relations), in *Abhath* 1:203–26.

44. The two letters are in the U.S. State Department Consular Dispatches, Algiers Series, File Microcopy M 23, Roll 1.

45. Rob Boston, "Joel Barlow and the Treaty with Tripoli," *Church and State* 50, no. 6 (June 1997): 11–14.

46. Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed at Tripoli November 4, 1796, The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/barbary/bar1796t.htm. The claim that the Arabic version of the treaty had the dey's letter substituted for Article 11 was put forward by the Dutch Orientalist scholar Snouk Hurgronje in an article in the *Christian Statesman* in 1930. Consideration of what Article 11 means should take into account the full article, including the final phrase: "it is declared by the parties that no pretext arising from religious opinions shall ever produce an interruption of the harmony between the two countries."

47. U.S. State Department Consular Disapatches, Algiers Series, File Microcopy M 23, Roll 3.

48. The emphasis on the importance of negotiating with Algiers to ensure America's commercial opportunities was present from the beginning of his captivity in O'Brien's correspondence. In a letter of June 8, 1786, to Thomas Jefferson, at the time representing the United States in Paris, he wrote that "money is the God of Algiers" (*Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, 9:614–15). The logical conclusion of this supposition was that if America's first concern was business, it could come to terms with the Algerians.

49. Madani, "Min watha'iq," 37–46.

50. Laurens, "Le siècle des lumières face à l'Empire Ottoman," in Batu and Bacqué-Grammont, eds., *L'Empire Ottoman, la République de Turquie et la France*.

51. Sa'adallah, *Ta'rikh al-Jaza'ir al-thaqafi*, 6:413–14.

52. Cathcart, "Record Book," 337.

53. Mancke, *Two Patterns of New England Transformation: Machias, Maine and Liverpool, Nova Scotia*.

54. Khadija, also known as "Khedaoudj," was one of Hasan's two daughters, his only reported children from his one wife. He purchased a house for her on the Rue Souk el-Djemâa in 1789. It is now the Musée Nationale des Arts et Traditions Populaires (see www.musee-mnatp.art.dz/historique.htm). William Shaler noted that Hasan's wife, when she died in about 1824, was one of the richest people in Algiers (*Sketches*, 53). Valuable insights on the property holdings of women in Ottoman Algiers can be found in Hoexter, *Endowments, Rulers and Community: Waqf al-Haramayn in Ottoman Algiers*.

55. Cole, *Napoleon's Egypt*.

56. Geertz, *Islam Observed*; Gellner, *Saints of the Atlas*.

57. Sa'adallah, *Abhath*, 2:301. He seems to have left for Morocco in 1796–97.

58. Martin, *Muslim Brotherhoods in Nineteenth-Century Africa*; O'Fahey, *Enigmatic Saint*.

59. Abun-Nasr, *The Tijaniyya*.

60. Prichard, *The Sanusiyya*; Triaud, *La légende noire de la Sanusiyya*; Vikor, *Sufi Scholar at the Desert Edge*.

61. Paden, *Religion and Political Culture in Kano*; Brenner, *West African Sufi*.

62. Sa'adallah, *Ta'rikh al-Jaza'ir al-thaqafi*, 1:218.

63. De Neveu, *Les Khouan*, 160–70; al-Zabiri, *al-Tijara al-kharijiyya*, 28–29.

64. 'Abd al-Rahim, 53–68, 173–90; 'Abd al-Hamid Bek, *'Ayan min al-mashariqa wa al-Maghariba* (Notables from the East and West); El Mansour, "Maghribis in the Mashriq," *JNAS* 6, no. 1 (Spring 201): 81–104; Clancy-Smith, "Between Cairo and the Algerian Kabylia," in Eickelman, ed., *Muslim Travelers*.

65. Sa'adallah, *Ta'rikh al-Jaza'ir al-thaqafi*, 1:220, 524–25; Zahhar, *Mudhakkirat*, 85–86.

66. Martin, *Muslim Brotherhoods*, 86.

67. Zahhar, *Mudhakkirat*, 77–78, relates a rather convoluted story concerning the visit of two of Napoleon's brothers to Algiers. The story can be seen as a commentary on the tricky position of the Dey Mustafa at this time, caught between public opinion, which opposed the French, and diplomatic pressure and commercial interest, which called for neutrality.

68. Zahhar, *Mudhakkirat*, 83.

69. Zabiri, *al-Tijara al-kharijiyya*, 54–55.

70. Zahhar, *Mudhakkirat*, 85.

71. De Neveu, *Les Khouan*, 164.

72. Ibid., 168.

73. Zahhar, *Mudhakkirat*, 86.

74. De Neveu, *Les Khouan*, 170. A "marabout" is a local saint.

75. Hindelsheim, 380–414; Hirschberg, *A History of the Jews of North Africa*, vol. 2; Ayoun, "Les Juifs d'Oran avant la conquête française," 375–90.

76. "Histoire des Juifs d'Oran," http://darmon.ifrance.com/juiforan.htm.

77. Bedarida, "La nazione ebrea di Livorno e I profughi algerini di 1805," 115–85; Playfair, *The Scourge of Christendom*, 235–36; Zahhar, *Mudhakkirat*, 88.

78. Zahhar, *Mudhakkirat*, 80; Sa'adallah, *Ta'rikh al-Jaza'ir al-thaqafi*, 2:574. After order was restored, Ibn al-Malik fled to Tunis, where he entered the service of the bey. Given Ibn al-Ahrash's alleged ties to the Bey Hamuda, this suggests at least a loose connection between the Algiers troubles and the revolt led by Ibn al-Ahrash in the Constantinois.

79. Zabiri, *al-Tijara al-kharijiyya*, 55.

80. A later incident involved the aftermath of the dismissal of the bey of Oran in 1813, when a supporter, Hanna Millul, and her two sons were killed—see "Histoire des Juifs d'Oran," http://darmon.ifrance.com/juiforan.htm.

81. The themes of both white and black slavery are raised by the Italian writer Filippo Pananti in his *Aventure e osservazioni sopra le coste di Barbaria*, translated into English as *Narrative of a Residence in Algiers*, with notes and illustrations by Edward Blaquiere, Royal Navy (London: Henry Colburn, 1818). Pananti, originally from the north of Italy, had moved to England and entered a career in theater. He was on his way back to Italy at the end of the Napoleonic wars

when his ship was captured by the Algerians. He was released following the Exmouth expedition of 1816. His work was particularly important because, at the time, the British presented themselves as the protectors of Italian interests in Algeria.

82. Playfair, *The Scourge of Christendom*, 258.

83. Strothers, "Volcanic Dry Fogs, Climate Cooling, and Plague Pandemics in Europe and the Middle East," 713–23.

84. Hamash, "Sifara 'Ali Ra'is ila Lundun fi 'am 1819" (The Voyage of 'Ali Ra'is to London in 1819), 507–34.

85. Shaler, *Sketches of Algiers*, 56, 67.

86. Pananti, *Narrative*, 165. This observation may well have been shaped by the views of the book's translator, Edward Blaquiere.

87. Hamdan Khodja, *Le Miroir: Aperçu historique et statistique sur la Régence d'Alger*, introduction by Abdelkader Djeghloul.

88. Temimi, "L'activité de Hamdan Khudja," 234–43.

89. Sa'adallah, *Abhath*, 3:232.

90. Boukaker, "La peste dans les pays du Maghreb"; Gallagher, *Medicine and Power in Tunisia*.

91. Amirawi, "Hamdan Khuja: Hayatuu wa atharuhu" (Hamdan Khodja: His Life and Influence), 97–121.

92. Sa'dallah, *Ta'rikh al-Jaza'ir al-thaqafi*, 5:494.

93. Sa'adallah, *Ibn al-'Annabi*.

94. Madani, "Min watha'iq al-Jaza'iriyya al-'Uthmaniyya," 42–43.

95. Revolts had begun in the Kabylie region in 1823, and in the Oranais.

96. Playfair, *The Scourge of Christendom*, 307.

97. Christelow, *Muslim Law Courts*, chap. 6.

98. On Blaquiere's links to Bentham, see Jeremy Bentham to Torbio Nuñez, March 22, 1822, in *From the Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham*, 9:47. Blaquiere's works include *Letters from the Mediterranean Containing a Civil and Political Account of Sicily, Tripoly, and Malta, with Biographical Sketches* (London: H. Colbrun, 1813); and *Narrative of a Second Visit to Greece* (London: G. B. Whitaker, 1825). See also Rosen, "Bentham's Constitutional Theory and the Greek Constitution of 1822"; and Gobli, "Edward Blaquière, agente del liberalimo," 306–25.

99. G. T. Raynal, *Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements de commerce des Européens dans l'Afrique septentrionnale, augmenté d'un aperçu de l'état actuel de ces établissments et du commerce avec les Européens* (Paris: Amable Costes, 1826); Thompson, "L'abbé Raynal et la Barbarie," 355–68; and Thompson, *Barbary and Enlightenment*. The extension of Raynal's work was written by Jacques Peuchet.

100. Peires, *The Dead Will Arise*.

101. Shaler, *Sketches of Algiers*; Sa'adallah, "al-'Alaqat al-Jazai'iriyya-al-Amrikiyya."

Chapter 2. Colonial-Era Border Crossing, 1830–1911

1. Pelissier, *Annales Algériennes*, 156.

2. A notable example is Robert Hichens, *The Garden of Allah*, set in the oasis town of Biskra, published in 1904. It was made into a movie in 1936, with some of the scenes shot in Yuma, Arizona.

3. Bessaih, *De l'Émir Abdelkader à l'Imam Chamil*; Kemper, "The Changing Images of Jihad

Leaders," 28–58. Both figures were the subjects of biographies by Englishmen (see Mackie, *Life of Schamayl*; and Churchill, *Vie d'Abdelkader*).

4. Clancy-Smith, *Rebel and Saint*, chap. 5.

5. Hilal, "Musahama al-Khalidi Salah bin 'Ammar," 116.

6. For examples of texts relating to the debates on both al-Andalus and Algeria, see Bin 'Abd al-Karim, *Hukm al-hijra*.

7. CD Constantine to GGA, July 3, 1860, AOM 30 KK 11.

8. This argument is made in a discussion of the case of a Muslim scholar who remained in Algiers, 'Ali Bin al-Hafaf, by Ahmad Tawfiq al-Madani, in *Kitab al-Jaza'ir* (The Book of Algeria), 90–92.

9. Sa'adallah, *Ta'rikh al-Jaza'ir al-thaqafi*, 6:356–68.

10. Président, Tribunal de Tunis to RG, Tunis, March 29, 1900, AGGT A 238–7.

11. Christelow, "The Mosque," 289–319.

12. Sa'adallah, "Qadiya thaqafiyya baina al-Jaza'ir wa Fransa, 1843" (A Cultural Problem between Algeria and France), *Abhath*, 11–48.

13. Interrogation de Mohamed Ben Aouda, January 20, 1847, in AOM 1 E 215.

14. Hilal, *al-Hijra al-Jaza'iriyya*, 23.

15. The term "Kabyle," or *qaba'il*, the Arabic word for "tribes," came into use in the Ottoman era to describe "Berber," or Tamazight, speakers who lived in the mountains of central and eastern Algeria. In the colonial era, the term "Zuwawa" (or "Zouaoua") seems to have been used to refer to Tamazight speakers in the province of Constantine. The Zuwawa dialect was considered the purest Tamazight dialect (see Basset, *Manuel de la langue Kabyle [dialecte Zouaoua]*).

16. See RG, Tunis to Secrétaire Général, September 7, 1900, in AGGT E 550/30–3.

17. Ponts et Chausées, Constantine, Report, April 3, 1880; Petition of Biskra notables, 1899 and GGA reply, November 11, 1899, in file on Biskra mosques, AN

18. Hillal, *Hijra*; Ageron, *Les Algériens musulmans*, chaps. 38–39.

19. Report of M. Benazouz, Mission Militaire française au Hedjaz, January 7, 1917, AGGT A-289–7; Report of Ben Saci, Vice Consul, Djeddah, 1919, AGGT A 289–5.

20. Madani, *Hayat kifah*, 1:25. Madani's grandfather did marry into a prominent Tunisian family, the Ibn Ghasham.

21. Étienne, *Abdelkader*.

22. On the role of sharifian lineage in the social structure of the Mascara region, see Christelow, *Muslim Law Courts*, chap. 2. On ideological aspects, see Bennison, "'Abd al-Qadir and Morocco," 1–20.

23. Danziger, *Abd al-Qadir and the Algerians*.

24. Habart, Introduction to Churchill, *La vie d'Abdelkader*.

25. Sa'adallah, *Ta'rikh al-Jaza'ir al-thaqafi*, 5:537.

26. CD, Oran to GGA, March 11, 1854; June 12, 1854; July 21, 1854, AOM 1 JJ 10.

27. Blunt, *My Reminiscences*, 28–29.

28. Abbasi, "From Algeria to Palestine," 41–59.

29. Harvey, *Our Cruise on the Claymore*, 90–91; Frankl, *The Jews of the East*, 290.

30. Schilcher, *Families in Politics: Damascene Factions and Estates*, 215.

31. Makdisi, "Corrupting the Sublime Sultanate," 180–208.

32. In 1848, the Latin Patriarchate for Palestine was established. The first major conflict to stem from this occurred in the village of Beit Jala, near Bethlehem, in 1854 (see Kildani, *History of Modern Christianity in the Holy Land*, chap. 7).

33. Émerit, "La crise Syrienne et l'expansion économique francçaise en 1860," 219; Churchill, *Vie d'Abdelkader*, 310.

34. Abbasi, "From Algeria to Palestine," 41–59.

35. One far-distant echo of 'Abd al-Qadir's fame was the naming of a town in Iowa, Elkader, in his honor in 1846 (see www.elkader-iowa.com/history.htm).

36. See, for instance, GCD Constantine to GGA, Report for July 1858, in AOM 1 H 15 (on appointment as Ottoman governor); CD Constantine to GGA, July 31, 1860, in AOM 17 H 3. The Bu Talib family was credited with spreading many of the rumors—see GCS Constantine to GCD Constantine, July 3, 1860, in AOM 30 KK 11.

37. Sa'adallah, *Ta'rikh al-Jaza'ir al-thaqafi*, 5:544.

38. Marcel Émerit refers to the idea of an "Arab Kingdom" at this time as a sort of *"monnaie d'échange"* to maintain 'Abd al-Qadir's co-operation with France (see Émerit, "La crise Syrienne et l'expansion économique francçaise en 1860," 219).

39. Sa'adallah, *Ta'rikh al-Jaza'ir al-thaqafi*, 5:540–45.

40. Étienne, *Abd El-Kader et la franc-maçonnerie*; Mohamed Boutaleb, "Le message spiritual de l'Émir"; Landau, Muslim Opposition to Freemasonry," 186–203.

41. Christelow, *Muslim Law Courts*, chap. 6.

42. Rapport politique sur l'insurrection du District de Souk Ahras en 1871, February 20, 1871, AOM 20 KK 45.

43. Habart, introduction to *Vie d'Abdel Kader*, 32; Sa'adallah, *Ta'rikh al-Jaza'ir al-thaqafi*, 5:559–60.

44. *El Mobacher*, August 13, 1870.

45. Koulakssis and Meynier, *L'Émir Khaled*, 59.

46. On Tahir al-Jaza'iri, see Escovitz, 293–310; and Weisman, "Between Reformism and Modernist Rationalism," *Die Welt des Islams* 41, no. 2 (2001): 206–37.

47. On the Zuwawa-Damascus connection, see below, "The Zuwawa Eastern Connection."

48. Sa'adallah, "Musahama al-muhajirun al-Maghariba fi al-fikr al-siyasi bi-bilad al-Sham" (The Role of Maghribi Refugees in Political Thought in Syria), *Buhuth fi al-ta'rikh al-'arabi al-islami*, 126–47.

49. Bin Shattah moved to Tunis in 1884 and then fled police problems, going to Syria in 1908 (see CG, Damas to MAE, January 18, 1910, in AGGT E 550/30–5. The paper was financially supported by 'Abd al-Qadir Bin 'Ali, a grandson of the Amir. His brother Muhammad al-Sa'id was a frequent contributor (see Hillal, *al-Hijra*, 17).

50. Sa'adallah, *Ta'rikh al-Jaza'ir al-thaqafi*, 5:602–3.

51. Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 57; Christelow, "Algerian Dimensions of France's Middle East Policy, 1916," in Brown and Gordon, eds., *Franco-Arab Encounters*, 286.

52. Notes on 'Abd al-Qadir family, AOM 1 E 237.

53. Christelow, *Muslim Law Courts*, 211–12.

54. One of the issues in this area involved securing water rights for the Compagnie Génévoise, represented at the time by Henri Dunant. Dunant set off in 1859 to Italy to present his case to Napoleon III, but he was distracted by the Battle of Solferino. His experience in treating the wounded there inspired him to found the International Red Cross. For reflections on the Swiss experience in Algeria, see Benchérif, *Les Suisses en Algérie*.

55. BA Setif, Report for Second Trimester, 1857, AOM F80 517.

56. CS Mascara to CD Oran, March 25, 1873, AOM 7 H 22; GGA to CD Oran, May 18, 1875, AOM 7 H 22; CS Mascara to CD Oran, May 14, 1874; Préfet Algiers to GGA, August 2, 1875;

Préfet Oran to GGA, February 28, 1878; and GGA to CD Oran, July 21, 1878—all in AOM 7 H 22; Lenz, *Tomboctou*.

57. Koulakssis and Meynier, *L'Émir Khaled*, 69.

58. Ibid., 100.

59. CD Constantine to GGA, July 14, 1862, AOM 1 KK 46.

60. Christelow, "Hawl bidaya," 55–64; Christelow, *Muslim Law Courts*, 233–34.

61. Robert Arnaud, "Un livre utile," *El Mobacher*, December 12, 1878. A French settler newspaper in Constantine, *Le Progrès de l'Est*, published a strong rebuke of Arnaud's views on December 20. They even briefly sponsored an Arabic newspaper edited by their *shawush*, or doorkeeper, L'arbi Bin Sabbaj.

62. Talbi, *Ibn Badis*, 21–25.

63. *Rawdat al-akhbar wa nuzhat al-afkar* (The Garden of News and the Stroll through Ideas) (Algiers: Imprimerie C. Zamith, 1901), 17, 68–69, 28.

64. Benhabylès, *L'Algéire française vue par un indigène*.

65. *Kawkib Ifriqiya*, November 13, 1908.

66. The ties of 'Abd al-Qadir's family to the official hierarchy in Algeria are illustrated by a visit paid by Amir 'Ali in early 1913. At a dinner at the home of the *qadi* of Constantine, Mustafa Darwish, he was greeted by numerous Bu Talib family members, and members of the Ben Gana family, who dominated the Biskra region (*Kawkib Ifriqiya*, January 3, 1913).

67. *Al-Islam*, January 28, 1912.

68. The term *"siditoyen"* combines the Arabic *sidi*, "my master," a term of respect for high-status individuals, with *citoyen*, the French for "citizen." The term had been used at least since 1887 (see "Le député Borbouche," in *El Mobacher*, July 6, 1887).

69. BA, Algiers, Reports for First Trimester 1852 and Fourth Trimester, 1853, in AOM F 80 514.

70. BA Oran, Report 1856, AOM F80 19. The totals for *barrani* populations recorded at this time are: Oran, 649; Mostagenem, 721; Mascara, 439; Tlemcen, 208.

71. The best analysis of Algerian geography and its implications is in Rey-Goldziguer, *Le Royaume Arabe*. On small urban centers in the Oranais and the challenges they faced, see Sari, *Les villes précoloniales*.

72. On smuggling, see Commissaire Civil, Constantine, Report, May-June 1857, AOM F80 507; on the breakdown of Ottoman-era urban organization in the early colonial period, see BA, Algiers, Report, third trimester 1851, AOM F80 517; on peddlers, see CD Constantine to GGA, report for 1852, AOM 1 H 9.

73. BA, Constantine, report, second trimester, 1851, AOM F80 507.

74. A. Cour, "Constantine en 1802 d'après un chanson du Cheikh Belgacem El-Rahmouni El-Haddad," 224–40. The poet's name indicates that he had been an ironsmith.

75. CD, Constantine to GGA, February 22, 1852, AOM 1 H 8. At least some civilian officials saw the *barranis* as hardworking and responsible, while the *baladis* were viewed as lazy and prone to fanaticism (see Préfet, Constantine, Report, fourth trimester, 1854, AOM F80 508).

76. The data referred to here are culled from the reports of the Bureau Arabe Départmentale of Constantine in AOM F80 507.

77. Holsinger, "Migration, Commerce and Community," 61–74.

78. In the case of the tightly knit Mzabi community, there was a concern that no local families would be able to claim property rights to their businesses.

79. Préfet, Constantine to GGA, June 22, 1852, AOM 1 H 9; Commissaire Civil, Constantine, Report, third trimester, 1851, AOM F80 517.

80. There are reports of violence involving Mzabis and local populations in Setif (*Le Temps*, July 1, 1887); Constantine (*L'Indépendant de Constantine*, June 24–28 and July 1, 1887); and Souk Ahras (*Akhbar*, June 18, 1890). Biskra was a frequent scene of conflicts, at least one involving Moroccan railway workers (*Le Temps*, July 8 1887; *Akhbar*, June 21 1888; June 24, 1890).

81. The 1850 figure is from the data in AOM F80 507. The later figures are from Joly, "La tannerie indigène à Constantine," 213–33. Joly's figures do not include the more prestigious leatherwork trades of saddlemaker and shoemaker, of which there were respectively fourteen and twelve in 1850.

82. See Joly, "La tannerie indigène"; and Delrieu, *L'industrie du cuir à Constantine*.

83. Nouschi, "La crise des années 1866–70," in *Colloque pour une histoire critique et citoyenne*; Mokaddem, *Le siècle des sauterelles*.

84. Christelow, "The Mosque," 294–96.

85. Ibn al-'Abid al-Jilali, *Taqwim al-Akhlaq*, 60.

86. Sa'adallah, *Ta'rikh al-Jaza'ir al-thaqafi*, 6:231. Morsly published *La question indigène* in 1894.

87. *Le Temps*, August 26, 1885; Ageron, *Les Algériens musulmans*, 116–22.

88. *Réponse des Conseillers Généraux indigènes au rapport de M. Treille sur les incendies* (Constantine: Imprimerie J. Bourmont, 1881). The drought in the United States set off huge fires in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan.

89. CS Setif to CD, Constantine, April 22, 1867, AOM 40 KK 23.

90. CS Setif to Commandant, Constantine, February 14, 1869, AOM 40 KK 23.

91. Sa'adallah, *Ta'rikh al-Jaza'ir al-thaqafi*, 5:547–48, 558–60.

92. Habart, introduction to *La vie d'Abdelkader*, 32.

93. CS Setif, Report, December 1860, AOM 40 KK 168.

94. Sellal, "La dramatique histoire des déportés algériens de la Nouvelle Calédonie," www.algerie-dz.com, August 21, 2004.

95. Bu 'Aziz, "'Audat 'ila nahaya," 118–38.

96. Consul Général, Damas to RG Tunis, August 1, 1888, AGGT, A 278.

97. Mohamed Ben Ahmed Ben Abdesselam el-Mokrani to MAE, January 30, 1890, AGGT, A 278.

98. N. E. Tatem, "Janvier 1871: El Hadj Mohamed El-Bachagha El-Mokrani," http://argotheme.dzblog.com/article-111025–6.html.

99. BA Constantine, Report, September 1855.

100. Report by GGA, August 26, 1858, AOM 1 H 15.

101. Martin, *Histoire du 2e Régiment*, 141.

102. Ibid., 8.

103. BA Algiers, Report, September 1855, AOM F80 508.

104. These included Isma'il Bu Darba, son of an Algiers merchant who had worked in Marseille and a French mother; Qaddur Bin Ruwila took refuge in Syria and died in Beirut in the 1850s (see Sa'adallah, *Ta'rikh al-Jaza'ir al-thaqafi*, 6:206–7, 228).

105. Christelow, "Algerian Interpreters," 84–89.

106. Hamet, *Nur el-Albab*.

107. Ibid., 7. Hamet's works include *Les Musulmans français de l'Afrique du Nord* (1906), and *Chroniques de la Mauritanie Sénégalaise*. His last published work seems to have been *Les Juifs de l'Afrique du Nord (noms et prénoms)* (1928).

108. Sa'id's brother Muhammad al-Sadiq Ibn Zakri had a prominent role in persuading the French to build a mosque in Tizi Ouzou, the emerging urban center of the Grand Kabylia (Mohamed Saddek ben Ahmed to Préfet, Algiers, July 8, 1893, ANA). On Sa'id, see *Kawkib Ifriqiya*, April 17, 1914; report on Ibn Zakri's death, 1914, in AOM 16 H 76; and Mérad, *Le réformisme musulman*, 35.

109. Sa'adallah, "Mashru' kitab (Ta'rikh Zuwawa) li-Abi Ya'ala al-Zuwawi" (Abu Ya'la al-Zuwawi's Project for a Book, A History of the Zuwawa), *Abhath wa ara'*, 2:145–67.

Chapter 3. The Last Jihad and the End of *Hijra*, 1911–1920

1. "Intiha' al-'alam" (The End of the World), *Kawkib Ifriqiya*, October 15, 1909.

2. Ozaydin, "The Indian Muslim Red Crescent Society's Aid to the Ottoman State during the Balkan War in 1912," 12–18; Baldinetti, "La Mezzaluna Rossa d'Egitto e la Guerra Italo-Turca," 565–72.

3. *Kawkib Ifriqiya*, February 23, 1912; *al-Islam*, February 25, 1912; Benhabylès, *L'Algérie française*, 124.

4. Depont in CIAM, August 5, 1915, AMAE 1670.

5. Controleuer Civil, Tunis to RG Tunis, March 11, 1913, AOM 1 H 34.

6. Naimi, *al-Ibadhiya: A Study of the Islamic Sect of Nafusa*.

7. Cuperly, "Muhammad Bin Yusuf Atfiyash," *Recherches biographiques Algériennes* 2 (1984).

8. Sa'adallah, "Sulayman al-Baruni: Adwa' wa mulahadhat" (Light and Observations), in *Buhuth*, 398–418; Sulaiman al-Baruni, *Safahat khalidah min al-jihad* (Eternal Pages from the Jihad); J. E. Peterson, "Arab Nationalism and the Idealist Politician: The Career of Sulayman al-Baruni," in Piscatori and Harris, eds., *Law, Personalities and Politics*.

9. *Kawkib Ifriqiya*, July 17, 1914; Meynier, *L'Algérie révélée*, 175; Sa'adallah, *Ta'rikh al-Jaza'ir al-thaqafi*, 3:241; Bennabi, *Mémoires d'un témoin du siècle*, 25.

10. Sa'adallah, *Ta'rikh al-Jaza'ir al-thaqafi*, 5:237–38.

11. Ageron, *Les Algériens musulmans*, 1085–87.

12. Ibrahimi, "Ana," 11–36.

13. Si Ahmed Cherif, report on 1913 pilgrimage, AOM 16 H 86; Ben Cherif, *Aux villes saintes de l'Islam*.

14. Messali, *Mémoires*, 41.

15. *Kawkib Ifriqiya*, July 1, October 7, December 17, 30, 1910; December 8, 1911.

16. Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East, Fourth Session, September 4, 1920.

17. For French efforts at discrediting the Germans, see Stuermer, *Deux ans de guerre à Constantinople*.

18. Bardin, *Algériens et Tunisiens*, 230–31.

19. Sureté Publique, Tunis, February 27, 1914, AGGT E-550–30; Consul, Cairo to MAE, AGGT A-289–1; Sa'adallah, *Ta'rikh al-Jaza'ir al-thaqafi*, 5:492, 575, 603.

20. "The Grand Imams of al-Azhar," www.sunnah.org; Sa'adallah, *Ta'rikh al-Jaza'ir al-thaqafi*, 5:500.

21. Bardin, *Algériens et Tunisiens*, 191.

22. MacKale, "German Policy toward the Sharif of Mecca, 1914-1916," *Historian* 55, no. 2

(1993); MacKale, "Germany and the Arab Question," 236–53; MacKale, "The Kaiser's Spy," 199–219; Hagen, "German Heralds of Holy War," 150.

23. Schwanitz, ed., *Germany and the Middle East*.

24. Report, October 23, 1917, MAE 1702; Sa'adallah, "Dawr al-muhajirun," 144–45.

25. Sa'adallah, "Watha'iq jadida 'an thawra al-Amir 'Abd al-Malik b-il Maghrib" (New Documents on the Revolt of Malik), *Abhath*, vol. 1.

26. Meynier, *L'Algérie révélée*, 583.

27. Ageron, *Les Algériens musulmans*, 1179–82.

28. Sa'adallah, *Ta'rikh al-Jaza'ir al-thaqafi*, 5:551–52.

29. Sa'id Bin 'Ali, *Ta'rikh hayat tayyib al-dhikr* (History of a Good-to-Remember Life), 39.

30. Ibid., 55–59.

31. Bardin, *Algériens et Tunisiens*, 183; Bin 'Ali, *Hayat tayyib al-dhikr*, 67.

32. Report, October 23, 1917, MAE 1702; Ahmed Ben Cherif, Report on Hajj 1913, AOM 16 H 86.

33. Mélia, *L'Algérie et la guerre*, 11.

34. Bin 'Ali, *Mudhakkirat*, 88; Lawrence to M. Brown, June 28, 1919, in *Letters of T. E. Lawrence*, 165.

35. Bin 'Ali, *Mudhakkirat*, 90–95.

36. Ibid., 118.

37. MAE to RG Tunis, February 4, 1916, AGGT, E 550 30.

38. Kharfi, *al-Jaza'ir wa-l-asala al-thawriyya* (Algeria and Revolutionary Authenticity), 103–10.

39. 'Abd al-Qadir Bin 'Ali to Malik Bin 'Abd al-Qadir, October 14, 1917, AMAE 1702.

40. 'Abd al-Qadir Bin 'Ali to Khalid, 28 Dhu al-Hijja, AMAE 1702.

41. Defrance to MAE, September 26, 1917, AMAE 1702.

42. Ibid., September 27, 1917, AMAE 1702.

43. Ibid., October 4, 1917, AMAE, 1702.

44. Mustapha Cherchali to MAE, October 3, 1917, AMAE 1702.

45. 'Abd al-Qadir Bin 'Ali to Khalid, 25 Dhu al-Hijja, 1335 (November 2, 1917) AMAE, 1702. The French intercepted this letter and surely 'Abd al-Qadir realized this was a likelihood.

46. Brémond, *Le Hedjaz dans la guerre*, 287–88.

47. Ibid., 183.

48. 'Abd al-Qadir Bin 'Ali to Malik, 28 Dhu al-Hijja 1335 (November 5, 1917), AMAE 1702.

49. Al-Ghussain, *Mudhakkirati*, 2:446; Bin 'Ali, *Muhdhakkirat*, 112.

50. Wilson, *Lawrence of Arabia*, 452–54, 460–61.

51. Bin 'Ali, *Mudhakkirat*, 118–25.

52. Ibid., *Mudhakkirat*, 139; Wilson, *Lawrence of Arabia*, 562–65. On this time in Lebanon, see Bliss, "What about Syria?" 590–99.

53. Brémond, *Le Hedjaz dans la guerre*, 318.

54. Russell, *The First Modern Arab State*.

55. Lawrence to Deputy Chief Political Officer, Cairo, June 28, 1919.

56. Gelvin, *Divided Loyalties*, 26.

57. Al-Ghussain, *Mudhakkirati*, 2:465–66.

58. Notes from a conversation with 'Izzat Pasha, July 10, 1916, AGGT A 289–5.

59. Shambrook, *French Imperialism in Syria*, 93.

60. Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, 377–79; Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, 73.

61. Philipp, *The Syrians in Egypt, 1725–1975*.

62. Christelow, "Algerian Dimensions of France's Middle East Policy, 1916," in Brown and Gordon, eds., *Franco-Arab Encounters*; Christelow, "Political Ends," 84–89; Eldar, "French Policy toward the Sharif of Mecca," 329–50.

63. Obituary notice, *Bulletin mensuel des questions musulmanes*, June 5, 1954, AOM 16 H 81; Arabian Report XVIII, November 20, 1916, PRO FO 371 2781.

64. Sa'dallah, "Khutba Ibn al-Muhub," *al-Thaqafa* 14, no. 84 (November-December 1984): 167–73.

65. GGA to MAE, n.d. (ca. September 1916), AOM 16 H 90; Hilal, *al-Hijra*, 70; Bin al-Muhub letter, *Kawkib Ifriqiya*, December 13, 1912; Bin Badis reply, *al-Zuhra*, January 29, 1913.

66. 'Abd al-Karim al-Bash Tarzi became head of this branch in 1912 and was also Hanafi mufti of Constantine. He was on good terms with influential settler politicians (see Feuille signalitique, AOM 16 H 76).

67. Sa'adallah, "Murasila ghariba," 256–63.

68. Fudala', "al-Imam al-Shaykh," 159–62.

69. *Sawt al-Muslim* (Tunis), May 1, 1953.

70. Brémond, *Le Hedjaz dans la guerre*, 53.

71. Bin Ghabrit dispatch, October 13, 1916, AMAE, CPG 1704; and Storrs diary, October 16, 1916, PRO FO 371 2782.

72. Brémond, Report October 20, 1916, AMAE 1704.

73. Christelow, "Algerian Dimensions of France's Middle East Policy," 290–91; 298–303; Cadi, *En terre d'Islam*.

74. Sa'adallah, *Ta'rikh al-Jaza'ir al-thaqafi*, 5:276–82.

75. Nasir, *al-Maqalat al-sahafiyya al-Jaza'iriyya* (The Algerian Press Article), 1:209–10, 332–34; 2:48–51; Jilali, *Taqwim al-akhlaq*, 49–51; Sa'adallah, *Ta'rikh al-Jaza'ir al-thaqafi*, 5:282–89.

76. *Murshid al-Umma*, 2 Rabi' Anwar, 1329, cited in Nasir, *al-Maqala*, 51.

77. Madani, *Hayat kifah*, 2:54–56.

78. Maraini, "Genesi e svillupi dell' arte moderna del Maghreb," 1–2. 'Umar Rasim's most noted student was M'hamed Issiakhem, a close friend of Kateb Yacine.

79. Benhabylès, *L'Algérie française*, 99.

80. Campaigns against alcohol were a common theme in progressive newspapers of the pre-war years (see *Kawkib Ifriqiya*, May 27, August 5, November 4, 1910).

81. Meynier, *L'Algérie révélée*, 461–75.

Chapter 4. Exchange and Innovation in the Revolutionary Era

1. Entelis, "Civil Society and the Authoritarian Temptation in Algerian Politics," in Norton, ed., *Civil Society in the Middle East*; Keane, *Global Civil Society?*

2. White, *Children of the French Empire*.

3. Streiff-Fénart, "Sauver la face," in Alber et al., eds., *Mariage tous azimuts*; Streiff-Fénart, "Le métissage Franco-Algérien," 343–51.

4. Laskier, "Israel and Algeria amid French Colonialism and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1954–1978," 1–32; Abdel Kader, *Le conflit judeo-arabe*.

5. Narbeth, "Evangelism among Women and Girls in Urban Algeria," 266–77.

6. Prefect Constantine to GGA, March 31, 1891; GGA to Prefect Constantine, April 8, 1891, ANA RAF.

7. SP Batna to GGA, May 1 1891, ANA RAF.

8. Municipal councilors, Batna to GGA, March 10, 1920; Prefect Constantine to SP Batna, February 16 1920; Report of architecte-voyeur, n.d., 1924, ANA RAF.

9. "Rachid Ksentini," *an-Nasr*, no. 2 (July 1943); "Le rire pour supporter la misère," *El Watan*, September 13, 2005.

10. Sa'adallah, *Ta'rikh al-Jaza'ir al-thaqafi*, 8:125–42.

11. *Al-Najah*, April 15, 1924.

12. Report on *madrasa* enrollments for the city of Constantine, 1939–44, AWC SR 387.

13. "Qariya nahida" (An Awakening Village), *al-Basa'ir*, February 23, 1948. Her father, Mulud al-Najjar, was imam of the local mosque and a member of the Association of 'Ulama (*al-Basa'ir*, February 16, 1948). She may have been related to Muhammad al-Najjar, who, along with Muhammad al-'Aid and Muhammad Bin al-'Abid, was active in writing plays to support Islamic reform in the 1930s (see Sa'adallah, *Ta'rikh al-Jaza'ir al-*thaqafi, 8:139–40, 449).

14. *Al-Basa'ir*, February 23, 1948.

15. Abu Ya'la al-Zuwawi, "al-Sahafa al-ahliyya bi-l qatr al-Jaza'ir" (The Native Press in the Territory of Algeria), *al-Basa'ir*, January 12, 1937.

16. Bachtarzi, *Mémoires*, 26.

17. Ibid., 20.

18. Ibid., 65.

19. Ibid., 77–78.

20. "Cheikha Rimitti: la Mamie du raï Algérien," www.cheikha-rimitti.com; Morgan, "Got Those North African Blues," *Independent*, November 6, 1997.

21. "Le Salon du Rire d'Alger." www.alger-roi.net/Alger/rue_isly/textes/12texte_salon_rire_pn30.htm.

22. See the presentations on literature, architecture, and art in *Algérie 1941*, edited by the Section de la Presse du Gouvernement Général for the Semaine de la France d'Outre-Mer, July 1941.

23. 'Abd al-Hamid Bin Badis, "al-Da'iya al fashila" (Unsuccessful Propganda), *al-Basa'ir*, May 6, 1939. See also *al-Basa'ir*, January 13 and 20, 1939.

24. Report from Ghardaia, April 15, 1946, AOM 16 H 80. An Ibadi Muslim scholar, Tahir Filali, was reported to have attacked the Pères Blancs in his sermon.

25. Destremeau and Moncelon, *Louis Massignon*, 296; Yves Aouate, "Elie Gozlan," *Recherches biographiques algériennes* 2 (1983); Ansky, *Les Juifs d'Algérie du Décret Crémieux à la Libération*.

26. "Chez le Cheikh el-Okbi," *En Terre d'Islam* 11 (March-April 1936): 75–77.

27. Bennabi, *Mudhakkirat*, 96; Madani, *Hayat kifah*, 2:183–84.

28. Scelles-Millie, "Le Cheikh el-Okbi," 120–23; Scelles-Millie, *Algérie, dialogue entre Christianisme et Islam*; BMQI March 1950, AOM 16 H 80.

29. BMQI, July 1950, AOM 16 H 80.

30. Ibid., March 1950, AOM 16 H 81.

31. Nozière, *Les Chrétiens dans la guerre*, 36–40.

32. Its editors were 'Abd al-Rahman Haffaf and Amar Ouzegane.

33. Prefect Constantine to GGA, December 31, 1929; GGA to Prefect Constantine, January 29, 1930, ANA RAF.

34. See, for example, dossier on Mohamed Boulahbel, 1936, in ANA RAF. The candidate's qualifications for appointment as an imam included the fact that he had four relatives in the official religious establishment, and three others working in the Muslim courts.

35. GGA to Prefect Constantine, June 23, 1939; Prefect Constantne to GGA, July 19, 1939, AWC SR 387.

36. Dr. Bendjelloul to Prefect Constantine, August 8, 1934; Prefect Constantine to Administrator CM Ain Milia, November 8, 1934, AWC SR 23.

37. Administrator, CM Akbou to Prefect Constantine, February 5, 1938, AWC SR 23.

38. Bashir Ibrahimi, "A fi kul quriya hakim bi-amrihi?" (Does the Mayor Have His Own Way in Each Village?), *al-Basa'ir*, September 20, 1948.

39. *Al-Basa'ir*, July 10, 1950.

40. Dossier on Belkacem Sadkhi, 1945, AWC SR 380.

41. SIDM, Constantine, February 25, 1947; September 6, 1948, AOM 16 H 80.

42. Administrateur, Mila to Prefect, Constantine, n.d., 1942; CIE, Constantine, June 3, 15, 1943, AOM 16 H 72

43. The essay was originally published in the periodical *al-Musawwat* in Cairo in 1955. It was republished under the title "Ana" (I) in *al-Thaqafa* 87 (1985): 11–36.

44. Ibrahimi, "Ana," 17–18.

45. Ibrahimi, "Murshid al-mu'allamin" (A Guide for Teachers), *al-Basa'ir*, February 21, 1949, in *Athar*, 3:162–64.

46. Bell, *Diaries*, October 11, 1919.

47. Thompson, *Colonial Citizens*.

48. Ibrahimi, "Ana," 21.

49. Ibrahimi, interview with Jamal Salim, *al-Jumhuriya*, July 5, 1962, in *Athar*, 5:303–4.

50. Administrator CPE Tébessa, June 21, 1945, AWC SR 387.

51. Dabbuz, *'Alam al-Islah*, 1:76; *al-Najah*, January 14, 1930.

52. Nasir, *al-Maqalat al-sahafiyya*, 373.

53. *Al-Najah*, January 15, 1930.

54. Ibrahimi, "Ana," 21.

55. Sa'adallah, "Al-Shaykh al-Ibrahimi fi Tlimsan," (Shaykh Ibrahimi in Tlemcen) in *Abhath*, 3:49–85; Ahmad Talib-Ibrahimi, introduction to *Athar*, vol. 1. On funding methods, Prefect Constantine to GGA, May 10, 1938, AOM 16 H 75.

56. Messali, *Mémoires*, 233; Stora, *Ils venaient d'Algérie*, 72–73; Bu Safsaf, *Jama'iat al-'Ulama*, 338–40; Ibrahimi, *al-Basa'ir*, March 6, 1950, in *Athar*, 3:224–25. The figures are from Bu Safsaf.

57. Qasiba, "al-Shaikh Ibrahimi fi manfa fi madinat Aflu" (Shaikh Ibrahimi in exile in the town of Aflou), 292; Merad, *Réformisme musulman*, 92; al-Hasani, "al-Siyaq al-ta'rikhi" (The Historical Thread), *Athar*, 2:14.

58. Garaudy, *Mon tour du siècle en solitaire*, 69–88; Jurquet, "Amar Ouzegane," *Parcours* 11 (1989): 43–48.

59. Administrateur principal de la délégation spéciale to Prefect Constantine, June 21, 1945, AWC SR 387.

60. Al-Hasani, "al-Siyaq al-ta'rikhi," in *Athar*, 3:18.

61. Ibrahimi, speech at Comité d'Amnistie, April 18, 1946, SIDM report, April 27, 1946, AOM 16 H 80.

62. *Al-Basa'ir*, June 19, 1950.

63. Sa'adallah, "Al-Amir Shakib Arslan wa-l-qadiya al-Jaza'iriyya" (Arslan and the Algerian Problem), *Abhath*, 4:114–38.

64. Sa'adallah, *Ta'rikh al-Jaza'ir al-thaqafi*, 8:181.

65. Ibrahimi, "al-Ustadh 'Ali al-Hamami," *al-Basa'ir*, December 26, 1949; Ibrahimi, "Fi tashyi' al-faqid 'Ali al-Hamami" (On the Burial of the Deceased 'Ali al-Hamami), *al-Basa'ir*, January 9, 1950, in *Athar*, 2:332–34.

66. Abaza, *Debates on Islam and Knowledge in Malaysia and Egypt*, 135.

67. BMQI, March 1952, AOM 16 H 80.

68. Douglas, "The Free Yemeni Movement," in Pridham, ed., *Contemporary Yemen*, 41; Ibrahimi, "al-Fudayl al-Wartilani," *al-Basa'ir*, November 5, 1951, in *Athar*, 4:591–93; Wartilani, *al-Jaza' al-tha'ira* (Revolutionary Algeria), 283–84; al-Ahnaf, "Al-Fudhayl al-Wartilani, un Algérien au Yémen," *Chroniques yéménites*, no. 7 (1999).

69. Abu 'Amran al-Qsuntini, "Risala maftuha ila Bashir Ibrahimi" (Open Letter to Bashir Ibrahimi), *Ifriqiya Shamaliyya*, March 21, 1951.

70. BMQI, December 1952, AOM 16 H 81.

71. Sa'adallah, "Azma jami'yat al-'ulama."

72. BMQI, November 1954, AOM 16 H 81.

73. Ibid., July 1955, AOM 16 H 80; Ibrahimi, "Shira't al-harb fi-l-Islam" (The Law of War in Islam), *Athar*, 5:92–94.

74. Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, chap. 5.

75. McDougall, *History and the Culture of Nationalism*, 141.

76. BMQI, December 5, 1955, and November 7, 1957 AOM 16 H 80.

77. Madani, *Hayat kifah*, 3:121.

78. Ibrahimi, "Ana," 15; B. Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India*, 108–9.

79. On the poet Ahmad Shawqi, see *Athar*, 5:200–209, 226–29; on Muhammad al-'Aid, see ibid., 5:256–59.

80. Claire de Casabianca, "L'exigence de vérité, envers et contre tout," *Archives de Réforme*, January 21, 2006; Madani, *Hayat kifah*, 3:299.

81. Ibrahimi, *Mémoires d'un Algérien*, vol. 1.

82. Amar Ouzegane, "Un patriot intransigeant," *Révolution Africaine*, May 29, 1965.

83. Christelow, "Bashir Ibrahimi," 99–122.

84. Carlier, "Médina et modernité," 219.

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Index

Abbas, Ferhat, 123, 128
'Abbas Hilmi, Khedive, 94
'Abd al-Qadir, 'Abd al-Raziq, 109
'Abd al-Qadir, Amir: family divisions, 51, 60; freemason, 59, 176; Ibn Khaldun's theory and, 175; Ibrahimi's view of, 123–24; pilgrimage 1864, 58–59; product of transitional era, 182; refugee, 50, 183–84; relations with British, 56–57; resistance 1832–47, 56–57; revolt of 1871 and, 60, 71, 75; Suez Canal construction, 59; surrender and exile, 57–58; wife Lalla Khaira, 58; Ahmad Zaoui comparison, 172. *See also* Bin 'Abd al-Qadir, Amir 'Ali; Bin 'Ali, 'Abd al-Qadir; Allal; Bu Talib family; Hashimi, Amir al-; Khalid Bin al-Hashimi, Amir; Mahi al-Din; Malik, Amir; 'Umar, Amir
'Abid, Ahmad Izzat Pasha al-: idea of Hijaz Mission, 1916, 99; marriage tie to Amir 'Ali, 62, 92; role in WWI, 94
'Abid, Muhammad 'Ali, president of Syrian Republic, 99
'Abid, Naziq al-: 'Abd al-Qadir family network, 16; school for war orphan girls, 120–21, 179
Abidi, Tahir al-, 100
Abu Doha, Haydar, 159
Abu Madyan, Shu'ayb, 116
Adams, Lorraine, 162
Ad-Da'wa Mosque, Paris, 154–55
Afghanistan, 142–44, 159, 167, 185
Africa, sub-Saharan: French colonial expansion, 78–79
Africans, sub-Saharan, in North Africa: in early colonial Algeria, 12; Gnawa, 152
Afro-Asian Movment, 138
Ain Milia, 118
Aïr Mountains, Niger, 90
Alatas, Hussein, 126
Alexandria, 47
Algeria: regional divisions, 91
Algerian-British relations, 44, 47, 198–99n81. *See also* Darqawa Sufi order
Algerian communities in France, 141, 150–51, 184
Algerian-French relations: 1790s, 36; early 1800s, 41
Algerian Refugee Council, 165
Algerian-Tunisian Brotherhood, 62, 88
Algerine Spy in Pennsylvania, 31–33
Algiers: as Ottoman base, 8; Kahhul assassination, 1936, 115; saving of New Mosque, 72
Alien and Sedition Act, 196n27
'Ali Pasha, Dey, 27
Alkarama for Human Rights, 166
Allal (nephew of Amir 'Abd al-Qadir), 57
Almohad Empire: Bennabi's image of, 137; in Ibn Khaldun's theory of historical cycles, 175; intellectual life, 7
Anas, 'Abdullah, 143, 159
Andalus: image in theater, 112; in Malik Bennabi's ideas, 182; Muhammad Bin L'arbi's trip, 1883
Annaba: attacks on Italian merchants, 44; illegal immigrant departure point, 161; religion and politics, 1948, 118
Arab nationalism: Tahir al-Jaza'iri, 11; Young Turk policy, 90
Aroua, 'Abbas, 166
Arslan, Shakib, 125
Art. *See* Mathiot brothers; Rasim, Muhammad; Rasim, 'Umar
'*Asabiya* (solidarity, enthusiasm), 5, 175, 188
Associations Cultuelles Musulmanes, 117
Asylum: Canada, 184; Haddam case in U.S., 148

Atfiyash, Muhammad Bin Yusuf, 84
Aumale, Duc d', 74
Aurès rebellion, 1916–17, 91, 102
Australia, 163, 169
'Azzam, 'Abdullah, 144, 159

Bachtarzi, Mahi al-Din, 113–14
Bali, Indonesia bombings, 163
Bande déssinée (comic strip), 18, 114–15
Barcelo, General Antonio, 30
Barranis (rural immigrant workers in cities): comparison to Algerians in France, 151; decline of, 70; organization, 11–12, 67–69, 183; transition to new patterns, 110, 184. See also *Beur*
Baruni, Sulayman al-, 84–85, 91
Bash Hanba, 'Ali, 91, 93, 106
Bash Tarzi, 'Abd al-Karim, 206n66
Bassaline, Alejandro, 29
Batna: new mosque, 110–11
Bayhum-Jaza'iri, Adila, 16, 121
Begag, Azouz, 168
Belbacha, Ahmad, 161
Belbachir, Hassiba, 163
Belkhader, 'Abd al-'Aziz, 145
Bell, Gertrude, 120–21
Ben 'Ali, Ahmad, 1, 14, 16, 36–37, 176
Benamane, Kamal, 143
Ben Bella, Ahmad, 23, 129, 166
Benbrika, 'Abd al-Nasir, 163
Bencheikh El Hocine, 'Abbas: ambassador to Riyadh, 129; head of Paris Mosque, 154; mediation with Ibrahimi, 128; support for PPA, 119, 128, 129
Bencherif, 'Uthman, 147–48
Bendjelloul, Doctor, 118
Ben Gana, Bu 'Aziz, 91
Ben Gana family, 130
Benhabylès, Chérif, 105
Ben Houra, Muhammad, 123
Benkalfat, Janina Messali, 162
Ben Meshkan, Ahmad, 78
Bennabi, Malik: in Cairo, 1954–63, 138; enduring impact of, 185; in France and Germany, WWII, 135–36; influence of Mohand Tazerout, 106; influence on Anwar Ibrahim, 213n87; in Paris, 1930s, 133–34; product of transitional era, 182; return to Algeria, 138–39; writing, 1945–54, 136–37; youth, 85, 133
Bensaddek, Bachir, 163
Bentham, Jeremy, 45, 199n98
Beur (North African youth in France), 13, 194n56. See also *Barranis*
Bhabha, Homi, 4
Bin 'Abd al-Qadir, Amir 'Ali (son of Amir 'Abd al-Qadir): exile to Bursa, 1916, 94; marriage tie to Izzat Pasha al-'Abid, 62–63, 99, 120; political role under CUP, 92; Sulayman al-Baruni tie, 85
Bin 'Ali, 'Abd al-Qadir (grandson of Amir 'Abd al-Qadir): conflict with T. E. Lawrence, 96; escape from Bursa, 1917, 94; killing of, 1918, 98; role in Damascus, 1918, 97; role in Hijaz, 1917, 95–96; support for girls' education, 120; support for newspaper *al-Muhajir*, 201n49; visit to Cairo, 1915, 93
Bin 'Ali, Muhammad al-Sa'id (grandson of Amir 'Abd al-Qadir): anti-French propaganda, 92; diplomatic role, 1918, 97; role in WWI, 93
Bin al-Muhub, Mulud, 100
Bin al-Sharif, 'Abd al-Qadir, 40
Bin 'Azuz, al-Makki, 88–89, 100, 126
Bin Badis, 'Abd al-Hamid: and Bashir Ibrahimi, 122; family's political influence, 117–18; ties with Sufi leader, 100
Bin Badis, al-Makki, 72
Bin Ghabrit, Qaddur: founder of Paris Mosque, 113; interpreter in Morocco, 80–81; leader of Hijaz Mission, 1916, 99, 101–2
Bin Hamana, 'Abbas, 84–85
Bin Laden, Usama, 144, 159
Bin L'arbi, Dr. Muhammad, 71–72
Bin Qaddur, 'Umar, 20
Bin Ruwila, Ahmad Bin Qaddur, 78
Bin Salim, Ahmad al-Tayyib, 58
Biskra: attack on Moroccan railway workers, 203n80; *hijra*, 1896, 55; Huhu family, 130–31; recruitment of camel troops, 1775, 28; refugees in Tunisia, 54; setting for Hichens, *Garden of Allah*, 199n2
Biskris, as urban workers, 69, 115, 131
Black September, 143
Blaquière, Edward, 42, 47–48, 198n81, 199n98
Blunt, Fanny, 57
Bosnia, 141–42, 144–45, 162
Bouazizi, Muhammad, 187
Bouchikhi, Ahmad, 143
Bouchikhi, Chico, 152
Bouchikhi, Zubir, 155
Boudia, Muhammad, 143

Boukabouya, Rabah, 106
Boumediene, Huwari, 23, 129, 139, 180
Boumediene v. Bush, 145
Brahimi, 'Abd al-Hamid, 144, 165
Brahimi, Rym, 164
"Brain drain" from Algeria, 181
Brémond, Colonel, 95–96, 100, 102
Brown and Root-Condor, 148
Bruguière, Judge Jean-Louis, 170
Bu Darba, Isma'il, 203n104
Burghul, 'Ali, 34
Burkina Faso: internment of terrorism suspects, 154, 170
Bursa, Anatolia (Turkey): exile of 'Abd al-Qadir's family, 1916, 94; exile of Amir 'Abd al-Qadir, 1852–55, 57
Busnach, Naphtali, 42
Busquant, Émilie, 162
Bu Talib family, 60
Bu Talib, 'Abd al-Qadir, 64
Bu Talib, Abu Bakr, 65–66, 83, 92
Bu Talib, Ahmad al-Mujahid, 65
Bu Talib, Ahmad Bin 'Ali, 63
Bu Talib, 'Ali Bin Ahmad, 63
Buti, Sa'id Ramadan al-, 155

Cadi, Colonel Sharif, 101
Cairo: Algerian refugees, 22; base for anti-colonial movements, 85–89; center of cultural innovation, 113; Maghreb Bureau, 125; North African community, 40, 62–63
Cambon, Governor General Jules, 74
Camus, Albert, 15
Canada: Algerian immigrants, 162–63, 184, 214n7; deportation policy, 162, 165; refugees, 214n90; Ahmad Ressam, 162, 184
Captivity experience: Algerian POWs in WWI, 89, 106–7; Americans in Algiers, 33–36; Hassiba Belbachir, 164; Malik Bennabi, 124–36; 'Umar Bin Qaddur, 103; Rabah Boukabouya, 106; Chicago suicide, 213n69; Roger Garaudy, 123; Hammondsworth Detention Center, 161; Hasan Pasha, 29–31; Ahmad Talib Ibrahimi, 21, 129; Bashir Ibrahimi, 123–24; Qamar al-Din Kherbane, 144; Ahmad Tawfiq al-Madani, 104–5; 'Umar Rasim, 20, 103; Jean Scelles, 20; Muhammad and Fatima Sekkoum, 165; Tayyib al-'Uqbi, 115, 124; Ahmad Zaoui, 171–72. *See also* Psychological warfare
Catholic Church. *See* Duval, Léon Étienne; Massignon, Louis; Pères Blancs; Sant' Egidio, Catholic Community of; Scelles, Jean; Tessier, Henri; Tibhirine monastery
Catholic orphanages, 20
Cercle Salah Bey, 70
Cezayrili, Hasan Pasha, 17–28, 35
Chaoui urban workers, 69
Chaulet, Anne-Marie, 132
Chechnya, 141–42
Cholera: Algeria, 1860s, 71–73, 179; Crimean War, 77; as metaphor, 180; Ottoman Empire, 1913, 87
Churchill, Charles Henry, 56–57
Citizenship rights: in colonial Algeria, 10; Statut d'Algérie, 1947, 12, 112
Civil society: closing in early 1950s, 127; impact of Algerian revolution, 19; opening in post-WWI Algeria, 111–13
Clash of civilizations, 185
Clauzel, Marshal, 47
Clinton, President Bill, 148
Code switching: 'Abd al-Qadir in Bursa, 57; Bin al-Muhub's illness, 100; *boulitique*, 137; concept, 4, 36; Haddam in U.S., 147; Ibrahimi-Garaudy discussion, 124; Kechat and interfaith dialogue, 155; Kherbane and Anas in Britain, 144–45; Ksentini narrative, 112; Mehmet in *The Algerine Spy*, 32; Moriscos, 7; Richard O'Brien, 37–38; *siditoyen*, 66
Cohen, Jacob Raphael, 32
Colonial mentality, 137, 176, 187
Communication technology: comparison of handwritten and electronic communication, 181; electronic communication, 19, 185, 187; handwritten communication and prophetic discourse, 18. *See also* Innis, Harold
Communists, 123, 126
Conscription: evasion, 1980s–1990s, 157–58; law of 1912, 66; post-independence Algeria, 157–58, 180; reaction against 1912 law, 84, 103; soldiers and workers in France, 106, 179
Conseil Français du Culte Musulman, 22, 154
Constantine city: attacks on Mzabis, 203n80; commercial boycotts of Jews and Mzabis, 1955, 132; conflicts with Jews, 1934, 115; Darqawa rebels attack, 1805, 41–42
Constantine province: grain trade, 26, 34
Converts to Islam. *See* Depui, Captain Ibrahim; Eberhardt, Isabelle; Garaudy, Roger; Kent, Shane; Urbain, Ismail

Convivencia, 24, 71
Cultural hybridity: in art and music, 113–15; concept, 4; neo-Moorish architecture, 72

Daghies, Hasuna, 45–48
Damascus: Algerian refugees, 58, 183–84; attacks on Christians, 1860, 58; Gertrude Bell visit, 1919, 120–21; Bashir Ibrahimi, 120; intellectual innovation, 177; WWI, 91–92, 97–98
Dan Fodio, Asma'u, 79
Dan Fodio, 'Uthman, 78–79
Darqawa Sufi order, 42–43; British support, 47; rebellion of 1805, 21, 42–43, 142, 175
Decatur, Stephen, 44
De Lesseps, Ferdinand, 59
Del Valle, Alexandre, 155
Demography of Algeria: decline of birth rates, 1990s, 181; impact of epidemics, famine, 1860s, 71–73
De Neveu, Édouard, 40
Depui, Captain Ibrahim, 101
Deraa, Syria, 96, 98
De Rochefort, Henri, 74
Desrayaux, Jeanne, 85
Dialogue, cross-cultural: Chico Bouchikhi, 153; in music and theater, 185
Dialogue, interfaith: Algerian Youth for Social Action, 117; Algiers, 1930s, 115; Malik Bennabi, 134, 138, 182; *Confluent* journal, 140; Léon Étienne Duval, 132; France, 1990s–2000s, 155; Ahmad Rida Huhu, 131; L'arbi Kechat, 153–55, 183; André Mandouze, 132; Ahmad Zaoui and Henri Tessier, 170; Zaoui in New Zealand, 172–73
Dialogue, Islamic and secular ideas: Ibrahimi-Garaudy meeting, 123–24. *See also* Masons
Djeha, 114
Domenach, Jean-Marie, 137
Druze: ties to 'Abd al-Qadir's family, 95–96
Duval, Léon Étienne, 132, 140, 146–47

Earthquakes: Algiers, 1802, 41; Batna, 1924, 111; Blida, 1825, 47; Bursa, 1855, 58; Oran, 1790, 34
Eberhardt, Isabelle, 16
Economy: Algerian debt crisis, 1994, 149–50; downturn, mid-1980s, 181; grain exports, 1780s, 34, 175; oil and, 178
El Oued, 100
Enver Pasha: support for Libyan resistance, 91; support for Pan Islam, 89; ties to Muhammad al-Sa'id, 92–94; ties to Sulayman al-Baruni, 85; view of Germany, 87
Exmouth expedition, 1816, 44
Extradition of terror suspects, 160

Faisal Bin Husain, Sharif: British ties, 95–96; capture of Damascus, 97–98; hostility to Bashir Ibrahimi, 120; visit to Damascus, 1915, 93
Family Code, 1984, 153, 166
Famine, 1866–68, 70
Fanon, Frantz, 6, 20, 176, 187
Fatimid Empire, 175, 188
Fauchet, Citizen, 36
Fayd, Husain Ahmad al-, 128
Fennec (Desert Fox), 185
FIS (Islamic Salvation Front): Algerianist wing, 144–45, 181; Rome Conference and, 147, 178
FLN (Front de Libération National), 127–28, 180
Fondation Nord-Sud, 166
French debt for Algerian grain shipments, 41
Frobenius, Leo, 93
Front for the Defense of North Africa, 126
Frontier society, 3–5, 185, 192n15

Garaudy, Roger, 20, 123
Gaspirali, Ismail Bey, 11
Genêt, Citizen, 36
Germans: Algeria policy, WWII, 135; alliance with Ottoman Empire, 87–89; explorers, 63; prisoners of war, 89, 106; role in 1871 revolt, 60; role in Morocco rebellion, 1915–18, 90–91. *See also* Frobenius, Leo; Malik, Amir; Tazerout, Mohand
Ghunaymi, 'Abd al-Ghani, 61
Ghusain, Fayiz al-, 98
GIA (Groupe Islamique Armée): Afghanistan returnees, 144; Tibhirine massacre, 148; violence in Europe, 170
Gibraltar, 30
Girls' education: Algeria, post-WWII, 112, 120; Egypt, early 1900s, 85. *See also* 'Abid, Naziq al-; Desrayaux, Jeanne; Huhu, Ahmad Rida
Gnawa, 152
Gozlan, Elie, 115
Guantánamo, 145, 161
Gülen, Fethullah, 178
Guyana prison colony, 20
Gypsies, 152

Habermas, Jürgen, 4, 174
Haddad, 'Aziz, 74–76, 103
Haddad, Bilqasim al-Rahmani al-, 68
Haddad, M'hammed, 74
Haddad, Shaikh Mohand Amezian, 73
Haddam, Anwar, 17; asylum denial, 148; mediator, 145; opposition to negotiation, 170
Hafidh, Sultan of Morocco, 100
Hajj, Messali. *See* Messali Hajj
Hajj Ahmad, al-, Bey of Constantine, 69
Hajj (Pilgrimage to Mecca): clandestine pilgrims, 84; colonial administration control, 177; pilgrimage of 1885, 72; pilgrimage of 1916, 99–102
Halliburton, 148
Hamami, 'Ali al-, 125–26
Hamdan Khodja, 16, 44–46, 57, 182
Harkis (Algerians in French armed forces), 20–21
Harraga (clandestine migration), 13, 15, 158, 161–62
Hasan Pasha, Dey: captivity and negotiation with Spanish, 14, 29–31; negotiation with Americans, 33–34; reign as Dey, 25–26. *See also* Khadija
Hashimi, Amir al- (son of Amir 'Abd al-Qadir): mother, 60; move from Syria to Algeria, 92; ties with Muhammad al-Muqrani, 75–76. *See also* Khalid Bin al-Hashimi, Amir
Hichens, Robert, 199n2
Hijaz Mission, 1916, 99–102
Hijaz Railway, 62–63, 84
Hijra (flight from infidel conquest): end of, 1918, 83; in Islamic law, 10; response to conscription law, 1911, 86; response to French conquest, 50, 53–55, 177
Historical cycles, 175
Hoggar Institute, Geneva, 166
Hogra (contempt), 187
Houston, Texas, 155
Hugo, Victor, 71
Huhu, Ahmad Rida, 130–32
Humor: in popular commentary, 27, 66, 77, 105. *See also Bande déssinée*; Benhabylès, Chérif; Bennabi, Malik; Bash Tarzi, 'Abd al-Karim; Zahhar, al-Hajj Ahmad al-Sharif al-
Husain, Muhammad al-Khidr, 88–90, 126
Husain, Sharif of Mecca: criticism by Ibrahimi, 121; meeting with 'Abd al-Qadir Bin 'Ali, 1917, 95–97; meeting with Amir Sa'id, 1915, 89; tensions with Faisal, 95; in WWI, 63, 89, 94, 128
Husain Dey, 41, 44, 47
Hybrid identity: concept, 16. *See also* Eberhardt, Isabelle; Urbain, Ismail

Ibadi sect, 84, 123, 207n24. *See also* Baruni, Sulayman al-; Jabal Nafusa; Mzabis
Ibn Abu Juma'a, Ahmad, 8
Ibn al-Ahrash, Muhammad, 40–42
Ibn al-'Annabi, Muhammad, 16, 44–47, 182
Ibn al-Malik, Muhammad, 43, 198n78
Ibn Khaldun, 5, 175, 188
Ibrahimi, Ahmad Talib, 21
Ibrahimi, Muhammad al-Bashir: break with FLN, 1956, 128–30; Cairo, 1952–56, 127; comparison to L'arbi Kechat, 155; Damascus, 1917–20, 120; *hijra*, 1911, 86; internment during WWII, 123; in Madina, 88; Pakistan, 1955, 128; product of transitional era, 182; protest against repression, 1948, 118; Dr. Smati as patron, 119; Tlemcen, 1933–39, 121–22; 'Ulama leader, 1945–52, 123–25; 'Uqbi's attacks against, 116
IMF (International Monetary Fund), 145, 149–50
Immigrants, illegal: Algerians outside of France, 180; detention centers, 161; sub-Saharan Africans, 141–42
Immigration and refugee law: asylum and conscription, 153; Zubir Bouchikhi case, 155; extradition of terror suspects, 160; family reunification, 151; marriage, 157, 164; migration restrictions for workers, 156; opening of travel for diplomats and merchants, 1820s, 44–45
Impagliazzo, Marco, 146
Indonesia, 126, 163
Innis, Harold, 6
Interpreters, 77–79
Iran, 144, 145
Iraq, 141–42
Islamic Jihad (organization), 144
Islamic schools: Annaba PPA school, 118; Association of 'Ulama schools, 121–24; Bin Hamana school, Tebessa, 84; enrollment increase post-WWII, 112; funding, 111; Oran, 1790s, 35
Israel, 109, 143, 148, 152
Ittihad al-Maghribi, al- (Maghrib Unity), 62, 87–88
Izzat Pasha. *See* 'Abid, Ahmad Izzat Pasha al-

Jabal Nafusa, Libya, 84
Jamal Pasha: distrust of 'Abd al-Qadir's family, 92–94, 96; May 1916 crackdown, 89, 94; possible alliance with British, 94

Janissaries, 8, 25, 45–46
Jaza'iri, Salim al-: upbringing, 61; execution, May 1916, 94
Jaza'iri, Tahir al-: comparison to Bashir Ibrahimi, 86; education and early career, 61–64; exile in Cairo, 90; idea of Arab national identity, 11, 177; mason, 62; ties with 'Abd al-Qadir al-Majjawi, 80. *See also* Jaza'iri, Salim al-
Jerusalem: Abu Madyan *waqf*, 116; attacks on Christian communities, 1909, 92
Jews in Algeria: Algerian Jews in Virginia, 1785, 31; Algiers, 28; attacks on, 1805, 42–43; commercial networks, 32; Constantine boycott, 1955, 132; Constantine clashes, 1934, 115; Isma'il Hamet's book on names, 204n107; the Kahina, 172; nostalgia for Algeria, 214n91; Oran, 1790s, 35; revocation of Crémiux Decree, 135, 177; rivalry with Moorish merchants, 45; stereotypes, 105. *See also* Cohen, Jacob Raphael; Gozlan, Elie; Kinstler, Tsalina; Wolf, John; Yafil, Edmond
Jihad volunteers, 1980s, 159, 180
Jonnart, Governor, 85

Kababti, Mustafa al-, 53–54
Kabyles: legal status in French Algeria, 11; as urban workers, 67. *See also Barranis*; Wartilani, Fudayl al-
Kaci, Nadia, 153
Kahhul, Mahmud, 115
Kateb, Amazigh, 152
Kateb Yacin, 143, 151–52
Kebir, Rabah, 147, 170
Kechat, L'arbi, 154–55
Kennedy, John F., 23
Kent, Shane, 163
Khadija (daughter of Hasan Pasha), 39, 197n54
Khaira, Lalla (Amir 'Abd al-Qadir's first wife), 58, 60, 63
Khalid Bin al-Hashimi, Amir (grandson of Amir 'Abd al-Qadir): Bu Talib connection, 66; departure from Damascus, 75; criticism by 'Umar Rasim, 104; education, 60–61; letter from 'Abd al-Qadir Bin 'Ali, 94–95; meeting with Amir 'Ali, 104; rescue of Malik, 64; study at French military academy, 92
Khaldi, Doctor, 136
Khalifa, Rafiq, 160
Kherbane, Qamar al-Din, 143, 159
Khodja, Hamdan. *See* Hamdan Khodja
Kinstler, Tsalina, 109
Ksentini, Rashid, 111–12
Kulughlis, 16, 44, 176, 182; in Tlemcen, 56, 106. *See also* Ben 'Ali, Ahmad; Hamdan Khodja; Ibn al-'Annabi, Muhammad

Laghouat, 122–23
Lahmak, Husain, 134
Laimeche, Sofaine, 162
Lallaoui, Mahdi, 168
Lamb, John, 33
Lawrence, T. E.: controversy over Deraa story, 96; role in Damascus, 1918, 97–98; view of 'Abd al-Qadir's grandsons, 93, 96
Legal problems in measures against suspected terrorists: Ahmad Belbacha, 161; Benamar Benatta, 212n59; Ahmad Bouchikhi, 143; Zubir Bouchikhi, 155; *Boumediene v. Bush*, 145; evidence problems, 145, 161; Anwar Haddam, 148; Adlène Hicheur, 167; Human Concern International, 144; institutional paranoia, 185; L'arbi Kechat, 154–55; ricin incident, 2003, 160; Lotfi Raïssi, 159–60; Ahmad Zaoui, 171. *See also* Captivity experience
Lenz, Oskar, 63
Libya: Italian invasion, 1911, 84–85; WWI resistance, 90–91
Loucif, Ahmad, 118
Lyautey, Marshal, 22, 99–100

Machias, Maine, 38
Madani, 'Abbasi, 147
Madani, Ahmad Tawfiq al-: editor of Zahhar's Memoirs, 195n4; family in Tunisia, 55; prison experience, 104–5; refugee in Cairo, 138; Saudi Arabia trip, 1957, 129
Madina: Huhu family, 131; Bashir Ibrahimi's exile, 86–88
Maghreb Bureau, Cairo, 125–26
Mahdi: rumors in 1893, 55, 74
Mahi al-Din (son of Amir 'Abd al-Qadir), 60, 73, 76
Majjawi, 'Abd al-Qadir al-: early life and writing, 64–65; link to Mizab scholars, 84–85; link to Tahir al-Jaza'iri, 80, 83, 177; teacher at Médersa of Algiers, 70
Malek, Rida, 145, 149–50, 185
Malik, Amir (son of Amir 'Abd al-Qadir): letter from 'Abd al-Qadir Bin 'Ali, 96; rescue by Khalid, 64; role in Morocco rebellion, 88–90, 125, 177

Mandouze, André, 132
Mansur, Hajj, 34
Markoe, Peter, 11, 32
Marriage, mixed: Algerian-Israeli, 109; *barrani* communities, 69, 202n78; Bennabi, 134; Isma'il Bu Darba, 203n104; emigrants and refugees, 176; in interwar Algeria, 109; Kulughlis in Ottoman Algeria, 44–45; Messali, 134; *métis*, 16, 109; urban immigrants, 69. *See also* Benkalfat, Janina Messali; Ksentini, Rashid; Morsly, Dr. Hajj Tayyib; Zohrab, Mary
Marriage age, 1990s, 180
Marriage and immigration law, 162–64, 168, 170, 213n70
Marriage and political alliance: Algerians in Damascus, 16, 60, 62–63, 92, 99, 120; Bin Gana and 'Abd al-Qadir family, 91; Hajj Mansur's daughter, 34; Khadija and Richard O'Brien, 39; refusal by Dey, 55; Rym Brahimi, 164
Marsa al-Kabir, 30, 35
Marsini, Jamal Pasha al-, 97
Mascara, Algeria: sharifian lineages, 200n22; uprising 1914, 102
Masons, 2, 37, 38, 176. *See also* 'Abd al-Qadir, Amir; Jaza'iri, Tahir
Massignon, Louis: support for Tayyib al-'Uqbi, 115–16, 123; tense relation with Malik Bennabi, 134, 136
Mathiot brothers (André and Eugène), 114
Médersa Supérieur, Algiers, 65
Mediation of conflict: Ben Bella and Iraq, 166; Lakhdar Brahimi in Afghanistan, 184; Buti in Syria, 1995, 156; Hasan Pasha and Spain, 29–31; Rida Malek in Iran, 1980, 184; negotiation framework, 23, 33, 36; Rome Conference, 145–47; John Wolf and American captives, 33; Ahmad al-Zuwawi in Mecca, 1916, 101
Medical study: 'Abbas Aroua, 165–66; Hamdan Khodja, 46; in Islamic discourse, 125; Bin L'arbi, 71, 179; Ahmad Talib Ibrahimi, 125; Morsly, 72; 'Abd al-Qadir Smati, 119
Mesli, Rashid, 17
Messali Hajj: cousin in 1913 pilgrimage, 87; daughter Janina in Canada, 162; military service in France, 106–7; opposition to 'Ulama, 122, 128
Messaoud, Khalida, 166
Mila, 119
Mili, Mubarak al-, 119
Military officers. *See* Cadi, Colonel Sharif; Khalid Bin al-Hashimi, Amir
Military recruitment. *See* Conscription; *Tirailleurs indigènes*; Jihad volunteers; Zuwawa
Mizon Expedition, 78
Montreal, Canada: Algerian immigrant community, 162–63, 184
Moriscos, 7–8, 21
Morocco: French conquest, 83; preservation of tradition under colonial rule, 184; rebellion during WWI, 88–90; refuge after French conquest of Algeria, 53–54; refuge for Sufi orders, 39
Morsly, Dr. Hajj Tayyib, 72
Mosque of Paris, 22, 154
Mossad, 143, 152
Muhammad al-Kabir Dey, 25, 34–35, 39–40, 196n27
Muhammad 'Uthman Dey, 23–27, 34–35
Muqrani, Muhammad: external ties, 46; revolt of 1871 and escape to Syria, 19, 73–76
Music: Mahi al-Din Bachtarzi, 113–14; Amazigh Kateb, 152; Shaikha Rimitti, 114; Rachid Taha, 168
Muslim Brotherhood: Bashir Ibrahimi, 127; Fudayl al-Wartilani, 123; Syria crackdown, 1980s, 156
Mustafa Dey, 41, 43
Mzabis: Constantine boycotts, 1955, 137; Constantine riots, 1887, 203n80; urban merchants, 69. *See also* Bin Hamana, 'Abbas; Ibadi sect
Mzitis, 69

Nafta, Tunisia, 88
Najjar, Fatima Zuhra al-, 112, 207n13
Napoleon, 39–41
Nasiri, Abu Ra's al-, 39
Neo-Sufi movements, 39, 175, 177
New Caledonia prison colony, 20, 74, 167–69
Newspapers and magazines: *al-Asad al-Islami*, 85; *Asa Musa*, 116; *al-Basa'ir*, 118; *Dhu al-Fiqar*, 103; *al-Faruq*, 103; *al-Ihya*, 85; in colonial Algeria, 18; *Le Jeune Musulman*, 117; journalists killed, 1990s, 19; *Kawkib Ifriqiya*, 83; *Majallat al-Jaza'ir*, 103; *al-Muayyad*, 61; *al-Muhajir*, 62; *al-Najah*, 133; *an-Nasr*, 114; *La République Algérienne*, 126, 136, 137; *Révolution Africaine*, 139; *Ya Allah*, 104
New Zealand: escape of 'Aziz al Haddad, 1881, 74; Zaoui asylum case, 171
NGOs (non-governmental organizations). *See* Algerian Refugee Council; Alkarama for Human Rights; Fondation Nord-Sud; Hoggar Institute; Projet Porte Parole

Norway, 143, 152
Nuclear scientists, 167, 181

O'Brien, Richard, 14, 33, 37, 197n48
Oran (city): fall of, 1792, 34–36; Spanish control, 30
Oran (province): as base for rebel movements, 39
O'Reilly, Alejandro, 28
Ouargla protests, 2004, 142
Ouzegane, Amar, 123

Pakistan, 126, 128
Pananti, Filippo, 45–48, 198n81
Pan Arab Conference, 1945, 124
Pan-Islam, 55, 62, 87, 128
Paris: *banlieue* riots, 2005, 155, 194n55; Metro bombing 1995, 141, 178; mosque construction, 156
Paris Commune, 1871, 74
Paris Peace Conference, 1919, 91
Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA), 118–19, 122, 126
Parti Populaire Français, 135
Pères Blancs (White Fathers), 115, 134
Peuchet, Jacques, 48
Philadelphia, 32
Philippeville (Skikda) massacre, 1955, 177
Phoenix, Arizona, 162
Plague: Algeria, 1785, 31; 1817, 44; Mecca pilgrimage, 1885, 72; medical study, 46; political metaphor, 174–75; outbreak in AQIM camp, 178; rural-urban migration and, 67; Western Mediterranean, 1348, 8
Prison. *See* Captivity experience
Projet Porte Parole, 184
Psychological warfare, 20
Public sphere, 4–6, 174–75

Qai'da, al-, 159, 163, 167
Qai'da in the Islamic Maghrib, al- (AQIM), 178
Qutb, Sayyid, 139

Radio: Radio Paris, 113; Voice of the Arabs, 127; in WWII, 123
Rahmaniyya Sufi order: alliance with Darqawa, 1805, 42–43; El Oued, 100; rebellion of 1871, 63, 73–74; Tunisia and eastern Algeria, 88
Ra'is, 'Ali, 44
Raïssi, Lutfi, 159–60, 162
Randolph, Edmond, 36
Rasim, Muhammad, 104
Rasim, 'Umar: opposition to war, 1914, 103–4; prison experience, 20
Raynal, Abbé, 48–49
Red Crescent, 84
Refugees: and 1980s jihads, 141; Algerian Refugee Council, 165; British policy, 144–45, 159; Canada deportation policy, 162, 165; from colonial Algeria, 50; conscription and asylum seeking, 157; Germany, 147; London, 1990s, 159; United States, 147
Ressam, Ahmad, 159, 162
Ricardi, Andrea, 146
Ricin poison, 160
Rida, Rashid: dispute with Salah al-Sharif, 89; flight to Cairo, 90; meeting with Ibrahimi, 86; role in WWI, 99, 101
Rimitti, Shaikha, 114
Roches, Léon, 63
Rome Conference, 1994–95, 145–48, 178
Russia: expansion into Muslim lands, 8, 27; frontier conflicts, 1980s, 24; Muslim refugees from, 52

Safayahi, Isma'il, 62
Sa'id, Amir. *See* Bin 'Ali, Muhammad al-Sa'id
Saint John, Robert, 45, 57
Saint-Saëns, Camille, 113
Saklawi, al-Mahdi al-, 58
Salah Bey, 25, 34–35
Sant' Egidio, Catholic Community of, 140, 145–49
Sanusi, Muhammad Bin 'Ali al-, 40, 51
Sanusiyya Sufi order: foundation, 40; propaganda, 1890s, 55; relations with Young Turks, 92; Sahara, 1890s, 79; WWI, 90
Scelles, Jean, 20, 116, 182
Scelles-Millie, Jeanne, 116, 182
Science: compatibility with Islam, 61, 136–37; Hailey's Comet, 83; Adlène Hicheur at CERN, 167; response to wildfires, 1880s, 72; study of in colonial Algeria, 52. *See also* Bennabi, Malik; Jaza'iri, Tahir al-
Scouts: Algerian Youth, 117; girls, 132; L'arbi Kechat, 155
Seddik, Ta'uti, 168
Selim III, Sultan, 26, 35–36, 38
Separation of religion and state: control of mosques, 117–18; expropriation of *waqf* endowments, 1843, 53; fund raising for mosque construction, 110; historical perspective, 21–23;

Islam in France, 154; law of 1905 and its application, 66, 180; post-independence Algeria, 129
September 11, 2001, 159
Setif: Bu Talib family, 63; *hijra*, 1911, 86; Dr. Smati, 119; uprising May 1945, 124
Shaler, William, 45, 48–49
Shamil, Imam, 51–52
Sharif, Salah: anti-French propaganda, 104, 106; founder of Algerian-Tunisian Brotherhood, 62, 91; role in Tripoli war, 1912, 89
Sharifian flag, 95, 97
Slavery: abolition, 44, 48, 198n81; Western Mediterranean, 1400s–1700s, 8, 14. *See also* Daghies, Hasuna; Pananti, Filippo; Smith, Sir Sidney
Slave trade: role of Tripoli, 1830s, 45
Smati, Dr.'Abd al-Qadir, 119
Smith, Sir Sidney, 42–43, 48
Société des Habous et des Lieux Saints, 102
Spain: attack on Algiers, 1775, 28; attack of 1783–84, 30; *convivencia*, 7, 71; expulsion of Muslims, 8; nostalgia for al-Andalus, 71; truce with Algiers, 1786, 30
Suez Canal, 59
Switzerland: Algerian refugees, 165–67; expulsion of Ahmad Zaoui, 170
Syria: Algerian refugees, 54, 86; autonomy within Ottoman Empire, 94; Islamists, 155–56

Tahar Khodja, 44
Taqiyya (outward acceptance, inward resistance), 8
Tazerout, Mohand, 20, 106
Tebessa: Bennabi, 133; Bin Hamana school, 84
Terrorism, 141–43
Tessier, Henri, 170
Theater: Algerian National Theater, 143; 'Abd al-Qadir Alloula, 153; as center of civic events, 112, 114; M'hammed Benguettaf, 153; Ahmad Rida Huhu plays, 131–32; Bashir Ibrahimi as playwright, 123; in interwar Algeria, 18, 111; Nadia Kaci, 153; Kateb Yasin, 152; *Karagöz*, 18; *Montréal la blanche*, 163, 184
Thunayyan, Iffat al-, 131
Tibhirine Monastery, 148–49
Tijani, Ahmad al-, 39–40
Tijaniyya Sufi order: founding, 39–40; political role in Annaba, 1948, 118
Tirailleurs indigènes (native riflemen): Crimean War, 76–77, 179; disrespect for authority, 86; recruitment, 68
Tizi Ouzou mosque construction, 204n107
Tlemcen: Abu Madyan tomb, 116; *hijra* of 1911–12, 86; Bashir Ibrahimi, 122; Kulughlis, 16, 56
Torture, 20
Toynbee, Arnold, 5
Transitional eras: Arab spring, 2010–, 187; since 18th century, 176, 182–83; 1820s, 14
Tripoli: Algerian refugees, 54, 75–76, 84
Tripoli Treaty: Christian nation clause, 37–38, 197n46
Tunis: Algerian migrants and refugees, 52–55; reformist-traditionalist debates, 88
Turkey: Justice and Development Party (AKP), 178–79

'Ulama, Association of: founding, 122; schools, 22; separation of religion and state, 117–19. *See also* Bin Badis,'Abd al-Hamid; Ibrahimi, Muhammad al-Bashir; 'Uqbi, Tayyib al-
'Umar, Amir (son of Amir'Abd al-Qadir): execution, May 1916, 94–95; work with Christian communities in Palestine, 92
Union Démocratique Musulman Algérien (UDMA), 126
Union des Croyants Monothéistes, 115
Union for the Medeterranean, 141
United States–Algeria relations: Barbary Wars, 33–35; civil war, 1990s, 147–48; Operation Torch, 1942, 123
United States–Ottoman Empire relations, 99
Universal League, 48
'Uqbi, Tayyib al-: dialogue with Catholics, 115–16; trip to Jerusalem, 1950, 116
Urbain, Ismail, 16

Veil and Islamic dress: 1568 Spanish decree, 7; 2004 French law, 13
Vichy France, 135
Vienna, Congress of, 1815, 43–44
Violette, Maurice, 134–35
Virginia: Algerian travelers, 1785, 31
Von Oppenheim, Max, 89

Waqf endowments: Abu Madyan *waqf*, Jerusalem, 116; campaign for recovery in Algeria, 13, 126; expropriation by French, 1843, 53
Wartilani, Fudayl al-: conflict with FLN, 128; in Middle East, East Asia, 126–27; work for 'Ulama in France, 122–23, 134

Wilson, President Woodrow: Bash Hanba's appeal for Algerian-Tunisian state, 91
Wolf, John, 33, 196n48
Women: 'Abd al-Qadir family, 58, 60, 63; divorce law, 63; employment, 110; Ottoman Algeria, 34; marriage ties, 35; music, 114; public roles, 179. *See also* 'Abid, Naziq al-; Chaulet, Anne-Marie; Dan Fodio, Asma'u; Desrayaux, Jeanne; Kaci, Nadia; Messaoudi, Khalida; Rimitti, Shaikha; Scelles-Millie, Jeanne; Thunayyan, Iffat al-
World Congress of Peace, Paris, 1949, 132

Ya Allah, 114
Yacin, Kateb. *See* Kateb Yacin
Yafil, Edmond, 113
Yemen, 126
Youth socialization, 105, 155
Yusuf, Salah, 62
Yusuf Bey of Tripoli, 38

Zabbushi, 'Abdullah, 41
Zahhar, al-Hajj Ahmad al-Sharif al-: Memoirs, 26–27, 34, 36, 40, 195n4, 198n67; return from exile, 54; son 'Ali, 78
Zaoui, Ahmad: education, 170; involvement in politics, 170; in New Zealand, 2–3, 171–73, 183
Zaytuna University, 88
Zohrab, Mary, 57
Zuwawa: military service in Ottoman Syria, 61, 80; ties to 'Abd al-Qadir, 54
Zuwawi, Abu Ya'la, 79–80, 113
Zuwawi, Ahmad, 55, 101

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